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Abstract	  	  	  The	  sovereign	  debt-­‐crises	  that	  recently	  unfolded	  in	  Europe	  highlight	  how	  incompletely	  we	  understand	  why	  prosperous	  developed	  countries	  persistently	  accumulate	  debt	  even	  in	   the	   face	   of	   risk	   of	   fiscal	   turmoil.	   Scholarly	   research	   explored	   why	   countries	   run	  deficits,	  but	  it	  remains	  unexplained	  why	  countries	  fail	  to	  put	  their	  fiscal	  houses	  in	  order	  once	  public	  debt	  reaches	  potentially	  dangerous	  proportions.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   key	   to	   the	   problem	  of	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	   is	   the	  lack	  of	  compromise	  among	  powerful	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  within	  the	  polity	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  necessary	  fiscal	  sacrifices.	  As	  long	  as	  each	  group	  finds	  it	  expedient	  to	  resist	  spending	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases	  that	  place	  part	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  consolidation	  on	  its	   members,	   stabilization	   is	   delayed	   and	   debt	   is	   allowed	   to	   grow.	   The	   readiness	   of	  groups	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  and	  accept	  a	  share	  of	  the	  fiscal	  pain	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  economic	   harm	   each	   suffers	   from	   the	   side-­‐effects	   of	   fiscal	   imbalances,	   such	   as	   high	  inflation	  or	  declining	  international	  competitiveness.	  Therefore,	  the	  insulation	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  actors	  from	  such	  side-­‐effects	  delays	  stabilization.	  This	  perspective	  sheds	  new	  light	  on	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  EMU-­‐membership.	  	  This	  explanation	   is	  couched	   in	  a	  society-­‐centred	  analysis	  of	  policy	  making.	  The	   thesis	  identifies	   coalitions	   of	   societal	   interest	   to	   explain	   policy	   choices,	   along	   the	   lines	   laid	  down	   in	  Gourevitch’s	  Politics	   in	  Hard	  Times	   (1986)	   and	   it	   uses	  Alesina	   and	  Drazen’s	  (1991)	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  of	  delayed	  stabilization	  to	  analyse	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  for	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   of	   resisting	   fiscal	   pain.	   Using	   this	   approach,	   it	   provides	  theoretically	   guided	   historical	   analyses	   of	   Belgium’s	   and	   Italy’s	   experiences	   with	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  the	  1980s,	  consolidation	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  mixed	  results	  in	  the	  2000s,	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  interests	  of	  societal	  groups	  shaped	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	   policy-­‐making	   and	   investigating	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   EMU	   accession	   on	   fiscal	  outcomes.	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Chapter	  1.	  Introduction:	  The	  politics	  of	  excessive	  indebtedness	  	  	  Why	   do	   some	   countries	   flirt	   with	   fiscal	   disaster?	   Why	   do	   prosperous,	   advanced	  industrial	   states	   with	   democratic	   governments	   and	   reasonably	   well-­‐organized	  bureaucracies	   keep	   borrowing	   in	   a	   time	   of	   peace	   and	   prosperity	   until	   they	   become	  excessively	   vulnerable	   to	   changing	   conditions	   in	   financial	   markets?	   The	   practical	  relevance	  of	  this	  question	  hardly	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasized	  today	  when	  a	  series	  of	  debt	  crises	  unfolds	  in	  Europe	  in	  front	  of	  our	  eyes.	  Several	  developed	  countries	  are	  currently	  struggling	   to	   secure	   financing	   to	   keep	   their	   state	   machineries	   going.	   Some	   of	   them	  would	  have	  already	  defaulted	  on	  their	  sovereign	  obligations,	  had	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  and	  the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  not	  come	  to	   their	  rescue.	  Even	  after	  receiving	  large	  bailouts	  on	  strict	  fiscal	  conditions,	  their	  situation	  is	  still	  precarious.	  The	  troubled	  countries’	   fiscal	  woes	   serve	  as	  a	   reminder	  of	   the	   risks	  entailed	   in	  persistent	  fiscal	   imbalances	   and	   the	   steady	  accumulation	  of	  debt,	  which	  becomes	  a	   ticking	   time	  bomb	  waiting	  to	  detonate	  if	  markets	  lose	  their	  nerve.	  	  	  Greece,	  Portugal	   and	  Hungary	  were	  all	   forced	   to	  ask	   for	  multiple	  bailouts	   in	   the	  past	  two	  years.	  Italy	  has	  not	  needed	  urgent	  external	  help	  yet,	  but	  its	  situation	  is	  extremely	  fragile1.	   All	   of	   these	   countries	   had	   repeatedly	   been	   alerted	   to	   the	   risks	   generated	   by	  their	  fiscal	  policies	  as	  they	  got	  progressively	  mired	  in	  debt	  in	  the	  past	  decades.	  In	  the	  wake	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	   global	   economic	   downturn,	   these	   risks	   suddenly	  materialized.	  The	  question	  is	  why	  and	  how	  these	  prosperous	  European	  states	  ended	  up	  in	  such	  difficult	   fiscal	  positions	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  major	  wars	  or	  economic	  cataclysms.	  Other	  countries	  that	  recently	  availed	  themselves	  of	  external	  financial	  help	  (like	  Ireland)	  or	  may	  do	   so	   in	   the	  near	   future	   (like	   Spain)	   are	  unlike	   these	   states	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  their	   fiscal	   disaster	   struck	   as	   a	   bolt	   from	   the	   blue	   due	   to	   imbalances	   in	   their	   private	  sectors	  despite	   a	   sound	   fiscal	   track	   record2.	   In	   these	   latter	   cases,	   the	   role	  of	   external	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Most	  recently,	  the	  Italian	  government	  has	  attempted	  to	  secure	  a	  quasi-­‐bailout	  from	  China	  by	  negotiating	  a	  deal	  with	  Chinese	  sovereign	  wealth	  funds.	  (See	  “Italy	  turns	  to	  China	  for	  help	  in	  debt	  crisis”	  Financial	  Times,	  September	  12,	  2011.)	  2	   In	   Ireland,	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   government	   to	   prop	   up	   the	   ailing	   Irish	   banking	   sector	   led	   to	   an	   extreme	  increase	  of	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  within	  a	  very	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  Between	  2007	  and	  2010,	  it	  grew	  from	  25	  per	  cent	  to	  96	  per	  cent.	  In	  November	  2010,	  the	  government	  was	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  IMF	  for	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forces	  in	  wreaking	  havoc	  in	  public	  finances	  is	  evident.	  The	  puzzle	  here	  is	  why	  the	  first	  group	  of	  countries	  allowed	  debt	  to	  gradually	  build	  up	  throughout	  the	  past	  decades	  and	  why	  they	  did	  little	  to	  mitigate	  the	  extreme	  vulnerability	  their	  high	  debts	  would	  create	  in	   periods	   of	   economic	   and	   financial	   turbulence.	   The	   role	   of	   past	   fiscal	   policies	   in	  generating	   exposure	   to	   changing	   market	   sentiments	   seems	   to	   be	   confirmed	   by	  Belgium’s	   experience	   in	   the	   present	   crisis.	   Despite	   having	   a	   history	   of	   fiscal	   troubles	  and	   being	   similarly	   heavily	   indebted	   as	   Greece	   or	   Italy,	   Belgium	   has	   so	   far	   fared	  considerably	  better	  than	  these	  countries.	  Its	  insistence	  on	  fiscal	  rigour	  and	  its	  success	  in	   steadily	   decreasing	   its	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   in	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   has	   likely	  contributed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   country	   has	   been	   spared	   of	   the	   latest	   episodes	   of	  turmoil	   in	   the	   sovereign	   debt	  markets,	   even	   despite	   the	  manifest	   political	   instability	  that	  beset	  the	  country	  in	  the	  recent	  years.	  	  While	   the	   fiscal	  disaster	  now	  engulfing	  ever	  more	  European	  countries	   is	  a	  shock	   that	  has	   been	   unprecedented	   since	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   the	   underlying	   problem	   is	  nothing	   new.	   It	   has	   been	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   attention	   for	   decades	   now.	   “Fiscal	  discipline”	   (or	   rather,	   the	   lack	   of	   it)	   has	   been	   a	   dominant	   theme	   in	   European	   policy	  discourse	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  due	  to	  the	  constantly	  increasing	  rate	  of	   indebtedness	  of	   many	   countries	   and	   due	   to	   the	   tying	   together	   of	   the	   fates	   of	   countries	   in	   the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  (EMU).	  The	  adoption	  of	  fiscal	  criteria	  for	  EMU-­‐accession	  in	   the	  Treaty	  of	   the	  European	  Union	   in	  1991	  amounted	   to	  an	  official	  declaration	   that	  certain	   member	   states	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   pursue	   budgetary	   policies	   that	   make	  them	   too	   much	   of	   a	   potential	   liability	   to	   be	   included	   in	   monetary	   integration.	   Since	  then,	  repeated	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  create	  a	  system	  of	  rules,	  surveillance	  and	  sanctions	  that	  effectively	  forces	  member	  states	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  fiscal	  imbalances.	  	  	  These	  endeavours	  seem	  to	  have	  made	  little	  difference	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  countries	  with	   grave	   fiscal	   problems,	   even	   though	   they	   voluntarily	   signed	  up	   to	   these	   schemes	  and	   repeatedly	   committed	   to	   correction	   programmes	   and	   deadlines.	   Despite	   initial	  compliance	  with	  the	  Maastricht	  treaty,	  Italy	  was	  in	  excessive	  deficit	  for	  five	  years	  and	  Portugal	  for	  seven	  years	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  In	  Greece’s	  case,	  even	  the	  apparent	  initial	  compliance	  with	  the	  rules	  has	  been	  discredited	  by	  subsequent	  audits	  of	   the	  country’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  bailout	  package	  as	  financing	  from	  the	  financial	  markets	  dried	  up.	  (See	  “Ireland	  Gets	  $113	  Billion	  Bailout	  as	  EU	  Ministers	  Seek	  to	  Halt	  Debt	  Crisis”	  Bloomberg,	  November	  29,	  2010).	  	  In	  Spain,	   the	  sharp	  end	  to	  the	  housing	  boom	  put	  great	  stress	  on	  the	   financial	  sector	  as	  well	  as	  on	  public	  finances	  and	  many	  observers	  expect	  the	  country	  to	  need	  external	  help	  soon.	  (See	  “Portugal	  bailout:	  Spain	  could	   be	   the	   next	   to	   fall”	   The	   Guardian,	   April	   7,	   2011	   or	   	   “Spain	   PM	   told	   unions	   country	   was	   close	   to	  bailout”	  Reuters,	  September	  6,	  2011)	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fiscal	   figures.	  Hungary	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  correct	   its	  excessive	  deficit	  and	  to	  fulfil	   the	  criteria	   for	   joining	   the	   common	   currency	   ever	   since	   it	   acceded	   to	   the	   EU	   in	   2004.	  Belgium	   and	   Spain	   were	   exceptional	   among	   countries	   with	   long-­‐standing	   fiscal	  troubles	   in	   firmly	  maintaining	   the	   improvements	   they	   had	   achieved	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	  the	  euro.	  The	  poor	  performance	  of	  the	  other	  fiscally	  troubled	  countries	  seems	  to	  have	  been	   impervious	   to	   the	   European	   attempt	   at	   institutionalizing	   fiscal	   discipline.	   The	  limited	  success	  of	  the	  European	  efforts	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  mounting	  of	  debt	  in	  most	  member	   states	   further	   underlines	   the	   puzzling	   stubbornness	   of	   the	   problem.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	   the	   improvement	  of	   the	   fiscal	  performance	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  countries	  since	  the	   introduction	   of	   the	   European	   fiscal	   surveillance	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   ways	   to	  address	  even	  deeply	  entrenched	  fiscal	  troubles,	  adding	  to	  the	  intricacy	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  Excessive	  indebtedness	  –	  besides	  being	  a	  burning	  practical	  problem	  –	  also	  represents	  a	  major	   theoretical	   puzzle.	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   resolving	   this	   puzzle	   requires	   an	  approach	  that	  substantially	  differs	  from	  earlier	  ways	  of	  studying	  fiscal	  policy	  making.	  It	  proposes	   a	   theory	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   of	   fiscal	   decisions	   and	  explains	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	   by	   analysing	   the	   policy	   preferences	   and	   the	  sources	   of	   policy	   influence	   of	   different	   groups	   within	   society,	   whereas	   existing	  literature	  on	  fiscal	  performance	  mostly	  concentrates	  on	  the	   institutional	  environment	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making,	  	  This	   introductory	   chapter	   is	   aimed	   at	   specifying	   the	   theoretical	   puzzle	   and	  placing	   it	  into	  the	  context	  of	  past	  research	  on	  fiscal	  policy	  making.	  The	  next	  section	  explains	  why	  the	   issue	   of	   excessive	   debt	   is	   theoretically	   puzzling.	   It	   contends	   that	   it	   is	   far	   from	  obvious	  why	  policy	  makers	  would	  keep	  borrowing	  when	  the	  outstanding	  debt	  stock	  is	  relatively	   high	   or	   why	   the	   electorate	   would	   tolerate	   such	   policies	   in	   view	   of	   the	  disproportionately	  high	  costs	  and	  risks	  of	  further	  debt	  accumulation	  beyond	  a	  certain	  level.	  The	  third	  section	  reviews	  the	  existing	  rich	  literature	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  fiscal	  performance,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  puzzle	  of	  dangerous	  debt	  accumulation	  remains	  in	  a	  blind	  spot	  for	  theories	  that	  aim	  at	  explaining	  general	  cross-­‐national	  and	  cross-­‐temporal	  variation	   in	   fiscal	   outcomes.	   While	   these	   theories	   provide	   several	   reasons	   why	  governments	  might	  fail	  to	  stay	  within	  their	  budgetary	  limits	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  other,	  they	   do	   not	   address	   the	   issue	   why	   governments	   do	   not	   stop	   borrowing	   once	   the	  cumulative	  effects	  of	  deficits	  –	  the	  escalating	  risks	  and	  the	  growing	  costs	  of	  debt	  –	  start	  to	  make	  persistent	  borrowing	   truly	  deleterious.	   It	   is	   this	   latter	  question	   this	   thesis	   is	  interested	   in.	   Therefore,	   the	   last	   section	   concludes	   by	   proposing	   a	   new	   approach	   to	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studying	   fiscal	   policy-­‐making	   that	   focuses	   on	   societal	   constraints	   on	   policy	   makers’	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  radical	  adjustment	  in	  the	  policy	  course	  in	  order	  to	  break	  the	  inertial	  forces	  driving	  debt	  growth	  and	  reduce	  the	  increasing	  risks.	  It	  also	  lays	  out	  the	  plan	  for	  developing	  and	  evaluating	  such	  a	  theory	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
The	  puzzle	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation	  	  	  Beyond	   its	   immediate	  practical	  relevance,	   the	   issue	  of	  enduring	   fiscal	   imbalances	  and	  excessive	   borrowing	   is	   fascinating	   from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective,	   too.	   It	   is	   puzzling	  why	   excessive	   deficits	   are	   allowed	   to	   persist.	   High	   and	   growing	   debt	   constrains	  governments’	   room	   for	   manoeuvre	   in	   managing	   the	   economy,	   it	   potentially	   retards	  growth	   and	   undermines	   price	   stability3	   and	   it	   gives	   rise	   to	   abruptly	   and	   swiftly	  increasing	   risks.	   It	   exposes	   countries	   to	   unpredictable	   and	   uncontrollable	  developments	  on	  the	   financial	  markets,	  by	  making	  them	  highly	  vulnerable	   to	  changes	  in	   interest	   rates	  and	   investor	   sentiments.	  Debt	  also	  entails	   risks	  of	  major	  economic	  –	  and	  potentially	  social	  and	  political	  –	  disruptions	   if	   investor	  confidence	  wanes	  and	  the	  country	   is	   forced	   to	   default	   on	   its	   obligations.	   Finally,	   even	   if	   the	   worst	   scenario	   is	  avoided,	   a	   high	   outstanding	   debt	   stock	   and	   a	   large	   interest	   burden	   foreshadow	   ever	  more	   painful	   adjustments	   in	   the	   future.	   Therefore,	   the	   premise	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	  continued	  borrowing	   in	   the	   face	  of	   these	   costs	   and	   risks	   is	   an	  anomaly	  waiting	   to	  be	  explained.	  	  	  This	  point	  of	  departure	  differs	  from	  the	  commonly	  held	  approach	  to	  public	  borrowing	  and	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	   political	   economy.	   The	   lack	   of	   corrective	   action	   to	   stem	  deficits	   is	   often	   considered	   rational,	   because	   borrowing	   is	   associated	   with	   political	  benefits,	  whereas	   the	   political	   costs	   of	   fiscal	   tightening	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   very	   high.	  There	   are,	   however,	   both	   empirical	   and	   theoretical	   reasons	   to	   depart	   from	   these	  assumptions,	  especially	  when	  indebtedness	  has	  already	  reached	  proportions	  that	  make	  the	  risks	  and	  costs	  of	  further	  borrowing	  more	  pronounced.	  In	  empirically	  investigating	  what	   they	   call	   the	   “textbook	   view”	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization,	  Alesina,	  Perotti	  and	  Tavares	  (1998)	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  governments	  that	  carry	  out	  fiscal	   tightening	   suffer	   a	   fall	   in	  popularity	  or	   are	  penalized	  at	   the	  ballot	  box.	   In	   some	  cases,	   there	   is	   even	   evidence	   of	   an	   electoral	   reward	   for	   consolidation.	   Similarly,	  Brender	  and	  Drazen	  (2008)	  find	  across	  a	  large	  sample	  of	  countries	  that	  deficits	  do	  not	  help	   incumbents	   to	   stay	   in	   power.	   In	   fact,	   they	   find	   that	   deficits	   reduce	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  a	  large	  debt	  stock	  on	  growth	  and	  inflation,	  see	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  (2010).	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government’s	   chance	   to	   be	   re-­‐elected.	   These	   results	   confirm	   the	   insights	   of	   earlier	  studies	  conducted	  on	  smaller	  samples4.	  	  	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   identify	  several	  strong	   incentives	  that	  could	   induce	   policy	  makers	   to	   adjust	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   close	   the	   fiscal	   gap	   as	   soon	   as	  possible	  once	  debt	  accumulation	  starts	  to	  reel	  out	  of	  control.	  First,	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  default	  are	  massive	  in	  political	  terms,	  if	  the	  blame	  for	  it	  is	  attributed	  to	  a	  given	  political	  force.	  Second,	  even	  if	  explicit	  default	  can	  be	  avoided,	  a	  debt	  crisis	  triggers	  immensely	  difficult	  policy	  problems	  that	  the	  government	  in	  power	  will	  need	  to	  deal	  with.	  Third,	  even	  when	  a	  debt	  crisis	  is	  not	  yet	  imminent,	  a	  grave	  fiscal	  problem	  is	  likely	  to	  receive	  considerable	  public	  attention	  and	  its	  handling	  becomes	  an	  important	  issue	  on	  which	  policy	  makers’	  performance	   is	  evaluated.	  Fourth,	  delay	   in	   the	   inevitable	  stabilization	   is	  only	   likely	   to	  make	   things	   worse,	   escalate	   the	   pressure	   on	   public	   finances	   and	   face	   policy	  makers	  with	  an	  ever	  more	  daunting	  task	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  Hence,	  policy	  makers	  –	  ministers,	  parties	   in	   the	   government	   or	   individual	   political	   personalities	   –	   with	   reasonable	  chances	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  political	  race	  for	  future	  government	  positions	  should	  feel	  under	  great	  and	  increasing	  pressure	  to	  stop	  the	  escalation	  of	  debt.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	   puzzling	   why	   policy	   makers	   who	   allow	   an	   alarmingly	   large	   debt	  stock	   to	   grow	   further	   get	   away	   with	   pursuing	   such	   a	   dangerous	   policy	   course	  electorally.	  Why	  the	  public	  would	  care	  about	  looming	  fiscal	  disaster	  and	  penalize	  policy	  makers	  who	  fail	   to	  deal	  with	  the	  threat	  goes	  without	  saying.	   It	   is	  an	  open	  question	  to	  what	   extent	   the	   electorate	   in	   different	   countries	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   risks.	   However,	   the	  example	  of	   the	   last	  British	  elections	  shows	  that	   the	  promise	   to	  stave	  off	  an	   imminent	  fiscal	   spiral	   and	   prevent	   a	   perceived	   crisis	   can	   be	   a	   very	   powerful	   political	  message.	  Therefore,	  it	   is	  likely	  that	  in	  countries	  with	  sizeable	  fiscal	  problems,	  political	  forces	  in	  opposition	  should	   find	   it	  useful	   to	  educate	   the	  public	  about	   the	   risks	  of	   the	  country’s	  debt	  and	  campaign	  on	  the	  pledge	  of	  solving	  the	  issue.	  Even	  in	  countries	  where	  debt	  has	  accumulated	  over	  the	  decades	  –	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  frightening	  surge	  as	  in	  Britain	  recently	  –	  the	  public	  seems	  to	  attach	  high	  significance	  to	  the	  state	  of	  public	  finances.	  The	  2006	  riots	  and	  waves	  of	  demonstrations	  in	  Hungary	  revealed	  immense	  public	  anger	  over	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  debt	  position5.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  opposition	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  debt	  as	  a	   campaign	   issue,	   but	   the	   confession	   about	   the	   real	   state	   of	   public	   finances	   led	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  for	  example	  Peltzman	  (1992)	  and	  Kraemer	  (1997)	  5	  Admittedly,	  the	  public	  mood	  was	  made	  no	  brighter	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  prime	  minister	  himself	  said	  in	  a	  private	  but	  secretly	  taped	  and	  subsequently	  leaked	  conversation	  that	  he	  and	  his	  government	  “lied	  morning	  noon	   and	   night”	   about	   the	   country’s	   fiscal	   situation	   during	   his	   previous	   term	   in	   office.	   (See	   “Hungary	  parliament	  condemns	  riots”	  BBC.co.uk	  September	  19,	  2006)	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months	   of	   demonstrations,	   long	   before	   any	   concrete	   austerity	   measures	   were	  announced.	   These	   examples	   suggest	   that	   the	   public	   does	   have	   some	   degree	   of	  awareness	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  large	  debt	  and	  is	  ready	  to	  act	  upon	  it.	  	  	  Why,	   then,	   do	   some	   countries	   expose	   themselves	   to	   the	   vagaries	   of	   financial	  market	  sentiments?	   Why	   does	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	   occur	   among	   rich,	   democratic,	  highly	   developed	   states	   –	   and	   with	   such	   relatively	   high	   frequency?	   Why	   did	   the	  European	   system	   of	   rules	   and	   surveillance	   fail	   to	   leave	   an	   imprint	   on	   the	   policies	   of	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  created	  and	  joined	  it	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  persistent	  problems?	  Why	  do	  policy	  makers	  make	  their	  own	  lives	  harder	  by	  procrastinating	  fiscal	  adjustment	  and	  why	  does	  the	  electorate	  let	  them	  continue	  to	  do	  so?	  	  	  This	  thesis	  explains	  this	  puzzle	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  societal	  conflicts	  of	   interests	   in	  the	  background	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making.	   It	   argues	   that	   since	  eliminating	  a	   large	   structural	  gap	   in	  public	   finances	   involves	  considerable	  changes	   in	   the	  existing	  arrangements	   for	  redistribution	  among	  different	  sections	  of	  society,	  understanding	  the	  delay	  or	  absence	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  requires	  exploring	  under	  what	  conditions	  the	  redistributive	  status	  
quo	   can	   be	   changed	   in	   the	   given	   polity.	   Both	   the	   actions	   of	   policy	   makers	   and	   the	  attitude	   of	   different	   sections	   of	   the	   electorate	   towards	   fiscal	   stabilization	   should	   be	  explored	   in	   light	   of	   the	   redistributive	   consequences	   of	   fiscal	   adjustment.	   Meaningful	  fiscal	  stabilization	  will	  be	  delayed	  as	  long	  as	  influential	  societal	  groups	  are	  determined	  and	  able	   to	  block	  momentous	  spending	  cuts	  and	   tax	   increases	   that	  would	  restore	   the	  balance	  of	  public	  finances	  at	  their	  expense.	  Debt	  accumulation	  will	  only	  be	  stopped	  if	  at	  least	  one	   large	  group	  within	  society	  acquiesces	   in	  or	  can	  be	   forced	   to	  accept	   taking	  a	  share	  or	  all	  of	  the	  necessary	  fiscal	  sacrifices.	   	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  thesis	  interprets	  the	  lack	  of	  stabilization	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  societal	  actors	  to	  decide	  who	  is	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  bill	  of	  painful	  adjustment.	  Until	  the	  societal	  conflict	  over	  this	  issue	  is	  resolved	  –	  either	  by	  compromise	  or	  by	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  some	  groups	  over	  the	  others	  –	  closing	  the	  fiscal	  gap	  is	  impossible	  even	  if	  policy	  makers	  in	  decision-­‐making	  position	  are	  bent	  on	  eliminating	  the	  problem.	  	  In	  other	  words,	   this	   thesis	   approaches	   the	  political	   economy	  of	   excessive	  public	  debt	  from	   a	   societal	   angle.	   It	   draws	   on	   the	   insights	   of	   Peter	   Gourevitch’s	   Politics	   in	   Hard	  Times	  (1986)	  in	  exploring	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  “politics	  of	   support	   for	   different	   economic	   policies”	   (p19).	   It	   combines	   this	   approach	   with	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen’s	  (1991)	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  of	  delayed	  fiscal	  stabilization	  in	  an	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effort	  to	  understand	  how	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  the	  necessary	  societal	  support	  can	  be	   generated	   for	   successfully	   implementing	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   fiscal	   stabilization	  programme.	  	  	  The	  next	  section	  reviews	  the	  results	  of	  existing	  scholarship	  on	  fiscal	  discipline,	  to	  show	  that	   focusing	   on	   the	   societal	   context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making	   represents	   a	   novel	  theoretical	   approach	   to	   fiscal	   performance	   and	   to	   argue	   that	   pursuing	   such	   a	   new	  direction	   is	   necessary	   to	   fully	   disentangle	   the	   conundrum	   of	   excessive	   debt	  accumulation.	   The	   existing	   literature	   concentrates	   exclusively	   on	   the	   governmental-­‐parliamentary	   sphere	   and	   locates	   the	   reasons	   for	   borrowing	   in	   the	   institutional	   and	  party-­‐political	   characteristics	   of	   fiscal	   decision-­‐making.	   It	   explores	   in	   detail	   the	  correlation	   between	   fiscal	   results	   and	   the	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   budgetary	  decisions	   are	   made,	   and	   places	   special	   emphasis	   on	   the	   institutional	   dispersion	   of	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  among	  actors	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  and	  on	  the	  way	  the	   latter	  process	   is	  structured.	  However,	  by	   investigating	  the	   factors	  behind	  public	  borrowing	  in	  general,	  the	  literature	  on	  fiscal	  discipline	  concentrates	  on	  a	  substantively	  different	   issue	   than	   the	  one	   targeted	   in	   this	   thesis.	  Therefore,	  while	   the	  insights	   of	   this	   literature	   provide	   some	   important	   clues	   for	   exploring	   the	   question	  asked	  here,	  they	  cannot	  be	  directly	  extended	  to	  explain	  why	  borrowing	  continues	  even	  when	  the	  debt	  is	  already	  large,	  because	  this	  literature	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	   strong	   motivations	   of	   policy	   makers	   for	   fiscal	   retrenchment	   that	   arise	   when	  indebtedness	  reaches	  dangerous	  proportions.	  	  	  
The	  literature:	  Fiscal	  governance	  and	  fiscal	  discipline	  	  
	  Fiscal	   imbalances	   are	   not	   a	   new	   issue.	   Especially	   from	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   1970s,	  budget	   deficits	   started	   to	   be	   a	   significant	   policy	   problem	   in	   several	   developed	  countries.	   In	   line	   with	   its	   increasing	   practical	   relevance,	   the	   question	  why	   countries	  spend	   beyond	   their	   means	   at	   times	   and	   accumulate	   debt	   has	   received	   growing	  scholarly	   attention.	   A	   wide	   range	   of	   theories	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   explain	   the	  phenomenon.	   One	   group	   of	   theories	   claim	   that	   governments	   have	   an	   interest	   in	  running	   deficits	   to	   increase	   their	   chances	   of	   re-­‐election.	   The	   public	   choice	   school,	  political	  business	  cycle	  models	  and	  electoral	  spending	  cycle	  models	  suggest	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  overspending	  can	  help	  governments	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  The	  other	  group	  of	  theories	  argue	  that	  governments	  may	  run	  deficits	  even	  without	  a	  specific	   intention	  to	   do	   so.	   They	   focus	   on	   the	   collective	   action	   issues	   entailed	   in	   democratic	   decision	  
	   16	  
making	  and	  contend	  that	  governments	  slip	  into	  borrowing	  whenever	  they	  have	  trouble	  collectively	   setting	  and	  controlling	   spending	  and	   taxation.	   Some	  of	   these	   theories	  are	  based	   on	   common	   resource	   pool	   models	   of	   public	   spending,	   others	   on	   veto	   actor	  models	  of	  governmental	  decision	  making,	  but	  they	  all	  investigate	  how	  the	  institutional	  context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making	   and	   party	   political	   factors	   influence	   the	   severity	   of	  collective	   action	   problems	   involved	   in	   deciding	   on	   the	   budget.	   This	   section	   reviews	  these	   two	   main	   branches	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   fiscal	   discipline	   in	   search	   of	   clues	   for	  understanding	  the	  puzzle	  of	  why	  some	  countries	  borrow	  until	  they	  are	  in	  the	  danger	  of	  going	  bust.	  	  
	  
Borrowing	  for	  electoral	  advantage	  	  	  Governments	   might	   be	   tempted	   to	   intentionally	   let	   expenses	   exceed	   revenues	   for	  several	   electoral	   reasons.	  The	  public	   choice	   school	   suggests	   that	   governments	   expect	  the	   electorate	   to	   appreciate	   the	   ability	   to	   consume	   more	   today	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  tomorrow.	   This	   can	   be	   the	   case	   if	   the	   electorate	   suffers	   from	   “fiscal	   illusion”	   and	   is	  therefore	  unable	  to	  recognize	  the	  costs	  that	  extra	  consumption	  in	  the	  present	  will	  have	  in	   the	   future	   (Buchanan	   and	  Wagner	   1977)	   or	   if	   it	  wants	   to	   transfer	   the	   costs	   of	   its	  present	  overconsumption	  to	  later	  generations	  (Cukierman	  and	  Meltzer	  1989).	  Political	  business	   cycle	   models	   contend	   that	   incumbent	   governments	   want	   to	   reinforce	   their	  image	  as	  competent	  managers	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  of	  public	  finances.	  They	  can	  do	  so	  by	  generating	   an	   artificial	   economic	   upswing	   via	   spending	  more	   and	   taxing	   less	   and	   by	  providing	  more	  public	  goods	  from	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  tax	  revenues	  (Nordhaus	  1975,	  Rogoff	  and	  Sibert	  1988,	  Franzese	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Finally,	  electoral	  spending	  cycle	  theories	  suggest	   that	   the	   incumbent	   political	   actors	   want	   to	   remind	   their	   supporters	   –	   and	  potential	   supporters	  –	  who	   they	   should	  vote	   for	  by	  pleasing	   them	  with	  new	   targeted	  spending	  measures	   or	   tax	   cuts	   before	   the	   elections	   (Tufte	   1978,	   Alesina	   et	   al	   1997).	  These	  motivations	  –	  on	   their	   own	  or	   in	   combination	  –	   could	  be	   strong	   forces	  behind	  borrowing.	  	  	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  electoral	  motivations	  for	  fiscal	  results	  is	  mixed.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Alesina	   et	   al.’s	   (1998)	   and	   Brender	   and	   Drazen’s	   (2008)	  results	   (quoted	   above)	   show	   that	   loose	   fiscal	   policies	   tend	   not	   to	   yield	   the	   electoral	  advantage	   that	   these	   theories	  attribute	   to	   them.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   incumbent	  policy	  makers	  might	  still	  be	  tempted	  to	  try	  their	  luck	  with	  such	  fiscal	  manipulation.	  Empirical	  work	  on	   the	  presence	  of	   electoral	   effects	  on	   fiscal	  policy	  variables	   suggests	   that	   they	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sometimes	   do.	   In	   reviewing	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   empirical	   studies,	   Alt	   and	   Rose	   (2007)	  point	   out	   that	  most	   of	   these	   studies	   find	   some	   evidence	   for	   electoral	   cycles	   in	   fiscal	  policies	  in	  different	  datasets,	  although	  the	  correlation	  between	  elections	  and	  lose	  fiscal	  policies	   seems	   to	   be	   limited	   to	   specific	   countries,	   specific	   periods	   or	   specific	   areas	  within	  fiscal	  policy.	  	  	  Despite	   the	  documented	  empirical	   relevance	  of	   these	   theories	   in	  certain	  contexts,	   the	  hypothesized	  electoral	  motivations	   for	  overspending	  or	  undertaxation	  do	  not	  help	   to	  dispel	  the	  puzzle	  of	  why	  borrowing	  continues	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rising	  costs	  and	  risks	  from	   a	   large	   outstanding	   debt	   stock.	   Opportunistic,	   office-­‐seeking	   political	   actors	   –	  individual	  policy	  makers	  as	  well	  as	  parties	  –	  with	  time	  horizons	  that	  stretch	  beyond	  the	  next	   elections	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   costs	   of	   allowing	   an	  already	  high	  debt	  stock	   to	  grow	  even	   further.	  Long-­‐term	  political	  damage	   from	  being	  associated	  with	  a	  crisis	  or	  with	  painful	  emergency	  measures	  needed	  to	  avert	  default	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  massive.	  The	  greater	  the	  chance	  that	  these	  costs	  arise	  already	  in	  the	  coming	  electoral	   term	   –	   i.e.	   the	   greater	   the	   debt	   –	   the	   stronger	   the	   incentives	   should	   be	   for	  incumbent	   policy	   makers	   to	   refrain	   from	   fiscal	   electioneering.	   Furthermore,	   the	  erosion	   of	   the	   room	   for	   policy	  manoeuvres	   to	  manage	   the	   economy	   and	   to	  maintain	  price	   stability	   foreshadows	   policy	   problems	   for	   the	   coming	   governmental	   term	   and	  therefore	   carries	   additional	   political	   costs	   for	   later	   elections.	   Finally,	   if	   one	   assumes	  that	   a	   large	   outstanding	   debt	   stock	   makes	   borrowing	   a	   salient	   policy	   issue,	   fiscal	  electioneering	   might	   backfire	   already	   in	   the	   current	   elections.	   In	   light	   of	   these	  considerations,	  the	  motivations	  of	  policy	  makers	  to	  subject	  their	  spending	  and	  taxation	  decisions	   to	   short-­‐term	   electoral	   targets	   should	   be	   progressively	   outweighed	   by	   the	  risks	   and	   costs	   of	   such	   a	   strategy	   as	   indebtedness	   reaches	   alarming	   proportions.	  Therefore,	   instead	   of	   resolving	   the	   puzzle,	   focusing	   on	   the	   electoral	   motivations	   of	  incumbent	   governments	   raises	   the	   question	   what	   forces	   can	   counterbalance	   the	  political	  risks	  entailed	  in	  continued	  deficits	  when	  the	  debt	  stock	  is	  large.	  	  	  
Borrowing	  and	  the	  intra-­governmental	  collective	  action	  problem	  	  While	  the	  above	  theories	  assumed	  that	  deficits	  are	  intentional	  and	  serve	  the	  electoral	  objectives	  of	  the	  incumbent	  political	  forces	  in	  various	  ways,	  the	  other	  significant	  group	  of	  theories	  contend	  that	  fiscal	  imbalances	  can	  also	  occur	  as	  an	  undesired	  side	  effect	  of	  collective	   decision-­‐making	   within	   the	   government	   (Grilli	   et	   al	   1991).	   Unintentional,	  undesired	   deficits	   arise	   from	   the	   collective	   action	   problem	   that	   governments	   face	   in	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trying	   to	   reconcile	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   a	   balanced	   budget	   with	   the	   particularistic	  interests	  regarding	  spending	  and	  taxation	  that	  different	  actors	  within	  the	  government	  represent.	   Deficits	   are	   a	   “residual	   source”	   of	   financing	  when	   decision	  makers	   cannot	  agree	   on	   the	   different	   spending	   items	   and	   taxes	   so	   that	   revenues	   and	   expenditure	  balance	  (Grilli	  et	  al	  1991).	  This	  reasoning	  focuses	  on	  the	  dispersion	  of	  decision-­‐making	  authority	   between	   several	   actors	   –	   ministers	   within	   the	   cabinet,	   coalition	   parties	  within	  the	  government	  and	  members	  of	  parliament	  –	  that	  are	  assumed	  to	  represent	  the	  spending	  and	  taxation	  preferences	  of	  different	  groups	  of	  voters	  or	  lobby	  groups.	  	  	  The	   collective	   action	   problem	   involved	   in	   budgetary	   decision-­‐making	   has	   been	  approached	   from	   two	   different	   angles	   in	   the	   past,	   but	   both	   approaches	   arrive	   at	  essentially	   the	   same	   conclusions.	   One	   set	   of	   theories	   investigate	   the	   question	   what	  motivates	  different	  participants	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  to	  increase	  spending	  or	  to	  cut	  taxes	  beyond	  a	  level	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  balanced	  budget.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  asks	  how	  deficits	  are	  actively	  created.	  The	  other	  approach	   looks	  at	  why	  participants	  of	   the	  policy	  making	  process	  would	  be	  against	  cutting	  spending	  or	  increasing	  taxes	  when	  the	  budget	  that	  they	  inherit	  is	  in	  deficit.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  approach	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  
passivity	  of	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  persistent	  problem.	  Consequently,	  the	  “active”	  approach	   argues	   that	   the	   public	   harm	   of	   deficits	   is	   generated	   by	   the	   pursuit	   of	  particularistic	   benefits	   (of	   higher	   spending	   and	   lower	   taxes),	   whereas	   the	   “passive”	  approach	  contends	  that	  the	  public	  good	  of	  balanced	  budget	  remains	  elusive	  because	  of	  the	   difficulties	   entailed	   in	   inflicting	   particularistic	   harm	   (spending	   cuts	   and	   tax	  increases).	  	  Common	  resource	  pool	  models	  take	  the	  “active”	  approach.	  They	  understand	  deficits	  as	  an	  externality	  problem.	  Budgetary	  processes	  may	  separate	  spending	  decisions	  from	  the	  ones	  on	  taxation,	  and	  spending	  that	  is	  specifically	  targeted	  at	  well-­‐delineable	  groups	  is	  usually	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  electorate	  as	  a	  whole,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  taxes	  or	  in	  the	  form	  of	   increasing	  public	   indebtedness.	  Therefore,	   individual	  decision	  makers	  do	  not	  fully	   internalize	   the	   costs	   of	   additional	   spending	   benefiting	   their	   voters	   and	   are	  excessively	   keen	   to	   increase	   spending	   directed	   at	   their	   constituencies.	   The	   seminal	  model	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  this	  family	  of	  models	  was	  developed	  by	  Weingast,	  Shepsle	  and	  Johnsen	  (1981)	   to	  explain	   the	  size	  of	  pork-­‐barrel	  spending	  directed	  at	  geographically	  concentrated	   interests	   in	   the	   US	   legislature.	   Von	   Hagen	   and	   Harden	   (1996)	   and	  Hallerberg	  (2004,	  2009)	  then	  applied	  this	   idea	  to	  targeted	  spending	  in	  general.	  These	  models	  do	  not	  explicitly	  investigate	  the	  revenue	  side	  of	  the	  budget	  and	  the	  incidence	  of	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taxes	   on	   different	   groups.	   In	   fact,	   they	   implicitly	   assume	   that	   taxes	   are	   general.	  Therefore,	   they	   treat	   the	   deficit	   problem	   as	   a	   spending	   control	   issue.	  However,	   their	  logic	  can	  be	  easily	  extended	  to	  tax	  cuts,	  exemptions	  and	  rebates	  which	  are	  often	  quite	  clearly	  aimed	  at	  specific	  groups	  and	  thus	  create	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  externality	  as	  targeted	  spending.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  pursuit	   of	   particularistic	   benefits	  not	  only	  bloats	  spending	  but	  also	  erodes	  revenues	  and	  can	  thus	  contribute	  to	  unwanted	  deficits	  through	  two	  channels.	  	  The	   “passive”	  approach	  concentrates	  on	   the	   conflicts	  of	   interests	   that	   arise	  when	   the	  budget	   needs	   to	   be	   adjusted	   in	   order	   to	   eliminate	   existing	   imbalances.	   Roubini	   and	  Sachs	   (1989)	   argued	   that	   even	   if	   the	   government	   aims	   at	   stabilizing	   public	   finances,	  this	   objective	  might	   be	   undermined	   if	   parties	   constituting	   the	   coalition	   try	   to	   shield	  their	   own	   constituencies	   from	   spending	   cuts	   and	   tax	   increases.	   In	   effect,	   coalition	  parties	   are	   tempted	   to	   secure	   a	   “free	   ride”	   for	   their	   own	   constituencies	   by	   vetoing	  measures	   that	   place	   part	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   consolidation	   on	   them,	   hoping	   that	   other	  retrenchment	  measures	  will	  pass	  and	  their	  voters	  can	  benefit	   from	  fiscal	  stabilization	  without	  having	  to	  contribute	  to	  it.	  If	  each	  of	  the	  parties	  takes	  an	  intransigent	  position,	  a	  prisoner’s	   dilemma	   ensues,	   and	   stabilization	   might	   not	   be	   launched	   at	   all	   in	   the	  coalition’s	  entire	  lifetime	  or	  might	  be	  insufficient,	  even	  if	  all	  of	  the	  parties	  are	  otherwise	  committed	  to	  stemming	  debt	  growth6.	  	  The	  “active”	  and	  the	  “passive”	  models	  reflect	  different	   implicit	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  budgetary	  policy	  making.	  The	  “passive”	  approach	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  inbuilt	  inertia	  of	  fiscal	  policies,	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  most	  developed	  countries	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	   budget	   is	   predetermined	   by	   laws	   and	   past	   commitments	   (Wildavsky	   and	   Caiden	  2004).	   It	   acknowledges	   that	   deficits	  might	   be	   inherited	   from	   the	   past,	   in	  which	   case	  restoring	   the	  balance	  of	  public	   finances	  requires	  active	   tightening	   in	   the	  present.	  The	  “active”	  approach,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  operates	  as	  if	  all	  items	  of	  the	  budget	  were	  subject	  to	   current	   decisions.	   Consequently,	   the	   two	   approaches	   concentrate	   on	   different	  institutional	   sources	   of	   power:	   “passive”	  models	   focus	   on	   veto	   points	   in	   the	   decision	  making	  process,	  whereas	  “active”	  approach	  is	  interested	  in	  how	  the	  budgetary	  process	  formally	   provides	   access	   of	   different	   actors	   to	   influence	  decisions7.	  However,	   despite	  these	  differences,	  the	  two	  approaches	  are	  conceptually	  identical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  both	   describe	   a	   situation	   in	  which	   the	   balance	   of	   public	   finances	   is	   the	   function	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  also	  Spolaore	  1999	  7	  See	  also	  Cox	  (2008)	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political	   agreement	   between	   representatives	   of	   particularistic	   interests	   to	   restrain	  those	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  equilibrium.	  	  In	  line	  with	  their	  conceptual	  congruence,	  the	  empirically	  observable	  implications	  of	  the	  two	  approaches	  are	  the	  same.	  These	  concern	  institutional	  and	  party-­‐political	  aspects	  of	  decision-­‐making	  that	  determine	  both	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  collective	  action	  issue	  and	  the	  available	  mechanisms	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  First,	  institutional	  settings	  that	  disperse	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  over	  fiscal	  matters	  among	  a	  large	  number	  of	  actors	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  associated	   with	   greater	   difficulties	   in	   maintaining	   or	   restoring	   budgetary	   discipline	  (Roubini	   and	   Sachs	   1989,	   Grilli	   et	   al.	   1991,	   Alesina	   and	   Perotti	   1996).	   Second,	  institutional	   mechanisms	   that	   foster	   coordination	   between	   the	   different	   actors	   and	  provide	   incentives	  and	  constraints	   that	  help	   them	  to	  overcome	   their	   collective	  action	  problems	  are	  expected	  to	  lead	  to	  better	  budgetary	  results	  (von	  Hagen	  1991,	  von	  Hagen	  and	   Harden	   1994,	   Hallerberg	   and	   von	   Hagen	   1997).	   Third,	   party-­‐political	   factors	  influence	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   different	   actors	  with	  access	   to	   the	   decision	   making	   process.	   Consequently,	   they	   determine	   the	   likelihood	  that	   these	   actors	   reach	   compromises	   over	   how	   to	   fit	   their	   spending	   and	   taxation	  priorities	   into	   a	   balanced	   budget.	   Countries	   where	   the	   party	   system	   exhibits	   large	  polarization	   between	   powerful	   parties	   or	   party-­‐blocs	   are	   expected	   to	   suffer	   from	  greater	  fiscal	   imbalances	  (Balassone	  and	  Giordano	  2001,	  Hallerberg	  2004,	  Hallerberg,	  Strauch	  and	  von	  Hagen	  2009).	  	  These	   predictions	   of	   the	   theoretical	   approach	   focusing	   on	   intra-­‐governmental	  collective-­‐action	   issues	   provide	   promising	   clues	   for	   resolving	   the	   puzzle	   of	   why	  countries	  might	  fail	  to	  balance	  their	  budgets	  even	  when	  further	  borrowing	  is	  risky	  and	  costly.	   In	   countries	   where	   the	   budgetary	   decision-­‐making	   process	   is	   excessively	  fragmented,	  intra-­‐governmental	  coordination	  mechanisms	  are	  missing	  and/or	  political	  polarization	   among	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   policy	   making	   process	   is	   significant,	  governments	  are	  expected	  to	  face	  especially	  great	  challenges	  in	  remaining	  within	  their	  budgetary	   limits.	   These	   challenges	  might	   frustrate	   efforts	   to	   stem	   debt	   growth	   even	  when	   indebtedness	   reaches	   alarming	   proportions.	   The	   rest	   of	   this	   section	   reviews	  studies	  focusing	  on	  the	  institutional	  and	  party-­‐political	  aspects	  of	  the	  collective-­‐action	  problem	  entailed	  in	  budgetary	  decision	  making	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  these	  aspects	  can	  explain	  the	  puzzle	  investigated	  here.	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Intra-­governmental	  decision-­making	  and	  institutions	  	  The	   institutional	   implications	   of	   the	   collective-­‐action	   models	   have	   been	   thoroughly	  explored	  empirically.	  One	  group	  of	  such	  studies8	  investigate	  how	  electoral	  institutions	  affect	   fiscal	   outcomes.	   Electoral	   institutions	   are	   expected	   to	   influence	   the	   severity	   of	  the	   collective	   action	   problem	   through	   determining	   the	   dispersion	   of	   policy-­‐making	  power	   among	   different	   party-­‐political	   actors.	   Roubini	   and	   Sachs	   (1989),	   Grilli	   et	   al.	  (1991),	   Alesina	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   find	   that	   countries	   that	   have	   proportional	   electoral	  systems	   –	   and	   that	   are,	   therefore,	   governed	   by	  multiparty	   governments	   most	   of	   the	  time	   –	   are	   likelier	   to	   run	   deficits	   and	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   successfully	  consolidate	  the	  budget	  after	  a	  shock	  to	  public	   finances.	  Padovano	  and	  Venturi	  (2000)	  and	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano	   (2001)	   also	   claim	   that	   government	   fragmentation	   –	  measured	   by	   the	   number	   of	   parties	   in	   the	   governing	   coalition	   –	   seems	   to	   be	   the	  strongest	  factor	  behind	  debt	  accumulation.	  	  	  Other	   studies9	   explored	   the	   fiscal	   effects	   of	   specific	   rules	   regulating	   the	   budgetary	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  itself10.	  Some	  budgetary	  institutional	  features	  –	  for	  example	  hierarchical	   decision-­‐making	   between	   different	   levels	   of	   government	   or	   the	  centralization	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  strong	  finance	  minister	  –	  determine	  the	   spread	   of	   decision-­‐making	   authority	   among	   different	   office	   holders	   and	   different	  entities	   (such	   as	   different	  ministers	  within	   the	   cabinet,	   between	   the	   cabinet	   and	   the	  parliament,	  among	  parliamentary	  committees	  etc.).	  Other	  features	  –	  such	  as	  spending	  and	   deficit	   rules	   or	   commitments	   to	   budgetary	   targets	   etc.	   –	   provide	  mechanisms	   to	  overcome	   the	   collective	   action	   issue.	   The	   empirical	   results	   show	   that	   limiting	   the	  dispersion	   of	   power	   between	   decision	   makers	   by	   procedural	   regulations	   improves	  budgetary	  outcomes	   (e.g.	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  1996,	  Hallerberg	  and	  von	  Hagen	  1997).	  Truly	  binding	  spending	  and	  deficit	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  fiscal	  targets	  and	  credible	  penalties	  for	   defection	   from	   pre-­‐agreed	   objectives	   are	   also	   associated	   with	   better	   fiscal	  performance	  (e.g.	  Hallerberg	  and	  von	  Hagen	  1997,	  Hallerberg	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   Roubini	   and	   Sachs	   (1989),	   Grilli	   et	   al.	   (1991),	   Alesina	   et	   al.	   (1998),	   Padovano	   and	   Venturi	   (2000),	  Balassone	  and	  Giordano	  (2001)	  9	   Von	   Hagen	   and	   Harden	   (1996),	   Hallerberg	   and	   von	   Hagen	   (1997),	   Perotti	   and	   Kontopoulos	   (2002),	  Hallerberg	  (2004),	  Lagona	  and	  Padovano	  (2007),	  Hallerberg	  and	  Yllaoutinen	  (2008),	  Hallerberg,	  Strauch	  and	  von	  Hagen	  (2009).	  10	   For	   a	   comprehensive	   list	   of	   the	   possible	   institutional	   factors	   that	   can	   come	   into	   consideration,	   see	  Lagona	  and	  Padovano	  (2007).	  
	   22	  
These	  results	  strongly	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  institutions	  –	  both	  electoral	  and	  budgetary	  –	  in	   determining	   a	   country’s	   ability	   to	   maintain	   and	   restore	   fiscal	   equilibrium.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  they	  also	  raise	  fundamental	  questions.	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  (1996),	  Poterba	  and	  von	  Hagen	   (1999)	  and	  Hallerberg	  et	   al.	   (2009)	  et	   al.	   –	   among	  others	  –	  point	  out	  that	  understanding	  why	   certain	   countries	   adopt	   certain	  budgetary	   institutions	  would	  be	  crucial	   for	  capturing	  what	   it	   is	  about	  countries	   that	  explains	   the	  great	  variation	   in	  their	   fiscal	   performance.	   Since	   certain	   budgetary	   institutions11	   have	   been	   shown	   to	  successfully	   mitigate	   the	   potential	   negative	   effects	   of	   electoral	   institutions	   on	   fiscal	  outcomes,	   it	   is	   the	   combination	   of	   the	   two	   sets	   of	   institutions	   that	  matters	   for	   fiscal	  performance.	  While	  the	  choice	  of	  electoral	  institutions	  in	  a	  given	  country	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  socio-­‐political	  and	  historical	  factors	  and	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  subjected	  completely	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   fiscal	   discipline,	   budgetary	   institutions	   can	   in	  principle	  be	  tailored	  more	  freely	  to	  improving	  the	  collective	  efficiency	  of	  policy	  making.	  The	  question	  is	  therefore	  why	  some	  countries	  forego	  the	  benefits	  of	  better	  institutions	  and	  of	  stronger	  coordination	  among	  different	  actors	  involved	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  question	  is	  especially	   important	  for	  the	  puzzle	  at	  hand	  here.	  Would	  growing	  pressure	  from	  mounting	  debt	  not	   force	   the	  actors	   involved	   in	  budgeting	   to	   find	  a	  coordination	  mechanism	   to	   overcome	   their	   collective	   action	   problem?	   If	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   limit	   the	  budgetary	   harm	   of	   collective	   decision	  making	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   rules	   and	   the	  adjustment	  of	  procedures,	  why	  would	  policy	  makers	  not	  avail	  of	  this	  option	  to	  avert	  a	  looming	  fiscal	  crisis?	  	  	  
Intra-­governmental	  decision-­making	  and	  party	  politics	  
	  The	   question	   of	   the	   endogeneity	   of	   budgetary	   institutions	   turned	   the	   attention	   of	  scholars	   to	   the	   previously	   under-­‐researched	   party-­‐political	   aspects	   of	   the	   collective	  action	  problem	  of	   fiscal	  decision-­‐making.	  Recent	   scholarship	   takes	   into	   consideration	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  present	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  forums,	  not	  just	  the	   dispersion	   of	   decision-­‐making	   authority.	   In	   answering	   the	   question	   why	   some	  countries	   have	   the	   right,	   others	   the	   wrong	   fiscal	   institutions,	   Hallerberg	   and	   others	  (2009)	  argue	   that	   the	   type	  of	  coordination	  mechanisms	  that	  policy	  makers	  can	  adopt	  depends	  strongly	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  party-­‐political	  conflict	  present	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere12.	  They	  contend	  that	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  coalition	  partners	  are	  willing	  to	  limit	  their	  own	  scope	  of	  action	  and	  to	  compromise	  their	  particularistic	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Or	  in	  Hallerberg	  et	  al.’s	  terminology	  certain	  forms	  of	  “fiscal	  governance”	  (2009,	  p	  5).	  12	  See	  also	  Hallerberg	  and	  von	  Hagen	  1997,	  Hallerberg	  2004.	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of	  a	  balanced	  budget	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  polarization	  of	  ideologies	  between	  the	  different	  parties	  and	  the	  chances	  that	  they	  will	  run	  together	  or	  against	  each	  other	  in	  subsequent	  elections.	  For	  example,	  the	  authors	  show	  that	  budgetary	  discipline	  can	  be	  enforced	  by	  a	  strong	   finance	   minister	   only	   if	   the	   government	   is	   unified,	   because	   parties	   in	   a	  heterogeneous	   coalition	   will	   not	   surrender	   control	   over	   spending	   and	   taxation	  completely	   to	   a	  minister	   from	   another	   party.	   Fragmented	   coalition	   governments	  will	  instead	   have	   to	   agree	   on	   detailed	   fiscal	   contracts	   in	   the	   coalition-­‐formation	   phase	   in	  order	   to	   commit	   themselves	   to	  a	   specific	   strategy	   that	  all	  of	   them	   find	  acceptable	   for	  achieving	  fiscal	  balance.	  Consequently,	  their	  ability	  to	  overcome	  collective	  action	  issues	  in	  budgeting	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  successfully	  negotiating	  a	  no-­‐deficit	  contract.	  	  However,	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano	   (2001)	   show	   that	   such	   a	   contract	   will	   be	  unachievable	  if	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  the	  possible	  coalition	  partners	  strongly	  differ	  and	  they	  have	  evenly	  distributed	  bargaining	  power	  (arising	  either	  from	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  a	  party	  can	  muster	  in	  the	  legislature	  or	  from	  a	  de	  facto	  veto	  connected	  to	  a	  party’s	  pivotal	  significance	  to	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  coalition).	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  might	  not	  be	  possible	   to	   put	   together	   a	   coalition	   that	   can	   agree	   on	   a	   programme	   of	   spending	   and	  taxation	  that	  ensures	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  budget,	  even	  if	   individually	  all	  the	  parties	  are	  otherwise	   keen	   on	   avoiding	   deficits.	   Furthermore,	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano	   note	   that	  even	   a	   single-­‐party	   government	   might	   be	   similarly	   unable	   to	   commit	   to	   a	   no-­‐deficit	  plan,	  if	  it	  consists	  of	  several	  strong	  factions	  with	  differing	  constituencies	  and	  divergent	  fiscal	   preferences.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	   factions	   make	   the	  delegation	  of	  authority	  to	  a	  strong	  finance	  minister	  equally	  unlikely	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  coalition	  government.	  	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  some	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  parties	  or	  policy	  makers	  might	   simply	   be	   too	   stubborn	   to	   handle	   even	   by	   negotiations	   and	   institutionalised	  commitment	  devices.	  If	  the	  different	  spending	  and	  taxation	  preferences	  represented	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  diverge	  very	  strongly,	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  compromising	  these	  interests	  and	  the	  benefit	  of	  consolidating	  public	  finances	  is	  very	  steep.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	   the	  willingness	   of	   policy	  makers	   to	   put	   the	  particularistic	   interests	   of	   their	  constituencies	   ahead	   of	   the	   goal	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization	   might	   be	   more	   than	   just	   an	  opportunistic	   impulse	   arising	   in	   the	   decentralized	   process	   of	   budget	   management,	  which	  can	  be	  reined	  in	  via	  the	  necessary	  coordination	  mechanisms.	  It	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  at	   the	   heart	   of	   policy	   makers’	   political	   strategies,	   perceived	   to	   be	   the	   key	   to	   their	  electoral	   survival.	   In	   such	   a	   situation,	   the	   adoption	   of	   budgetary	   institutions	   that	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enforce	   self-­‐restraint	   on	   the	   representatives	   of	   particularistic	   interests	   is	   unfeasible.	  Therefore,	   in	   a	   policy	   space	   populated	   by	   actors	   of	   matching	   strength	   representing	  strongly	   polarized	   interests,	   balancing	   the	   budget	   will	   be	   particularly	   hard,	   possibly	  even	  once	  debt	  accumulation	  starts	  to	  reach	  dangerous	  proportions.	  	  Furthermore,	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano’s	   observation	   about	   internally	   factionalized	  single-­‐party	   governments	   implies	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	   such	   a	   situation	   is	  independent	   of	   the	   primary	   characteristics	   of	   the	   party-­‐political	   landscape	   (such	   as	  fragmentation	  or	  concentration),	  because	  the	  same	  strong	  conflicts	  can	  arise	  within	  as	  among	   parties.	   It	   is	   the	   degree	   of	   divergence	   of	   spending	   and	   taxation	   preferences	  between	   crucial,	   electorally	   significant	   constituencies	   that	   matters,	   rather	   than	   how	  they	   are	   distributed	   among	   parties.	   Moreover,	   Hallerberg	   et	   al.’s	   (2009,	   p205-­‐208)	  results	   in	   connecting	   fiscal	   outcomes	   to	   institutions	   of	   social	   partnership	   and	   to	   the	  presence	   of	   social	   pacts	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   non-­‐party	   political	  representatives	   of	   interests	   of	   different	   constituencies	   in	   the	   policy	   making	   process.	  Their	   findings	   indicate	   that	   a	   full	   analysis	   of	   how	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	  different	   constituencies	   influence	   fiscal	   outcomes	   cannot	   stop	   at	   the	   exploration	   of	  party	   strategies,	   but	   has	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   a	   broader	   set	   of	   interest-­‐representing	   actors	   and	   the	   way	   their	   survival	   and	   success	   is	   connected	   to	   the	  protection	  of	  particularistic	  preferences.	  	  These	   results	   shed	   new	   light	   on	   the	   determinants	   of	   fiscal	   performance	   and	   suggest	  that	   the	   institutional	   factors	   that	   empirical	   studies	   found	   to	   be	   so	   closely	   correlated	  with	   fiscal	   outcomes	   might	   be	   only	   intervening	   variables	   between	   underlying	  structural	   factors	   –	   such	   as	   the	   constellation	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   of	   different	  political	   constituencies	   –	   and	   fiscal	   problems.	   The	   greater	   the	   urge	   of	   actors	   with	  significant	   influence	   on	   policy	   making	   –	   such	   as	   parties,	   factions	   within	   parties,	  possibly	   trade	   unions	   and	   employers	   organizations	   –	   to	   safeguard	   the	   strongly	  divergent	   interests	  of	   their	  constituencies,	   the	  more	  challenging	   it	   is	   to	  overcome	  the	  collective	   action	   problem	   of	   having	   to	   reconcile	   and	   restrain	   those	   interests	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  equilibrium.	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   puzzle	   at	   hand,	   these	   findings	   identify	   a	   potentially	   significant	  force	   that	   could	   drive	   governments	   –	   and	   therefore	   countries	   –	   towards	   borrowing	  even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   an	   alarmingly	   large	   debt	   stock.	   But	   does	   it	   mean	   that	   countries	  where	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   constituencies	  of	  different	  powerful	  political	   organizations	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strongly	   diverge	   are	   meant	   to	   never	   resolve	   their	   fiscal	   problems	   and	   borrow	  unflinchingly	   until	   they	   go	   bust?	   After	   all,	   political	   actors	   bent	   on	   pleasing	   their	  constituencies	  cannot	  infinitely	  ignore	  the	  accumulation	  of	  debt.	  Under	  what	  conditions	  are	   the	   costs	   and	   risks	   associated	  with	  high	   and	  growing	  debt	   likely	   to	  outweigh	   the	  collective	   action	   problem	   generated	   by	   the	   conflicts	   of	   interests?	   Conversely,	   under	  what	   conditions	   are	   the	   conflicts	   so	   strong	   that	   they	  push	   the	   country	   to	   the	   edge	  of	  fiscal	  disaster?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  that	  this	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  answer.	  	  
Conclusion	  –	  the	  neglected	  puzzle	  	  The	  general	  feature	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  fiscal	  deficits	  reviewed	  here	  is	  that	  it	  takes	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  the	  “textbook	  view”	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  fiscal	  discipline	  and	  fiscal	   stabilization.	   The	   theories	   described	   above	   only	   concentrate	   on	   the	   possible	  political	   downsides	   of	   fiscal	   rigour	   and	   fiscal	   tightening	   for	   policy	   makers.	   None	   of	  them	   take	   into	   consideration	   that	   in	   certain	   situations	   it	   is	   borrowing	   and	   fiscal	  imbalances	  –	   rather	   than	   fiscal	   restraint	  –	   that	  are	   likely	   to	  become	  ever	  more	  costly	  politically	  for	  the	  policy	  maker.	  This	  is	  equally	  true	  for	  theories	  that	  see	  borrowing	  as	  a	  conscious	  decision	  of	  the	  government	  and	  for	  ones	  that	  consider	  deficits	  an	  undesired	  side	   effect	   of	   collective	   decision-­‐making.	   Therefore,	   these	   theories	   are	   “blind”	   to	   the	  puzzle	  entailed	  in	  continued	  imbalances	  in	  the	  face	  of	  alarming	  levels	  of	  debt.	  They	  are	  interested	   in	  explaining	  the	  variation	   in	  deficits	  across	  countries	  and	  periods,	  but	  see	  nothing	  fundamentally	  puzzling	  in	  relentless	  debt	  accumulation.	  This	  “blindness”	  is	  not	  too	  surprising	  given	  the	   low	  empirical	  relevance	  of	   the	   issue	  of	  potentially	  dangerous	  indebtedness	   in	  most	  of	   the	  post-­‐war	  period.	   It	   is	  only	  recently	   that	   in	   the	  developed	  world	  fiscal	  problems	  reached	  proportions	  that	  generate	  potentially	  large	  and	  growing	  costs	  for	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  countries.	  Previously,	  the	  assumption	  that	  deficits	  are	  costless	   for	   policy	  makers	   held	   for	   the	   large	  majority	   of	   countries.	   Since	   it	   “assumes	  away”	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation	  puzzling,	  the	  existing	  literature	  does	  not	  directly	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  asked	  here.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   literature	   does	   offer	   clues	   to	   identifying	   the	   forces	   behind	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation.	  The	  next,	  concluding	  section	  proposes	  a	  theoretical	   framework	  that	   is	  based	  on	  the	  same	  basic	   intuition	  as	   the	   theories	  about	  unintentional	   deficits	   described	   in	   this	   section.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	   conflicts	   of	  particularistic	   interests	   of	   different	   constituencies	   within	   the	   polity	   and	   on	   the	  difficulties	  in	  restraining	  and	  reconciling	  these	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  regaining	  fiscal	  
	   26	  
equilibrium.	   However,	   the	   proposed	   new	   framework	   differs	   from	   the	   literature	  reviewed	  here	  in	  two	  crucial	  aspects.	  	  	  First,	   while	   the	   theories	   described	   here	   concentrate	   on	   the	   problems	   entailed	   in	  collective-­‐decision	   making	   in	   the	   narrowly-­‐defined	   policy	   making	   forums,	   the	  theoretical	  framework	  proposed	  below	  broadens	  the	  scope	  of	  investigation	  beyond	  the	  governmental	  and	  parliamentary	  sphere,	   to	  encompass	  a	  more	  complete	  set	  of	   forces	  that	   have	   an	   influence	   on	   policy	   outcomes.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   broadening	   of	   the	  scope	  of	  analysis	  incorporates	  the	  newest	  results	  of	  Hallerberg	  and	  others	  (2009)	  and	  the	   insights	   of	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano	   (2001)	   about	   the	   need	   to	   take	   into	  consideration	  actors	  other	  than	  parties	  when	  explaining	  fiscal	  outcomes.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  goes	  beyond	  exploring	  the	  role	  of	  previously	  neglected	  actors	  in	  policy	  making	  –	  like	  trade	  unions,	  employer	  organizations	  or	  influential	  factions	  within	  parties	  –	  and	  seeks	  to	  encompass	  every	  possible	  political	  force	  that	  affects	  fiscal	  outcomes.	  	  	  Second,	   the	   proposed	   new	   framework	   seeks	   to	   capture	   more	   accurately	   the	   tension	  between	   the	   public	   good	   and	   particularistic	   interests	   of	   different	   sections	   of	   the	  population	  and	  to	  incorporate	  the	  structural	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  levels	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  between	  different	  groups	  within	  a	  polity.	  The	  government-­‐centred	  common	  resource	   pool	   and	   veto	   actor	   theories	   use	   this	   tension	   as	   the	   centrepiece	   of	   their	  models,	   but	   never	   explicitly	   investigate	   it.	   The	   theories	   reviewed	   here	   assume	   that	  different	  political	  actors	  stand	  for	  different	  sets	  of	  interests,	  but	  –	  apart	  from	  sporadic	  attempts	  to	  proxy	  the	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  by	  measures	  of	  ideological	  polarization13	  –	  they	   do	   not	   actually	   investigate	   the	   divergence	   of	   preferences	   and	   how	   exactly	   it	  interferes	  with	   promoting	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   fiscal	   stability.	   The	   proposed	   theory	  explores	  the	  strength	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  conflicts	  between	  the	  different	  constituencies	  of	  different	  political	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  reasons	  why	  policy	  makers	  might	  be	  unable	  to	  stem	  debt	  growth	  and	  steer	  the	  country	  away	  from	  fiscal	  disaster.	  	  	  
The	  argument	  in	  brief	  and	  plan	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  The	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   determinants	   of	   fiscal	   performance	   throws	   into	  relief	  the	  necessity	  to	  study	  the	  substance	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  mechanics	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  accounting	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  certain	   countries.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   suggests	   going	   beyond	   institutional	   analyses	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  E.g.	  Grilli	  et	  al.	  (1991),	  Hallerberg	  et	  al.	  (2009)	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policy	   formation	   and	   focusing	   more	   on	   structural	   factors	   shaping	   the	   nature	   and	  intensity	   of	   political	   conflict	   surrounding	   fiscal	   decisions	   in	   a	   polity.	   Therefore,	   this	  thesis	   develops	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   explains	   how	   the	   underlying	   socio-­‐economic	  characteristics	  of	  a	  given	  polity	  influence	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  and	  determine	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  country	  goes	  down	  the	  path	  of	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation.	  	  	  This	   theoretical	   framework	   places	   less	   emphasis	   on	   how	   and	   why	   fiscal	   imbalances	  originally	  arise.	  Instead	  it	  concentrates	  more	  closely	  on	  how	  borrowing	  can	  be	  stopped	  –	  or	  not	  –	  once	  it	  becomes	  obvious	  how	  explosive	  the	  fiscal	  path	  is.	  Public	  finances	  can	  be	  pushed	  out	  of	  balance	  by	  economic,	   financial	  or	  societal	  shocks	  that	  policy	  makers	  have	   no	   control	   over	   –	   such	   as	   the	   slowing	   of	   growth,	   a	   permanent	   rise	   in	  unemployment,	  population	  aging	  or	  a	  jump	  in	  the	  interest	  rates	  on	  outstanding	  public	  debt	  etc.	  –	  or	  by	  earlier	  policy	  mistakes	  that	  present	  generations	  need	  to	  address.	  It	  is	  arguably	  not	  the	  original	  source	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  matters	  for	  debt	  accumulation,	  but	  the	   ability	   of	   the	   country	   to	   adapt	   its	   fiscal	   course	   to	   restore	   fiscal	   balance	   and	   stem	  further	  borrowing.	  	  	  Since	  a	  major	  adjustment	  in	  fiscal	  policy	  –	  a	  substantial	  growth	  in	  taxes	  or	  large	  cuts	  in	  expenditure	  –	  necessarily	  upsets	  the	  redistributive	  arrangements	  present	  in	  the	  given	  country,	   choosing	   a	   specific	   path	   towards	   consolidation	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   highly	  contentious	   matter	   politically.	   Different	   groups	   within	   society	   are	   likely	   to	   mobilize	  their	   resources	   and	   form	   political	   coalitions	   in	   defence	   of	   their	   long-­‐term	   fiscal	  interests.	  As	  long	  as	  all	  groups	  find	  it	  expedient	  to	  use	  their	  political	  influence	  to	  veto	  stabilization	  plans	   that	  would	   restore	   the	  balance	  of	  public	   finances	  at	   their	  expense,	  policy	   will	   be	   impossible	   to	   adjust	   and	   the	   persisting	   gap	   in	   the	   budget	   will	   keep	  feeding	  the	  debt	  stock	  despite	  the	  growing	  costs	  and	  risks	  of	  further	  debt	  accumulation.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  chances	  of	  stabilization	  depend	  on	  the	  calculus	  of	  resistance	  for	  different	  groups.	  As	  long	  as	  defending	  their	  redistributive	  interests	  trumps	  the	  urge	  to	  eliminate	  the	   costs	   and	   risks	   arising	   from	   the	   ever-­‐higher	   debt	   stock,	   groups	   will	   form	   and	  maintain	  political	  coalitions	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  resist	  tax	  increases	  or	  benefit	  cuts	  that	  harm	  their	   interests	  and	  channel	   their	  political	   resources	   towards	   this	  end.	  However,	  since	   the	   policy	   status	   quo	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   progressively	   deteriorating	   fiscal	  situation	  –	  as	  interest	  costs	  of	  the	  mounting	  debt	  stock	  place	  ever-­‐greater	  pressure	  on	  the	  budget	  –	  the	  calculus	  of	  resistance	  might	  dynamically	  change	  for	  different	  groups	  as	  time	   goes	   by.	   Stabilization	   that	   seemed	   impossible	   at	   an	   earlier	   stage	   could	   become	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possible	  as	  certain	  groups	  now	  find	  it	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  bearing	  sacrifices	  and	  to	  use	  their	  political	  clout	  to	  endorse	  consolidation.	  When	  this	  point	  in	  time	  arrives	  depends	   on	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics	   of	   different	   groups,	   which	   determine	  their	   respective	   fiscal	   and	   economic	   interests	   and	   the	   tradeoffs	   between	   these	  interests.	   Therefore,	   understanding	   how	   long	   debt	   is	   allowed	   to	   grow	   and	   when	  consolidation	  will	  take	  place	  in	  a	  given	  polity	  requires	  mapping	  out	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  landscape	  of	  the	  country	  as	  well	  as	   investigating	  the	  distribution	  of	  political	   influence	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  coalition	  formation	  across	  different	  sections	  of	  society.	  	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  veto	  actor	  models	  discussed	  above,	   but	   instead	   of	   looking	   at	   institutional	   veto	   points	   in	   the	   narrowly	   understood	  governmental	  sphere,	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  studies	  directly	  the	  clusters	  of	  interests	  present	  in	  a	  given	  polity	  and	  investigates	  how	  the	  conflicts	  between	  them	  shape	  policy	  outcomes.	   It	   places	   less	   emphasis	   on	   institutional	   structures.	   Instead,	   it	   takes	   a	  fundamentally	   society-­‐centred,	   structuralist	   approach	   towards	   explaining	   policy	  outcomes	  –	  based	  on	  Peter	  Gourevitch’s	  theoretical	  framework	  developed	  in	  ‘Politics	  of	  Hard	  Times’	  (1986)	  –	  and	  combines	  this	  approach	  with	  insights	  of	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen’s	  (1991)	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   about	   dynamically	   changing	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	  different	  strategies	  in	  the	  fiscal	  stabilization	  game.	  	  By	  developing	  such	  a	  theory	  to	  explain	  a	  puzzling	  fiscal	  policy	  phenomenon,	  the	  thesis	  also	   taps	   into	   a	   broader	   debate	   in	   comparative	   political	   economy	   about	   the	   relative	  importance	   of	   structural,	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   factors	   in	   determining	   policy	  outcomes	  in	  different	  countries.	  While	  it	  readily	  acknowledges	  the	  role	  of	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  aspects	  of	  politics	  and	  policy	  making	  in	  influencing	  fiscal	  performance,	  it	  argues	   that	   these	   aspects	   are	   secondary	   –	   and	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   derive	   from	   –	   the	  constellation	   and	   evolution	   of	   interests	   within	   the	   polity	   and	   hence	   from	   the	   socio-­‐economic	  position	  of	  different	  groups	  within	  society.	  It	  analyses	  in	  detail	  the	  politics	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation	  through	  time	  (from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  to	  the	  present)	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   a	   society-­‐centred	   theory,	   and	   attempts	   to	   depict	   the	  interplay	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   factors	   with	   different	   institutional	   –	   electoral,	   party-­‐political,	  corporatist	  and	  governance	  –	  arrangements	  and	  with	   ideational	   issues	  (such	  as	   policy	   traditions,	   paradigm	   shifts	   and	   ideological	   transformations)	   in	   shaping	   the	  experiences	  of	  these	  two	  countries	  with	  excessively	  high	  public	  debt.	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The	   next	   chapter	   explains	   the	   theoretical	   approach	   of	   the	   thesis	   in	   detail	   and	   sets	   it	  against	   possible	   alternative	   institutionalist	   and	   ideationalist	   explanations	   of	   the	  observed	   puzzling	   policy	   phenomenon.	   It	   also	   contemplates	   the	   methodological	  considerations	  involved	  in	  empirically	  evaluating	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  a	  society-­‐centred	  and	   dynamic	   theory	   and	   explains	   the	   reasons	   for	   choosing	   Belgium	   and	   Italy	   as	  concrete	   cases	   to	   study.	   Chapters	   three	   through	   six	   analyse	   the	   Italian	   and	   Belgian	  experiences	  with	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  employing	  the	  theoretical	   framework	   and	  methodological	   approach	   developed	   in	   chapter	   two.	   Each	  country	   study	   is	   divided	   into	   two	  parts.	  The	   first	   part	   explores	   the	   emergence	  of	   the	  problem	  of	  alarming	  debt	  growth	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  explains	  why	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  response	  was	   initially	   delayed	  by	   analysing	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	  making.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  each	  country	  study	  describes	  how	  each	  country	  addressed	  the	  debt	  problem	  in	  the	  later	  periods	  with	  special	  emphasis	  of	  the	  impacts	  if	  the	  euro-­‐accession	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  fiscal	  policies,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  fiscal	  preconditions	  for	  joining	   the	   euro	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   effects	   of	   the	   common	  currency.	  The	  last	  chapter	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  First,	  it	  considers	   how	   they	   managed	   to	   combine	   the	   two	   relatively	   distant	   approaches	   of	  Gourevitch	   and	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model.	   Second,	   it	   evaluates	   how	   the	   empirical	  material	   enriched	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   proposed	   here.	   Finally,	   it	   assesses	   the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  mechanism	  posited	  here	  relative	  to	  other	  theories	  and	  spells	  out	  the	  contributions	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  theoretical,	  methodological	  and	  policy	  debates.	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Chapter	  2.	  The	  theoretical	  approach:	  Coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  and	  delayed	  fiscal	  stabilization	  	  	  The	  basic	  debate	  in	  comparative	  political	  economy	  centres	  on	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  interests,	  institutions	  and	  ideas	  in	  governing	  economic	  and	  political	  developments	  in	  different	  countries	  (Hall	  1997,	  Immergut	  and	  Anderson	  2008).	  Structuralist	  (or	  society-­‐centred	  or	  group-­‐)	  theories	  argue	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  raw	  societal	  conflict,	  determined	  by	  the	  constellation	  of	  economic	  interests	  as	  well	  as	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  and	  power	   (Gourevitch	   1986,	   Rogowski	   1990,	   Frieden	   1991a	   and	   1991b,	   Frieden	   and	  Rogowski	   1996).	   Institutionalist	   and	   ideational	   approaches,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   call	  attention	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	   institutional	   arrangements	   as	  well	   as	   cognitive	  models	  influence	   both	   the	   definition	   of	   interests	   by	   different	   social	   actors	   and	   the	   power	  imbalances	  between	  them	  (Thelen	  and	  Steinmo	  1992,	  Pontusson	  1995,	  Hall	  and	  Taylor	  1996,	  Jacobsen	  1995,	  Blyth	  1997,	  2002	  and	  2003).	  Ultimately,	  all	  three	  approaches	  try	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  collective	  decisions	  are	  made	  concerning	  policies	  and	  institutions	  and	   how	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   are	   sorted	   out	   in	   the	   political	   sphere	   to	   give	   rise	   to	  different	  outcomes,	  but	   they	  disagree	  on	  which	   factors	  matter	  most	   in	  explaining	   the	  variation	  in	  these	  outcomes	  across	  polities	  and	  times.	  	  	  In	   trying	   to	   account	   for	   the	   puzzling	   phenomenon	   of	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	   in	  certain	  countries,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  a	  structuralist	  approach.	  This	  decision	  is	  motivated	  partly	  by	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  the	  review	  of	  existing	  literature	  on	  fiscal	  policy,	  but	   also	   and	   more	   importantly	   by	   Peter	   Gourevitch’s	   (1986)	   argument	   about	   the	  manifest	  importance	  of	  structural	  factors	  –	  socio-­‐economic	  interest	  and	  political	  power	  –	  in	  determining	  systemic	  policy	  choices	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  	  In	  prosperous	   times	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   forget	   the	   importance	  of	  power	   in	  the	  making	  of	  policy.	  Social	  systems	  appear	  stable,	  and	  the	  economy	  works	  with	   sufficient	   regularity	   that	   its	   rules	   can	   be	  modelled	   as	   if	  they	   functioned	  without	   social	   referent.	   In	   difficult	   economic	   times	  this	   comfortable	   illusion	   disintegrates.	   Patterns	   unravel,	   economic	  models	   come	   into	   conflict,	   and	   policy	   prescriptions	   diverge.	  Prosperity	   blurs	   a	   truth	   that	   hard	   times	   make	   clearer:	   the	   choice	  made	  among	  conflicting	  policy	  proposals	  emerges	  out	  of	  politics.	  The	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victorious	   interpretation	  will	   be	   the	   one	  whose	   adherents	   have	   the	  power	  to	  translate	  their	  opinion	  into	  the	  force	  of	  law14.	  In	  other	  words,	   in	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making	  –	  where	  numerous	  questions	  of	  varying	  significance	  need	   to	  be	  decided	  upon	  –	   it	   is	  easy	   to	   forget	  about	  the	   broader	   societal	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   that	   bear	   upon	   the	   broad	   characteristics	   of	  policies	   that	  govern	  the	  economy	  and	  redistribution	   in	  a	  given	  polity.	   It	   is	   tempting	  –	  and	   reasonable	   –	   to	   assume	   that	   policy-­‐making	   is	   the	   internal	   matter	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   machinery	   of	   the	   state	   and	   that	   policy	   choices	   are	   determined	   by	   the	  preferences	  of	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  form	  part	  of	  this	  machinery,	  which,	   in	  turn	  are	  influenced	   by	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   constraints.	   However,	   at	   times	   of	   major	  economic	   adversity	   –	   or	   in	   Gourevitch’s	   words	   in	   ‘hard	   times’	   –	   when	   difficult	   and	  momentous	  zero-­‐sum	  decisions	  need	  to	  be	  made,	  the	  wider	  societal	  embeddedness	  of	  policy	  making	  manifests	  itself	  more	  clearly,	  as	  large	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  mobilize	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  vital	  interests.	  	  ‘Hard	  times’	  are	  times	  of	  economic	  dislocation	  that	  trigger	  major	  political	  controversy	  and	   ultimately	   lead	   to	   large	   adaptations	   in	   economic	   policy	   (Gourevitch	   1986	   p19).	  They	  represent	  systemic	  crises	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  accepted	  ways	  of	  managing	  economic	  and	  political	  life	  break	  down	  under	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  large	  external	  shock,	  such	  as	  a	  global	  slowing	   of	   growth,	   realignment	   of	   global	   production	   patterns,	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	  production	   procedures	   or	   the	   disruption	   of	   global	   trade	   and	   financial	   flows.	   The	   key	  feature	   of	   such	   a	   situation	   is	   that	   change	   seems	   inevitable,	   but	   its	   direction	   is	   highly	  contentious.	   In	   ‘hard	   times’,	   the	   stakes	   are	   unusually	   high,	   because	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  adjustments	  made	  in	  response	  to	  the	  profound	  changes	   in	   exogenous	   circumstances.	   Economic	   and	   political	   institutions	   as	   well	   as	  ideologies	   come	   under	   pressure	   as	   different	   groups	   within	   society	   marshal	   up	   their	  resources	   and	   rethink	   their	   political	   coalitions	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   influence	   the	   emergent	  systemic	  policy	  choices	  in	  their	  own	  favour15.	  	  	  Times	  of	  large	  fiscal	  imbalances	  and	  dangerous	  debt	  accumulation	  are	  also	  ‘hard	  times’,	  because	   they	  expose	   the	  unsustainability	  of	   the	  redistributive	  status	  quo	   in	   the	  given	  country.	  Existing	  spending	  and	  revenue	  arrangements	  –	  even	  if	  they	  kept	  the	  budget	  in	  balance	   at	   some	  point	   in	   the	   past	   –	   now	   require	   constant	   and	   substantial	   borrowing	  that	  leads	  to	  accelerating	  debt	  growth.	  Just	  as	  in	  economic	  crises,	  exogenous	  shocks	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  	  “Politics	  in	  Hard	  Times’	  (1986,	  p17)	  	  15	   On	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   resilience	   and	   adjustment	   of	   institutions	   in	   the	   face	   of	   societal	   conflict,	   see	   also	  Shepsle	  (2008).	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likely	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  generating	  the	  original	  problem.	  A	  sudden	  increase	  in	  world	  real	  interest	   rates	   might	   generate	   extra	   interest	   costs	   on	   outstanding	   public	   debt,	   a	  permanent	  slackening	  of	  economic	  activity	  might	  cause	  tax	  revenues	  to	  decrease	  or	  a	  surge	  in	  unemployment	  might	  generate	  extra	  social	  outlays	  etc.	  Fiscal	  ‘hard	  times’	  often	  accompany	  economic	   ‘hard	  times’	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  economic	  downturns	  trigger	  fiscal	  problems,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   always	   the	   case.	   The	   shocks	   generating	   fiscal	  issues	   could	   be	   independent	   of	   the	   economic	   cycles.	   Furthermore,	   earlier	   policy	  mistakes	  can	  also	  engender	  problems	   for	   the	  present	  via	  creating	  a	  public	  debt	  stock	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  high	  interest	  expenses.	  	  	  A	   distinguishing	   feature	   of	   ‘fiscal	   hard	   times’	   is	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   effective	  adaptation	   to	   the	   problem,	   the	   situation	   gets	   progressively	   worse	   as	   the	   growing	  interest	  costs	  of	  the	  accumulating	  debt	  burden	  continuously	  compound	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  original	  shock.	  Therefore,	  such	  crises	  have	  a	  pronounced	  dynamic	  element	  due	  to	  the	  endogenous	  escalation	  of	  the	  issue	  to	  be	  solved	  and	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  itself	  becomes	  an	  important	  element	  in	  influencing	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  Apart	   from	   this	   diachronic,	   continuous	   aspect,	   however,	   times	   of	   fiscal	   troubles	   are	  conceptually	   very	   similar	   to	   Gourevitch’s	   hard	   times	   in	   that	   they	   require	   a	   major	  adjustment	   in	  policies	  –	   large	  cuts	   in	  spending	  and/or	   increases	   in	   taxes	  –	   that	  affect	  the	   long-­‐term	   pecuniary	   interests	   of	   large	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   and	   therefore	   are	  likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   political	   controversy.	   Furthermore,	   the	   order	   of	   magnitude	   of	  losses	   to	   be	   faced	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   sizeable,	   since	   stabilizing	   public	   finances	   require	  major	   sacrifices	   from	   society	   once	   the	   debt	   stock	   has	   grown	   large	   and	   the	   interest	  pressure	  on	  the	  budget	  is	  significant16.	  	  	  Therefore,	   the	   constellation	   of	   conflicts	   and	   commonalities	   of	   interests	   between	  different	   sections	   of	   society	   and	   the	   de	   facto	   power	   relations	   between	   them	   can	   be	  expected	   to	  play	  a	  major	  role	   in	  how	  and	  when	  public	   finances	  are	  consolidated.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model	  to	  be	  developed	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Empirical	  examples	  help	  to	  appreciate	  the	  size	  of	  the	  challenge.	  In	  2006,	  the	  year	  before	  a	  consolidation	  programme	  was	  started	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  cyclically	  adjusted	  deficit	  of	  the	  budget	  was	  over	  11	  percent	  of	  the	  GDP.	   In	   the	   same	   year,	   the	   total	   non-­‐interest	   spending	   of	   the	   government	   was	   48	   percent	   and	   total	  revenues	  amounted	  to	  42	  percent.	  Reversing	  debt	  growth	  required	  cutting	  non-­‐interest	  spending	  by	  more	  than	  a	  fifth	  or	  increasing	  taxation	  by	  almost	  a	  fourth.	  Similarly,	  in	  2010	  when	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  won	  the	  British	  elections	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  averting	  a	  debt	  spiral,	   the	  cyclically	  adjusted	  deficit	  of	  the	  budget	  was	   9	   percent	   of	   the	   GDP,	   almost	   a	   fifth	   of	   total	   non-­‐interest	   expenditure	   or	   a	   fourth	   of	   revenues.	  Consolidating	  Greek	  public	  finances	  in	  the	  five	  years	  of	  boom	  and	  historically	  low	  interest	  rates	  before	  the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  would	  have	  taken	  cutting	  expenditure	  or	  increasing	  taxes	  by	  a	  sixth.	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and	  why	   societal	   conflicts	   about	   fiscal	   stabilization	   can	   lead	   to	   a	  policy	  deadlock	  and	  thereby	  to	  an	  endogenous	  reeling	  out	  of	  control	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  a	  country.	  	  The	  next	  section	  sets	  down	  the	  criteria	  for	  identifying	  social	  groups	  within	  a	  polity	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  and	  for	  determining	  the	  sources	  of	  influence	  they	  can	   exercise	   on	   policy	   outcomes.	   It	   follows	   Gourevitch’s	   own	   model	   for	   explaining	  policy	   responses	   to	   economic	   dislocation,	   but	   it	   adapts	   its	   guiding	   principles	  specifically	   to	   the	  problem	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation.	  The	   third	   section	   incorporates	   into	  this	  society-­‐centred	  analysis	  a	  dynamic	  aspect,	  using	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	   of	   delayed	   stabilization	   of	   Alesina	   and	   Drazen	   (1991).	   Gourevitch’s	   original	  approach	   is	   targeted	   at	   comparative	   statics:	   it	   focuses	   on	   explaining	   why	   a	   certain	  economic	   shock	   changes	  policies	   and	   institutions	   in	   a	   certain	  way	   in	   a	   certain	  polity.	  Given	  that	   fiscal	  problems	  endogenously	  escalate	  once	  an	  exogenous	  shock	  sets	   them	  into	   motion,	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   relevant	   actors	   should	   be	   traced	   in	   a	   continuous,	  diachronic	   framework	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   explaining	   fiscal	   consolidation.	   The	   war	   of	  attrition	   model	   helps	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   interests	   and	   strategies	   of	   relevant	   actors	  evolve	  as	   the	   fiscal	   situation	  deteriorates	   if	   a	   commensurate	  policy	   response	   to	   fiscal	  imbalances	  is	  delayed.	  	  	  The	   fourth	   section	   attempts	   to	   put	   the	   model	   developed	   here	   into	   perspective	   by	  setting	   it	   against	   a	   range	   of	   alternative	   explanations.	   It	   briefly	   discusses	   how	  institutions	  of	  interest	  representation	  and	  of	  the	  state	  might	  influence	  the	  way	  societal	  conflicts	  about	  fiscal	  policy	  play	  out	  in	  different	  countries,	  how	  ideational	  factors	  might	  modulate	   the	   effect	   of	   structurally	   given	   interests	   and	   political	   coalitions	   on	   fiscal	  choices	   and	   how	   the	   international	   system	   might	   shape	   the	   way	   fiscal	   problems	   are	  handled	   in	   the	   domestic	   political	   sphere.	   The	   fifth	   section	   discusses	   methodological	  considerations	   involved	   in	  applying	  the	  society-­‐centred	   framework	  to	  empirical	  cases	  and	   explains	   the	   reasons	   for	   choosing	   Belgium’s	   and	   Italy’s	   experiences	   with	   public	  debt	  as	  concrete	  cases	  to	  study.	  	  
Applying	  the	  Gourevitchian	  society-­centred	  framework	  to	  fiscal	  policy	  	  Society-­‐centred	  approaches	  to	  explaining	  economic	  policy	  choices	  and	  outcomes	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  policy	  areas,	  but	  so	  far	  not	  to	  fiscal	  policy.	  Among	  others,	  Kindleberger	  (1951),	  Rogowski	  (1990)	  and	  Frieden	  and	  Rogowski	  (1996)	  concentrated	  on	  producer	  groups	  in	  accounting	  for	  variation	  in	  trade	  policy	  across	  countries.	  Frieden	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(1991)	  also	  explains	   trade	  and	   industrial	  policy	   in	  different	  Latin-­‐American	  countries	  by	  examining	  the	  conflicts	  and	  commonalities	  of	  interests	  among	  different	  classes	  and	  sectors	   in	   each	   country.	   Monetary	   and	   exchange	   rate	   policies	   have	   similarly	   been	  analysed	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   conflicting	   societal	   interests	   by,	   for	   example,	   Henning	  (1994)	   and	   Frieden	   (1991	   and	   2001).	   In	   ‘Politics	   of	   Hard	   Times’,	   Gourevitch	   (1986)	  uses	   this	   approach	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   choices	   between	   complex	   policy	   packages	   –	  incorporating	   various	   areas	   of	   economic	   policy	   –	   which	   different	   countries	   took	   at	  different	   turning	   points	   in	   economic	   history.	   This	   section	   investigates	   the	   ways	   in	  which	  this	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  fiscal	  policy,	  using	  Gourevitch’s	  model	  as	  a	  template.	  	  For	  Gourevitch	  (1986,	  Chapter1),	   the	  starting	  point	   is	   that	  governments	  need	  societal	  support	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  decisions	  in	  highly	  contentious	  situations.	  In	  other	  words,	  governmental	  discretion	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  influential	  groups	  within	  society	  can	  mobilize	  against	  decisions	  that	  encroach	  on	  their	  interests.	  This	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  when	  public	  finances	  are	  out	  of	  balance,	  existing	  redistributive	  arrangements	  have	  to	   be	   renegotiated	   and	   large	   sections	   of	   society	   need	   to	   be	   convinced	   or	   forced	   to	  acquiesce	  in	  losing	  lose	  part	  of	  their	  income	  via	  higher	  taxes	  or	  cuts	  in	  public	  spending.	  Although	  elections	  authorize	  governments	  to	  make	  policy	  choices,	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  possess	  the	  de	  facto	  authority	  to	  decide	  as	  they	  please	  in	  redesigning	  the	  redistributive	  features	  of	  policies.	  	  	  For	   such	   momentous	   policy	   decisions	   to	   succeed,	   the	   government’s	   executive	   and	  legislative	   authority	   needs	   to	   be	   complemented	   with	   the	   political	   support	   and	   the	  cooperation	   of	   economically	   and	   politically	   influential	   societal	   groups.	   Beyond	  delegating	   their	   representatives	   into	   the	   parliament,	   these	   groups	   can	   defend	   their	  interests	   through	   several	   extra-­‐parliamentary	   ways.	   Workers	   can	   go	   on	   strike;	  investors	  can	  move	   their	  capital	  out	  of	   the	  country;	  producers	  can	  withdraw	   into	   the	  underground	   economy;	   various	   groups	   can	   stage	   demonstrations	   or	   lobby	   the	  government	  etc.	  For	  the	  government’s	  policies	  to	  pass	  and	  to	  have	  their	  desired	  effect,	  a	  large	  enough	  proportion	  of	  the	  groups	  needs	  to	  support	  them	  or	  at	  least	  acquiesce	  in	  them.	  Every	  stabilization	  package	  creates	  losers,	  who	  will	  have	  to	  pay	  more	  into	  or	  take	  less	  out	  of	  the	  public	  purse,	  and	  winners,	  who	  are	  spared	  of	  the	  sacrifices	  required	  for	  the	   sake	   of	   stabilizing	   public	   finances.	   The	   prospective	   losers	   of	   a	   consolidation	  initiative	  are	  likely	  to	  mobilize	  their	  policy	  influence	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  their	  interests.	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The	   success	   of	   stabilization	   thus	   depends	   on	   whether	   the	   prospective	   winners	   are	  strong	  enough	  to	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  the	  given	  package.	  	  Therefore,	  understanding	  whether	  stabilization	  is	  possible	  and	  debt	  accumulation	  can	  be	   reversed	  –	  or,	   conversely,	  whether	   a	   country	  keeps	  borrowing	   even	   in	   the	   face	  of	  mounting	   risks	   –	   requires	   finding	   out	   whether	   there	   exists	   a	   viable	   stabilization	  package	  in	  the	  given	  polity,	  one	  that	  can	  garner	  the	  necessary	  societal	  support.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  requires	  mapping	  the	  structure	  of	  societal	  interests	  within	  the	  polity,	  identifying	  the	  sources	  of	  policy	  influence	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  defend	  these	  interests	  and	  analysing	  how	   the	   different	   societal	   groups	   unite	   their	   forces	   in	   support	   of	   or	   in	   resistance	   to	  certain	   stabilization	   initiatives.	  Using	  Gourevitch’s	   terminology,	   the	   task	   is	   to	   identify	  the	   relevant	   societal	   actors,	   determine	   the	   sources	   of	   their	   influence	   on	  policy	   choices	  and	   observe	   how	   they	   form	   societal	   coalitions	   of	   interests	   in	   the	   struggle	   over	   policy	  choices.	  	  
Relevant	  societal	  actors	  	  In	   identifying	   relevant	   groups	  within	   society,	   authors	   in	   the	   society-­‐centred	   tradition	  mostly	   base	   their	   investigation	   on	   a	   priori,	   theoretical	   assumptions	   about	   the	  distributional	   effects	   of	   different	   economic	   policies	   across	   different	   groups.	   For	  example,	   in	   investigating	   the	   politics	   of	   trade	   policies	   Frieden	   and	   Rogowski	   (1996)	  systematically	   review	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   Ricardo-­‐Viner,	   Stolper-­‐Samuelson,	  Heckscher-­‐Ohlin	  etc.	   theories	   for	   identifying	   socio-­‐economic	  characteristics	  of	  groups	  that	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   differentially	   affected	   by	   trade	   policy	   choices.	   In	   explaining	  economic	   policies	   in	   Latin-­‐America,	   Frieden	   (1991)	   delineates	   relevant	   social	   units	  according	   to	   class	   and	   asset	   specificity.	   In	   accounting	   for	   preferences	   concerning	  exchange	   rate	   and	   monetary	   policies,	   Frieden	   (1991	   and	   2001)	   concentrates	   on	  exposed	  and	  sheltered	  sectors.	  	  	  Gourevitch	  (1986,	  Chapter	  2),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  adopts	  a	  different	  strategy.	  Instead	  of	  categorically	  defining	  the	  groups	  whose	  interests	  are	  expected	  to	  play	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  economic	   policy	   choices,	   he	   lists	   a	   number	   of	   general	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics	  that	  could	  play	  a	  role	   in	  delineating	   the	  relevant	  groups.	  He	  argues	   that	  within	  broad	  categories,	   such	   as	   class,	   a	   number	   of	   important	   variations	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  consideration	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   conflicts	   and	   commonalities	   of	  interests	   that	   arise	   between	   groups	   across	   classes.	   He	   points	   out,	   for	   example,	   that	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business	   groups	   might	   have	   differing	   policy	   preferences	   depending	   on	   their	  competitiveness,	  the	  nature	  of	  demand	  for	  their	  products,	  the	  character	  of	  their	  labour	  needs	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  capital	  markets	  they	  face.	  The	  interests	  of	  workers	  might	  differ	   based	   on	   their	   skill	   levels,	   the	   scale	   and	   character	   of	   the	   enterprise	   they	   are	  working	  for	  or	  the	  sector	  they	  are	  employed	  in,	  whereas	  landholders	  might	  be	  divided	  according	  to	  the	  scale	  of	  production	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  products.	   	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	   general	   criteria,	   he	   maps	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   ‘production	   profile’	   of	   the	   given	  country	   at	   the	   given	   point	   in	   history	   and	   identifies	   relevant	   producer	   and	   labour	  groups	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  This	  flexible	  strategy	  is	  necessitated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	   looking	   at	   choices	   between	   complex	   policy	   packages,	   rather	   than	   at	   binary	  alternatives	  within	  the	  same	  policy	  field,	  and	  therefore	  dissecting	  society	  along	  a	  single	  dimension	   is	   unworkable.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   approach	   has	   the	   added	   benefit	   of	  being	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   specific	   socio-­‐economic	   context	   of	   the	   countries	   under	  consideration.	  	  	  This	  pragmatic,	  context-­‐dependent	  approach	  is	  useful	  in	  identifying	  relevant	  clusters	  of	  fiscal	  preferences,	  too.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  fiscal	  policy,	  relevant	  societal	  actors	  are	  groups	   within	   society	   characterized	   by	   largely	   similar	   fiscal	   preferences.	   These,	  however,	   are	   impossible	   to	   categorize	   based	   on	   a	   handful	   of	   theoretically	  motivated	  criteria,	  because	  variability	  in	  tax	  regimes	  and	  spending	  patterns	  is	  practically	  limitless.	  In	  principle,	  fiscal	  policies	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  advantage	  or	  disadvantage	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  groups,	  based	  on	  class,	  income	  or	  wealth,	  age,	  enterprise	  size,	  geographical	  position	  and	  so	  on.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  delineate	  groups	  within	  society	  according	  to	  their	  a	  priori	  fiscal	  interests.	  	  When	   it	   comes	   to	  preferences	   towards	  different	  ways	  of	   fiscal	   stabilization,	  however,	  the	  policy	  status	  quo	  provides	  a	  useful	   starting	  point	   for	   finding	   the	   relevant	   societal	  groups.	  Since	  fiscal	  stabilization	  involves	  large	  negative	  changes	  to	  the	  status	  quo,	  the	  preferences	  of	  societal	  groups	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  determined	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  by	  their	  vested	   interests	   in	   existing	   policies.	   Some	   groups	   are	   attached	   to	   extant	   spending	  programmes,	  others	  to	  specific	  tax	  arrangements	  etc.	  While	  socio-­‐economic	  position	  is	  likely	  to	  play	  a	  large	  role	  in	  determining	  these	  vested	  interests,	  clearly	  identifying	  the	  relevant	  groups	  a	  priori,	  on	  theoretical	  grounds	  is	  not	  possible,	  because	  of	  the	  country-­‐specificity	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  government	  spending	  and	  revenues.	  For	  example,	  public	  employment	  has	  very	  different	  order	  of	  magnitude	  in	  different	  countries.	  Therefore,	  in	  some	  countries,	  public	  employees	  might	  constitute	  a	  powerful	  societal	  group,	  whereas	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in	   other	   countries	   they	   might	   not	   play	   such	   a	   significant	   role.	   Another	   example	   for	  national	  variations	  in	  fiscal	  policies	  is	  the	  profound	  differences	  in	  welfare	  programmes,	  such	  as	  pensions	  or	  unemployment	  benefits.	  Since	  eligibility	  criteria	  vary	  widely	  across	  countries,	   the	  weight	   of	   groups	  with	   vested	   interests	   in	   these	   expenditure	   items	  will	  differ	   nationally.	   Consequently,	   the	   constellation	   of	   preferences	   towards	   policy	  adjustment	  will	  be	  country-­‐specific.	  Identifying	  relevant	  actors	  thus	  requires	  exploring	  the	   fiscal	   policy	   status	   quo	   in	   the	   given	   country	   and	   delineating	   the	   groups	   of	  beneficiaries	  of	  existing	  spending	  programmes	  as	  well	  as	  major	  categories	  of	  taxpayers.	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   fiscal	   policies	   on	  different	  groups	   within	   society	   is	   not	   one-­‐dimensional.	   Beyond	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   taxes	   and	  revenues	  on	  income,	  the	  budget	  balance	  itself	  can	  have	  indirect	  effects	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	   certain	   groups	   via	   its	   influence	   on	   the	   general	   economic	   environment.	   Large	  persistent	   deficits	   can	   give	   rise	   to	   considerable	  macroeconomic	   problems,	  which	   can	  cause	   significant	   losses	   to	   societal	   groups	   depending	   on	   their	   position	   within	   the	  economy.	   High	   inflation	   is	   a	   typical	   side	   effect,	   if	   part	   of	   the	   deficit	   is	   monetized.	  Another	  is	  high	  interest	  rates	  that	  crowd	  out	  private	  investment.	  For	  groups	  that	  suffer	  from	   the	   corollary	   macroeconomic	   costs	   of	   the	   fiscal	   problem,	   the	   calculus	   of	  supporting	  or	  opposing	  a	  given	  stabilization	  package	  has	   to	  go	  beyond	  evaluating	  the	  package’s	   impact	   on	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	   the	   group	   in	   certain	   spending	   and	   tax	  measures.	   These	   corollary	   costs	   therefore	   modulate	   the	   distribution	   of	   preferences	  towards	  fiscal	  stabilization.	  	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   constellation	   of	   conflicts	   and	   communalities	   of	   interests	   towards	   fiscal	  stabilization	   in	  a	  given	  polity	  are	   jointly	  determined	  by	   the	   fiscal	   status	  quo	  –	   i.e.	   the	  existing	  spending	  and	  tax	  arrangements	  –	  and	  by	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  production,	  which	   influences	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   different	   groups	   within	   the	   country	   towards	   side	  effects	   of	   fiscal	   problems.	   The	   policy	   status	   quo	   delineates	   major	   categories	   of	  taxpayers	  and	  beneficiaries	  of	  public	  spending,	  whereas	  the	  economic	  structure	  defines	  groups	  that	  are	  under	  similar	  levels	  of	  pressure	  from	  unresolved	  fiscal	  problems.	  These	  dimensions	   might	   demarcate	   overlapping	   groups	   but	   crosscutting	   divisions	   are	   also	  possible.	   Specific	   economic	   structures	   and	   fiscal	   histories	   are	   likely	   to	   give	   rise	   to	  country-­‐specific	  patterns	  of	  relevant	  societal	  groups.	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Policy	  influence	  	  The	  sources	  of	  policy	  influence	  that	  the	  different	  societal	  groups	  can	  employ	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  interests	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  context-­‐specific	  for	  the	  given	  country.	  Gourevitch	  (1986	  p58-­‐60)	   emphasizes	   the	   link	  between	  actors’	   position	   in	   the	   economy	  and	   the	  sources	   of	   pressure	   they	   can	   exercise	   to	   thwart	   policies	   they	   oppose.	   The	   primary	  source	   of	   influence	   of	   capital	   owners,	   workers,	   professionals,	   investors,	   buyers	   etc.	  over	  the	  success	  of	  policies	  is	  their	  economic	  decisions	  that	  they	  make	  in	  response	  to	  a	  given	   policy.	   In	   other	   words,	   Gourevitch	   underlines	   that	   the	   distribution	   of	   policy	  influence	  across	  groups	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  the	  given	  country.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  explicitly	  foregoes	  identifying	  the	  exact	  organizational	  channels	  through	  which	   this	   power	   is	  wielded	   and	   the	   institutional	   structures	   through	  which	   they	   are	  incorporated	   into	   policy	   makers’	   decision-­‐making.	   Thereby,	   he	   separates	   economic	  structure	  –	  as	  a	  variable	  he	  is	  most	  interested	  in	  –	  from	  institutional	  arrangements	  that	  are	  epiphenomenal	  to	  his	  explanatory	  framework.	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   take	   into	  consideration	  not	  only	  the	  actual	  use	  of	  such	  positional	  power,	  but	  also	  the	  threat	  of	  it.	  For	  example,	  workers	  can	  go	  on	  strike	  in	  response	  to	  announced	  stabilization	  packages	  –	  spending	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases	  –	  or	  governments	  can	  limit	  themselves	  in	  light	  of	  the	  credible	   threat	  of	  a	  disruptive	  strike.	  Large	  employers	  can	  relocate	   from	  a	  country	   in	  response	  to	  tax	  increases	  or	  governments	  can	  forego	  such	  tax	  measures	  in	  order	  not	  to	  scare	   productive	   capital	   away.	   Clearly	   such	   threats	   can	   be	   made	   explicitly	   by	   the	  organizations	  representing	  the	  relevant	  groups,	  but	  they	  could	  be	  implied	  in	  observed	  past	  behaviour.	  Furthermore,	  beyond	  using	  their	  economic	  clout,	  different	  groups	  can	  exercise	  leverage	  over	  policies	  via	  harnessing	  other	  resources	  they	  can	  mobilize	  to	  put	  pressure	   on	   decision	   makers	   –	   such	   as	   violence	   and	   destruction	   or	   disruptive	  demonstrations.	  The	  distribution	  of	   these	  sources	  of	   influence	  among	  different	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  is	  likely	  to	  vary	  across	  countries.	  For	  example,	  the	  ability	  of	  workers	  to	  blackmail	  policy	  makers	  via	   the	   threat	  of	   strikes	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  much	  stronger	   in	  a	  tight	   labour	   market	   than	   in	   one	   where	   workers	   have	   reason	   to	   fear	   for	   their	   jobs.	  Similarly,	  demonstrations	  and	  riots	  can	  cause	  more	  disruption	  in	  some	  settings	  than	  in	  others.	   Therefore,	   identifying	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   different	   groups	   can	   prop	   up	   their	  interests	  requires	  clarifying	  the	  relevant	  conditions	  in	  the	  given	  country.	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Societal	  coalitions	  	  Crucially,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  different	  groups	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  policy	   influence	   is	   translated	   into	   their	   preferred	   policy	   outcomes	   depends	   on	   the	  coalitions	   that	   groups	   build	   with	   other	   groups.	   Such	   coalitions	   might	   even	   give	  politically	   less	  powerful	   sections	  of	   society	  a	  disproportionate	   leverage	   in	   influencing	  eventual	   policy	   choices.	   For	   Gourevitch	   (1986	   p55),	   observed	   policy	   choices	   are	  bargains	   that	   arise	   from	   political	   coalitions	   between	   distinct	   groups.	   Therefore,	  understanding	  policy	  decisions	  is	  equivalent	  to	  being	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  successful	  formation	  of	  specific	  societal	  coalitions	  around	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  interests.	  	  Since	   potential	   for	   coalition	   building	   is	   a	   function	   of	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	  interests17,	  it	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  constellation	  of	  interests	  of	  different	  groups.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  –	  as	  explained	  above	  –	  these	  are	  jointly	  dependent	  on	  vested	   interests	   in	   specific	   features	   of	   the	   fiscal	   status	   quo	   and	   on	   the	   sensitivity	   of	  different	  groups	  to	  the	  negative	  macroeconomic	  side	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  imbalances.	  Hence,	  the	   formula	   for	   the	   way	   different	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   unite	   their	   forces	   against	  others	  to	  promote	  their	  joint	  (or	  at	  least	  mutually	  compatible)	  preferences	  is	  specific	  to	  each	  country	  according	  to	  its	  fiscal	  history	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  structure.	  	  	  
The	  limits	  of	  comparative	  statics	  in	  the	  fiscal	  stabilization	  context	  	  Exploring	   these	   three	   components	   of	   the	   societal	   background	   of	   policy-­‐making	   –	   the	  relevant	   actors,	   the	   sources	   and	   strength	   of	   their	   influence	   and,	   finally,	   the	  commonalities	  and	  conflicts	  of	  their	  respective	  interest	  –	  allows	  for	  explaining	  why	  and	  how	   a	   specific	   fiscal	   consolidation	   programme	   succeeds	   or	   fails	   in	   a	   certain	   national	  economic	   and	   social	   context	   and	   why	   it	   may	   be	   impossible	   to	   find	   a	   feasible	  stabilization	   package	   under	   a	   given	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   different	   coalitions	   of	  societal	   interests.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   such	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   societal	   context	   of	   given	  stabilization	   attempts	   can	   only	   capture	   snapshots	   of	   different	   moments	   along	   the	  trajectory	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation.	  This	  template	  for	  society-­‐centred	  policy	  analysis	  has	  been	  developed	  and	  used	  to	  explain	  discreet	  policy	  choices	  at	  given	  points	  in	  time,	  under	   the	   prevailing	   economic	   and	   societal	   circumstances.	   Therefore,	   it	   can	   only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This	  context	  dependence	  of	  coalition-­‐formation	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  international	  economy	  in	  this	  context	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  internationalization-­‐literature.	  This	  line	  of	  scholarship	  is	  dedicated	  to	   analysing	   the	   shifts	   in	   societal	   coalitions	   under	   the	   effect	   of	   shifts	   in	   the	   international	   economy	   (e.g.	  Milner	  and	  Keohane	  1996,	  Rogowski	  1989,	  Thatcher	  2007).	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explain	  why	   a	   certain	   policy	   –	   in	   this	   context	   a	   certain	   stabilization	   programme	   –	   is	  proposed	  and	  gains	  or	  fails	  to	  gain	  the	  necessary	  societal	  support	  in	  a	  given	  moment.	  	  However,	  the	  puzzle	  of	  risky	  debt	  accumulation	  is	  a	  dynamic	  problem	  that	  can	  only	  be	  fully	   understood	   in	   a	   diachronic	   context.	   As	   debt	   gradually	   piles	   up,	   the	   country’s	  vulnerability	   to	   exogenous	   changes	   in	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   environment	  progressively	   increases,	   the	   government’s	   room	   for	   manoeuvre	   shrinks	   and	   the	  negative	   effects	   on	   the	   economic	   environment	   grow.	   Understanding	   why	   a	   country	  continues	  borrowing	  under	  such	  circumstances	  goes	  beyond	  accounting	  for	  the	  lack	  or	  failure	  of	   specific	   stabilization	   initiatives.	   It	   also	  has	   to	   entail	   an	   explanation	   for	  how	  the	  societal	  context	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making	  might	  or	  might	  not	  change	  under	  pressure	  from	   the	   alarming	   escalation	   of	   the	   debt	   problem,	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	  conditions	   under	   which	   windows	   of	   opportunity	   open	   up	   for	   stabilization	   or	  persistently	  elude	  policy	  makers.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  full	  explanation	  of	  the	  puzzle	  needs	  to	   include	  a	   clarification	  of	   the	   conditions	  under	  which	   the	  escalation	  of	   the	  problem	  generates	  or	  fails	  to	  generate	  the	  necessary	  societal	  support	  for	  a	  specific	  stabilization	  package.	  The	  next	  section	  describes	  a	  game	  theoretical	  model	  that	  helps	  to	  understand	  this	  evolution.	  
	  
The	   war	   of	   attrition	   model:	   strategic	   choices	   of	   societal	   actors	   in	   a	   dynamic	  
context	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  societal	  context	  of	  fiscal	  policy-­‐making	  changes	  under	  the	   effect	   of	   the	   increasing	   debt	   problem,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   study	   how	   the	   fiscal	  preferences	   of	   the	   relevant	   societal	   actors	   towards	   fiscal	   stabilization	   evolve.	   As	   the	  balance	  of	   costs	  and	  benefits	  of	   intransigently	  defending	  one’s	  vested	   interests	   in	   the	  fiscal	   status	   quo	   changes	   under	   pressure	   from	   the	   deterioration	   of	   the	   economic	  environment,	   the	  attitude	  of	  different	  groups	  towards	  different	  stabilization	  packages	  is	   likely	   to	   change.	   For	   groups	   that	   originally	   formed	   political	   coalitions	   with	   other	  groups	   in	   defence	   of	   certain	   policy	   arrangements,	   such	   a	   strategy	   might	   become	  increasingly	   costly	   if	   they	   suffer	   economic	   harm	   from	   the	   side	   effects	   of	   the	   deficits.	  	  This	  would	  put	  pressure	  on	  existing	  coalitions	  and	  potentially	  enhance	  the	  formation	  of	  new	   ones	   that	   promise	   to	   promote	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   fiscal	   stalemate.	   Therefore,	  tracking	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  preferences	  of	  different	  groups	  allows	  for	  explaining	  how	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  might	  break	  up	  and	  reconfigure	  and	  how	  these	  shifts	  in	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the	  support	  for	  and	  opposition	  to	  a	  given	  stabilization	  package	  might	  eventually	  open	  the	  way	  for	  a	  successful	  consolidation.	  	  	  
Evolving	  strategies	  in	  the	  fiscal	  stabilization	  game	  	  The	   evolution	   of	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   towards	   specific	  stabilization	   packages	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   growing	   debt	  was	  modelled	   by	  Alesina	   and	  Drazen	   (1991).	   Their	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   of	   delayed	   stabilization	   explores	   a	  situation	  in	  which	  some	  exogenous	  shock	  creates	  a	  structural	  gap	  in	  the	  public	  finances	  of	  a	  country.	  Unless	  new	  taxes	  are	  levied,	  the	  country	  keeps	  borrowing	  and	  the	  original	  structural	   gap	   widens	   due	   to	   the	   growing	   interest	   burden	   associated	   with	   the	  accumulating	  debt.	  Socio-­‐economic	  groups	  within	  the	  country	  have	  the	  power	  to	  resist	  tax	  increases	  that	  affect	  them	  and	  thereby	  to	  delay	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  issue.	  However,	  in	   the	   absence	   of	   stabilization,	   the	   situation	   becomes	   progressively	  more	   difficult	   to	  solve,	  because	  higher	  and	  higher	  tax	  increases	  are	  needed	  to	  fill	  the	  growing	  gap.	  The	  model	   investigates	  under	  what	  conditions	   it	   is	   rational	   for	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  group	  to	  acquiesce	   in	   bearing	   all	   or	   most	   of	   the	   new	   tax	   burden	   or	   to	   intransigently	   resist	  making	  sacrifices	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  restoring	   the	  balance	  of	  public	   finances.	   In	  doing	  so,	  the	  model	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	   parameters	   that	   determine	  whether	   and	   how	   long	  fiscal	   stabilization	   will	   be	   delayed	   in	   a	   given	   country18.	   The	   insights	   of	   the	   model	  provide	  invaluable	  help	  in	  understanding	  how	  the	  societal	  context	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  evolves19.	  	  	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  set	  out	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  attitude	  of	  important	  societal	  actors	   towards	   given	   stabilization	   packages	   might	   change	   with	   time,	   if	   these	   actors	  suffer	  growing	  harm	  from	  macroeconomic	  problems	  connected	  to	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  debt	   issue,	   such	   as	   inflation,	   high	   interest	   rates	   or	   slowing	   growth.	  The	   sensitivity	   of	  each	  group	  to	  such	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  depends	  on	  each	  group’s	  position	  within	   the	  domestic	   and	   international	   economy.	   For	   groups	   that	   suffer	   from	  the	  corollary	  macroeconomic	  costs	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problem,	  the	  calculus	  of	  supporting	  or	  opposing	   a	   given	   stabilization	   package	   has	   to	   go	   beyond	   evaluating	   the	   package’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  logic	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  model,	  see	  Appendix	  1.	  19	   While	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   has	   been	   widely	   cited	   in	   scholarly	   literature	   on	   persistent	   fiscal	  imbalances,	   its	  empirical	  applications	  have	  been	  sporadic	  (Grilli	  et	  al.	  1991,	  Padovano	  and	  Venturi	  2001,	  Alesina	   et	   al.	   2006).	   Furthermore,	   since	   the	   few	   existing	   empirical	   studies	   test	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  model	   in	  a	  quantitative,	   large-­‐n	  setting,	   they	  are	  unable	   to	  capture	   the	  crucial	  diachronic	  element	  of	   the	  logic	  of	  the	  model.	  In	  attempting	  to	  document	  the	  working	  of	  the	  diachronic	  logic	  of	  the	  model,	  this	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  empirical	  relevance	  of	  the	  theory	  posited	  by	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen.	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impact	   on	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	   the	   group	   in	   certain	   spending	   and	   tax	  measures.	   It	  also	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  if	  a	  given	  package	  fails,	  the	  group	  will	  have	  to	  put	  up	  with	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  debt	  longer.	  	  	  As	   debt	   keeps	   accumulating	   and	   the	   deficit	   widens	   under	   pressure	   from	   a	   growing	  interest	   burden	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   stabilization,	   the	   macroeconomic	   harm	   becomes	  larger,	   too.	   In	   this	  dynamically	  deteriorating	  context,	   societal	  groups	  are	   faced	  with	  a	  dilemma	  between	  supporting	  stabilization	  packages	  that	  harm	  their	  vested	  interests	  in	  extant	  policies	  or	  putting	  up	  with	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  macroeconomic	  problems	  longer	  in	  the	   hope	   that	   other	   groups	   have	   a	   greater	   urge	   for	   consolidation	   and	   thus	   a	   more	  favourable	  stabilization	  package	  can	  be	  adopted	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  	  Consequently,	  for	  a	  group	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  paying	  (some	  or	  all	  of)	  the	  price	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  –	  i.e.	  to	  not	  resist	  an	  unfavourable	  package	  –	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  adopting	  a	  more	  favourable	   package	   is	   impossible	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future.	   Therefore,	   a	   group	   that	  initially	   prefers	   to	   oppose	   a	   given	   package	   because	   of	   the	   sacrifices	   it	   imparts	   on	   its	  vested	  interests	  might	  come	  to	  support	  the	  same	  (or	  even	  a	  harsher)	  package	  when	  it	  realizes	   that	   this	   is	   the	   only	   way	   it	   can	   get	   rid	   of	   the	   growing	   losses	   caused	   by	   the	  macroeconomic	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  debt.	  	  	  Importantly,	   the	   shift	   between	   opposition	   and	   support	   is	   motivated	   by	   a	   cognitive	  factor:	   a	   change	   in	   the	   group’s	   assessment	   of	   the	   likelihood	   that	   other	   groups	  would	  consent	  to	  bearing	  the	  costs	  of	  consolidation	  soon	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  worthwhile	  to	  put	  up	   with	   the	   macroeconomic	   problems	   a	   little	   longer.	   This	   assessment	   depends	   on	  assumptions	  about	  how	  urgent	  it	  is	  for	  other	  groups	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  fiscal	  problem	  and	  how	  strongly	  the	  other	  groups	  are	  wedded	  to	  their	  vested	  interests.	  	  	  Unless	   one	   group	   is	   obviously	  worse	   affected	   by	   the	  macroeconomic	   harm	   than	   any	  other,	   all	   groups	   will	   initially	   resist	   making	   sacrifices	   and	   will	   first	   try	   to	   gauge	   the	  likelihood	  that	  others	  will	  pick	  up	  the	  bill	  for	  consolidation.	  As	  time	  passes,	  all	  groups	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  their	  chances	  of	  being	  able	  to	  “wait	  out”	  other	  groups	  in	  the	  polity	  and	   to	   free	   ride	   on	   others	   sacrifices.	   As	   soon	   as	   a	   group	   realizes	   that	   its	   chances	   to	  prevail	   in	   this	  game	  of	  waiting	  are	   low,	   it	   is	  rational	   for	   it	   to	   throw	  in	  the	  towel	  right	  away	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   further	   macroeconomic	   harm	   and	   also	   to	   stem	   the	   self-­‐generating	   escalation	   of	   the	   problem.	   Therefore,	   the	   passage	   of	   time	   –	   and	   the	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deterioration	  of	  the	  situation	  –	  is	  as	  an	  important	  informational	  element	  that	  actors	  in	  this	  game	  take	  into	  consideration	  when	  forming	  their	  strategies.	  Consequently,	  initially	  resisting	   unfavourable	   stabilization	   packages	   could	   be	   rational	   even	   as	   a	   means	   of	  sending	  signals	  to	  other	  groups	  to	  induce	  them	  to	  reconsider	  their	  strategies	  and	  soften	  up	  their	  stance.	  	  Based	  on	  this	   logic,	   the	  delay	   in	  consolidation	  will	  depend	  on	  two	  factors.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  resistance	  of	  groups	   to	  stabilization	  packages	  will	  depend	  on	   the	   long-­‐term	  harm	  they	  suffer	  from	  it.	  Therefore,	  the	  more	  polarized	  the	  fiscal	  interests	  of	  different	  groups	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  more	  one-­‐sided	  their	  preferred	  stabilization	  packages	  –	  are	  the	  longer	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  resist	  and	  wait	  for	  a	  favourable	  package.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  stalemate	  will	  persist	   longer	  and	  fiscal	  stabilization	  will	  be	  delayed	  longer,	   the	   longer	  the	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  can	  afford	  to	  wait	  for	  others	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  bill	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  problem.	  Therefore,	  the	  delay	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  the	  debt	  depends	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  macroeconomic	  harm	  that	  the	  fiscal	  problem	  generates,	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  to	  these	  macroeconomic	  side	  effects20	  and	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  the	  fiscal	  problem	  endogenously	  escalates	  (which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  interest	   rates	   the	   state	   has	   to	   pay	   on	   newly	   incurred	   public	   debt).	   These	   factors	  influence	  the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  costs	  of	  waiting	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	   the	  problem	  and,	  consequently,	   the	   incentives	   of	   each	   group	   to	   make	   sacrifices	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   swift	  consolidation.	  Importantly,	  if	  the	  debt	  has	  no	  macroeconomic	  side	  effects	  or	  all	  groups	  are	   insulated	   from	   the	   side	   effects,	   such	   incentives	   are	   missing	   and	   the	   problem	   is	  expected	  to	  escalate	  as	  long	  as	  the	  country	  manages	  to	  secure	  financing	  for	  its	  deficits.	  	  	  
Evolving	  strategies,	  evolving	  coalitions	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen’s	  framework	  is	  based	  on	  modelling	  the	  strategies	  of	  groups	  that	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  unitary	  actors	  with	  their	  specific	  strategic	  calculus	   and	   a	   given	   ability	   to	   fend	   for	   themselves	   in	   the	   political	   struggle.	   These	  groups	   have	   a	   binary	   choice	   between	   paying	   for	   the	   stabilization	   themselves	   (i.e.	  accepting	   an	   unfavourable	   stabilization	   package)	   and	   enduring	   the	   macroeconomic	  costs	  of	  having	  to	  wait	  for	  other	  groups	  to	  pay.	  Bargaining	  with	  other	  groups	  about	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  stabilization	  package	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  model	  and	  neither	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  groups	  would	  gain	  extra	  power	  to	  prevail	  over	  others	  by	  forming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   Strictly	   speaking,	   it	   is	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   most	   vulnerable	   group	   that	   matters	   for	   the	   timing	   of	  stabilization,	   because	   the	   group	   that	   suffers	   most	   from	   the	   macroeconomic	   side	   effects	   is	   expected	   to	  throw	  in	  the	  towel	  first.	  For	  more	  detail,	  see	  Appendix	  1.	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a	   coalition21.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   does	   not	   have	   an	   immediate	  connection	   to	   the	   Gourevitchian	   framework,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   bargains	   between	  different	  societal	  groups	  and	  on	  political	  coalitions	  between	  them,	  cobbled	  together	  in	  order	  to	  muster	  the	  necessary	  influence	  to	  defend	  their	  interests.	  However,	  the	  insights	  of	   the	   model	   can	   be	   usefully	   injected	   into	   Gourevitch’s	   approach	   to	   track	   how	   the	  calculus	  of	  maintaining,	   leaving	  or	  reforming	  coalitions	  changes	  for	  each	  group	  as	  the	  debt	  problem	  escalates.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  choice	  is	  not	  necessarily	  between	  accepting	  or	  rejecting	  a	  given	  stabilization	  alternative,	  but	  between	  maintaining	  a	  coalition	  that	  can	  secure	  the	  defence	  of	  a	  group’s	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  fiscal	  status	  quo	  and	  forming	  a	  new	  coalition	  that	  might	  involve	  fiscal	  compromises	  but	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  enforce	  a	  stabilization	  package	  that	  stems	  debt	  accumulation	  for	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Gourevitchian	   framework,	   the	   insights	   of	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	  model	   help	   to	   explain	   stability	   and	   change	   in	   coalitions	   of	   support	   and	   resistance	   to	  given	   policy	   choices.	   The	   constellation	   of	   the	   different	   societal	   preferences	   towards	  fiscal	   policy	   is	   jointly	   determined	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   vested	   interests	   in	   existing	  policies	   and	   by	   the	   differential	   urge	   for	   stabilization	   across	   the	   population.	   As	   the	  pressure	  from	  the	  macroeconomic	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  increases	  with	  the	  passage	  of	   time,	   the	   latter	  dimension	  becomes	   increasingly	   important.	  Therefore,	   the	  commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	   different	   groups	   evolve	   with	   time.	  Societal	  coalitions	  that	  were	  based	  on	  the	  joint	  defence	  of	  vested	  interests	  in	  a	  specific	  policy	  might	   split	   up	   if	   part	   of	   the	   coalition	   becomes	  willing	   to	   compromise	   on	   that	  policy	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   consolidation	   and	   a	   new,	   consolidation-­‐minded	   coalition	  might	  form.	  	  As	  this	  happens,	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  opens	  up	  for	  stabilization.	  	  	  Notably,	   these	   results	   are	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   all	   groups	   are	  motivated	   by	  their	   private	   interests	   only.	   The	   growing	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   country	   to	   exogenous	  changes	  in	  economic	  and	  financial	  conditions	  remains	  a	  purely	  public	  problem	  that	  no	  groups	   are	   keen	   on	   voluntarily	   sacrificing	   their	   vested	   interests	   for.	   Therefore,	   if	   no	  group	  suffers	   from	   the	  macroeconomic	  consequences	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  or	   if	   such	  consequences	  are	  completely	  absent,	   there	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  cobbling	  together	  a	  societal	  coalition	   in	   support	   of	   stabilization.	   In	   this	   situation	   a	   prisoner’s	   dilemma	   arises	  between	  the	  different	  groups.	  All	  of	  them	  resist	  stabilization	  attempts	  that	  would	  harm	  their	   vested	   interests,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   free	   ride	   on	   others’	   sacrifices.	   Stabilization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	   In	   fact,	   the	  model	  assumes	  a	   two-­‐group	  society,	  although	  the	  conclusions	  work	  for	  a	   larger	  number	  of	  separate	  groups,	  too.	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remains	   elusive	   despite	   the	   potentially	   deleterious	   effects	   of	   debt	   growth	   for	   the	  country	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  likely	  for	  each	  of	  the	  groups,	  too.	  	  In	   sum,	   in	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   proposed	   here,	   continued	   borrowing	   in	   the	  presence	   of	   alarming	   debt	   accumulation	   reflects	   the	   inability	   of	   influential	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  to	  allocate	  the	  costs	  of	  stabilization	  amongst	  themselves.	  The	  country	  flirts	  with	  fiscal	  disaster	  because	  stabilization	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  increasing	  risks	  for	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole	  but	  by	  the	  private	  harm	  that	  influential	  groups	  suffer	  from	  it.	  If	   this	   harm	   is	   significant	   enough	   to	   force	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	   groups	   to	   make	  concessions	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  danger	  can	  be	  averted,	  but	  if	  not,	  consolidation	  might	  be	  delayed	  all	  the	  way	  until	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  turns	  the	  public	  problem	  into	  private	  economic	  loss.	  	  	  
The	   missing	   pieces	   of	   the	   puzzle:	   institutional,	   ideational	   and	   international	  
aspects	  of	  delayed	  fiscal	  stabilization	  	  By	  studying	  the	  constellation	  of	   interests	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  policy	   influence,	  and	  by	   modelling	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   rational	   behaviour	   of	   actors	   in	   a	   progressively	  deteriorating	  fiscal	  situation,	  the	  theory	  presented	  above	  provides	  a	  logic	  that	  accounts	  both	  for	  delay	  in	  fiscal	  stabilization	  and	  for	  a	  possible	  later	  consolidation.	  It	  allows	  for	  explaining	  both	  why	   certain	   countries	   flirt	  with	   fiscal	  disaster	   and	  pile	  up	  dangerous	  amounts	  of	  debt	  even	  in	  times	  of	  peace	  and	  relative	  prosperity	  and	  why	  and	  how	  they	  eventually	  might	  make	  much	   harsher	   sacrifices	   than	   initially	   needed,	   in	   order	   to	   put	  their	  public	  finances	  in	  order.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  theory	  sidesteps	  many	  important	  questions	   about	   how	   the	   posited	   mechanisms	   –	   the	   definition	   of	   groups’	   interests,	  coalition-­‐formation,	  -­‐breakup	  and	  -­‐realignment	  as	  well	  as	  bargaining	  and	  compromises	  –	   play	   out	   in	   an	   actual	   political	   setting.	   It	   keeps	   quiet	   about	   how	   interests	   are	  articulated	   and	   how	   they	   are	   represented	   in	   the	   policy	   making	   sphere,	   how	   policy	  alternatives	   are	   formulated	   and	   decisions	   are	   made	   within	   governments	   and	  bureaucracies,	  or	  how	  the	  manoeuvring	  space	  for	  policy	  making	  might	  be	  constrained	  by	  a	  country’s	  position	  in	  the	  international	  political	  and	  economic	  system.	  	  Institutional	   aspects	   –	   such	   as	   partisan	   and	   corporatist	   constellations	   that	   affect	  interest	   representation,	   the	   electoral	   regime	  determining	  preference	   aggregation,	   the	  rules	   and	   conventions	   guiding	   the	  working	   of	   the	   state	   etc.	   –	   are	   given	   a	   secondary,	  subordinate	   place	   in	   this	   structuralist,	   society-­‐centred	   approach	   based	   on	   the	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argument	   that	   the	   intensity	   of	   conflict	   that	   surrounds	   decisions	   to	   be	  made	   in	   ‘hard	  times’	  puts	  existing	  institutional	  frameworks	  under	  great	  pressure	  and	  make	  them	  prey	  to	  the	  struggle	  between	  societal	  actors.	  Similarly,	  ideational	  factors	  –	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  ideological	   traditions	   and	   policy	   paradigms	   in	   forming	   conceptions	   about	   possible	  policy	  alternatives	  –	  are	  assumed	  to	  play	  an	  epiphenomenal	  role	  to	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  in	  this	  approach.	  In	  other	  words,	  ideas	  and	  institutions	  are	  subject	  to	  how	  the	  struggle	  evolves,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Obviously,	  this	  puts	  this	  theory	  at	  odds	  with	  ideational	   and	   institutionalist	   approaches	   that	   argue	   that	   institutional	   and	   ideational	  factors	   crucially	   determine	   how	   interests	   are	   identified	   and	   preferences	   are	   defined,	  how	  societal	  actors	  are	  delineated	  and	  political	  coalitions	  are	  formed	  and	  how	  bargains	  are	  struck	  and	  compromises	  are	  made.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   proposed	   theoretical	   framework	   focuses	   strictly	   on	   the	   domestic	  political	  arena	  without	  explicitly	  referring	  to	  possible	  constraints	  on	  policy	  making	  that	  derive	   from	  the	  country’s	  position	   in	   the	   international	  political	  and	  economic	  system.	  Countries	   are	   typically	   members	   of	   international	   organizations	   and	   are	   tied	   up	   in	  networks	  of	  international	  agreements	  about	  economic	  policy.	  These	  commitments	  limit	  their	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  in	  shaping	  their	  responses	  to	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  challenges,	  unless	   they	  are	  ready	  to	  give	  up	  their	  existing	  status	  within	   the	  system.	   International	  factors	  can	  be	  fitted	  into	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  from	  two	  angles.	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   insofar	   as	   the	   international	   economic	   and	   political	   system	   affects	   the	  constellations	   of	   interests	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   resources	   in	   the	   given	   country,	  international	  factors	  are	  exogenous	  variables	  in	  the	  model,	  which	  affect	  the	  parameters	  of	   the	   domestic	   struggles	   about	   policy	   choices.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   country’s	  decision	   to	   honour	   or	   to	   attempt	   to	   change	   its	   international	   commitments	   is	   in	   itself	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  domestic	  policy	  conflict22.	  The	  question	  of	  international	  commitments	   is	   especially	   important	   in	   the	   context	   of	   European	   countries	   that	   have	  delegated	   ever	   more	   of	   their	   policy	   making	   powers	   to	   the	   European	   Union	   and	  subjected	  themselves	  to	  rules	  in	  the	  field	  of	  fiscal	  policy.	  	  This	   section	   contemplates	   the	  possible	   roles	   that	   institutions,	   ideas	  and	   international	  constraints	   can	  play	   in	   influencing	   the	   likelihood	  of	   excessive	  debt	   accumulation	   in	   a	  country.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  setting	  up	  alternative	  explanations	  against	  which	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  theory	  presented	  here	  can	  be	  measured.	  On	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   On	   the	   two-­‐way	   effect	   of	   the	   international	   economic	   and	   political	   system	   on	   domestic	   politics,	   see	  Gourevitch	  (1978).	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the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   reflecting	   on	   the	   institutional,	   ideational	   and	   international	  aspects	   of	   policy-­‐making	   also	   helps	   to	   place	   the	   abstract	   theory	   into	   the	   context	   of	  concrete	  political	  settings.	   It	  provides	  a	  more	  explicit	   treatment	  of	   the	   implications	  of	  the	  theory	  for	  questions	  like	  how	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  with	  convergent	  interests	  and	  societal	  coalitions	  can	  be	  identified	  behind	  interest	  representing	  organizations	  (such	  as	  parties,	   trade	  unions	  and	  employer	  organizations	  and	   their	  alliances);	  how	  the	  policy	  influence	  of	  these	  actors	  is	  rooted	  in	  electoral	  and	  corporatist	  arrangements;	  how	  these	  groups	   interact	   with	   representatives	   of	   the	   state;	   how	   they	   put	   ideologies	   into	   the	  service	  of	  their	  interests	  and	  how	  they	  use	  or	  defy	  international	  constraints	  in	  order	  to	  further	  their	  cause.	  	  
Institutions	  	  Institutionalist	   approaches	   are	   usually	   classified	   into	   three	   branches	   –	   historical,	  rational	  choice	  and	  sociological	   institutionalism	  –	  according	  to	  their	  genesis	  and	  their	  specific	   theoretical	   assumptions	   (Hall	   and	  Taylor	   1996,	   Steinmo	  2008).	  However,	   for	  the	  purposes	  of	  reviewing	  competing	  and	  complementary	  theories	  of	  the	  structuralist	  framework	   offered	   here,	   Pontusson	   (1995)	   offers	   a	   more	   useful	   categorization	   by	  differentiating	   between	   intermediate	   organization-­‐centred,	   polity-­‐centred	   and	   state-­‐centred	   theories.	   These	   three	   groups	   of	   institutionalist	   theories	   allow	   for	  contemplating	  how	  interests	  are	  mediated	  by	  interest-­‐representing	  organizations,	  how	  preferences	  are	  allowed	  representation	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  arena	  via	  specific	  rules	  of	  the	   political	   game	   (such	   as	   electoral	   systems)	   and	   how	   decision	  making	   takes	   place	  within	  the	  state.	  	  In	   modern	   democratic	   societies,	   intermediate	   organizations	   –	   such	   as	   parties,	   trade	  unions,	  employer	  organizations,	  artisan	  associations	  etc.	  –	  normally	  serve	  the	  function	  of	  representing	  the	  clusters	  of	  interests	  and	  exerting	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  political	  and	  economic	   pressure	   that	   the	   above-­‐described	   structuralist	   theory	   focuses	   on.	  Institutionalist	   theories	   see	   these	   intermediate	   organizations	   as	   having	   their	  independent	  genesis	  and	  their	  independent	  effect	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  an	  important	  branch	  of	   the	   literature	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Grofman	  2008)	  contend	  that	   the	  crucial	   structural	   characteristics	   of	   party	   systems	   –	   the	   number	   of	   parties,	   their	  programmatic	  and	  ideological	  orientation,	  their	  predisposition	  towards	  coalitions	  etc.	  –	  are	  defined	  mostly	  by	  the	  electoral	  system	  of	  the	  given	  country.	  Others	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  historical	  contingency	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	  current	  partisan	   landscapes	  (Lipset	  and	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Rokkan	  1967,	  Sartori	  1969,	  Boix	  2009).	  Similarly,	  the	  literature	  on	  trade	  unions	  often	  concentrates	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   historical	   development	   in	   defining	   the	   strategies	   and	  strength	  of	  these	  interest-­‐representing	  institutions	  (e.g.	  Rothstein	  1992,	  Crouch	  1993).	  In	  this	  approach,	  differences	  in	  observed	  policy	  outcomes	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  variation	  in	  party	  and	  union	  strategies	  –	  subject	  to	  different	  electoral	  and	  party	  systems	  as	  well	  as	  the	  historical	  evolution	  of	  social	  partnership	  –	  without	  a	  need	  to	  explicitly	  spell	  out	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  current	  underlying	  societal	  interests	  in	  the	  given	  policy23.	  	  	  The	  theory	  offered	  here,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  interests	  determine	  the	   landscape	   of	   intermediate	   organizations.	   It	   is	   expected	   that	   there	   is	   normally	  congruence	  between	  such	  organizations	  –	  their	  supporter	  base	  and	  strategic	  outlook	  –	  and	  significant	  clusters	  of	   interests.	  Whenever	  new	  clusters	  of	   interests	  arise,	  a	  niche	  opens	   up	   in	   the	   organizational	   space	   that	   political	   entrepreneurs	   can	   occupy.	  Whenever	  interests	  change	  –	  under	  the	  effect	  of	  exogenous	  shocks	  or	  under	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  endogenously	  evolving	  economic	  situation	  –	  the	  organizations	  have	  to	  adapt	  their	  strategies	   and	   possibly	   face	   a	   transformation	   of	   their	   constituencies.	   In	   short,	  intermediate	   organizations	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   vehicles	   for	   underlying	   interests.	  Alliances	   and	   cooperation	   between	   the	   different	   intermediate	   organizations	   are	  expected	   to	   be	   the	   main	   avenue	   for	   forming	   coalitions	   among	   different	   clusters	   of	  interests.	   In	   some	   cases,	   individual	   organizations	   can	   serve	   as	   umbrellas	   for	   social	  coalitions,	   but	   as	   soon	   as	   coalitions	   break	   up	   and	   new	   ones	   reform,	   the	   umbrella	  organization	  has	  to	  adapt	  accordingly.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  model	  outlined	  above,	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  observe	  the	  stability	  or	  evolution	  of	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  different	  societal	   groups	   under	   pressure	   from	   the	   escalating	   fiscal	   problem	   to	   be	   directly	  reflected	   in	   a	   parallel	   stability	   or	   evolution	   of	   the	   strategic	   position	   of	   parties,	   trade	  unions	  etc.	  	  	  Inextricably	  intertwined	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  interest	  mediation	  through	  parties	  and	  other	  associations	   is	   the	   question	   of	   how	   interests	   are	   aggregated	   and	   channelled	   into	   the	  policy	  making	   sphere	   through	   electoral	   rules,	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   legislature	   and	  the	   executive	   as	   well	   as	   through	   corporatist	   practices.	   Institutionalist	   theories	  emphasize	   the	   independent	   role	   of	   such	   arrangements	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	   formal	  policy	  influence	  amongst	  different	  groups	  within	  society	  as	  well	  as	  their	  representative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Indeed,	  Steinmo’s	  (1989)	  paper	  about	  variations	  in	  tax	  systems	  as	  well	  as	  the	  theories	  reviewed	  in	  the	  introduction	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  electoral	  structures	  and	  government	  formation	  patterns	  on	  spending	  and	  deficits	   (e.g.	   Roubini	   and	   Sachs	   1989,	   Grilli	   et	   al	   1991,	   Spolaore	   1999,	   Balassone	   and	   Giordano	   2001,	  Hallerberg	  et	  al.	  2009)	  follow	  exactly	  such	  a	  logic	  when	  investigating	  fiscal	  outcomes.	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organizations	   (e.g.	   Cox	   and	   McCubbins	   2001,	   Taagepeera	   2009,	   Lijphart	   1999,	  Schmitter	  1974,	  1977,	  1999).	  	  The	  framework	  outlined	  here,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  posits	  the	  primacy	  of	  those	  sources	  of	  policy	   influence	  that	  are	   linked	  to	  different	  groups’	  position	   in	  the	  domestic	  economy	  and	   to	   their	   control	   over	   crucial	   resources,	   such	   as	   capital,	   labour,	   professional	  expertise,	   the	   ability	   to	   cause	   disruption	   etc.	   Thereby,	   it	   assigns	   the	   formal,	  institutionalized	  ways	   of	   channelling	   the	   preferences	   of	   different	   actors	   a	   secondary	  role.	   For	   example,	   a	   group	   that	   has	   been	   sidelined	   in	   the	   electoral	   and	   government	  formation	  process	  and	  lacks	  corporatist	  access	  to	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere,	  might	  still	  exert	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  and	  influence	  policy	  choices	  through	  control	  over	  its	  resources.	  Similarly,	  the	  formal	  electoral	  predominance	  or	  institutional	  veto	  rights	  of	  a	  group	   can	   be	   useless	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	   credible	   threat	   from	   other	   groups	   to	   use	   their	  economic	   position	   to	   frustrate	   policies	   not	   to	   their	   liking.	   Whether	   such	   positional	  sources	   of	   influence	   and	   weakness	   are	   eventually	   formalized	   –	   through	   changes	   in	  electoral,	  corporatist	  or	  other	  coordinative	  arrangements	  –	  is	  a	  different	  issue,	  but	  the	  theory	  offered	  here	  assumes	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  institutionalist	  approaches	  –	  that	  the	  formal	  provisions	  have	  little	  added	  impact	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  given	  group	  has	  a	  say	  in	  policies.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  model	  outlined	  above,	   it	   is	  expected	  that	  shifts	   in	  coalitions	  of	  interest	  –	  and	  consequently	  changes	  in	  the	  combination	  of	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  mobilized	  behind	  a	  given	  policy	  option	  –	  can	  either	  happen	  under	  unchanging	  institutional	   parameters	   or	   themselves	   be	   the	   cause	   behind	   changes	   in	   those	  parameters.	  	  The	   third	   important	   question	   that	   institutional	   theories	   focus	   on	   is	   the	   nature	   of	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  state.	  Most	  importantly,	  these	  theories	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  state	  itself	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  autonomous	  entity	  with	  its	  own	  set	  of	   objectives	   and	   preferences	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   policy	   formation.	   They	   investigate	  whether	   the	   institutional	   aspects	   of	   decision	   making	   lend	   state	   actors	   a	   degree	   of	  freedom	   to	   influence	   policy	   outcomes	   or	   they	   make	   the	   policy	   making	   process	  permeable	   to	   conflicting	   societal	   interests.	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   are	   looking	   for	  institutional	   structures	   that	   make	   the	   state	   “strong”	   or	   “weak”	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	  multitude	  of	  societal	  pressures	  (Krasner	  1978,	  Skocpol	  1985,	  Fukuyama	  2004).	  	  	  These	  considerations	  about	  the	  independent	  role	  of	  the	  state	  do	  not	  arise	  in	  context	  of	  the	  society-­‐centred	  theory	  presented	  here.	  Policy	  choices	  are	  by	  definition	  assumed	  to	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be	  the	  outcome	  of	  societal	  conflict,	  whereas	  the	  state	  itself	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  entity	  that	  has	  no	  weight	  of	  its	  own.	  Its	  policy	  authority	  is	  expected	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  societal	  support	  it	  can	  muster	  behind	  a	  given	  policy	  option,	  but	  that	  support	  needs	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  supporting	  group,	  rather	  than	  in	  some	  abstract	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  
Ideas	  	  Ideational	  approaches	  seek	  to	  capture	  the	  independent	  effect	  of	  cognitive	  factors	  in	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  adjustment.	  They	  argue	  that	  when	  a	  country	  radically	  alters	  its	  policy	  course,	   the	   constellation	   of	   interests	   and	   institutional	   parameters	  might	   explain	  why	  change	  was	   necessary,	   but	   not	   why	   a	   specific	   new	   course	  was	   chosen.	   Instead,	   they	  contend	   that	   the	   range	   of	   possible	   policy	   choices	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   scope	   of	   and	  direction	  of	  policy	  change	   is	  determined	  by	   two	  cognitive	   factors:	  what	  crucial	  actors	  believe	  are	  possible	  responses	  to	  existing	  policy	  issues,	  and	  how	  actors	  conceive	  their	  own	   interests	   in	   the	   given	   situation	   (Hall	   1993,	   Jacobsen	   1995,	   Blyth	   1997,	   2002,	  2003).	  	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  factors	  is	  usually	  investigated	  from	  a	  statist	  angle:	  i.e.	  authors	  look	  at	  how	  conversion	  to	  a	  new	  policy	  ‘paradigm’	  takes	  place	  or	  fails	  to	  take	  place	  within	  the	  policy	  making	  structures	  of	  the	  state,	  especially	  among	  technocratic	  apparatuses	  (Weir	  and	   Skocpol	   1985,	   Hall	   1993).	   This	   issue	   has	   little	   relevance	   for	   a	   society-­‐centred	  approach	   that	   underplays	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   as	   an	   independent	   actor.	   Instead,	   it	  constitutes	  a	  competing	  theory	  to	  explain	  policy	  change.	  	  	  The	  question	  of	  how	  societal	  actors’	  interests	  are	  defined,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  poses	  an	  intriguing	  challenge	  for	  a	  society-­‐centred	  theory	  that	  assumes	  interests	  to	  be	  materially	  given.	  Blyth	   (2002),	   in	  particular,	   underlines	   the	  power	  of	   ideas	   in	  making	   coalitions	  between	   different	   actors	   possible,	   by	   providing	   a	   cognitive	   basis	   for	   identifying	  commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   within	   society.	   This	   raises	   the	   question	  whether	  policy	  entrepreneurship	  –	  and	  therefore	  the	  agency	  of	  individual	  politicians	  or	  party	   elites	   –	   plays	   an	   independent	   role	   in	   influencing	   coalition	   formation	   between	  different	  clusters	  of	  societal	  interests	  and	  the	  choice	  between	  different	  policy	  options.	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  assumes	  that	  interests	  are	  objectively	  given,	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  entrepreneurs	  on	  the	  political	  market	  place	  to	  seize	  upon	  and	  nurture	  coalitions	  that	  enhance	  their	  political	  fortunes.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  model	  developed	  above,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  as	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  different	  actors	  evolve	  
	   51	  
under	  pressure	  from	  fiscal	  deterioration,	  a	  political	  actor	  (old	  or	  new)	  should	  decide	  to	  assume	   the	   role	   of	   the	   leading	   promoter	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization	   and	   thereby	   gain	   the	  support	   of	   those,	   who	   are	   now	   more	   interested	   in	   swift	   consolidation	   than	   in	   the	  defence	  of	  their	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  political	  status	  quo.	  	  
International	  constraints	  	  	  The	   question	   how	   the	   international	   economic	   and	   political	   environment	   affects	  domestic	   policy	   choices	   has	   occupied	   scholars	   in	   all	   three	   traditions	   of	   comparative	  political	  economy	  alike	  (Thatcher	  2007).	  Structuralists	  have	  focused	  on	  how	  changes	  in	  the	   international	   economy	   change	   the	   constellation	   of	   interests	   among	   domestic	  groups	  and	  how	  it	  thereby	  transforms	  domestic	  politics	  (e.g.	  Gourevitch	  1978,	  Frieden	  and	   Rogowski	   1996).	   Institutionalist	   scholars	   are	   interested	   in	   how	   domestic	  institutions	   mediate	   and	   modulate	   international	   changes	   in	   the	   domestic	   political	  sphere,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   how	   they	   are	   shaped	   by	   international	   pressures	   and	  adapted	  to	  better	  fit	  new	  conditions,	  on	  the	  other	  (e.g.	  Garrett	  and	  Lange	  1996,	  Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  2005).	   Ideational	  approaches	   look	  at	  how	  the	   international	  dissemination	  and	   acceptance	   of	   given	   policy	   paradigms	   influence	   policy	   convergence	   and	  international	  cooperation	  (e.g.	  McNamara	  1998).	  	  For	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making,	   international	   effects	   can	   become	   relevant	  through	  two	  channels.	  First	  of	  all,	  since	  the	  constellation	  of	  interests	  and	  the	  resources	  of	   domestic	   actors	   are	   posited	   to	   be	   the	   fundamental	   driving	   factors	   behind	   the	  accumulation	  of	  debt	  as	  well	  as	  an	  eventual	  consolidation,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  international	  developments	  on	  the	   interests	  and	  policy	   leverage	  of	  different	  groups	  are	  crucial.	  For	  example,	  changes	   in	  competitive	  conditions	  on	  the	   international	  markets	  –	  due	  to	  the	  integration	   of	   new,	   low-­‐cost	   producer	   countries,	   a	   change	   in	   technologies	   or	   a	  more	  complete	   liberalization	   of	   trade	   –	   can	   influence	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   different	   producer	  groups	   to	   the	   negative	   side	   effects	   of	   fiscal	   problems	   such	   as	   high	   inflation	   or	   high	  interest	  rates.	  Such	  a	  change	  is	  expected	  to	  alter	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  defending	  their	  vested	   interests	   and	   promoting	   consolidation,	   and	   thereby	   to	   influence	   the	   societal	  coalitions	  they	  form.	  Similarly,	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  lucrative	  investment	  or	  employment	  opportunities	   abroad	   can	   influence	   the	   ability	   of	   capital	   owners	   or	   workers	   to	  blackmail	  each	  other	  in	  the	  political	  process.	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Secondly,	   international	   economic	   and	   political	   coordination	  might	   limit	   the	   range	   of	  available	   policy	   options	   within	   a	   country.	   For	   example,	   exchange	   rate	   arrangements	  under	   Bretton	  Woods	   or	   the	   European	   Monetary	   System	   (EMS)	   put	   a	   constraint	   on	  monetary	  policies	   in	  participating	  countries.	  This	  had	   indirect	  consequences	   for	   fiscal	  policy	  as	  well,	  insofar	  as	  the	  monetization	  of	  debt	  clashed	  with	  the	  commitment	  to	  fixed	  exchange	   rates.	   In	   the	   Economic	   and	   Monetary	   Union,	   monetary	   autonomy	   is	  completely	   ceded.	   An	   instance	   of	   a	   more	   direct	   limit	   on	   fiscal	   policy	   options	   of	  countries	  is	  the	  system	  of	  fiscal	  surveillance	  and	  excessive	  deficit	  procedures	  that	  were	  launched	   in	  Europe	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   euro,	   placing	   ceilings	   on	   admissible	   deficits.	  The	  crucial	  question	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   to	  what	  extent	  a	   country’s	  willingness	   to	  enter	  into	   and	   to	   comply	   with	   commitments	   within	   such	   international	   and	   European	  frameworks	   of	   cooperation	   should	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   exogenously	   given	  parameter	  of	  domestic	  politics	  or	  seen	  itself	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  domestic	  struggles	  over	  economic	   policy.	   This	   question	   can	   only	   be	   answered	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   by	  empirically	   investigating	  the	  relative	   influence	  of	   international	  political	  and	  economic	  pressures	  and	  the	  domestic	  political	  impetuses	  in	  the	  two-­‐level	  game24	  of	  international	  cooperation.	  	  
Conclusion:	  observing	  societal	  struggle	  over	  fiscal	  stabilization	  	  	  By	   spelling	   out	   in	   detail	   the	   divergences	   between	   the	   model	   offered	   here	   and	  alternative	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  policy	  making,	  this	  section	  also	  provided	  a	  series	  of	   observable	   implications	   for	   the	   hypothesized	   explanation	   for	   excessive	   debt	  accumulation.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   the	   model	   operates	   with	   largely	   abstract	  variables	   and	   actors,	   whose	   concrete	   manifestations	   in	   political	   life	   and	   their	  relationship	   to	   observable	   political	   phenomena	   –	   such	   as	   parties,	   interest	   groups,	  electoral	   rules	   and	   corporatist	   arrangements,	   state	   structures,	   ideologies	   and	  international	   arrangements	   –	   need	   to	   be	   clarified.	   	   This	   section	   summarizes	   these	  implications	  in	  a	  list	  of	  points.	  	  1. Intermediate	  organizations	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  vehicles	  for	  representing	  clusters	  of	   interests	   within	   society.	   In	   other	   words,	   their	   organizational	   parameters	   and	  strategic	   choices	   are	   expected	   to	   derive	   from	   the	   underlying	   constellation	   of	  interests	   within	   the	   polity.	   Organizations	   –	   parties,	   trade	   unions,	   employer	  associations	   etc.	   –	   either	   stand	   for	   a	   well	   delineable	   cluster	   of	   interests	   or	   for	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Putnam	  (1988).	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coalition	  of	  interests.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  separate	  clusters	  are	  likely	  to	  represent	  factions	  or	  cliques	  within	  the	  same	  organization.	  Accordingly,	  coalitions	  of	  interests	  can	  be	  formed	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  a	  single	  organization	  or	  through	  cooperation	  among	  organizations	  for	  a	  common	  policy	  goal.	  As	  the	  conflicts	  and	  commonalities	  of	   interests	   evolve,	   intermediate	   organizations	   have	   to	   adopt	   their	   strategies	   and	  suffer/enjoy	   a	   transformation	   of	   their	   constituencies,	   membership	   or	   supporter	  base.	  Adaptation	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	   the	  constellation	  of	   interests	  can	  also	  happen	  through	   the	   rise	   of	   new	   and	   the	   fall	   of	   old	   interest	   representing	   organizations.	  Consequently,	   as	   fiscal	   problems	   become	   progressively	  more	   severe	   in	   a	   country	  suffering	  from	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  –	  and	  the	  preferences	  of	  societal	  actors	  towards	   fiscal	   stabilization	  evolve	  –	   this	   is	   expected	  be	   reflected	   in	   the	   strategies	  and	  fortunes	  of	  parties	  and	  other	  interest	  representing	  organizations.	  	  2. Policy	  choices	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  closely	  correspond	  to	  the	  formal	  distribution	  of	  power	   among	   intermediate	   organizations.	   Electoral	   strength	   or	   the	  presence/absence	  of	  corporatist	  consultation	  procedures	  and	  veto	  rights	  might	  not	  always	   explain	   why	   a	   policy	   choice	   was	   taken	   or	   a	   policy	   initiative	   failed.	   Such	  discrepancies	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  account	   for	  based	  on	  the	   leverage	  of	  different	  societal	  groups	  arising	   from	  their	  position	  within	  the	  economy	  and	   in	  the	  societal	  coalition	   they	   form	  part	  of.	  Accordingly,	  very	  similar	   stabilization	  packages	  might	  fail	  and	  then	  eventually	  succeed	  in	  a	  largely	  unchanged	  electoral	  setting	  or	  amongst	  similar	   corporatist	   arrangements	   if	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   shifts	   between	   groups	  and/or	  coalitions	  reconfigure.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  within	   coalitions	   might	   themselves	   trigger	   changes	   in	   electoral	   rules	   and	  corporatist	  arrangements.	  	  3. State	   actors	   are	   not	   assumed	   to	   have	   autonomous	   power	   to	   influence	   policy	  choices.	   The	   presence	   of	   strong	   advocates	   of	   a	   given	   policy	   option	   within	   the	  echelons	   of	   the	   state	   –	   especially	   amongst	   the	   technocratic	   elite	   –	   only	   matter	  insofar	  as	   their	  views	  are	  backed	  by	  a	  strong	  enough	  political	   coalition.	  Similarly,	  institutional	   arrangements	   that	   are	   aimed	   at	   guiding	   policies	   in	   a	   predetermined	  direction	  –	  such	  as	  rules,	  procedures	  or	  the	  centralization	  of	  decisions	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  single	  decision	  maker	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  public	  spending	  –	  are	  only	  expected	  to	  work,	   if	   that	   pre-­‐defined	   direction	   has	   the	   necessary	   societal	   support.	   In	   other	  words,	   insulating	   the	   state	   from	   the	   pressure	   of	   societal	   groups	   through	  institutional	  engineering	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  possible.	  Consequently,	  technocratic	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initiatives	   to	   alter	   the	   fiscal	   policy	   course	   and	   stem	   borrowing	   are	   expected	   to	  succeed	  only	  in	  conjunction	  with	  underlying	  a	  rearrangement	  of	  societal	  coalitions	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  stabilization	  initiative.	  	  4. Ideologies	   are	   a	  powerful	   tool	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   political	   entrepreneurs	   in	   cobbling	  together	  new	  coalitions	  of	   societal	   interests.	  However,	   the	   successful	   realignment	  of	   coalitions	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   predicated	   upon	   the	   transformation	   of	   underlying	  material	   interests	   of	   the	   groups	   involved.	   Since,	   the	   attitude	   of	   different	   societal	  groups	  towards	  stabilization	  involving	  potential	  sacrifices	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  affected	  by	   the	   negative	   side	   effects	   of	   fiscal	   problems,	   new	   coalitions	   are	   only	   possible	  amongst	   groups	   that	   suffer	   similar	   levels	  of	  harm	   from	  such	   side	  effects.	  Political	  entrepreneurs	   might	   seize	   upon	   the	   growing	   but	   yet	   politically	   unharnessed	  discontent	  with	  the	  policy	  status	  quo	  amongst	  the	  affected	  groups,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  expected	   to	  have	  much	  manoeuvring	   space	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   coalition	   they	   can	  assemble.	  	  5. International	   constraints	   are	   assumed	   to	   act	   upon	   domestic	   policies	   through	   the	  behaviour	   of	   societal	   actors.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization,	   conditions	   on	  international	  markets	  are	  expected	  to	  influence	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  certain	  groups	  to	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation.	  International	  commitments,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  both	  exogenous	  and	  endogenous	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  assuming	  such	  commitments	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  just	  as	  much	  the	  outcome	  of	  policy	  struggles	  as	  an	  important	  constraining	  factor	  on	  them.	  	  These	  institutional,	  ideational	  and	  international	  considerations	  make	  the	  theory	  based	  on	   Gourevitch’s	   societal	   coalitions	   approach	   and	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   more	  complete.	  The	  next	  section	  investigates	  the	  methodological	  considerations	  involved	  in	  empirically	   applying	   this	   theory	   to	  better	  understand	  excessive	  debt	   accumulation	   in	  certain	   countries	   and	   in	   gauging	   its	   exploratory	  power	   relative	   to	  other	   explanations	  via	  analysing	  the	  experiences	  of	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  with	  dangerous	  debt.	  	  
Methodology:	  Studying	  the	  societal	  background	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  	  	  	  This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  explain	  a	  puzzling	  policy	  outcome	  –	  potentially	  disastrous	  debt	  accumulation	   in	   prosperous	   developed	   countries	   –	   by	   marrying	   two	   very	   different	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theoretical	  approaches.	  Gourevitch’s	  societal	  coalitions	  approach	  provides	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  mapping	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context	  of	  policy	  making,	  whereas	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  helps	  to	  track	  and	  explain	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  central	  variable	  of	   that	  context	  –	  the	  interests	  of	  societal	  groups	  –	  through	  time.	  The	  thesis	  uses	  this	  combined	  theoretical	   framework	   to	   explore	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   policy-­‐making	   in	   Belgium	   and	  Italy	   –	   two	   countries	   that	   had	  profound	  difficulties	   in	   controlling	   the	   growth	  of	   their	  public	   debt	   in	   the	  past	   decades	   –	   and	   to	   explain	   the	  policy	   trajectory	   that	   led	   to	   this	  risky	  outcome.	  	  	  Through	  this	   investigation,	   the	  thesis	  aims	  to	  achieve	  three	  goals.	  First,	   it	  probes	   into	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  posited	  here	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  observed	  policy	  course	  and	  political	  developments	  in	  these	  two	  countries	   (Eckstein	   1992	   pp147-­‐152).	   In	   conjunction	   with	   this,	   it	   explores	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   proposed	   here	   and	   alternative	  theories	  about	   the	  determinants	  of	   fiscal	  outcomes.	   It	  seeks	  to	  establish	  their	  relative	  explanatory	   power	   for	   the	   two	   concrete	   cases	   and	   explore	   complementarities	   and	  contradictions	   between	   them.	   Second,	   the	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   further	   develop	   the	  theoretical	  framework	  by	  observing	  the	  empirical	  manifestations	  of	  the	  core	  concepts	  the	  theory	  is	  based	  on.	  This	  is	   likely	  to	  yield	  interesting	  insights	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  further	   research,	   because	   of	   the	   theoretical	   choice	   taken	  here	  not	   to	   identify	  a	  priori	  key	  societal	  actors,	  sources	  of	  societal	  influence,	  mechanisms	  of	  coalition-­‐formation	  etc.	  Third,	  the	  case	  studies	  seek	  to	  build	  a	  coherent	  template	  for	  marrying	  the	  very	  different	  methodological	  approaches	  that	  the	  two	  component	  parts	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  require.	   The	   Gourevitchian	   approach	   calls	   for	   historically	   informed,	   “thick”	   socio-­‐political	   description	   whereas	   the	   game	   theoretical	   model	   uses	   formal	   analytical	  methods	   to	  provide	  a	  handful	  of	   testable	  predictions	  about	   the	  behaviour	  of	  different	  actors	   through	   time.	   The	   case	   studies	   develop	   a	   consistent	   procedure	   for	   weaving	  together	   these	   two	  different	  methodological	   requirements.	  This	   section	  describes	   the	  empirical	   strategy	   that	   the	   thesis	   follows	   in	   order	   to	   realise	   these	   goals.	   First,	   it	  explains	  the	  motivation	  for	  choosing	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  as	  historical	  examples	  to	  study.	  Then	   it	   expounds	   on	   the	   method	   for	   using	   the	   findings	   to	   evaluate	   the	   explanatory	  power	   of	   the	   theory	   relative	   to	   alternative	   propositions	   and	   specifies	   the	   way	   the	  relevant	  empirical	  detail	  is	  teased	  out	  of	  the	  concrete	  cases.	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Case	  selection	  	  Italy	   and	  Belgium	   are	   highly	   relevant	   examples	   of	   the	   puzzle	   that	   this	   thesis	   tries	   to	  explain.	   The	   question	   to	   be	   answered	   here	   is	   why	   certain	   countries	   “flirt	   with	   fiscal	  disaster”.	   Why	   do	   they	   fail	   to	   eliminate	   imbalances	   in	   their	   public	   finances	   that	  threaten	  with	  debt	  crisis	  and	  default	  and	  what	  does	  it	  depend	  on	  when	  they	  manage	  to	  reverse	   their	   risky	   policy	   course?	   Italy	   and	   Belgium	   were	   struggling	   with	   such	  imbalances	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Both	  countries	  borrowed	  heavily	  and	  persistently	  throughout	  the	   1980s,	   and	   by	   the	   early	   1990s	   both	   had	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratios	   well	   in	   excess	   of	   a	  hundred	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  GDP.	  At	   the	  time	  of	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  Maastricht	  criteria,	   it	  was	  widely	  assumed	  that	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  were	  the	  targets	  of	  these	  criteria,	  because	  both	  were	  deemed	  fiscally	  too	  vulnerable	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  monetary	  union.	  	  	  The	  two	  countries’	  fiscal	  problems	  were	  quite	  substantial	  in	  international	  comparison,	  too.	   Figure	   2.1	   shows	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   development	   of	   the	   debt	   to	   GDP	   ratio	   of	  selected	  OECD	   countries25	   from	  1975	   to	   200526.	   It	   shows	   that	  Belgium	  was	   the	  most	  indebted	  developed	  country	  in	  the	  world	  throughout	  the	  1980s,	  until	  Italy	  overtook	  it	  in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   to	   be	   then	   overtaken	   by	   Japan	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   decade27.	   Of	   all	  OECD-­‐countries,	  Belgium,	  Italy,	  Ireland,	  Canada,	  Greece	  and	  Japan	  have	  dealt	  with	  gross	  debt	   stocks	   close	   to	   or	   in	   excess	   of	   a	   hundred	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP	   in	   the	   past	   three	  decades28.	  A	   similar	   ranking	   is	  observable	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  net	   financial	   liabilities	  of	  the	  governments29	  in	  the	  same	  period	  in	  Figure	  2.230.	  	  	  All	   of	   these	   countries	   would	   be	   fascinating	   cases	   to	   study,	   but	   Belgium	   and	   Italy	  perhaps	   best	   exemplify	   the	   puzzle	   in	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Both	   have	   consistently	  ranked	   among	   the	   most	   prosperous	   developed	   countries	   of	   the	   world	   as	   shown	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  For	  reasons	  of	  presentation,	  the	  graph	  only	  shows	  those	  OECD	  countries	  for	  which	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  figures	  are	   available	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   until	   the	   mid-­‐2000s.	   Debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   figures	   for	   all	   OECD	   countries	   are	  shown	  in	  the	  graph	  in	  Appendix	  2	  (for	  years	  depending	  on	  data	  availability).	  26	  Debt	  figures	  are	  shown	  here	  only	  until	  2005	  in	  order	  to	  disregard	  the	  confounding	  effects	  of	  the	  present	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  on	  fiscal	   figures.	  Debts	   incurred	  in	  the	  past	  four	  years	  will	  be	  an	  important	  problem	   for	   countries	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come	   and	   it	   will	   therefore	   be	   interesting	   to	   study	   how	   different	  governments	  adapt	  public	  spending	  and	  revenues	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  challenge.	  At	  this	  point,	  however,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	   the	  eventual	  policy	  responses,	   the	  shocks	  are	  more	  of	  a	  confounding	   factor	  than	  useful	  information.	  27	  Countries	  are	  sorted	  according	  to	  their	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  in	  1990.	  28	  Of	  all	  the	  countries	  that	  were	  excluded	  from	  Graph	  2.1	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  continuous	  data,	  only	  Israel	  has	  had	  a	  similar	  debt	  problem	  to	  the	  six	  countries	  listed	  above,	  with	  a	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  that	  peaked	  at	  102	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  1995.	  29	  N.B.	  the	  lack	  of	  figures	  for	  Ireland	  before	  2000	  hide	  the	  problems	  of	  that	  country	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  30	   Countries	   are	   sorted	   according	   to	   their	   net	   liabilities	   in	   2000,	   the	   first	   year	   for	   which	   figures	   are	  available	  for	  all	  countries.	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Figure	  2.3.	   In	   this	   respect,	   Ireland	  and	  Greece	  are	   less	   ideal	   candidates,	   as	   they	  were	  two	  of	  the	  poorest	  OECD	  countries	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  when	  they	  registered	  the	  greatest	   increases	   in	  their	  debt	  stock.	  Furthermore,	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  displayed	  a	  sustained	  inability	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  debt	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  1980s	  and	  the	  early	  1990s.	   In	   this	  respect,	   Japan	   is	  a	   less	  suitable	  case	  with	  a	  much	  shorter	  experience	  with	  alarming	  net	  debt	  growth,	  which	  only	  seriously	  started	   in	   the	  2000s.	  Canada’s	  experience	  with	  debt	  growth	  and	  then	  consolidation	  is	  somewhat	  unique	  due	  to	   the	   dependence	   of	   that	   country	   on	   resource	   revenues.	   Canadian	   fiscal	   problems	  seem	  largely	  correlated	  with	  a	  slump	  in	  resource	  rents	  from	  the	  early	  1980s	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  whereas	   the	  recovery	  benefited	  greatly	   from	  a	  sizeable	   increase	   in	  oil	  and	  gas	  royalties	  from	  the	  early	  1990s,	  which	  provided	  a	  windfall	  support	  for	  governments	  in	  balancing	   the	   budget31.	   In	   sum,	   Belgium	   and	   Italy	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   most	   suitable	  examples	  of	  prosperous	  countries	  that	  steadily	  amassed	  excessive	  amounts	  of	  debt	   in	  times	  of	  peace	  and	  prosperity.	  	  
Figure2.	  1	  -­	  Gross	  consolidated	  debt	  general	  government	  in	  selected	  OECD	  countries	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  For	  figures	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  resource	  rents	  in	  Canada,	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  see	  the	  World	   Development	   Indicators	   Database	   of	   the	   World	   Bank:	   data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/world-­‐development-­‐	  indicators.	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Figure2.	  2	  –	  Net	  financial	  liabilities	  of	  general	  government	  in	  selected	  OECD	  countries	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  OECD.Stat	  
	  
Figure2.	  3–	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  constant	  prices	  in	  selected	  OECD	  countries	  
USD,	  constant	  PPPs	  
Source:	  OECD.stat	  
	  	  Beyond	   being	   obvious	   examples	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   under	   consideration,	   the	   two	  countries	   also	   display	   interesting	   variation	   in	   the	   ways	   they	   were	   able	   to	   deal	   with	  their	   fiscal	   problems	   in	   subsequent	   periods.	   Italy	   had	   a	   promising	   bout	   of	   fiscal	  tightening	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  but	  it	  relapsed	  into	  sizable	  deficits	  after	  2000,	  and	  failed	  to	  harness	   the	  beneficial	   effects	  of	   its	   temporary	  efforts	  and	   its	  EMU-­‐accession	  on	   its	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interest	  burden	   to	   further	  eliminate	   its	  excessive	  debt.	  By	   the	  mid-­‐2000s,	   its	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  was	  on	  the	  rise	  again	  and	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  crisis,	  it	  was	  back	  to	  where	  it	  had	  been	   in	   the	   early	   1990s.	   Belgium,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   regained	   control	   over	   its	  borrowing	  and	  significantly	   reduced	   its	   indebtedness	   in	   the	  past	   two	  decades.	  By	   the	  time	   the	   crisis	   started,	   most	   of	   the	   damage	   of	   the	   1980s	   had	   been	   undone	   and	   the	  country’s	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	  was	   in	   a	  more	  moderate	   range	   (see	  Figure	  2.4).	   In	   other	  words,	   after	   having	   encountered	   the	   same	   problem	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   shown	   similar	  difficulties	   in	   dealing	   with	   it	   initially,	   the	   two	   countries	   showed	   very	   different	  performance	   in	   later	   periods.	   Therefore,	   this	   choice	   of	   countries	   entails	   considerable	  variation	   on	   the	   dependent	   variable	   both	   within	   countries	   across	   time	   and	   across	  countries	   in	   the	   same	   period.	   This	   facilitates	   both	   probing	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	  theoretical	   framework	   proposed	   here	   and	   its	   further	   development	   by	   observing	  significant	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  each	  case.	  	  
Figure2.	  4	  –	  The	  evolution	  of	  gross	  government	  debt	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Ameco	  and	  Belgostat	  
	  	  An	   additional	   appeal	   of	   the	   two	   country	   cases	   is	   that	   they	   display	   considerable	  variation	   on	   aspects	   that	   a	   large	   stream	  of	   alternative	   theories	   of	   fiscal	   performance	  focuses	  on.	  The	  significant	  institutional	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	   period	   under	   consideration	   allow	   the	   case	   studies	   to	   speak	   to	   the	   literature	   that	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emphasizes	   the	   institutional	   determinants	   of	   fiscal	   discipline.	   Political	   institutions	  changed	  considerably	  in	  both	  countries.	  Italy	  adopted	  an	  important	  electoral	  reform	  in	  1993,	  whereas	  Belgium	  underwent	  waves	  of	  federalizing	  reforms,	  which	  progressively	  devolved	  fiscal	  decisions	  to	  the	  regional	  level.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  party	  system	  was	  completely	  transformed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s.	  Furthermore,	  both	  countries	  gave	  up	  their	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy	  by	  joining	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  and	  both	  adopted	  various	  domestic	  budgetary	   institutions	   in	  order	   to	   improve	   their	   fiscal	  management	  and	  subjected	  themselves	  to	  external	  fiscal	  oversight	  under	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	   and	   the	   fiscal	   rules	   of	   the	   Stability	   and	   Growth	   Pact.	   This	   variation	   on	   the	  institutional	  aspects	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  allow	  not	  only	  for	  evaluating	  the	  relative	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  society-­‐centred	  theoretical	  framework	  compared	  to	   the	   institutional	   theories	   but	   also	   for	   detecting	   complementarities	   and	  contradictions	  as	  well	  as	  relations	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  superiority	  between	  them.	  	  	  	  Studying	   these	   two	  countries’	   experiences	  with	  alarming	  debt	  growth	  does	  not	   allow	  for	  rigorously	  testing	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  advanced	  in	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  the	  nature	   of	   the	   argument	  made	   here	   does	   not	  make	   a	   controlled	   comparison	   of	   cases	  possible.	   The	   theoretical	   framework	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   identified	   in	  abstract	  terms	  the	  relevant	  units	  of	  analysis	  and	  laid	  out	  a	  general	  mechanism	  through	  which	  these	  units	  are	  expected	  to	  drive	  the	  observed	  outcomes	  of	  interests.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  explicitly	  forewent	  defining	  in	  more	  concrete	  terms	  the	  observable	  implications	  of	  the	  posited	  mechanism	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  prematurely	  limiting	  the	  application	  of	  the	   theory	   by	   hypothesizing	   what	   content	   the	   abstract	   concepts	   will	   assume	   in	   the	  empirical	  cases.	  For	  example,	  it	  did	  not	  specify	  the	  type	  of	  economic	  arrangements	  that	  would	   create	   constellations	   of	   interests	   that	   make	   a	   country	   more	   or	   less	   prone	   to	  difficulties	  in	  stabilizing	  its	  public	  finances.	  It	  did	  not	  identify	  the	  types	  of	  economic	  or	  societal	   cleavages	   that	   determine	   the	   probability	   of	   dangerous	   fiscal	   trajectories.	  Instead,	  it	  clarified	  a	  logic	  along	  which	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  is	  expected	  to	  work.	  This	   lack	  of	  a	  more	  concrete	  definition	  of	   the	   independent	  variables	  makes	   the	  application	  of	  Mill’s	  methods	  unfeasible.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  to	  gain	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   possible	   concrete	   content	   that	   the	   key	   units	   of	  analysis	   and	   explanatory	   variables	   can	   assume	   and	   thereby	   further	   develop	   the	  theoretical	  framework.	  	  
	   61	  
The	  empirical	  strategy	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  case	  studies	  do	  seek	  to	  provide	  a	  plausibility	  probe	  for	  the	  theory.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   this	   is	   facilitated	  by	   the	  choice	  of	   cases,	  which	  display	  considerable	  variation	   on	   the	   variable	   of	   interests.	   The	   case	   studies	   use	   the	   society-­‐centred	  theoretical	   framework	   developed	   above	   to	   explain	   the	   observed	   changes	   in	   policy	  outcomes	   through	   time	   and	   the	  differences	   across	   countries.	  They	   compare	   the	   fit	   of	  these	  explanations	  with	  alternative	  ones	  based	  on	  government	  centred-­‐theories.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   the	   case	   studies	   also	   gauge	   the	   fit	   of	   the	   theory	  with	   the	   observed	   facts	  through	   carefully	   tracing	   the	   empirical	   observations	   the	   mechanism	   that	   the	   theory	  outlines,	   leading	   from	   the	   interests	   of	   societal	   groups	   to	   the	   observed	   levels	   of	  borrowing.	   They	   register	   developments	   on	   four	   different	   levels.	   Besides	   tracing	   the	  variable	  of	  interest	  (borrowing),	  they	  also	  investigate	  and	  explain	  choices	  made	  about	  different	  expenditure	  and	  revenue	  items,	  follow	  and	  account	  for	  political	  developments	  –	  such	  as	  changes	  in	  party	  and	  union	  behaviour	  or	  shifts	  in	  electoral	  and	  membership	  support	   –	   and	   point	   out	   changes	   in	   the	   economic	   situation	   of	   societal	   groups.	   The	  analysis	  shifts	  between	  these	  four	  levels	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  a	  continuous	   link	   from	   the	   interests	   and	   policy	   preferences	   of	   societal	   groups	   to	   their	  political	  choices	   to	   the	  decisions	  of	  political	  actors	  and,	   finally,	   to	  policy	  outcomes.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  tracing	  of	  the	  political	  process	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  “process-­‐tracing”	  in	  the	  methodological	  sense,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  contrasting	  the	  explanation	  for	  developments	   along	  each	   step	  of	   the	  procedure	  with	   alternative	   theories	   about	   fiscal	  outcomes	  (George	  and	  Bennett	  Ch10).	  Since	  theories	  about	  fiscal	  discipline	  concentrate	  strictly	   on	  what	  happens	  within	   the	  narrowly	  understood	  governmental	   sphere,	   they	  do	   not	   provide	   predictions	   about	   the	   phases	   of	   the	   process	   that	   lie	   outside	   of	   this	  sphere.	  	  	  The	  close	  tracing	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  and	  the	  shifting	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  analysis	  between	  policy,	   politics	   and	   society	   is	   also	   useful	   in	   dealing	  with	   the	  methodological	  difficulties	  entailed	  in	  combining	  Gourevitch’s	  emphasis	  on	  historical	  accuracy	  with	  the	  formal	   analysis	   of	   the	   game	   of	   attrition	   model.	   Gourevitch’s	   societal	   coalitions	  framework	   provides	   the	   bridge	   from	   policies	   through	   politics	   to	   societal	   actors,	  whereas	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  provides	  a	  heuristic	  device	  to	  analytically	   identify	  the	  factors	  that	  bear	  upon	  the	  choices	  of	  the	  societal	  actors.	  Therefore,	  each	  case	  study	  first	   uses	   “thick”	   historical	   description	   to	   identify	   societal	   coalitions	   behind	   a	   given	  political	   constellation	   observed	   in	   the	   given	   country.	   Then	   it	   uses	   the	   categories	   and	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mechanisms	   provided	   by	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   observed	  changes	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  constellation	  of	  societal	  coalitions32.	  For	  the	  thick	  historical	  detail,	  the	  case	  studies	  rely	  on	  secondary	  sources.	  They	  use	  existing	  historical,	  political	  and	   sociological	   analyses	   of	   the	   given	   countries	   to	   understand	   the	   socio-­‐economic	  structure	   underlying	   policy	  making	   in	   each	   polity.	   They	   use	   these	   existing	   studies	   as	  the	   basis	   for	   inferences	   about	   the	   configuration	   of	   societal	   interests	   towards	   fiscal	  policies	   and	   about	   the	  distribution	   of	   political	   influence.	   It	   is	   these	   inferred	   interests	  that	  are	   then	  used	   to	  explain	   the	  observed	   fiscal	  policy	  patterns,	  which	  are	  extracted	  from	  government	  finance	  statistics.	  	  The	  next	  four	  chapters	  apply	  this	  empirical	  strategy	  in	  attempting	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  experiences	  of	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  with	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  the	  past	  three	  decades.	   Each	   country	   study	   is	   divided	   into	   two	   parts.	   The	   first	   part	   explores	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  alarming	  debt	  growth	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  explains	  why	  the	  appropriate	   policy	   response	   was	   initially	   delayed	   by	   analysing	   the	   socio-­‐political	  context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	  making.	  The	   second	  half	   of	   each	   country	   study	  describes	  how	  each	   country	   addressed	   the	   debt	   problem	   in	   later	   periods.	   The	   last	   chapter	   gives	   an	  overview	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  with	  a	  special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  theoretical	  insights	  to	  be	  gleaned	  from	  each.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  It	  is	  perhaps	  useful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  although	  the	  combination	  of	  historical	  description	  and	  game	  theory	  closely	  resembles	  the	  method	  known	  as	  analytic	  narrative	  (Bates	  et	  al.	  1998),	  the	  methodological	  approach	  used	  here	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  analytic	  narratives.	  Analytic	  narratives	  are	  inductive.	  They	  build	  models	   to	   explain	   specific	  historical	   cases	   and	   then	  attempt	   to	  draw	  generalizable	   conclusions	   from	   the	  formal	   representation	   of	   the	   observed	   facts.	   In	   the	   approach	   applied	   here,	   a	   general	  model’s	   empirical	  plausibility	  is	  gauged	  using	  concrete	  cases.	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Appendix	  1.	  to	  Chapter	  2.	  	   	   The	  war	  of	  attrition	  game	  
	  This	  appendix	  discusses	  some	  game	  theoretical	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  of	  delayed	  fiscal	  stabilization	  developed	  by	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  (1991).	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  model	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  basic	  public	  goods	  game	  in	  which	  actors	  decide	  whether	  to	  make	   private	   contributions	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   non-­‐excludable	   public	   benefit.	   It	  explains	  the	  central	  role	  of	  time	  and	  cognitive	  factors	  in	  yielding	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  fiscal	  game.	  Then	  it	  presents	  the	  observable	  predictions	  of	  the	  mathematical	  modelling.	  	  
Fiscal	  stabilization	  as	  a	  public	  good	  	  The	  modelling	  of	   the	  political	   economy	  of	   fiscal	   stabilization	   sets	  off	   from	   the	   insight	  that	   a	   welfare-­‐improving	   policy	   adjustment	   in	   a	   policy	   area	   with	   distributive	  consequences	   is	   analogous	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   a	   public	   good	   can	   be	   provided	   to	  members	  of	  a	  community	  (Roubini	  and	  Sachs	  1989,	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  1991,	  Drazen	  2000).	   Fiscal	   stabilization	   is	   assumed	   to	   improve	  welfare	   because	   it	   contributes	   to	   a	  generally	   more	   stable	   economic	   environment.	   Lower	   and	   more	   stable	   inflation	   and	  interest	  rates,	  lower	  share	  of	  tax	  revenues	  spent	  on	  debt	  service	  burden,	  more	  efficient	  working	   of	   automatic	   stabilizers	   and	   Keynesian	   demand	   management	   etc.	   benefit	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  although	  the	  utility	  accruing	  to	  different	  sections	  might	  be	  different	  (Artis	   and	   Buti	   2005).	   For	   example,	   low	   inflation	   is	   less	   important	   for	   those	   with	  indexed	   incomes	   etc.	   The	   costs	   of	   stabilization	   are	   either	   private,	   when	   taxes	   are	  increase	  and	  entitlements	  are	  cut;	  or	  public	  when	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment	  are	  cut.	  Admittedly	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  different	  public	  spending	  items	  that	  cover	  intermediate	   ranges	   of	   the	   private-­‐public	   continuum.	   For	   example,	   expenditure	   on	  education	  and	  health	  care	  are	  more	  directly	  related	  to	  private	  consumption	  –	  especially	  for	   certain	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   –	   while	   defence	   spending	   or	   investment	   in	  infrastructure	  is	  closest	  to	  pure	  public	  spending.	  	  	  The	   fact	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation,	   players	   can	   opt	   for	   trading	   in	   public	  goods	   (through	   cuts	   in	   public	   consumption	   and	   investment)	   for	   the	   public	   benefits	  associated	  with	  stabilization	  does	  not	  cause	  too	  much	  of	  a	  discrepancy	  with	  the	  analogy	  of	  public	  good	  provision.	  As	  long	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  items	  on	  which	  spending	  are	  cut	  have	  a	  positive	  net	  benefit	  for	  the	  public,	  such	  a	  conversion	  of	  one	  public	  benefit	  for	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another	  essentially	  amounts	  just	  to	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  players	  trade	  off	  publicly	  shared	  benefits	  for	  private	  savings.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  benefit	  of	  stabilization	  is	  not	  bought	  at	  private	  cost	  but	  in	  return	  for	  foregoing	  a	  publicly	  shared	  benefit.	  	  	  
Uncertainty	  in	  the	  public	  goods	  game	  	  The	  problem	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  is	  free	  riding.	  A	  public	  good	  requires	   private	   contributions,	   but	   no	   one	   can	   be	   excluded	   from	   sharing	   its	   benefits.	  Whether	  such	  a	  good	  is	  provided,	  depends	  on	  the	  individual	  decision	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  Each	  member	  has	  the	  option	  to	  agree	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  public	  good	  or	  to	  try	  to	  free-­‐ride	  on	  others’	  contributions.	  If	  at	  least	  one	  member	  of	  the	   community	   agrees	   to	   pay,	   the	   good	  will	   be	   provided.	   If	   there	   are	  more	  members	  willing	   to	   pay,	   they	   share	   the	   costs.	   If	   all	  members	  wait	   for	   others	   to	   do	   it	   (i.e.	   they	  choose	  to	  free-­‐ride),	  the	  public	  good	  will	  not	  be	  provided.	  	  The	  pay-­‐off	  matrix	  in	  Figure	  A.1.	  demonstrates	  the	  choices	  and	  possible	  outcomes	  that	  individuals	   face	   in	   a	   simple,	   static,	   two-­‐player	   example	   of	   the	   public	   good	   provision	  game.	  The	  public	  as	  a	  whole	  (player	  A	  and	  B	  together)	   is	  better	  off,	  when	  the	  good	   is	  provided	  if	  the	  benefit	  enjoyed	  by	  all	  minus	  the	  full	  cost	  is	  greater	  than	  zero.	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  that	  the	  individuals	  are	  better	  off	  paying	  for	  the	  public	  good	  alone	  (and	  letting	  the	  other	  free-­‐ride)	  than	  not	  having	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  public	  good	  at	  all,	  whenever	  the	  individual	   benefit	  minus	   the	   full	   cost	   of	   the	   public	   good	   is	   greater	   than	   zero.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  even	  if	  all	  of	  the	  former	  are	  true,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  the	  final	  outcome	  is	  the	   socially	   inferior	   one	  where	   the	  public	   good	   is	   not	  provided,	   if	   all	   players	   tried	   to	  maximize	  their	  net	  benefit	  by	  deciding	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  free-­‐riding	  strategy.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  pure	  strategy	  Nash	  equilibrium	  in	  this	  game.	  If	  one	  player	  decides	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  public	  good,	  the	  other	  will	  prefer	  to	  free	  ride,	  but	  if	  one	  was	  known	  to	   free	  ride	   for	  sure,	   the	  other	  will	  prefer	  to	  provide	  the	  public	  good.	  Therefore,	  we	  know	   that	   all	   of	   the	   outcomes	   –	   including	   the	   one	  where	  both	  players	  attempt	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  the	  other’s	  contributions	  –	  will	  have	  positive	  probability.	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Figure	  A.	  1	  -­	  stylized	  game	  of	  public	  good	  provision	  	   	   Player	  B	  	   pay	   free	  ride	  pay	   BA-­‐λC	   BB-­‐(1-­‐λ)C	   BA-­‐ρC	   BB-­‐(1-­‐ρ)C	  Player	  A
	  
free	  ride	   BA-­‐τC	   BB-­‐(1-­‐τ)C	   0	   0	  	   Where	  BA	  and	  BB	  is	  the	  benefit	  A	  and	  B	  gain	  from	  having	  the	  public	  good,	  C	  is	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  public	  good,	  λ,	  τ	  and	  ρ	  is	  the	  share	  of	  the	  total	  costs	  that	  A	  pays	  under	  a	  symmetric	  solution,	  under	  free-­‐riding	  at	  B’s	  expense	  and	  under	  free-­‐riding	  at	  A’s	  expense	  respectively.	  BA+BB	  >	  C	  BA-­‐τC	  >	  BA-­‐λC	  >	  0	  BB-­‐(1-­‐ρ)C	  >	  BB-­‐(1-­‐λ)C	  >	  0	  BA-­‐ρC	  >	  0	  and/or	  BB-­‐(1-­‐τ)C	  >	  0	  	  Each	  player	  tries	  to	  maximise	  his	  expected	  net	  benefit.	  Assuming	  he	  knows	  his	  payoffs	  corresponding	   to	   the	  different	  possible	  outcomes,	  he	  has	   to	  make	  assumptions	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  each	  outcome.	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  has	  to	  make	  assumptions	  about	  how	  likely	  his	  opponent	  is	  to	  free-­‐ride.	  	  Each	  player	  can	  best	  make	  assumptions	  about	  the	  opponent’s	  likely	  strategy	  by	  trying	  to	   think	   with	   the	   opponent’s	   head.	   However,	   since	   each	   player	   only	   knows	   his	   own	  payoffs,	  he	  needs	  to	  guess	  how	  much	  net	  benefit	  the	  other	  gains	  from	  the	  good.	  In	  the	  above	   stylized	   example,	   the	   payoff	   matrix	   was	   symmetrical	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   both	  players	  had	   the	  same	  net	  benefit	   in	  each	  of	   the	  roles	   (sole	  payer,	   co-­‐payer,	   free-­‐rider	  etc).	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  so	  in	  all	  the	  cases:	  a	  public	  good	  can	  entail	  different	  benefits	  to	  different	  players.	  Whoever	  is	  benefiting	  more	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  public	  good	  can	  draw	  smaller	  benefit	  from	  free-­‐riding	  relative	  to	  the	  loss	  suffered	  if	  the	  good	  is	  not	  provided	   and	   will	   therefore	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   opt	   for	   the	   strategy	   of	   agreeing	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	  public	  good.	  Therefore,	   if	   it	  was	  unambiguous	   that	  one	  player	  has	  a	  greater	   benefit	   from	   the	   public	   good	   and	   therefore	   suffers	   a	   greater	   loss	   in	   every	  moment	  of	  not	  having	  it	  and	  if	  he	  also	  knew	  that	  the	  other	  is	  clear	  about	  this,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  opt	  for	  providing	  the	  public	  good	  and	  –	  knowing	  this	  –	  the	  other	  player	  would	  opt	  for	  free-­‐riding.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  reliable	  information	  on	  the	  relative	  benefits	  of	   the	   public	   good	   to	   the	   different	   players,	   a	   Pareto-­‐optimal	   equilibrium	   would	  automatically	  and	  instantaneously	  form:	  the	  player	  to	  whom	  the	  public	  good	  is	  dearer	  would	  pay	  for	  it	  and	  the	  other	  would	  free-­‐ride	  on	  his	  contribution.	  In	  most	  cases,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  unambiguous	  information	  about	  who	  stands	  to	  lose	  most	  from	  a	  “free-­‐ride	  :	  free-­‐ride”	   outcome.	   Therefore,	   in	   a	   one-­‐off	   game	   actors	   would	   have	   to	   make	   their	  choices	   between	   paying	   or	   free-­‐riding	   randomly,	   or	   more	   accurately:	   based	   on	   an	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assumed	   probability	   distribution33	   of	   the	   other	   actor’s	   responses.	   Therefore,	   the	  outcome	  would	  also	  be	  predictable	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  probability	  distribution	  only34.	  	  	  However,	  if	  a	  public	  good	  is	  welfare	  enhancing,	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  repeated	  attempts	  to	   secure	   it.	   Attempts	   will	   go	   on	   until	   at	   least	   one	   actor	   agrees	   to	   foot	   the	   bill.	  Throughout	   the	   repetitions,	   the	   randomness	  arising	   from	   the	   lack	  of	   information	  will	  give	   way	   to	  more	   informed	   strategy	   if	   the	   passage	   of	   time	   and	   the	   decision	   of	   each	  player	  in	  each	  moment	  gives	  clues	  to	  the	  other	  about	  his	  payoff	  matrix.	  As	  time	  goes	  by	  and	  in	  each	  moment	  the	  players	  have	  to	  make	  yet	  another	  decision	  whether	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  public	  good	  or	  wait	  for	  the	  other	  to	  provide	  it,	  the	  assumptions	  about	  other	  players’	  optimal	  strategy	  can	  be	  continuously	  updated	  as	  each	  moment	  that	  passes	  without	  the	  other’s	   concession	   to	   foot	   the	   bill	   gives	   a	   further	   indication	   of	   how	  much	   the	   other	  suffers	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  players’	  decision	  in	  each	  moment	  can	  be	   interpreted	  not	  only	  as	  a	  way	   to	  optimize	   their	  welfare,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  signal	   sent	   to	   the	   other	   player.	   If	   the	   public	   good	  has	   a	   positive	   net	   utility	   for	   either	  player	  (its	  benefits	  are	  higher	  than	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  providing	   it),	   it	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  finite	   time	   if	   rounds	  of	   the	  game	  are	  continuously	  repeated,	  because	  after	  a	  sufficient	  number	   of	   repeated	   rounds,	   at	   least	   one	   player	   for	  whom	   the	   good	   has	   positive	   net	  utility	  becomes	  convinced	  that	  the	  other	  is	  credibly	  determined	  to	  refuse	  to	  pay	  and	  he	  will	  provide	  the	  good.	  Therefore,	  the	  question	  is	  only	  when	  it	  happens	  and	  who	  will	  pay	  for	  it.	  	  	  	  This	  analysis	  shows	  the	  ways	   in	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  economic	  actors	  are	  willing	  to	  trade	  off	  publicly	  shared	  benefits	  for	  savings	  on	  private	  costs.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  repeated	   rounds,	   players	   are	   prepared	   to	   forego	   positive	   net	   benefits	   from	   having	   a	  public	  good	   in	   the	  hope	  of	   larger	  net	  benefits	   in	   later	  rounds.	   In	  a	  sense,	   they	  opt	   for	  playing	  a	  costly	   lottery	   (Fearon	  1995)	   in	  which	  only	  one	  of	   them	  can	  win.	  The	   larger	  the	   difference	   between	   the	   net	   benefit	   accruing	   to	   the	  winner	   and	   the	   loser	   and	   the	  higher	   the	   chances	   of	   winning,	   the	   more	   attractive	   the	   lottery	   is.	   The	   two	   players	  together	  would	  be	  better	  off	  sharing	   the	   jackpot	  (i.e.	   the	   total	  net	  public	  benefit	   from	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  public	  good)	  through	  bargaining	  and	  saving	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  lottery	  (i.e.	   the	  welfare	   loss	   from	   the	   delay	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   the	   public	   good).	   But	   if	   each	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  As	  said	  above,	  this	  assumption	  will	  be	  based	  on	  what	  he	  thinks	  about	  the	  benefit	  that	  the	  other	  draws	  from	   the	   public	   good,	   relative	   to	   his	   own	   benefit.	   If	   he	   has	   no	   information,	   he	  would	   attribute	   50-­‐50%	  chance	  the	  other	  paying	  or	  free-­‐riding.	  If	  he	  thinks	  the	  opponent	  benefits	  more,	  he	  gives	  a	  higher	  chance	  to	  pay	  and	  vice	  versa.	  34	  I.e.	  one	  could	  say	  that	  “pay	  :	  pay”	  happens	  with	  a	  probability	  X,	  “pay	  :	  free-­‐ride”	  with	  a	  probability	  Y	  etc.	  But	  one	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  specific	  round	  of	  the	  game.	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firmly	  believes	  that	  he	  has	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  winning	  (which	  necessarily	  means	  that	  one	  side	   overestimates	   the	   odds	   in	   his	   favour	   due	   to	   imperfect	   information),	   then	   the	  lottery	  will	  be	  their	  preferred	  option35.	  	  	  
Delayed	  stabilization	  	  The	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   of	   delayed	   fiscal	   stabilization	   complements	   the	   above	  described	  mechanism	  with	  one	  crucial	  element:	  added	  emphasis	  on	  time.	  In	  the	  public	  good	  game,	  the	  loss	  from	  the	  delay	  of	  providing	  the	  good	  was	  implicitly	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  linear	  function	  of	  time.	  (In	  each	  period,	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  good	  caused	  a	  certain	  loss.)	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen’s	  model	   incorporates	   the	   insight	   that	   the	   fiscal	  problem	  gets	  ever	  more	  pressing	  over	  time	  and	  thus	  the	  loss	  from	  delay	  grows	  exponentially.	  The	  longer	  the	   deficit	   persists	   and	   as	   public	   debt	   mounts,	   the	   more	   painful	   the	   negative	  consequences	  are	  –	   in	  terms	  of	  high	  debt	  service	  burden,	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  high	  inflation	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  benefit	  of	  stabilization	  becomes	  ever	  bigger.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	   cost	   of	   stabilization	   also	   gets	   larger	   as	   taxes	   will	   have	   to	   increase	   or	   publicly	  financed	   consumption	   needs	   to	   be	   cut	   by	  more	   to	   cover	   the	   original	   deficit	   plus	   the	  ever	   growing	   debt	   service	   burden.	   These	   characteristics	   –	   a	   continuous	   game,	   with	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  other	  actor’s	  characteristics,	  where	  the	  decision	  variable	  is	  when	  to	  end	  the	  game	  and	  payoffs	  are	  a	  decreasing	  function	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  end	  -­‐	  make	  the	  problem	  analogous	  to	  a	  particular	  example	  of	  a	  standard	  game	  of	  timing:	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  game.	  	  	  	  The	   name	   of	   the	   model	   is	   a	   metaphor:	   in	   a	   war	   of	   attrition,	   warring	   parties	   cannot	  directly	  defeat	  each	  other	   in	  battle	  and	  therefore	  try	  to	  tire	  each	  other	  out	  to	  win	  the	  war.	  However,	  holding	  out	  until	  the	  enemy	  surrenders	  is	  costly	  and	  costs	  are	  increasing	  as	  ammunition	  gets	  scarce.	  Moreover,	  the	  country	  is	  getting	  devastated	  by	  the	  war,	  so	  the	  prize	   for	  which	   the	  war	   is	   fought	   loses	   some	  of	   its	   value	   as	   the	  war	  drags	  on.	   So	  each	  party	  would	  like	  to	  end	  the	  war	  as	  early	  as	  possible,	  but	  still	  later	  than	  the	  enemy	  (since	  winning	  is	  defined	  as	  holding	  out	  longer).	  Crucial	  to	  this	  game	  is	  that	  the	  warring	  parties	   should	   have	   limited	   information	   about	   the	   relative	   strength	   of	   the	   other.	  Otherwise,	   the	  army	  that	   realises	   that	   it	   is	  unambiguously	  weaker	  and	  cannot	  escape	  surrender	  would	  give	  up	  right	  away	  to	  avoid	  all	   the	  costs	  of	   trying	  to	  hold	  out,	   if	   it	   is	  anyway	   in	   vain.	   As	   time	   passes	   and	   the	   enemy	   still	   persists,	   each	   camp	   has	   to	   re-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  For	  a	  formal	  treatment	  on	  why	  conflict	  is	  chosen	  over	  cooperation	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  perfect	  information,	  see	  Fearon	  (1995)	  and	  Powell	  (2004	  and	  2007)	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evaluate	  its	  estimates	  of	  its	  chances	  of	  winning	  and	  when	  one	  camp	  feels	  that	  its	  chance	  of	  winning	  are	  lower	  than	  what	  could	  compensate	  for	  the	  pain	  of	  having	  to	  wait	  longer,	  it	  surrenders	  and	  the	  war	  is	  over.	  	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen’s	  model	  describes	  a	  case,	   in	  which	  a	  country	  needs	  to	  eliminate	  a	  long	   term	   deficit	   in	   its	   public	   finances	   –	   that	   was	   created	   by	   some	   unexplained	  exogenous	  shock	  –	  through	  levying	  a	  new	  tax,	  but	  groups	  within	  the	  polity	  are	  unable	  to	  agree	  upon	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  tax	  burden	  and	  each	  insists	  on	  a	  sharing	  ratio	  that	  puts	   most	   of	   the	   burden	   on	   the	   other	   group.	   Until	   the	   deficit	   is	   eliminated,	   the	  government	  has	  to	  cover	  part	  of	  it	  by	  issuing	  debt	  and	  part	  of	  it	  by	  printing	  money.	  The	  latter	  causes	  accelerating	  inflation,	  which	  makes	  all	  groups	  worse	  off	  for	  the	  time	  of	  the	  delay,	   but	   not	   (or	   not	   necessarily)	   to	   the	   same	   degree.	   The	   cost	   of	   inflation	   for	   the	  actors	  has	  two	  components:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  tax	  because	  it	  erodes	  the	  real	  value	  of	  actors’	  income	  (and	  creates	  income	  for	  the	  government),	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  causes	  distortions	  in	  the	  working	  of	  the	  economy.	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  assume	  the	  inflation	  tax	  to	  affect	  all	  interest	  groups	  equally	  (all	  “pay”	  the	  same	  amount),	  but	  the	  distortionary	   effect	   could	   have	   different	   consequences	   for	   different	   groups.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   debt	   is	   also	   growing,	   which	  means	   that	   once	   the	   new	   taxes	   are	   imposed,	  they	  will	  have	   to	   cover	   the	   interest	  payments	  on	   the	  accumulated	  debt,	   too,	   so	  every	  minute	  of	  delay	  decreases	  future	  consumption.	  So,	  in	  this	  model,	  the	  public	  good	  to	  be	  provided	   is	   an	   inflation-­‐free	   environment	   and	   a	   stable	   debt	   level.	   The	   cost	   is	   a	  permanently	  higher	   level	  of	   (non-­‐distortionary)	   taxation	  –	  with	  differential	   incidence	  for	  the	  winning	  and	  the	  losing	  group.	  	  	  For	  each	  group,	  the	  optimal	  strategy	  is	  to	  wait	  and	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  additional	  tax	  burden	   as	   long	   as	   the	   cost	   of	   waiting	   an	   additional	  moment	   seems	   smaller	   than	   the	  expected	   benefit	   from	   prolonging	   resistance	   an	   additional	   moment.	   The	   costs	   of	  waiting	   include	   having	   to	   pay	   the	   inflationary	   tax,	   bear	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   distortions	  from	  inflation	  and	  seeing	   future	  consumption	  shrink	   for	  another	  moment	   longer.	  The	  expected	  benefit	  depends	  on	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  share	  of	  the	  stabilization	  costs	  for	  the	  winner	  and	  the	  loser	  and	  expected	  size	  of	  the	  debt	  at	  the	  time	  of	  stabilization	  as	  well	  as	  each	  actor’s	  assumptions	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  prevailing	  –	  by	  being	  able	  to	  persist	  in	  a	   high	   inflation	   environment	   longer	   than	   the	   others.	   This	   in	   turn	   depends	   on	   his	  assumptions	  about	  who	  is	  suffering	  more	  from	  inflation.	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Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  show36	   that	  stabilization	  will	  happen	   in	   finite	   time	  as	   long	  as	  –	  at	  least	  for	  one	  group	  –	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  waiting	  incurred	  indefinitely	  are	  higher	  than	   the	   cost	   associated	   with	   being	   the	   loser	   of	   the	   game	   and	   paying	   higher	   taxes	  forever	   (i.e.	   stabilization	   has	   a	   positive	   net	   benefit	   even	   if	   the	   group	   has	   to	   bear	   the	  higher	   part	   of	   the	   burden).	   Each	   actor’s	   cut-­‐off	   time	   and	   therefore	   the	   delay	   in	  stabilization	  is	  longer	  -­‐	  the	  greater	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  share	  of	  the	  burden	  borne	  by	  winner	  and	  loser,	  	  -­‐	  the	  lower	  the	  level	  of	  welfare	  loss	  suffered	  by	  the	  worst-­‐hit	  actor	  from	  the	  same	  level	  of	  inflation37,	  -­‐	  the	  lower	  the	  interest	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  debt	  is	  compounded	  and	  -­‐	  the	  lower	  the	  part	  of	  the	  deficit	  that	  is	  being	  financed	  by	  money	  printing	  (i.e.	  the	  lower	  the	  share	  of	  the	  deficit	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  present	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  share	  of	  it	  pushed	  into	  the	  future	  in	  the	  form	  of	  debt)38.	  	  This	  latter	  result	  has	  to	  be	  qualified	  in	  light	  of	  how	  long	  the	  game	  could	  possibly	  go	  on.	  If	   a	   positive	   share	   of	   the	   deficit	   is	   financed	   by	   debt,	   then	   it	   can	   become	   infeasible	   to	  assign	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  adjustment	  costs	  to	  one	  player	  if	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict	  is	  delayed	  beyond	  a	  certain	  time.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  debt	  grows	  so	   large	  that	  no	  group	  could	  possibly	  afford	  to	  pay	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  the	  tax	  burden	  needed	  to	  close	  the	  original	  gap	  and	  the	  interest	  burden	  on	  debt.	  The	  infeasibility	  of	  the	  situation	  would	  become	   obvious	   for	   example	   if	   debt	   reached	   a	   level	   where	   the	   government	   finds	   it	  difficult	  to	  raise	  new	  funds	  to	  cover	  the	  deficits.	  In	  other	  words,	   if	  the	  markets	  send	  a	  signal	   that	   they	   do	   not	   see	   repayment	   secured	   from	   the	   future	   tax	   revenues.	   The	  authors	  assume,	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  government	  would	  have	  to	  (and	  also	  would	  be	  able	   to	   due	   to	   the	   pressing	   situation)	   enact	   an	   emergency	  measure	   to	   close	   the	   gap.	  They	  also	  assume	  that	  such	  an	  extraordinary	  measure	  would	  entail	  a	  very	  large	  loss	  of	  utility	  for	  all	  players.	  If	  there	  exists	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  drastic	  and	  exogenous	  end	  to	  the	  game,	  a	  player	  whose	  optimal	  cut-­‐off	  time	  would	  be	  beyond	  this	  end	  point	  may	  become	  motivated	  to	  give	  up	  just	  before	  the	  emergency	  measures	  are	  enacted,	  if	  being	  the	   loser	   is	   still	   less	   costly	   for	   him	   than	   to	   bear	   half	   of	   the	   utility	   loss	   caused	  by	   the	  havoc.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   this	  might	   induce	  some	  groups,	  who	  would	  otherwise	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	  the	  mathematical	  derivation	  see	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  (1991).	  37	  Some	  countries,	  for	  example,	  have	  institutions	  that	  make	  inflation	  more	  bearable	  for	  economic	  actors	  –	  like	   automatic	   indexation	   of	   incomes	   or	   a	   flexible	   exchange	   rate	   etc.	   In	   these	   countries,	   the	   delay	   is	  expected	  to	  last	  longer	  as	  the	  costs	  of	  waiting	  arising	  from	  inflation	  will	  be	  lower.	  38	  This	  latter	  result	  only	  holds	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  any	  increase	  in	  inflation	  causes	  a	  proportional	  increase	  in	  the	  welfare	   loss	   suffered	   from	   the	   associated	   distortion.	   For	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  welfare	   loss	   is	   an	  exponential	  function	  of	  the	  level	  of	  inflation,	  the	  opposite	  might	  hold.	  	  
	   70	  
surrendered	   before	   the	   exogenous	   end	   point,	   to	   postpone	   their	   surrender	   until	   the	  emergency	  intervention	  becomes	  imminent,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  other	  groups	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  surrender	  early	  and	  take	  on	  the	  loser’s	  share	  of	  the	  taxes.	  If	  all	  groups	  wait	  until	   just	  before	   the	  emergency	  measures	  and	  concede	  at	   the	  same	   time,	  each	  has	  an	  equal	  chance	  of	  becoming	  the	  winner	  or	  the	  loser.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  if	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	   the	   deficit	   is	   financed	   by	   debt	   issuance	   (and	   less	   by	   inflation),	   that	   brings	   the	  possibility	   of	   such	   an	   emergency	   closer.	   This	   potentially	   induces	   certain	   groups	   to	  concede	  earlier	  than	  suggested	  by	  their	  strategy	  but	  also	  makes	  other	  groups	  concede	  later.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	  mathematical	  modelling	  by	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	   led	   to	   the	  prediction	   that	  the	  length	  of	  the	  delay	  depends	  on	  two	  things:	  (i.)	  on	  how	  we	  try	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  deficit	  on	   a	   temporary	   basis,	   before	   a	   permanent	   solution	   is	   found,	   (ii.)	   on	   how	   bad	   the	  consequences	   of	   the	   mix	   of	   temporary	   measures	   are	   compared	   to	   the	   permanent	  solution.	   In	   this	   model,	   until	   stabilization,	   the	   deficit	   is	   partly	   financed	   by	   inflation,	  partly	  pushed	  into	  the	  future	  in	  the	  form	  of	  debt	  accumulation.	  If	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  deficit	   is	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  present,	  part	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  waiting	  are	  higher,	  because	  the	  level	  of	  distortion	  from	  inflation	  is	  higher	  and	  therefore	  delay	  should	  be	  shorter.	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   for	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   inflation	   financing,	   a	   lower	   share	   is	   pushed	   into	   the	  future,	   and	   therefore	   the	   decrease	   in	   future	   consumption	   will	   be	   smaller	   as	   debt	  increases	  more	  slowly,	   so	  actors	  will	  not	  be	   in	   such	  a	  hurry	   to	  end	   the	  game	   to	  stem	  debt	  growth.	  So	  this	  other	  component	  of	  the	  waiting	  cost	  is	   lower	  and	  that	  makes	  the	  delay	   longer.	  Furthermore,	   if	   less	  debt	   is	  accumulated,	   the	  emergency	  scenario	   is	   less	  likely,	  which	  either	  brings	  forward	  or	  delays	  the	  expected	  time	  of	  stabilization.	  Which	  one	   of	   these	   three	   effects	   of	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   inflation-­‐financing	   dominates,	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  level	  of	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  actors	  suffer	  from	  the	  distortions	  caused	  by	  inflation.	  Higher	  interest	  rates,	   i.e.	   the	  rate	  at	  which	  debt	  grows	  until	  the	  deficit	  is	  eliminated,	  would	  make	  the	  latter	  two	  effects	  more	  dominant:	  	  higher	  inflation	  financing	  would	  delay	  stabilization.	  Higher	  utility	  loss	  from	  the	  same	  amount	  of	   inflation	   would	   strengthen	   the	   first	   effect,that	   is	   higher	   inflation	   financing	  precipitates	  stabilization.	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Appendix	  2.	  to	  Chapter	  2.	  Overview	  of	  debt	  per	  GDP	  ratios	  in	  OECD	  countries	  	  	  
Figure	  A.	  2	  Gross	  debt	  general	  government	  –	  in	  OECD	  countries	  1970-­1980	  
percent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  OECD	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Chapter	  3.	  	  Biding	  their	  time:	  Policy	  passivity	  and	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  1980s	  	  	  	  In	   the	   midst	   of	   the	   European	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis,	   default	   hung	   over	   Italy	   like	  Damocles’	  sword	  last	  summer.	  Since	  then,	  policy	  makers	  have	  adopted	  a	  series	  of	  harsh	  austerity	   measures	   to	   convince	   markets	   that	   the	   country	   will	   be	   able	   to	   service	   its	  enormous	   debt,	   and	   they	   secured	   support	   from	   Europe.	   The	   danger	   seems	   to	   have	  subsided	   for	   the	   time	  being,	  but	   the	   immense	  precariousness	  of	   Italy’s	   fiscal	  position	  has	  been	  amply	  revealed.	  This	  chapter	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  1980s	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  country	  got	  into	  such	  a	  perilous	  situation.	  	  	  Although	  Italy’s	  public	  finances	  were	  already	  out	  of	  balance	  throughout	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  the	  1970s,	  it	  was	  after	  1980	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  started	  to	  reach	  truly	  alarming	  proportions.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  the	  slowing	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  a	  jump	  in	  the	   real	   interest	   rates	   charged	   on	   outstanding	   debt	   greatly	  magnified	   the	   underlying	  imbalances	   between	   revenues	   and	   expenditure	   and	   speeded	   up	   the	   growth	   of	   debt.	  Between	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  doubled.	  By	  1994,	  it	  exceeded	   120	   per	   cent	   (see	   Figure	   3.1).	   Despite	   gradual	   corrections	   in	   the	   primary	  balance,	   net	   borrowing	   stayed	   uniformly	   high	   throughout	   the	   1980s,	   as	   the	   costs	   of	  servicing	  the	  outstanding	  debt	  spiralled	  out	  of	  control.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  interest	  bill	  was	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  (see	  Figure	  3.2).	  It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  that	  debt	  accumulation	  was	  finally	  halted.	  This	  chapter	  is	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	  fiscal	  problems	   could	   reach	   such	   perilous	   proportions	   and	   why	   decisive	   action	   to	   avert	  further	   escalation	  was	   delayed	   for	   such	   a	   long	   time.	   It	   seeks	   to	   answer	   the	   question	  why	   successive	   governments	   failed	   to	   react	   more	   forcefully	   to	   the	   dramatic	  deterioration	  of	  public	  finances	  from	  the	  early	  1980s	  and	  how	  the	  way	  to	  consolidation	  was	  eventually	  opened	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	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Figure3.	  1	  -­	  Gross	  consolidated	  debt	  general	  government	  (1970-­1991)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  
Figure3.	  2	  –	  Net	  borrowing,	  cyclically	  adjusted	  net	  borrowing,	  primary	  deficit	  and	  interest	  expenses	  
(1980-­1991)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
	  
Source:	  Ameco	  	  	  Analysts	   of	   Italy’s	   troubled	   fiscal	   history	   have	   mostly	   concentrated	   on	   the	   role	   of	  political	   institutions,	   emphasizing	   the	   extraordinary	   extent	   to	   which	   particularistic	  interests	   were	   able	   to	   permeate	   parliamentary	   policy	   making	   and	   diverted	   policy	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outcomes	  from	  a	  collective	  optimum	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  Cox	  and	  McCubbins	  (2001)	  quote	  Italy	  as	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  a	  polity	  that	  would	  be	  given	  to	  pork-­‐barrel	  politics.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   system	   of	   preference	   votes	   in	   national	   elections	   encouraged	  competition	   amongst	   candidates	   within	   the	   same	   party	   and	   gave	   incentives	   to	  legislators	   to	   distinguish	   themselves	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   their	   voters	   through	   measures	  targeted	  at	  their	  electorate.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  these	  impulses	  for	  overspending	  were	  given	  free	  rein	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  sphere,	  where	  decision	  making	  was	  dominated	  by	  committees,	  diminishing	  the	  control	  of	  the	  government	  over	  the	  budget.	  Padovano	  and	  Venturi	   (2001)	   focus	  on	   fragmentation	  and	   ideological	  polarization	  arising	  within	  the	  parliamentary	  sphere	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Italy’s	  proportionate	  electoral	  system	  and	  link	  these	  factors	  to	  observed	  levels	  of	  public	  borrowing	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  	  Hallerberg	   (2004	   Chapter	   7)	   also	   emphasizes	   the	   role	   of	   fragmentation	   within	  parliamentary	   and	   governmental	   decision	   making,	   especially	   the	   dispersion	   of	  authority	  among	  committees	  and	  ministries,	  which	  gave	  a	  say	  in	  fiscal	  matters	  to	  all	  the	  parties	  within	  government,	  and	  at	   times	  even	   in	   the	  opposition.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	  he	  points	   out	   that	   it	   bears	   explaining	   why	   parties	   in	   successive	   coalitions	   forewent	  applying	   coordination	   devices	   to	   reassert	   discipline	   over	   the	   budgeting	   process.	  Coalition	  governments	  often	  successfully	  maintain	  fiscal	  balance	  despite	  the	  conflicting	  spending	  preferences	  of	   their	   constituent	  parties	  via	   signing	   fiscal	   contracts	   in	  which	  they	  commit	  to	  spending	  targets.	  However,	  such	  contracts	  were	  absent	  in	  this	  period	  in	  Italy	  and	   fiscal	  policy	  was	  governed	  by	  what	  Hallerberg	  calls	   the	   “fiefdom”	  approach.	  Fiscal	   contracts	   were	   unfeasible	   but	   also	   unnecessary	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  coalition	   partners	   –	   Hallerberg	   argues	   –	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   real	   competition	   for	  government.	   Throughout	   the	   1980s,	   there	   was	   no	   viable	   alternative	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	  
pentapartito	   coalition.	   Therefore,	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   enforce	   contracts	   by	  threatening	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  government,	  because	  there	  was	  no	  possibility	  to	  exclude	  renegade	  spenders	  from	  the	  coalition	  after	  a	  new	  election.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  viable	  alternative	  also	  prevented	  the	  electorate	  from	  meaningfully	  punishing	  the	  five	  stable	   coalition	   partners	   for	   the	   appalling	   fiscal	   results,	   which	   greatly	   reduced	   the	  sensitivity	  of	  policy	  makers	  to	  the	  downside	  of	  fiscal	  problems.	  	  	  These	  approaches	  provide	  a	  compelling	  account	  for	  the	  role	  of	  political	   institutions	  in	  shaping	  policy	  makers’	   incentives	   to	  care	  more	  about	   their	  electorates’	  particularistic	  preferences	   than	   about	   fiscal	   discipline.	   However,	   governments	   arguably	   have	   other	  possible,	   not	   immediately	   electoral	   motivations	   to	   overcome	   their	   internal	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coordination	  problems	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  restoring	  the	  equilibrium	  of	  public	  finances.	  The	  costs	   of	   fiscal	   imbalances	   –	   and	   therefore	   the	   costs	   of	   the	   government’s	   failure	   at	  coordinating	   party	   positions	   and	   controlling	   ministers	   –	   are	   steeply	   increasing	   for	  policy	   makers	   as	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   reaches	   proportions	   that	   jeopardize	   the	  economic	  and	  financial	  stability	  of	  the	  country	  due	  to	  the	  immense	  political	  and	  policy	  consequences	   of	   a	   default	   or	   a	   major	   fiscal	   crisis.	   This	   consideration	   was	   especially	  important	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Italy	   in	   the	   1980s,	   where	   –	   due	   to	   the	   country’s	   peculiar	  political	  system	  –	  the	  same	  parties	  and,	   in	  fact,	   the	  same	  people	  were	  likely	  to	  stay	  in	  government	  for	  extended	  periods	  of	  time.	  Therefore,	  the	  very	  policy	  makers	  who	  were	  procrastinating	   effective	   fiscal	   stabilization	   in	   the	   1980s	   could	   realistically	   expect	   to	  still	   be	   in	   charge	  when	   a	   potential	   crisis	  would	   unfold	   or	  when	   desperate	  measures	  would	  need	  to	  be	  put	  into	  place	  to	  avert	  a	  fiscal	  meltdown39.	  Policy	  makers	  of	  such	  long	  time	  horizons	  would	  have	  a	  very	  large	  incentive	  to	  sort	  out	  their	  internal	  coordination	  problems	  in	  the	  face	  of	  large	  risks40.	  	  	  Therefore,	   this	   chapter	   looks	   beyond	   the	   governmental	   and	   parliamentary	   scene	   in	  search	   of	   the	   forces	   that	   motivated	   policy	   making	   actors	   to	   defend	   particularistic	  interests	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  escalating	  fiscal	  problems	  and	  held	  governments	  back	  from	  effective	  consolidation.	  It	  shows	  that	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  fiscal	  policy	  was	  hostage	  to	  unresolved	   redistributive	   conflicts	   between	   socio-­‐economic	   groups,	   who	   blocked	  policy	   change	   through	   their	   representatives	   both	   from	   inside	   and	   from	   outside	   the	  government.	  This	  argument	  draws	  on	  Della	  Sala’s	   insight	   (1997).	  Della	  Sala	   contends	  that	   the	  dangerous	  debt	  accumulation	  of	   the	  1980s	  was	  the	  result	  of	   the	  weakness	  of	  successive	   Italian	   governments	   in	   the	   face	   of	   different	   societal	   demand	   pressures,	  which	  made	   them	  unable	   to	  decisively	  adjust	   the	  policy	   course41.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Evidence	  that	  the	  leading	  personalities	  of	  the	  two	  largest	  parties	  of	  the	  government	  coalition	  that	  held	  power	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  expected	  to	  be	  in	  policy-­‐making	  position	  in	  the	  decades	  to	  follow	  is	  provided	  by	   Ginsborg	   (2001	   p249).	   He	   quotes	   the	   joint	   interview	   of	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Christian	  Democratic	   and	  Socialist	  parties	  –	  the	  two	  dominant	  parties	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	  pentapartito	  coalitions	  of	   the	  1980s	  –	   laying	  out	  their	  plans	  for	  joint	  government	  for	  the	  next	  decade	  in	  1991.	  40	  It	  is	  of	  course	  an	  open	  question	  what	  makes	  policy	  makers	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  risks	  entailed	  in	  a	  progressively	   escalating	   fiscal	   problem.	   Hallerberg,	   Strauch	   and	   von	   Hagen	   (2009	   pp126-­‐129)	   seek	   to	  integrate	   into	   their	   framework	   the	   role	   of	   past	   fiscal	   crises	   as	   a	   factor	   that	   determines	   this	   sensitivity	  (although	  they	  focus	  on	  the	  electorate	  rather	  than	  the	  policy	  makers	  themselves).	  In	  Italy,	  experiences	  with	  having	  to	   turn	  to	   the	   IMF	  and	  to	  Germany	   for	   loans	   in	   the	  1970s	  could	  have	  possibly	  served	  as	  warning	  signs	  about	   the	  dangers	  of	   continued	  heavy	  borrowing,	  but	  Hallerberg,	   Strauch	  and	  Hagen	  do	  not	   count	  these	   among	   crisis	   events.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   next	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   argues	   that	   policy	  makers	  were	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  fiscal	  developments	  as	  the	  1980s	  progressed.	  41	   Della	   Sala’s	   point	   about	   the	   role	   of	   conflicting	   societal	   interests	   in	   generating	   fiscal	   problems	   is	  reinforced	  by	  Regini	  and	  Regalia	  (1997)	  and	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  (2004),	  who	  emphasize	  how	  tensions	  between	   social	   partners	   spilled	   over	   into	   fiscal	   problems,	   as	   governments	   aimed	   to	   secure	   agreements	  vital	  to	  the	  satisfactory	  working	  of	  the	  economy	  by	  offering	  large	  compensations	  for	  both	  sides	  in	  the	  form	  of	  increased	  transfers	  and	  tax	  adjustments.	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fiscal	   problems	  were	   the	   consequence	   of	   a	   socio-­‐political	   situation	   that	   rendered	   the	  executive	  weak	  and	  lacking	  the	  authority	  to	  achieve	  its	  policy	  objectives.	  	  	  However,	  Della	  Sala	  does	  not	  spell	  out	  the	  specific	  sources	  of	  and	  political	  channels	  for	  the	  pressures	  that	  kept	  governments’	  authority	  over	  the	  budget	  in	  check.	  Therefore,	  the	  chapter	  identifies	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  from	  whom	  these	  pressures	  emanated.	  It	  clarifies	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  these	  groups	  and	  the	  sources	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  policy	   makers.	   It	   uses	   this	   information	   to	   explain	   why	   the	   specific	   constellation	   of	  societal	   interests	  prevented	  meaningful	  adjustments	  to	  the	  budget.	  Finally,	   it	  explores	  how	   the	   policy	   demands	   of	   these	   groups	   evolved	   with	   the	   escalation	   of	   the	   fiscal	  problem	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  executives	  gave	  way	  to	  decisive	  action	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  The	  chapter	  contends	  that	  the	  delay	  in	  effective	  fiscal	  adjustment	  was	  the	  consequence	  of	   the	   inability	   of	   successive	   governments	   of	   the	   1980s	   to	   assert	   control	   over	  conflicting	   demands	   on	   public	   finances	   of	   four	   large	   societal	   groups:	   large	   business,	  small	   entrepreneurs,	   organized	   labour	   and	   the	   dependents	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   South.	  This	  impotence	  arose	  from	  the	  political	  predicament	  of	  the	  party	  that	  dominated	  every	  government	   from	   the	  war	   to	   the	  early	  1990s,	  Christian	  Democracy	   (DC).	  The	  DC	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  entrepreneurial	  class	  and	  on	  the	  votes	  of	  its	  clientele	  of	  public	  employees	  and	  welfare	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  South	  and	  it	  had	  strong	  ties	  with	  large	  business.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  party	  was	  unable	  to	  sideline	  the	  policy	  demands	  of	  organized	  labour	  after	  these	  demands	  had	  been	  forcefully	  asserted	  in	  the	  labour	  unrest	  of	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s.	   Unwilling	   to	   harm	   groups	   within	   the	   DC’s	   core	  supporter	  base	  but	  unable	  to	  inflict	  fiscal	  pain	  on	  the	  main	  societal	  group	  outside	  of	  it,	  successive	   DC-­‐led	   governments	   responded	   to	   growing	   fiscal	   problems	   by	   adjusting	  spending	   and	   revenue	   items	   that	   none	   of	   the	   four	   societal	   groups	   had	   strong	   vested	  interests	   in	   and	   by	   making	   very	   cautious	   corrections	   in	   those	   areas	   where	   vested	  interests	  were	  present.	   These	   responses	  were	   inadequate	   and	   lagged	  behind	   the	   fast	  rate	   of	   growth	   of	   interest	   expenses.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   escalation	   of	   the	   fiscal	   situation.	  Effective	  stabilization	  was	  impossible	  as	  long	  as	  trade	  unions	  continued	  to	  resist	  cuts	  to	  welfare	  entitlements	  or	  higher	  taxes	  on	  wage	  income	  and	  the	  DC	  continued	  to	  hang	  on	  to	   power	   through	   a	   strategy	   of	   protecting	   the	   specific	   interests	   of	   three	   disparate	  societal	  groups.	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Ultimately,	   the	  deadlock	  was	   resolved	  when	   the	  DC	   lost	   the	   ability	   to	   further	   pursue	  this	   strategy.	   Simultaneously,	   unions	   adopted	   a	  more	   conciliatory	   tone.	   Although	   the	  DC’s	   passing	   from	   the	   scene	   happened	   under	   rather	   dramatic	   circumstances	   that	  involved	   a	   wave	   of	   corruption	   scandals,	   this	   chapter	   argues	   that	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	  party’s	   final	   demise,	   its	   strategy	   was	   already	   defunct	   as	   the	   support	   of	   the	   societal	  groups	   it	   had	   relied	  on	  had	  been	   considerably	   eroded	  by	   the	  negative	   economic	   side	  effects	  of	  the	  fiscal	  imbalances.	  Similarly,	  even	  though	  labour’s	  change	  of	  heart	  ensued	  in	   the	  midst	  of	   considerable	  political	  and	  economic	  upheaval,	   it	  had	  been	   fostered	  by	  the	  cumulative	  adverse	  consequences	  on	  employment	  of	  the	  persistent	  fiscal	  problems.	  The	   progressive	   deterioration	   of	   the	   general	   economic	   environment	   –	  manifested	   in	  high	   inflation,	  high	   interest	   rates	  and	   the	  attendant	  appreciation	  of	   the	  real	  exchange	  rate	   of	   the	   lira	   –	   caused	   significant	   difficulties	   to	   those	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   that	  depended	   on	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   Italian	   industry	   in	   the	   international	   economy.	  These	  groups	  gradually	  withdrew	  their	  support	  from	  their	  representatives	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere	  –	   from	  the	  DC,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	   from	  trade	  union,	  on	   the	  other	  –	  and	   from	   the	   strategy	   of	   the	   intransigent	   defence	   of	   their	   vested	   interests	   that	   had	  caused	   the	   fiscal	   stalemate	  of	   the	  1980s.	  This	  opened	   the	  way	   for	   a	   resolution	  of	   the	  fiscal	  problem	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  radically	  new	  political	  situation.	  	  Conceptually,	   this	  narrative	  rests	  on	  two	  pillars.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  societal	  coalitions.	   These	   unite	   specific	   clusters	   of	   interests,	   wield	   specific	   forms	   of	   political	  leverage	  and	  motivate	  the	  choices	  of	   interest	  representing	  organizations	   in	   the	  policy	  making	  sphere.	  In	  the	  Italian	  case,	  the	  relevant	  clusters	  of	  interests	  were	  ordered	  into	  two	  opposing	   coalitions	   at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   greatest	   accumulation	   of	   debt.	  On	   the	   one	  side,	  the	  DC	  served	  as	  a	  political	  umbrella	  for	  an	  awkward	  coalition	  of	  three	  clusters	  of	  interests:	   large	  businesses,	  small	  enterprises	  and	  a	  clientele	  network	  in	  the	  South.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  trade	  unions	  represented	  labour.	  These	  four	  groups	  can	  be	  identified	  by	  their	  vested	   interests	   in	   four	  quite	  clearly	  delineable	  areas	  of	   the	  policy	  status	  quo	  of	  the	  1980s:	  tax	  exemptions,	  the	  toleration	  of	  tax	  evasion,	  clientelistic	  systems	  of	  public	  employment	  and	  investment,	  and	  welfare	  spending.	  	  	  The	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  coalitions	  remained	  relatively	  even	  throughout	  the	  decade	  and	  therefore	  all	  four	  major	  societal	  groups	  were	  able	  to	  effectively	  protect	  their	   vested	   interests	   in	   these	   areas.	   Consequently,	   stabilization	   was	   delayed.	  Importantly,	   the	  chapter	   shows	   that	   societal	   coalitions	  with	  no	   institutional	  access	   to	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policy	  making	  fora	  –	  such	  as	  workers	  in	  the	  Italian	  case	  –	  can	  have	  effective	  influence	  on	  policies	  via	  non-­‐institutional	  sources	  of	  leverage.	  	  The	  second	  conceptual	  pillar	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  key	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	   are	   not	   fixed,	   but	   evolve	   with	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   economic	   environment,	  opening	   up	   the	  way	   for	   new	   coalitions	   of	   societal	   interests	   and	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	  policy	   deadlock.	   The	   development	   of	   each	   group’s	   interests	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	  predictions	   of	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model,	   which	   shows	   that	   the	   escalation	   of	   fiscal	  problems	  can	  generate	  corollary	  costs	   for	  each	  group,	  which	  might	   induce	  the	  groups	  to	  give	  up	  their	  vested	  interests	   in	  given	  policies	  for	  the	  sake	  of	   fiscal	  stabilization.	  In	  the	  Italian	  case,	  the	  economic	  side	  effects	  of	  budgetary	  imbalances	  arose	  in	  the	  form	  of	  declining	   international	   competitiveness,	   which	   forced	   business	   groups	   and	   labour	   in	  the	   exposed	   sectors	   to	   reconsider	   their	   attachment	   to	   welfare	   policies	   and	   tax	  exemptions,	   respectively,	   and	   led	   to	  a	  decline	  of	   support	   for	  both	   the	  unions	  and	   the	  DC,	  whose	  raison	  d’être	  was	  by	  this	  time	  little	  more	  than	  the	  defence	  of	  these	  policies.	  This	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  DC-­‐led	  distributive	  coalition	  and	  a	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  alliance	  between	  large	  business	  and	  labour.	  	  The	   chapter	   lays	   out	   the	   argument	   in	   three	   parts.	   The	   next	   section	   gives	   a	   brief	  overview	   of	   the	   fiscal	   developments	   of	   the	   1980s	   to	   underline	   the	   contradiction	  between	  the	  seeming	  urge	  of	  policy	  makers	  to	  regain	  control	  over	  fiscal	  problems	  and	  the	  feebleness	  of	  their	  attempts	  at	  effective	  fiscal	  retrenchment	  or	  revenue	  generation.	  The	   third	   section	   explains	   the	   socio-­‐political	   origins	   of	   the	   weakness	   of	   successive	  governments	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  escalating	  problems.	  It	  provides	  a	  historical	  account	  of	  the	   evolution	   of	   the	   defining	   coalitions	   of	   societal	   interests	   and	   of	   the	   origins	   of	   the	  political	   gridlock	   between	   the	   actors	   representing	   their	   conflicting	   preferences.	   The	  fourth	   section	   uses	   the	  war	   of	   attrition	  model	   to	   explain	   the	   changing	   stances	   of	   the	  different	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   within	   the	   two	   coalitions	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  economic	  environment.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes.	  
	  
Fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  1980s:	  perilous	  passivity42	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  Italy	  looked	  back	  on	  a	  tumultuous	  decade	  of	  major	  economic	  shocks	  and	  soaring	  fiscal	  deficits	  that	  left	  a	  difficult	  legacy.	  Debt	  had	  doubled,	  reaching	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  all	  data	  referred	   to	   in	   this	  section	  are	   taken	   from	  the	  Annual	  Macroeconomic	  Database	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  (Ameco).	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almost	  60	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  GDP,	   interest	   expenditure	  had	  quadrupled,	   eating	  up	  5	  per	  cent	   of	   the	   GDP	   in	   1981,	   while	   the	   government’s	   revenues	   still	   fell	   short	   of	   its	   non-­‐interest	   spending	   commitments.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  monetizing	   the	  deficit	   –	   a	   channel	  that	  had	  been	  extensively	  used	  in	  the	  1970s	  to	  dissipate	  some	  of	  the	  pressure	  created	  by	   the	   fiscal	   imbalances	   –	   became	   increasingly	   unattractive	   after	   the	   country	  committed	   to	   maintaining	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   with	   its	   main	   trade	   partners	   in	   the	  framework	  in	  the	  new	  European	  Monetary	  System	  (EMS)	  in	  1978.	  Inflation	  needed	  to	  be	   brought	   down	   from	   the	   double	   digits,	   if	   parity	   was	   to	   be	   kept	   with	   low-­‐inflation	  Germany.	  This	  foreshadowed	  increasing	  interest	  rates,	  putting	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  budget.	  It	  was	  clearly	  time	  to	  get	  the	  country’s	  fiscal	  house	  in	  order.	  	  	  It	   seemed	   like	  policy	  makers	  were	  acutely	  aware	  of	   this.	   In	   the	  decade	   that	   followed,	  the	  discourse	  of	   fiscal	  policymaking	  was	  dominated	  by	   the	  objective	  of	   “risanamento”	  (Radaelli	   2000)	  as	  ministers	   and	   central	  bank	  officials	   repeatedly	   called	   for	   austerity	  measures	  to	  stabilize	  public	  finances	  (Walsh	  1999).	  Throughout	  the	  decade,	  ever	  more	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  reforms	  were	  introduced	  to	  ensure	  better	  control	  over	  the	  budget43.	   The	   tax	   system	   went	   through	   a	   series	   of	   adjustments	   and	   attempts	   were	  made	   to	   control	   spending	   (Guerra	   1993,	   Bosi	   et	   al	   2003).	   By	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	  decade,	   one	   major	   adjustment	   package	   was	   announced	   after	   another,	   promising	   to	  comprehensively	  deal	  with	  the	  fiscal	  problem44.	  Yet,	  net	  borrowing	  stayed	  firmly	  above	  ten	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP.	  The	  primary	  deficit	  narrowed	  only	  gradually	  and	  with	  cyclical	  setbacks.	   The	   pace	   of	   its	   correction	   fell	   behind	   the	   rate	   of	   increase	   of	   the	   interest	  burden.	   Spending	  was	   approximately	   stabilized,	   but	   not	   cut,	   revenues	   increased	  only	  hesitantly.	  For	  all	  the	  talk	  of	  “risanamento”,	  the	  trends	  and	  figures	  gave	  little	  indication	  that	   real	   fiscal	   sacrifices	  were	   forthcoming	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   balancing	   the	   budget	   (see	  Figure	  3.3).	  This	  section	  analyses	  the	  different	  spending	  areas	  and	  revenue	  sources	  in	  order	   to	   gain	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   what	   was	   and	   was	   not	   done	   and	   why	  consolidation	  eluded	  policy	  makers	  in	  this	  period	  despite	  their	  apparent	  urge	  to	  bring	  the	  budget	  back	  into	  balance.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	   Some	   of	   these	   reforms	   were	   aimed	   at	   ensuring	   better	   planning,	   such	   as	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	  standardized	  format	  for	  presenting	  the	  budget	  as	  a	  single	  law	  (Legge	  Finanzaria)	  in	  1978,	  or	  the	  launching	  of	   comprehensive	   economic-­‐financial	   planning	   in	   1988.	   Other	   procedural	   adjustments	   were	   aimed	   at	  enforcing	  discipline	  on	  the	  members	  of	  parliament.	  From	  1983	  and	  1985,	  the	  budget	  would	  be	  debated	  in	  separate,	  designated	  sessions	   in	   the	  Chamber	  and	   the	  Senate	   (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004	  p64).	   In	  1986	  secret	  voting	  on	  budgetary	  issues	  was	  abolished	  to	  stop	  „snipers“(franchi	  tiratori)	  from	  undermining	  the	  government’s	  fiscal	  plans	  (Padovano	  and	  Venturi	  2001).	  44	  The	  Goria	  plan	  of	  1986	  attempted	  to	  cut	  expenditure	  by	  9	  precentage	  points	  over	  the	  following	  four-­‐year	  period	   but	   failed	   (Bosi	   et	   al	   2003).	   From	  1988	   on,	   several	   adjustment	   programmes	  were	   launched,	   but	  none	  of	  them	  managed	  to	  meet	  its	  deficit	  targets	  (European	  Economy	  1993).	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Figure3.	  3	  -­	  Primary	  expenditure	  and	  revenues	  (1980-­1991)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  	  
	  	  Bringing	  non-­‐interest	  expenditures	  under	  control	  was	  a	  huge	  challenge	  in	  the	  1980s.	  In	  the	  preceding	  decade	  and	  a	  half,	  public	   spending	  had	  skyrocketed,	  growing	   from	   just	  under	  30	  to	  close	  to	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  (Morcaldo	  1993).	  The	  results	  achieved	  in	  the	   1980s	   in	   taming	   this	   expansion	   were	   modest.	   Initially	   the	   growth	   was	   even	  compounded	   by	   a	   further	   boost	   to	   social	   security	   spending	   from	   a	   wave	   of	  redundancies	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   a	   large	   campaign	   of	   industrial	   restructuring	   in	   the	   first	  years	   of	   the	   1980s45.	   In	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   decade,	   expenditure	   growth	   was	   slowed	  considerably,	  but	  not	  reversed.	  Practically	  all	  categories	  of	  public	  spending	  continued	  to	  slowly	  drift	  up	  (see	  Figure	  3.4).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Workers	   laid	  off	   in	   the	   restructuring	  process	  were	  entitled	   for	  up	   to	   three	  years	   to	  generous	   income-­‐replacement	   benefits	   –	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   Cassa	   Integrazione	   Guadagni	   (CIG)	   and	   Cassa	   Integrazione	  
Guadagni	   Straordinaria	   (CIGS)–	   that	   had	   been	   created	   in	   the	   previous	   decades.	   Furthermore,	   early	  retirement	  was	   introduced	   for	   redundant	  workers	   in	  1981,	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  dissipate	   the	  growing	   tension	  over	  the	  large	  number	  of	  redundancies.	  Therefore,	  the	  wave	  of	  reorganizations	  had	  repercussions	  for	  the	  budget.	   In	   later	   years,	   even	   though	   unemployment	   kept	   increasing,	   the	   budget	   remained	   unaffected,	  because	   this	   mostly	   involved	   workers	   not	   covered	   by	   the	   CIG	   and	   CIGS,	   and	   regular	   unemployment	  benefits	  were	  trivially	  small	  and	  short	  in	  duration	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi,	  2004).	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Figure3.	  4	  -­	  Non-­interest	  spending	  by	  type	  (1980-­1991)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  
	  	  Successive	  governments	  tried	  to	  achieve	  savings	  on	  social	  security,	  the	  largest	  item	  in	  the	  budget,	  but	   they	  accomplished	   little.	  They	  performed	  some	  marginal	  adjustments	  on	  the	  pension	  system46,	  but	  never	  managed	  to	  put	  to	  the	  Parliament	  a	  comprehensive	  proposal	  for	  pension	  reform	  despite	  discussing	  several	  of	  these	  in	  the	  cabinet	  (Ferrera	  and	  Jessoula	  2007	  p422).	  They	  introduced	  stricter	  rules	  on	  invalidity	  pensions,	  which	  could	  have	  potentially	  produced	  more	  notable	  savings,	  given	  the	  widespread	  abuse	  of	  these	   entitlements,	   but	   they	   did	   not	   ensure	   the	   strict	   enforcement	   of	   these,	   and	   the	  savings	   never	   materialized	   (Ferrera	   and	   Gualmini	   2004	   p94).	   Instead	   of	   declining,	  social	  security	  spending	  increased	  by	  half	  a	  percentage	  point	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  as	   pension	   expenditure	   slowly	   edged	   up	   with	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   people	   in	  pension-­‐age.	  The	  other	  major	  expenditure	  item,	  the	  compensation	  of	  public	  employees	  also	  marginally	  increased.	  Although	  the	  large	  waves	  of	  hiring	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  seen	  in	  the	  1970s	  had	  stopped,	  employee	  numbers	  kept	  marginally	  drifting	  up	  and	  salaries	  increased	  in	  line	  with	  rest	  of	  the	  economy	  (Morcaldo	  1993,	  Bosi	  et	  al	  2003).	  Only	  two	  fields	   stand	  out	  where	   the	   government	   could	   achieve	   savings:	   health	   care,	  where	   co-­‐payments	   were	   introduced	   (Ferrera	   and	   Gualmini	   2003	   p95),	   and	   production	  subsidies,	   because	   state	   aid	  was	   gradually	   phased	  out	   after	   1986	   in	   compliance	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  For	  example,	  they	  introduced	  limits	  on	  the	  collection	  of	  multiple	  benefits	  and	  defined	  income	  ceilings	  for	  the	  entitlement	  to	  social	  pensions	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004	  p94).	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rules	  of	  the	  Single	  Market.	  In	  all	  other	  areas	  of	  spending,	  inertial	  forces	  were	  stronger	  than	  savings	  efforts.	  	  	  On	  the	  revenue	  front,	  the	  improvement	  was	  larger.	  Between	  1980	  and	  1991,	  revenues	  grew	  by	  almost	  8	  percentage	  points	  of	  the	  GDP.	  However,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  this	  growth	  was	  achieved	  not	  by	  government	  intervention,	  but	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  extreme	   progressivity	   of	   the	   personal	   income	   tax	   system	   and	   high	   inflation,	   which	  automatically	   and	   swiftly	   increased	   fiscal	   pressure	   on	   employment	   income,	   boosting	  direct	   tax	   revenues	   (Giavazzi	   and	   Spaventa	   1989).	   After	   the	   governments	   readjusted	  the	   brackets	   in	   1983	   under	   pressure	   from	   trade	   unions,	   the	   momentum	   of	   revenue	  growth	   considerably	   slowed.	   Even	   though	   fiscal	   drag	   kept	   gradually	   pushing	   up	  personal	  income	  taxes	  (triggering	  new	  adjustments	  to	  the	  brackets	  in	  1986	  and	  1989),	  this	  had	  a	  much	  weaker	  effect	   than	  before	  1983.	  Other	  revenue	   items	  stagnated	  until	  the	  last	  third	  of	  the	  decade,	  when	  a	  major	  improvement	  –	  of	  around	  4	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  –	  was	  finally	  achieved	  (see	  Figure	  3.5).	  	  
Figure3.	  5-­	  Revenues	  by	  type	  (1980-­1991)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  
	  	  Although	  the	  corporate	  income	  tax	  rate	  was	  raised	  from	  25	  to	  36	  per	  cent	  as	  early	  as	  1983	  and	  the	  rate	  of	   local	  taxes	  on	  productive	  entities	  grew	  from	  15	  to	  16.2	  per	  cent,	  this	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  revenues	  due	  to	  the	  frequent	  use	  of	  tax	  rebates	  to	  help	  industry,	  and	  also	  due	  to	  widespread	  tax	  evasion	  (Guerra	  1993).	  A	  reform	  on	  income	  reporting	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and	  tax	  collection	  was	  put	  forward	  in	  1984	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  latter	  problem,	  but	  it	  was	  adjusted	   in	   the	   face	   of	   fierce	   opposition	   from	   self-­‐employed	   groups	   (Ginsborg	   2003,	  p154).	   Evasion	   continued	   to	   be	   a	   major	   drain	   on	   public	   revenues.	   Social	   security	  contributions	   on	   the	   income	   of	   the	   self-­‐employed	   were	   raised	   several	   times,	   but	  revenue	  from	  contributions	  remained	  flat	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  Revenue	  growth	  only	   gained	   new	   momentum	   after	   1986,	   when	   the	   government	   abolished	   tax	  exemptions	  on	  interest	  income	  from	  government	  bonds	  and	  considerably	  increased	  the	  withholding	   tax	   on	   other	   forms	   of	   capital	   income.	   In	   the	   same	   year,	   the	   treasury	  managed	   to	   capture	   the	   windfall	   gain	   from	   a	   reverse	   oil	   price	   shock,	   via	   increased	  excise	   taxes	   on	   fuel	   (Guerra,	   1993).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   privatization	   –	   a	   possibly	  considerable	  source	  of	  extra	  revenue	  –	  was	  not	  on	  the	  agenda	  in	  this	  decade.	  The	  sale	  of	  public	  enterprises	  remained	  sporadic	  and	  was	  usually	  motivated	  by	  the	  companies’	  financial	  problems	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  urge	  to	  raise	  revenues	  (Goldstein	  2003).	  	  In	  sum,	  despite	  a	  seeming	  sense	  of	  emergency,	  fiscal	  policy	  was	  lacking	  bold	  measures	  and	   decisive	   action	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   Even	  when	   apparently	   drastic	   action	  was	  taken	  –	  such	  as	  the	  increasing	  of	  the	  corporate	  income	  tax	  rate	  by	  almost	  a	  half	  –results	  failed	   to	   come	   forth	   due	   to	   countervailing	   decisions	   to	   soften	   the	   blow	   and	   due	   to	   a	  permissive	   attitude	   towards	   enforcement.	   At	   times,	   governments	   were	   even	   putting	  into	  place	  measures	  that	  set	  fiscal	  consolidation	  back	  for	  the	  medium	  term,	  by	  agreeing	  –	   for	  example	  –	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   early	   retirement	   in	  1981	   in	  order	   to	  deal	  with	  industrial	   conflict	   stirred	   by	   mass	   redundancies.	   Another	   example	   of	   expansive	  measures	  was	   the	  adjustment	  of	   income	   tax	  brackets	   in	  1983	  and	  1986	   that	   stopped	  the	   increasing	  of	   tax	  pressure	  on	  wages.	   It	  was	  only	   in	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	  decade	  that	  some	  real	  progress	  started	  to	  be	  seen	  –	  on	  the	  revenue	  side	  –	  but	  this	  came	  fairly	  late	  and	  was	  insufficient.	  Interest	  expenses	  had	  already	  increased	  to	  almost	  9	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP,	  at	  which	  point	  a	  gradual	  narrowing	  of	  the	  primary	  deficit	  was	  not	  going	  to	  do	  much	  for	  the	  stopping	  of	  the	  debt	  spiral.	  	  	  Why	  were	  the	  consolidation	  measures	  so	  hesitant	  despite	  the	  accelerating	  escalation	  of	  the	  problem?	  Why	  did	  governments	  shy	  away	  from	  taking	  effective	  measures	  in	  fields	  that	   could	   have	   yielded	   substantial	   savings,	   such	   as	   welfare	   spending	   and	   public	  employment,	   or	   major	   revenue	   increases,	   such	   as	   corporate	   or	   personal	   income	  taxation?	   Why	   did	   they	   only	   achieve	   successes	   in	   such	   relatively	   minor	   fields	   as	  healthcare	   or	   the	   taxation	   of	   interest	   income?	   In	   1990,	   health	   care	   expenditure	  amounted	   to	   6	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP.	   In	   comparison,	   welfare	   spending	   accounted	   for	  
	   84	  
three	  times	  as	  much,	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees	  twice	  as	  much	  (Ameco	  and	  Banca	  d’Italia).	  Tax	  revenues	  from	  interest	  income	  added	  up	  to	  as	  little	  as	  3.6	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	   in	   1991	   (Japelli	   and	   Pagano	   1994).	   Clearly,	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   required	  savings	  and/or	  revenue	  increases	  a	  larger	  spending	  ticket	  or	  a	  greater	  tax	  pool	  would	  have	  needed	  to	  be	  targeted.	  The	  next	  section	  disentangles	  this	  puzzle	  by	  investigating	  the	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  background	  of	  the	  policy	  paralysis.	  	  	  
Coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  in	  the	  making:	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  policy	  stalemate	  
of	  the	  1980s	  
	  The	  political	  legacy	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  was	  at	  least	  as	  onerous	  as	  the	  fiscal	  one.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  policy	  makers	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  practically	  impossible	  task	  in	  attempting	  to	  consolidate	   public	   finances	   in	   the	   face	   of	   strong	   political	   resistance	   from	   different	  societal	   groups	   with	   vested	   interests	   in	   different	   policy	   areas.	   It	   was	   virtually	  inconceivable	  to	  find	  substantial	  savings	  or	  extra	  revenues	  in	  a	  political	  context	  where	  each	  major	  fiscal	  area	  was	  protected	  from	  bearing	  the	  brunt	  of	  consolidation	  by	  some	  influential	  societal	  group	  that	  had	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  it.	  Workers’	  welfare	  entitlements	  were	  ring-­‐fenced	  by	  potent	  unions.	  Large	  corporations	  continued	  to	  obtain	  exemptions	  from	   taxes	  and	  contributions	  by	   lobbying	   the	  government.	  A	  weak	  attempt	   to	   rein	   in	  tax	  evasion	  by	  small	  enterprises	  and	  the	  self-­‐employed	  brought	  the	  government	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  crisis47.	  Finally,	  public	  employment	  and	  public	  investment	  was	  a	  major	  way	  to	  channel	  funds	  to	  crucial	  voters	  in	  extensive	  clientele	  networks	  of	  the	  dominant	  party	  of	  the	   government.	   Explaining	   how	   these	   vested	   interests	   were	   created	   and	   how	   fiscal	  policy	   became	  hostage	   to	   so	  many	  disparate	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   requires	   looking	  back	   at	   the	   events	   of	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   Therefore,	   this	   section	   analyses	   how	   the	  distributive	   conflicts	   of	   post-­‐war	   Italy	   created	   a	   specific	   constellation	   of	   coalitions	   of	  societal	  interests	  by	  the	  1980s.	  	  A	   useful	   starting	   point	   for	  mapping	   coalitions	   of	   interests	   and	   the	   balance	   of	   power	  between	  them	  is	  studying	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  strategic	  position	  of	  a	  pivotal	  party	  in	  the	  political	  system,	  Christian	  Democracy,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  relationship	  to	  its	  main	  opponents,	  the	   workers’	   movement,	   because	   this	   opposition	   captures	   the	   structure	   of	   socio-­‐political	  conflicts	  that	  so	  strongly	  determined	  the	  context	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	   DC	   occupied	   a	   peculiar,	   ambivalent	   position	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   Italian	   political	  system.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  was	  “bound”	  to	  dominate	  every	  government	  from	  the	  end	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Visentini-­‐attempt	  to	  control	  the	  reporting	  of	  incomes,	  see	  Ginsborg	  (2003	  p154)	  
	   85	  
the	  war,	  because	  the	  only	  other	  party	  of	  comparable	  size	  –	  the	  Communist	  party	  (PCI)	  –	  was	  isolated	  due	  to	  what	  was	  seen	  at	  the	  time	  as	  an	  anti-­‐system	  ideology	  (Bull	  2004)48.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   the	  DC	  was	  not	   immune	   to	   electoral	  pressures,	   because	  the	   number	   of	   votes	   it	   received	   crucially	   determined	   its	   bargaining	   position	   in	  negotiations	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  ministerial	  seats	  and	  other	  influential	  posts	  in	  the	  state	   bureaucracy	   and	   public	   enterprises	   at	   the	   time	   of	   each	   coalition	   formation	  (Pasquino	  1994).	  Therefore,	  the	  party’s	  economic	  policy	  choices	  were	  strongly	  guided	  by	   the	   preferences	   of	   its	   constituencies	   and	   these	   choices,	   in	   turn,	   determined	   the	  policy	  decisions	  of	  every	  government	  due	  to	  the	  DC’s	  central	  position.	  	  In	   the	  1950s	   and	   first	   half	   of	   the	  1960s,	   the	  DC-­‐led	  governments	  pursued	  neoliberal,	  business-­‐friendly	   policies,	   characterized	   by	   low	   inflation,	   low	   taxation,	   low	   spending	  and	   balanced	   budgets	   (Posner	   1977,	   Ginsborg	   1990	   p112-­‐113,	   Sassoon	   1986	   p18).	  These	  policies	  favoured	  the	  DC’s	  core	  supporter	  base	  amongst	  the	  populous	  stratum	  of	  self-­‐employed	   and	   small	   entrepreneurs,	   but	   also	   bigger	   corporations,	   which	   had	  originally	  supported	  the	  DC’s	  coalition	  partners,	  but	  which	  then	  created	  ever-­‐stronger	  ties	  with	   the	  DC	   itself49.	   This	   policy	  mix	   required	   the	   suppression	   of	   policy	   demands	  from	  labour.	  Spending	  on	  public	  education,	  health	  and	  housing	  stayed	  very	  low,	  despite	  repeated	   calls	   for	   the	   improvement	   of	   these	   public	   services	   and	   the	   social	   insurance	  system	   remained	   rudimentary50	   (Ginsborg	   1990	   pp188-­‐190,	   Ferrera	   and	   Gualmini	  2004	  p33).	   In	   the	  underdeveloped	  South,	   little	  was	  done	  directly	   to	  ease	   the	  massive	  un-­‐	  and	  underemployment	  of	  the	  large	  reservoirs	  of	  unskilled	  labour,	  which	  continued	  to	  fuel	  mass	  emigration	  from	  the	  region	  to	  areas	  of	  the	  industrial	  North	  and	  also	  abroad	  (Ginsborg	   1990	   p212).	   Businesses	   in	   the	   region	   received	   subsidies	   and	   interest-­‐free	  loans	   in	   order	   to	   encourage	   investment	   and	   public	   companies	   built	   large	   heavy	  industrial	   plants	   in	   the	   South	   but	   these	   efforts	   were	   not	   tailored	   to	   helping	   the	  unskilled	  labour	  force51.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Throughout	  the	  1980s,	  the	  DC	  governed	  in	  a	  (practically)	  fixed	  coalition	  with	  the	  same	  four	  parties:	  the	  Socialists	   (PSI),	   the	  Republicans	   (PRI),	   the	   Liberals	   (PLI)	   and	   the	  Democratic	   Socialist	   Party	   (PSDI)	   The	  coalition	  is	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  pentapartito.	  49	  Traditionally,	   the	  Liberals	  used	   to	  be	   the	  party	  of	  big	  business.	   Later	   this	   role	  was	   increasingly	   taken	  over	  by	  the	  Republicans,	  whose	  ministers	  and	  party	  notables	  channelled	  business	  views	  and	  demands	  to	  the	  government.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  main	  employer	  organization,	  Confindustria	  had	  privileged	  ties	  with	  the	  DC,	  too.	  (Ruzza	  and	  Fella	  2007,	  p12,	  Pasquino	  2004)	  50	  Calls	  for	  reform	  in	  these	  areas	  were	  put	  forward	  as	  early	  as	  1950	  in	  the	  Communist	  trade	  union’s	  Piano	  
del	  lavoro	  and	  by	  the	  National	  Committee	  for	  Labour’s	  (CNEL)	  comprehensive	  proposal	  for	  welfare	  reform	  in	  1963	  (Ginsborg	  1990	  188-­‐190,	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004,	  p33).	  51	  State	  enterprises	  brought	  crucial	  basic	  industries	  –	  such	  as	  petrochemicals	  and	  steel	  –	  to	  the	  South	  but	  these	  were	  capital-­‐	   rather	   than	   labour-­‐intensive	  production	  processes	  and	   in	  any	  case	  could	  not	  employ	  unskilled	  labour	  (Rodgers	  1970,	  Sassoon	  1997,	  p32).	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Sidelining	  labour’s	  policy	  preferences	  was	  unproblematic	  in	  the	  first	  decades	  after	  the	  war.	  First,	  the	  political	  quarantining	  of	  the	  Left	  “neutralized”	  most	  of	  the	  working	  class	  vote	   in	   the	   electoral	   competition,	   since	   the	   vote	   of	   most	   industrial	   workers	   went	  automatically	   to	   parties	   that	   could	   not	   stake	   a	   claim	   for	   a	   governmental	   position52.	  Second,	   the	   oversupply	   of	   labour	   –	   especially	   due	   to	   the	   constant	   influx	   of	   Southern	  workers	  into	  the	  Northern	  industrial	  districts	  –	  practically	  eliminated	  the	  possibility	  of	  effective	   industrial	   action	   (Sassoon	   1991).	   Third,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   meaningful	  resources,	   the	   proletariat	   of	   the	   South	   lacked	   any	   political	   clout.	   Some	   of	   the	   severe	  socio-­‐economic	   tensions	   in	   the	   area	   were	   dissipated	   by	   outmigration,	   while	   the	  remaining	  population	  remained	  largely	  politically	  unorganized	  and	  it	  continued	  to	  vote	  along	   religious	   lines,	   increasing	   the	   electoral	   strength	   of	   the	   DC	   without	   gaining	  substantial	  policy	  advantages	  in	  return.	  	  However,	   the	   situation	   rapidly	   changed	   in	   later	   decades.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   a	   swiftly	  changing	   society	   and	   a	   fast-­‐growing	   economy,	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   labour	  and	  business	  shifted.	  As	   labour	  markets	   in	   the	  Northern	   industrial	  districts	   tightened	  with	   the	   drying	   up	   of	   internal	  migration	   from	   the	   South,	   industrial	   action	   became	   a	  more	   powerful	   weapon	   (Sassoon	   1991).	   The	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   that	   had	   been	  previously	  suppressed	  finally	  erupted	  in	  the	  form	  of	  intense	  worker	  unrest	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1970s.	  The	  large	  industrial	  areas	  of	  the	  North	  were	   shaken	   by	   a	   wave	   of	   unusually	   intense	   and	   intransigent	   strikes	   and	  demonstrations	  from	  1968	  to	  1973.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  were	  sporadic,	  but	  intense	  outbursts	  of	  discontent	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  the	  South,	  too,	  involving	  riots	  and	  violence53.	  	  	  The	  massive	  mobilization	  of	  labour	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  DC’s	  ability	  to	  tailor	  policies	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  business.	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  hitherto	  suppressed	  policy	  demands	  had	  to	  be	  accepted.	  Between	  1968	  and	  1975,	  a	  series	  of	  welfare	  reforms	  were	  put	  into	  place	  for	  workers	  with	  regular	  employment54.	  These	  affected	  mostly	  organized	  labour	  in	  the	  North.	  Furthermore,	  large	  resources	  were	  allocated	  to	  creating	  jobs	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Until	  1963,	  the	  political	  quarantine	  extended	  to	  both	  the	  Communist	  and	  the	  Socialist	  party.	  The	  latter	  was	  reintegrated	  into	  the	  political	  system,	  when	  it	  joined	  the	  government	  coalition	  in	  1963.	  53	   Demonstrations	   took	   place	   Avola	   (Sicily)	   and	   Battipaglia	   (Campania)	   against	   the	   dire	   employment	  situation.	  In	  Reggio	  Calabria	  the	  population	  fought	  a	  year-­‐long	  battle	  against	  the	  police	  in	  order	  to	  force	  the	  government	   to	   make	   their	   city	   the	   capital	   of	   the	   newly	   formed	   region	   of	   Calabria,	   so	   that	   the	   new	  administrative	   jobs	   that	   come	   with	   the	   function	   can	   help	   alleviate	   the	   city’s	   soaring	   unemployment.	  (Ginsborg	  1990	  p337,	  Partridge	  1998	  p50)	  	  54	   These	   reforms	   involved	   the	   upgrading	   of	   unemployment	   benefits	   in	   1968;	   a	   pension	   reform	   in	   1969	  setting	  up	  social	  pensions,	  linking	  regular	  pensions	  to	  previous	  earnings	  and	  introducing	  indexation	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  living;	  a	  reform	  of	  invalidity	  benefits	  in	  1974;	  and	  the	  putting	  into	  place	  of	  a	  generous	  system	  of	  income	  replacement	  for	  the	  temporarily	  unemployed	  in	  1975,	  the	  Cassa	  Integrazione	  Guadagni	  (CIG)	  and	  
Cassa	  Integrazione	  Guadagni	  Straordinaria	  (CIGS)	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2003	  p37)	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underdeveloped	  South55.	  As	  a	  result,	  public	  spending	  grew	  from	  a	  little	  over	  thirty	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  1964	  to	  almost	  forty	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s	  (Morcaldo	  1993).	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  the	  experience	  with	  mass	  mobilization	  provided	  effective	  influence	  for	  the	  representatives	  of	  labour	  within	  the	  policy-­‐making	  sphere,	  abolishing	  the	  monopoly	  of	  advocates	  of	  business	  on	  policy	  formation.	  	  	  The	   representation	   of	   labour	   interests	   was	   taken	   up	   and	   the	   political	   potential	   of	  labour	  mobilization	  was	  harnessed	  by	  two	  fairly	  different	  sets	  of	  intermediate	  interest	  representing	   organizations.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   trade	   unions	   were	   the	   natural	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  sudden	  outbursts	  of	  political	  energy	  of	  industrial	  workers	  in	  large	  enterprises.	   The	  unions	  had	  been	  weak	   and	  divided	   in	   the	  1950s	   and	   the	  1960s,	   but	  when	   the	   first	   major	   strikes	   and	   demonstrations	   started	   –	   mostly	   spontaneously	  organized	   on	   the	   shop	   floor	   without	   the	   involvement	   of	   unions56	   –	   they	   were	   best	  placed	   to	   assume	   leadership,	   to	   coordinate	   action	   and	   to	   negotiate	   with	   the	  representatives	   of	   employers	   and	  with	   the	   government.	   The	   years	   of	  worker	   protest	  enormously	   boosted	   their	   standing:	   it	   doubled	   their	   membership57,	   forced	   the	   three	  confederations	   –	   the	   Communist	   CGIL,	   the	   Catholic	   CISL	   and	   the	   Socialist	   UIL	   –	   to	  suppress,	   at	   least	   temporarily,	   their	   party-­‐political	   divisions	   and	   allowed	   them	   to	  comment	   on	   and	   negotiate	   over	   policies	   from	   a	   position	   of	   power.	   They	   also	   gained	  important	  institutionalized	  roles	  in	  managing	  the	  welfare	  architecture	  built	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  turmoil	  and	  they	  were	  often	  consulted	  on	  and	  signed	  bilateral	  agreements	  with	  the	  government	  about	  economic	  policy	  decisions	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997,	  Natali	  and	  Rhodes	   2004).	   At	   the	   same	   time	   “riding	   the	   tiger”	   (Ginsborg	   1990	   p317)	   of	   worker	  discontent	   required	   that	   the	   unions	   adopt	   an	   intransigent	   position	   in	   their	   dealings	  with	   employers	   and	   the	   government.	   This	   was	   especially	   so	   for	   the	   CGIL,	   whose	  Communist	  credentials	  and	  dominance	  amongst	  the	  three	  confederations	  predestined	  it	  to	  a	  militant	  position.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  workers’	  unrest,	  the	  unions’	   power	   was	   linked	   to	   a	   strategy	   of	   uncompromisingly	   defending	   the	  achievements	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Employment	  was	  boosted	  in	  the	  South	  via	  investment	  from	  public	  enterprises	  in	  the	  area	  (for	  example	  the	  port	  of	  Gioia	  Tauro	  was	  built	   specifically	  with	   the	  purpose	   to	   increase	  employment	  opportunities	   in	  Calabria),	   via	   the	   overtaking	   and	   strengthening	   of	   existing	   but	  weak	   companies	   by	   the	   public	   sector	   (a	  specific	   fund	   was	   set	   up	   in	   1971	   for	   this	   purpose),	   and	   by	   the	   progressive	   overstaffing	   of	   the	   public	  administration.	  (Partridge	  1998	  p50,	  Ginsborg	  1990	  and	  2003	  p338-­‐340	  and	  p345,	  Alesina	  et	  al	  1999)	  56	  Ginsborg	  (1990	  p317)	  claims	  that	  unions	  and	  even	  the	  Communist	  Party	  were	  taken	  by	  surprise	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  events.	  Sassoon	  (1997,	  p136)	  goes	  even	   further	   in	  claiming	  that	  “[t]he	  unrest	  of	  1968	  would	  not	  have	   occurred	   with	   that	   level	   of	   intensity	   if	   the	   Italian	   unions	   had	   been	   stronger.	   A	   strong	   and	   well-­‐entrenched	  union	  movement	  would	  have	  exercised	  a	  measure	  of	  restraint	  and	  control,	  partly	   in	  order	  to	  protect	  vested	  interests,	  partly	  in	  order	  not	  to	  jeopardize	  existing	  power	  relations.“	  57	  The	  membership	  of	  CGIL	  grew	   from	  2.5	   to	  4.5	  million,	   that	  of	   the	  CISL	   from	  1	   to	  2.5	  million	  between	  1968	  and	  1975	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004).	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  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  union	  representation	  did	  not	  extend	   to	   large	  sections	  of	   labour	   in	  the	  South,	  because	  of	  the	  chronic	   lack	  of	  permanent	  employment	  opportunities	   in	  the	  region,	   making	   much	   of	   the	   Southern	   proletariat	   “unorganizable”.	   Their	   case	   was	  instead	  taken	  up	  by	  local	  politicians	  of	  the	  DC	  itself.	  The	  demonstrations	  and	  riots	  –	  and	  especially	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   post-­‐fascist	  Movimento	   Socialista	   Italiano	   (MSI)	   in	  perpetuating	  the	  violence	  in	  Reggio	  Calabria	  –	  revealed	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  dissatisfaction	  of	  the	  local	  DC	  voter	  base	  with	  the	  way	  their	  plight	  was	  handled	  by	  the	  government	  and	  their	   susceptibility	   to	   mobilization	   by	   alternative,	   anti-­‐system	   forces,	   adding	   to	   the	  threat	  to	  the	  existing	  balance	  of	  political	  power	  from	  the	  working	  classes	  –	  albeit	  from	  a	   right-­‐wing	   extremist	   direction	   and	   underlining	   the	   need	   for	   the	   DC	   to	   pay	   more	  attention	   to	   these	   disadvantaged	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   in	   the	   South.	   The	   party	   had	  traditionally	   relied	   on	   clientele	   networks	   in	   the	   region	   and	   used	   state	   resources	   to	  reward	  voters	  and	  supporters	  (Tarrow	  1977).	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  these	  networks	  were	  extended	  to	  new	  strata	  of	  society	  and	  augmented	  with	  resources	   of	   various	   kinds.	   Apart	   from	   the	   stepping	   up	   of	   investment	   of	   public	  enterprises	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  decentralization	  of	  public	  administration	  in	  1970	  and	  the	  expansion	   of	   public	   education	   was	   also	   used	   as	   a	   vehicle	   to	   create	   extra	   jobs	   via	  overstaffing58,	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   fraudulently	   awarding	  welfare	   benefits	   –	   primarily	  disability	  benefits	  –	  became	  established	  to	  provide	  income	  for	  many	  of	  those	  who	  could	  not	  be	  given	  public	  jobs	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004	  p45).	  The	  increased	  significance	  of	  the	   Southern	   proletariat	   also	   increased	   the	  weight	   of	   those	   politicians	  within	   the	  DC	  that	  operated	  the	  clientele	  networks	  in	  the	  region.	  Since	  the	  new	  uses	  of	  public	   funds	  benefited	  local	  DC	  politicians,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  clients,	  they	  were	  crucially	  interested	  in	  ensuring	  the	  continuous	  supply	  of	  those	  funds	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  upheaval	  of	   the	  1960s	  and	  the	  1970s	  not	  only	  created	   large	  spending	  commitments	  for	  the	  state	  but	  also	  established	  two	  important	  power	  nodes	  within	  the	  policy	   making	   sphere	   that	   were	   crucially	   interested	   in	   and	   capable	   of	   safeguarding	  those	   spending	   commitments.	   The	   unions	   mostly	   stood	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  In	  1999,	  Alesina	  et	  al.	  calculated	  that	  public	  institutions	  in	  the	  South	  in	  different	  types	  of	  public	  services	  were	   overstaffed	   ten-­‐fold	   compared	   to	   the	   North	   and	   concluded	   that	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   public	  employment	  bill	  in	  the	  South	  were	  de	  facto	  income	  transfers	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  only	  served	  the	  purpose	  of	   keeping	   up	   incomes,	   rather	   than	   providing	   services	   to	   the	   public.	   They	   also	   point	   out	   that	   almost	   a	  quarter	   of	   the	   people	   who	   had	   jobs	   in	   the	   South	   were	   working	   in	   the	   public	   sector.	   Alesina	   and	   his	  colleagues’	  calculations	  relate	  to	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  similar	  calculations	  are	  not	  available	  for	  the	  seventies	  and	  1980s,	  but	  given	  that	  public	  employment	  decreased	  in	  the	  nineties	  compared	  to	  the	  1980s,	  it	  seems	   likely	   that	   their	   conclusions	   about	   overstaffing	   and	   income	   transfers	  would	   hold	   –	   possibly	   even	  more	  strongly	  –	  in	  the	  1980s.	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government,	   and	   exerted	   power	   through	   the	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   threat	   of	   mass	  mobilization.	   The	   patrons	   of	   the	   Southern	   proletariat	   gained	   influence	   within	   the	  dominant	  party	  of	  government	  through	  the	  revealed	  risks	  to	  the	  DC	  voter	  base	   in	  the	  South.	   These	   new	  wielders	   of	   power,	   however,	   did	   not	   replace	   the	   old	   ones.	   The	  DC	  continued	   to	   rely	   heavily	   on	   the	   self-­‐employed	   and	   to	   cultivate	   good	   ties	   with	   big	  business,	  even	  after	  it	  co-­‐opted	  the	  Southern	  poor	  and	  was	  faced	  by	  strong	  opposition	  from	  the	  unions.	  	  	  Therefore,	  Christian	  Democratic	  policy	  makers	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  difficult	  dilemma.	  The	  irreversible	  jump	  in	  spending	  required	  a	  corresponding	  increase	  in	  revenues,	  but	  they	  were	   reluctant	   to	   force	   their	   business	   constituencies	   to	   pick	   up	   the	   bill.	   At	   the	   same	  time,	  unions	  would	  surely	  not	  acquiesce	  in	  a	  tax	  system	  that	  assigns	  all	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  new	  spending	  programmes	   to	  dependent	  workers.	   Initially,	   this	  dilemma	  gave	  rise	   to	  procrastination	  and	  tax	  reform	  was	  delayed	  until	  1974	  despite	  the	  growing	  gap	  in	  the	  budget	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1960s59.	   While	   the	   reform	   that	   was	   ultimately	   put	   into	   effect	  formally	   conformed	   to	   labour’s	   preferences,	   with	   its	   extreme	   progressivity60	   in	  personal	  taxation	  and	  relatively	  high	  rate	  of	  corporate	  tax,	  the	  de	  facto	   fiscal	  pressure	  on	   business	   was	   eased	   both	   by	   explicit	   countervailing	   measures	   –	   tax-­‐rebates,	  temporary	   and	   sector-­‐specific	   exemptions	   from	   payroll	   taxes,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   so-­‐called	  negative	   VAT	   on	   investment	   	   –	   and	   by	   the	   tacit	   toleration	   of	   increased	   tax	   evasion	  (Guerra	  1993,	  Della	  Sala	  1997,	  p27)61.	  The	  explicit	  measures	  were	  more	  accessible	   to	  large	  firms,	  which	  were	  likelier	  to	  achieve	  specific	  relief	  to	  their	  problems	  via	  lobbying,	  whereas	  evasion	  was	  more	  available	  for	  small	  firms	  and	  the	  self-­‐employed	  due	  to	  their	  lower	  visibility.	  The	  share	  of	  corporate	  taxes	  remained	  low	  (less	  than	  a	  tenth	  in	  1990)	  in	  total	  tax	  revenues	  (Jappelli	  and	  Pagano	  1994),	  and	  evasion	  increased	  in	  response	  to	  higher	   rates,	   partly	   through	   the	   adjustment	   of	   behaviour	   of	   individual	   firms	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  The	  tax	  reform	  was	  already	  legislated	  in	  1972,	  but	  its	  actual	  introduction	  was	  postponed	  by	  two	  years	  on	  request	   from	   independent	  entrepreneurs,	  who	  claimed	   they	  needed	  more	   time	   to	  prepare.	   (Ginsborg	  1990	  p330)	  60	  The	  personal	  income	  tax	  system	  had	  32	  brackets	  and	  the	  top	  rate	  was	  72	  per	  cent.	  (Jappelli	  and	  Pagano	  1994)	  61	  Naturally,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   ascertain	  why	   the	   government	   remained	  passive	   in	   the	   face	   of	   growing	   tax	  evasion.	  A	   few	  facts,	  however,	   feed	  the	  suspicion	  that	  evasion	  might	  have	  been	  part	  of	  a	   tacit	  agreement	  between	  small	  business	  and	  the	  DC	  to	  allow	  the	  former	  to	  avoid	  the	  consequences	  of	  formally	  ever-­‐higher	  fiscal	   pressure.	   First,	   as	   Ginsborg	   (1990,	   p330)	   points	   out,	   the	   tax	   reform	   of	   1972	   failed	   to	   introduce	   a	  proper	  method	  of	  tax	  collection.	  Second,	  the	  years	  to	  follow	  brought	  a	  number	  of	  tax	  amnesties:	  a	  general	  one	   in	   1982	   and	   one	   especially	   for	   the	   self-­‐employed	   in	   1983	   (Torgler	   and	   Schaltegger	   2007).	   Third,	  property	  taxes	  –	  the	  type	  of	  tax	  most	  difficult	  to	  evade	  –	  were	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  the	  range	  of	  taxes	  applied	  in	  Italy	  (Guerra	  1993).	  Fourth,	  the	  uproar	  and	  government	  crisis	  following	  the	  Visentini	  attempt	  to	  reform	   tax	   collection	   shows	   how	   difficult	   government	   parties	   found	   it	   to	   touch	   the	   tax	   collection	   issue	  (Ginsborg	  1990	  p419	  and	  2003,	  La	  Palombara	  1987	  p49).	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through	  a	  general	  shift	  towards	  organising	  production	  into	  smaller	  scale	  units,	  making	  income	  and	  employment	  easier	  to	  conceal62.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   events	   of	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   completely	   reordered	   the	   policy	  landscape	  relative	  to	   the	  post-­‐war	  years.	  First,	   the	  tightening	  up	  of	   labour	  markets	   in	  the	  North	  and	  the	  attendant	  increase	  in	  the	  potential	  for	  industrial	  action	  caused	  a	  shift	  in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   favour	   of	  worker	   groups,	   placing	   the	   policy	   hegemony	   of	  business	   under	   pressure.	   In	   the	   political	   sphere,	   this	   shift	   manifested	   itself	   via	   the	  increased	   influence	   and	   assertiveness	   of	   the	   political	   left	   –	   the	   newly	   strengthened	  union	  movement	  –	  as	  well	  as	  threat	  to	  the	  DC’s	  positions	  from	  the	  political	  right.	  The	  response	   of	   the	   DC	   –	   the	   chief	   interlocutor	   of	   business	   interests	   –	   to	   these	  developments	  was	   threefold.	   First,	   it	   could	   no	   longer	   avoid	  making	   significant	   policy	  concessions	   to	   organized	   workers.	   Second,	   it	   politically	   co-­‐opted	   the	   Southern	  proletariat	   through	   extended	   clientele	   networks,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   having	   to	   fight	   a	  two-­‐front	  battle.	  Third,	  it	  did	  all	  it	  could	  to	  shield	  its	  business	  constituencies	  from	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  new	  spending	  commitments.	  	  	  	  The	  new	  sets	  of	  measures	  –	  the	  ones	  on	  the	  spending	  side	  and	  the	  negative,	  exemptive	  policies	   on	   the	   taxation	   side	   –	   created	   four	   very	   distinct	   fiscal	   clusters	   of	   interests	  based	  on	   strong	  vested	   interests	   in	   specific	   policy	   areas.	  They	   split	   labour	   as	  well	   as	  business	  into	  two	  by	  reinforcing	  existing	  distinctions	  within	  the	  classes.	  Among	  labour	  –	   which	   was	   originally	   uniformly	   interested	   in	   all-­‐encompassing	   welfare	   and	  employment-­‐creating	   policies	   –	   they	   created	   a	   divide	   according	   to	   labour	   market	  position,	   which	   largely	   corresponded	   to	   geographic	   location	   as	   well.	   The	   welfare	  architecture	   built	   between	   1968	   and	   1975	   was	   closely	   targeted	   to	   employees	   with	  regular	   employment	   histories.	   Therefore,	   its	   benefits	   and	   entitlements	   –	   regular	  pensions,	   income	   replacements	   etc.	   –	   remained	   inaccessible	   for	   workers	   in	   areas	   of	  chronic	  unemployment,	  like	  in	  many	  provinces	  of	  the	  South,	  where	  jobs,	  if	  available	  at	  all,	  were	  mostly	  seasonal,	  unpredictable	  or	  in	  the	  shadow	  economy.	  Notably,	  long-­‐term	  unemployment	  benefits	   and	  basic	  pensions	   remained	  notional	   (Bertola	   and	  Garibaldi	  2002).	   Conversely,	   the	   funds	   channelled	   to	   the	   Southern	   proletariat	   through	   public	  employment	   and	   welfare	   fraud	   were	   inseparable	   from	   the	   clientele	   networks	   that	  provided	  them	  and	  therefore	  not	  available	  outside	  of	  those	  networks.	  Business,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Alworth	  and	  Castelucci	  (1993)	  point	  out	   that	   in	   the	  decade	  between	  1977	  and	  1988,	  only	  a	   little	  over	  one-­‐third	   of	   all	   companies	   reported	   a	   positive	   income	   in	   any	   one	   year	   –	   i.e.	   approximately	   two-­‐thirds	  reported	   no	   taxable	   gains.	   Schneider	   (1997)	   estimates	   that	   the	   size	   of	   the	   underground	   economy	   grew	  from	  around	  one	  tenth	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  1970,	  to	  around	  one	  eight	  in	  1980	  and	  to	  almost	  one	  fourth	  by	  1990.	  See	  also	  Chiesi	  (1999).	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had	  previously	  had	  a	  general	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  low	  taxes,	  was	  now	  split	  according	  to	   size,	   due	   to	   the	   differential	   ability	   of	   large	   and	   small	   firms	   to	   achieve	   exemptions	  from	  high	  taxes	  or	  avail	  themselves	  of	  evasion.	  	  	  As	   a	   result,	   by	   the	   time	   fiscal	   problems	   turned	   severe	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970s	   and	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s,	  four	  relatively	  well-­‐delineable	  clusters	  of	  vested	  fiscal	  interests	  structured	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   policy.	   As	   explained	   before,	   these	   four	   groups	   were	  ordered	  into	  two	  opposing	  political	  camps,	  with	  organized	  labour	  on	  one	  side,	  facing	  an	  awkward	   redistributive	   coalition	   of	   large	   and	   small	   business	   and	   clientele	   networks	  involving	   the	   Southern	  proletariat	   under	   the	  umbrella	   of	   the	  DC.	  The	  power	  of	   these	  two	  camps	  were	  approximately	  balanced	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  neither	  could	  force	  the	  other	  to	   make	   significant	   fiscal	   sacrifices.	   The	   coalition	   of	   large	   and	   small	   business	   and	  clientele	   networks	   involving	   the	   Southern	   proletariat	   had	   direct	   access	   to	   policy	  making	   through	   the	   DC’s	   permanent	   central	   role	   in	   government,	   whereas	   labour	  wielded	  power	  through	  unions	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  mass	  mobilization.	  	  The	  legacy	  of	  these	  developments	  was	  a	  completely	  paralysed	  policy	  space.	  The	  room	  for	   adjustment	  was	  marginal.	   Taking	   on	   the	  welfare	   system	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  militant	  workforce	  would	   have	   been	   a	   risky	   undertaking.	   In	   fact,	   strikes	   and	   demonstrations	  could	   even	   extract	   a	   new	  welfare	  measure	   –	   the	   introduction	   of	   early	   retirement	   in	  1981	   –	   when	   workers	   faced	   new	   challenges	   due	   to	   the	   wave	   of	   redundancies.	  Furthermore,	   unions	   achieved	   the	   adjustment	   of	   tax	   brackets	   when	   fiscal	   drag	   was	  increasing	   the	   tax	   pressure	   on	   wages.	   The	   Southern	   clientele	   would	   have	   been	  electorally	   costly	   to	   pick	   on.	  While	   the	   DC’s	   vote	   share	  was	   declining	   in	   every	   other	  region,	   the	   party	   was	   getting	   growing	   support	   in	   the	   South	   throughout	   the	   1970s	  (Cattaneo).	  Indeed,	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees	  remained	  stable	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  and	  even	   the	  attempt	   to	  crack	  down	  on	  benefit	   fraud	  remained	  unenforced.	  The	  government	   seemed	  ambivalent	   towards	   the	   idea	  of	   increasing	   the	   fiscal	  pressure	  on	  business.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   did	   try	   to	   elicit	   higher	   contributions	   –	   through,	   for	  example,	  the	  drastic	  increase	  of	  the	  corporate	  tax	  rate	  –	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  also	  seemed	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  counter	  this	  increase	  by	  exemptions	  and	  rebates.	  The	  Visentini	  affair	   in	   1984	   with	   the	   shopkeepers’	   tax	   reporting	   also	   showed	   that	   willingness	   to	  clamp	   down	   on	   evasion	   was	   less	   than	   firm.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   is	   less	   surprising	   that	  successive	   governments	   resorted	   to	   trying	   to	  make	   savings	  on	  health	   care,	   increased	  taxes	  on	   interest	   income	  and	  waited	   for	  opportunities	   like	   capturing	  a	  windfall	   in	  oil	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prices	   via	   excise	   taxes	   to	   generate	   extra	   revenue,	   even	   though	   these	  measures	  were	  obviously	  too	  small	  relative	  to	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.	  	  	  Throughout	   the	   1980s,	   it	   was	   difficult	   to	   see	   when	   and	   how	   concessions	   needed	   to	  stabilize	   public	   finances	   could	   be	   elicited	   at	   last	   from	   any	   of	   the	   four	   main	   interest	  groups,	   even	   though	   the	  primary	  budget	  gap	  created	  by	   the	  unfunded	  rise	  of	  welfare	  and	  employment	  spending	  was	  still	  open,	  the	  debt	  amassed	  in	  the	  previous	  decade	  was	  generating	  ever-­‐higher	  interest	  costs	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  was	  set	  on	  a	  much	  steeper	  path.	  The	  next	  section	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  pressures	  from	  the	   international	   economy	   that	   broke	   the	   political	   and	   policy	   deadlock,	   by	  making	   it	  ever	  more	   costly	   for	   some	   of	   the	   four	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   to	   insist	   on	   defending	  their	  vested	  interests	  in	  the	  policy	  status	  quo.	  	  
Fiscal	  problems	  as	  catalysts	  for	  political	  change:	  The	  fall	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  	  However	   irresolvable	   the	  deadlock	  might	  have	   seemed	   in	   the	  1980s,	   it	  was	   suddenly	  gone	   in	   the	  early	  1990s.	  A	  drastic	   consolidation	  package	  was	  enacted	   in	  1992	  and	   in	  the	   following	   years,	   affecting	   virtually	   all	   large,	   previously	   untouchable	   areas:	  corporate	   taxation,	   tax	  evasion,	  public	  employment,	  benefit	   fraud	  and	   to	   some	  extent	  even	  pensions.	  The	  explanation	  for	  how	  the	  mighty	  political	  obstacles	  to	  thoroughgoing	  retrenchment	  were	   removed	  –	  how	  and	  why	   the	   representatives	  of	   the	   four	  defining	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	   lost	   the	   ability	  or	   the	  willingness	   to	   intransigently	  defend	   the	  vested	  interests	  of	  their	  supporters	  –	  rests	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model.	  	  	  The	   model	   underlines	   that	   the	   same	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   can	   have	   dynamically	  changing	  attitudes	  towards	  making	  concessions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization,	  if	  the	  lack	   of	   stability	   causes	   progressively	   increasing	   losses	   to	   them	   through	   secondary	  effects	  such	  as,	   for	  example,	   inflation.	  Therefore,	  understanding	  the	  changing	  political	  context	  of	  stabilization	  requires	  analysing	  the	  changing	  balance	  between	  the	  constant	  benefits	  accruing	  to	  each	  group	  from	  defending	  their	  vested	  interests	  in	  certain	  policies	  and	   the	   increasing	   loss	   they	   suffer	   from	   the	   deterioration	   of	   the	   general	   economic	  environment	   due	   to	   the	   persistent	   fiscal	   imbalances.	   Through	   such	   an	   analysis,	   this	  section	  shows	  that	  while	  politics	  seemed	  frozen	  and	  policies	  appeared	  to	  be	  caught	  in	  a	  permanent	  deadlock	  throughout	  the	  1980s,	  the	  stances	  of	  some	  of	  the	  four	  important	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  towards	  making	  concessions	  were	  gradually	  shifting	  and	  their	  loyalties	  to	  their	  representatives	  and	  to	  the	  political	  strategies	  they	  were	  pursuing	  was	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progressively	   eroded.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   loss	   of	   support	   of	   both	   the	   DC	   and	   the	   unions,	  leading	   to	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   former	   and	   a	  dramatic	   re-­‐evaluation	  of	   the	   strategies	   of	   the	  latter,	  allowing	  for	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  political	  basis	  for	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  	  The	   key	   to	   understanding	   how	   fiscal	   imbalances	   exercised	   their	   secondary,	   negative	  effects	   on	   different	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   is	   Italy’s	   membership	   in	   the	   European	  Monetary	   System.	   Italy	   committed	   to	   participating	   in	   this	   system	   of	   quasi-­‐fixed	  exchange	   rates	  when	   the	   regime	  was	   launched	   in	   late	   1978.	   This	   decision	   became	   a	  crucial	   exogenous	   international	   factor	   in	   determining	   the	   ability	   of	   different	   groups	  within	  the	  Italian	  polity	  to	  live	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  escalating	  fiscal	  problems,	  because	  of	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  tension	  between	  the	  exchange	  rate	  commitment	  and	  the	  need	   to	   slow	   the	   accumulation	   of	   debt	   through	   monetization.	   Given	   the	   country’s	  double-­‐digit	  inflation	  at	  the	  time	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  –	  and	  the	  double-­‐digit	  inflation	  differential	  with	  Germany	  –	  the	  decision	  was	  generally	  seen	  as	  a	  dangerous	  one	  for	  the	  international	  competitiveness	  of	  Italian	  industry	  and	  all	  political	   forces	  were	  opposed	  to	  such	  a	  turn.63	  	  	  However,	  Italy	  was	  under	  considerable	  external	  pressure	  to	  join	  (Ludlow	  1982	  pp114-­‐115,	  Frieden	  2001,	  Quaglia	  2004).	  Both	  Germany	  and	  France	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  Italy,	  even	  though	  Andreotti,	  Prime	  Minister	  at	  the	  time	  had	  originally	  announced	  that	  Italy	  would	   for	   the	   time	  being	  stay	  out	  of	   the	  EMS.	   Italy’s	   final	  acquiescence	  was	  probably	  motivated	  by	  the	  willingness	  to	  reconfirm	  its	  European	  credentials,	  but	  perhaps	  also	  by	  the	   precedent	   of	   having	   received	   considerable	   help	   with	   its	   balance-­‐of-­‐payment	  differences	  from	  Germany	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  decade	  (Posner	  1977,	  Spaventa	  1980,	  Ludlow	  1982,	  Frieden	  2001,	  Quaglia	  2004).	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  country	  managed	  to	  secure	  preferential	   treatment	   within	   the	   system	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   broader,	   more	   permissive	  fluctuation	   band,	   but	   this	   was	   not	   quite	   enough	   to	   resolve	   the	   tension	   between	   its	  exchange	   rate	   commitment	   and	   the	   severe	   inflation	   issues	   the	   country	   was	   riddled	  with.	  	  The	  main	  source	  of	  high	  inflation	  was	  that	  the	  Italian	  central	  bank	  automatically	  acted	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  last	  resort	  of	  government	  bonds	  between	  1975	  and	  1981	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  was	  subjected	  to	  budgetary	  outcomes.	  After	  fixing	  the	  exchange	   rate,	   any	   further	   monetization	   of	   debt	   and	   the	   further	   fuelling	   of	   inflation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  commentary	  at	  the	  time	  by	  the	  president	  of	  Confindustria	  and	  former	  governor	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  minister	  for	  industry	  and	  the	  minister	  for	  agriculture	  see	  Ludlow	  (1982	  pp209-­‐211).	  Among	  parties,	  none	  supported	  the	  move	  (Frieden	  2002	  p31)	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would	   automatically	   translate	   into	   real	   exchange	   rate	   appreciation	   and	   consequently	  into	  a	  loss	  of	  competitiveness	  for	  Italian	  industry.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  such	  a	  chain	  of	  policy	  problems,	  the	  central	  bank	  was	  given	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  in	   1981	   and	   its	   automatic	   obligation	   to	   buy	   up	   all	   unsold	   government	   bonds	   was	  terminated.	  However,	  it	  continued	  to	  provide	  financing	  for	  the	  deficit	  –	  albeit	  at	  a	  much	  smaller	  scale	  –	  throughout	  the	  1980s64,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  having	  to	  pay	  even	  higher	  interest	   rates	   on	   debt	   and	   to	   prevent	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   from	   growing	   along	   an	   even	  steeper	   trajectory	   (Fratianni	   and	   Spinelli	   1997).	   This	   practice	   contributed	   to	   the	  persistence	  of	   a	   sizeable	   inflation	  differential	  with	  Germany	  and	   to	   real	   appreciation.	  Thereby,	  it	  created	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  fiscal	  problems	  and	  the	  (loss	  of)	  welfare	  of	  all	  those	  in	  the	  exposed	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Policy	  makers	  tried	  to	  escape	  the	  Scylla	  and	  Charybdis	  of	   faster	  debt	  growth	  and	  real	  appreciation	  by	  combining	  the	  continued	  partial	  monetization	  of	  deficit	  with	  repeated	  adjustments	   of	   the	   exchange	   rate65,	   but	   the	   nominal	   depreciations	   they	   achieved	   in	  negotiations	   with	   their	   EMS-­‐partners	   did	   not	   make	   up	   for	   the	   cumulative	   inflation	  differential	   in	   this	   period.	  The	   lira	   appreciated	  by	  42	  per	   cent	   in	   real	   terms	  between	  1978	   and	   1991	   (Fratianni	   and	   Spinelli	   1997	   p236-­‐237).	   The	   effect	   of	   the	   real	  appreciation	   was	   different	   across	   different	   industries:	   some	   suffered	   large	   setbacks	  whereas	   others	   held	   up	   well	   in	   world	   markets	   despite	   the	   exchange	   rate	  disadvantage66.	  Generally,	   large-­‐scale	  manufacturing	  –	   such	   as	   the	  production	  of	   cars	  and	  white	   goods	   –	  was	  worst	   affected,	   but	   some	   of	   the	   traditional	   products	   of	   small	  enterprises	  of	   the	   industrial	  districts	  –	   such	  as	   textile	  and	  apparel	  or	   leather	  goods	  –	  also	   lost	   market	   share	   in	   this	   period	   (Guerrieri	   and	   Milana	   1990	   pp147-­‐163).	   The	  setbacks	   suffered	   by	   manufacturing	   were	   also	   reflected	   in	   a	   loss	   of	   employment.	  Between	  1980	  and	  1990,	  10	  per	   cent	  of	   the	   jobs	  were	   lost	   in	   the	   sector.	   In	   the	   same	  period,	  unemployment	  grew	  from	  around	  7	  to	  almost	  10	  per	  cent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	   Fratianni	   and	   Spinelli	   (1997,	   p	   242)	   point	   out	   that	   the	   1981	   “divorce”	   of	   the	   Banca	   d’Italia	   from	   the	  treasury	  –	  i.e.	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  to	  automatically	  buy	  unsold	  treasury	  bonds	  –	  was	  far	  from	  a	  complete	  break	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  domination	  of	  the	  bank	  by	  the	  treasury.	  In	  fact,	  the	  bank	  continued	  to	  finance	  a	  sizeable	  share	  of	  the	  deficit	  via	  overdraft	  and	  buying	  a	  predetermined	  share	  of	  the	  bonds	  at	  auctions.	  	  See	  also	  Bruni	  et	  al.	  (1989),	  Epstein	  and	  Schor	  (1989)	  and	  Bartilossi	  (2003).	  65	  The	  lira	  was	  realigned	  eleven	  times	  between	  1979	  and	  1990:	  twice	  in	  1979,	  twice	  in	  1981,	  twice	  in	  1982,	  once	  in	  1983,	  once	  in	  1985,	  twice	  in	  1986	  and	  once	  in	  1987	  (Fratianni	  and	  Spinelli	  1997,	  p236-­‐237).	  66	   The	   automotive	   industry,	   electric	   appliances,	   telecommunications,	   computers	   and	   office	   machines,	  petrochemicals,	  chemicals	  and	  pharmaceuticals	  as	  well	  as	  textiles	  and	  apparel	   lost	  a	  part	  of	  their	  market	  share	   in	  world	   exports	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Other	   industries,	   such	   as	  wood	   and	   furniture,	   ceramics	   and	   glass,	  metal	  products	  or	  trains	  and	  airplanes	  recovered	  after	  a	  short	  fall	  or	  held	  up	  well	  throughout	  the	  period	  despite	   the	   exchange	   rate	   disadvantage.	   Some,	   such	   as	   agricultural	   machines	   or	   thermo-­‐mechanical	  equipment	  even	  increased	  their	  market	  share	  (Guerrieri	  and	  Milana	  1990	  pp147-­‐163).	  
	   95	  
Real	   appreciation	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   international	   competitiveness	   introduced	   a	   new	  aspect	   into	   the	   redistributive	   conflict	   between	   the	   four	  main	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	  whose	  vested	  interests	  paralysed	  fiscal	  policy	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  For	  those	  workers	  and	   large	   and	   small	   businesses	   that	   felt	   the	   full	   weight	   of	   declining	   international	  competitiveness,	  the	  fiscal	  stalemate	  became	  ever	  more	  costly	  and	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	   intransigently	   defending	   their	   interests	   were	   progressively	   dwarfed	   in	  comparison.	   For	   those	   entrepreneurs,	   workers	   and	   dependents	   of	   the	   state,	   whose	  livelihood	  was	   sheltered	   from	   international	   competition,	   the	   calculus	   of	   resistance	   to	  fiscal	  pain	  did	  not	   change.	  Two	  of	   the	   fiscally	   important	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  –	   the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  South	  and	  large	  business	  –	  clearly	  stood	  on	  two	  opposite	  sides	  of	  the	  exposed-­‐sheltered	  divide.	  Small	  business	  and	  labour,	  however,	  were	  cut	  in	  the	   middle.	   Politically,	   the	   exposed-­‐sheltered	   divide	   fuelled	   internal	   conflicts	   of	  interests	  both	  within	  the	  DC’s	  constituency	  and	  within	  the	  labour	  movement,	  between	  those	  who	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  with	  a	  fiscal	  compromise	  resolving	  the	  stalemate	  and	   those	   who	   had	   little	   to	   win	   from	  making	   sacrifices	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   stabilization.	  Thus,	  both	  the	  DC	  and	  the	  unions	  were	  confronted	  with	  an	  ever	  more	  pressing	  internal	  dilemma	  between	  sticking	  to	  their	  policy	  of	  intransigence	  and	  accepting	  fiscal	  pain	  for	  their	  supporter	  bases.	  	  Out	   of	   the	   four	   groups,	   the	   Southern	   clientele	   of	   the	   DC	  was	   in	   the	   least	   ambiguous	  position.	   Since	   it	   depended	  on	   the	   flow	  of	   public	   funds	   –	   via	   public	   employment	   and	  benefit	   fraud	   –	   rather	   than	   on	   market	   forces,	   it	   remained	   unaffected	   by	   the	  deterioration	   of	   international	   competitiveness.	   If	   anything,	   the	   employment	  opportunities	   provided	   by	   the	   clientele	   network	   became	   ever	   more	   valuable	   as	   the	  private	  labour	  market	  in	  the	  region	  further	  deteriorated	  and	  unemployment	  more	  than	  doubled	   between	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   and	   the	   late	   1980s67	   (Bertola	   and	   Garibaldi	   2004).	  Therefore,	  the	  Southern	  clientele	  had	  more	  to	  fear	  from	  fiscal	  retrenchment	  than	  ever.	  	  	  The	   situation	   of	   large	   business	   was	   similarly	   clear-­‐cut.	   Due	   to	   its	   export-­‐orientation	  and	   its	   concentration	   in	   those	   industries	   that	  were	   losing	  market	   share	  most	   rapidly,	  this	   group	   endured	   uniformly	   large	   losses	   from	   real	   appreciation.	   These	   were	  compounded	  by	  high	  capital	  costs	  due	   to	   the	  upward	  pressure	  on	   interest	  rates	   from	  sustained	  borrowing	  by	  the	  state.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  group	  anyway	  had	  little	  hope	  to	  preserve	  the	  public	  benefits	  it	  had	  previously	  enjoyed	  –	  namely	  the	  elaborate	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  In	  1990,	  unemployment	  stood	  around	  15	  per	  cent	  among	  men	  and	  around	  38	  per	  cent	  among	  women	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2004)	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of	  tax	  rebates,	  exemptions	  and	  subsides	  –	  since	  such	  measures	  were	  to	  be	  phased	  out	  under	  the	  Single	  Market.	  Therefore,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	   fiscal	  consolidation	  had	  become	   the	   overriding	   concern	   for	   large	   businesses	   and	   Confindustria,	   the	   peak	  industry	   association	   was	   calling	   ever	   more	   insistently	   for	   immediate	   stabilization	  (Walsh	  1999).	  	  	  Small	   businesses	   and	   organized	   labour	   were	   more	   divided.	   Small	   firms	   and	   self-­‐employed	   active	   in	   sheltered	   services	   and	   commerce	   were	   mostly	   spared	   from	   the	  negative	   consequences	   of	   macroeconomic	   imbalances.	   They	   continued	   to	   enjoy	   the	  benefits	   of	   a	   lax	   tax	   collection	   system	  without	   suffering	   from	   real	   appreciation.	   They	  were	  also	  likely	  to	  benefit	  rather	  than	  suffer	  from	  the	  high	  interest	  rates	  generated	  by	  large	  public	  debt,	   because	   they	  were	   likely	   to	  be	   savers	   and	   their	   capital	  needs	  were	  moderate.	  Accordingly,	  they	  had	  more	  reason	  to	  be	  resentful	  about	  the	  introduction	  of	  withholding	   taxes	  on	   interest	   income	   from	  government	  bonds	   than	  about	  deficits.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   small	   entrepreneurs	   engaged	   in	   tourism	   or	   involved	   in	   export	  production	   in	   one	   of	   the	   many	   industrial	   districts	   in	   the	   North	   and	   Centre	   of	   the	  country	   were	   under	   increasing	   pressure	   and	   became	   increasingly	   vehement	   in	   their	  protests	  about	  the	  macroeconomic	  problems	  (Walsh	  1999).	  	  	  Organized	  labour	  was	  also	  differentially	  hit,	  although	  their	  divisions	  were	  complicated	  by	   labour	  market	   institutions.	  Workers	   in	   heavily	   regulated	   large	   and	  medium-­‐sized	  companies	  tended	  to	  be	  largely	  cushioned	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  declining	  competitiveness	  by	   stringent	   redundancy	   laws68,	   a	   generous	   income	   replacement	   scheme69	   and	   early	  retirement,	   and	   enjoyed	   a	   guarantee	   on	   the	   real	   value	   of	   their	   wages	   through	   the	  system	   of	   automatic	   indexation.	   In	   contrast,	  workers	   in	  more	   permissively-­‐regulated	  small	   firms	   and	   in	   the	   ever-­‐expanding	   informal	   economy	   felt	   the	   full	   weight	   of	   the	  declining	  economic	  dynamism	  and	  growing	  unemployment,	  along	  with	  new	  entrants	  to	  the	   job	   market,	   who	   had	   not	   earned	   entitlements	   to	   job	   protection	   and	   welfare	  benefits70.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  Workers	  Statute	   legislated	   in	  1970	  placed	  very	  strict	   constraints	  on	  dismissal	   in	   firms	  with	  more	  than	  15	  employees.	  (Sassoon	  1986,	  Hine	  1993,	  Partridge	  1998)	  69	  Workers	  in	  large	  industrial	  enterprises	  are	  entitled	  to	  wage-­‐replacement	  benefits	  up	  to	  eighty	  per	  cent	  and	  up	  to	  three	  years	  from	  the	  CIGS	  (OECD	  2009).	  70	  Unemployment	  grew	  disproportionately	  fast	  in	  younger	  cohorts	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  The	  generation	  that	  was	  already	  employed	  at	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  seventies	  was	  practically	  unaffected.	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2002)	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As	   the	   pressure	   grew	   on	   firms	   and	  workers	   that	   were	  most	   directly	   exposed	   to	   the	  consequences	  of	  deteriorating	  competitiveness,	  so	  weakened	  their	  attachment	  to	  their	  party	   or	   unions,	   which	   were	   still	   caught	   up	   in	   a	   dilemma	   between	   the	   conflicting	  interests	  of	  their	  constituencies	  and	  did	  little	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  decisive	  resolution	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  DC	  was	  most	  visible	  in	  the	  industrial	  districts	  of	  the	  North,	  where	  a	  new	  political	  movement	  of	  regionalist	  parties	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  lega-­‐s	  –	   appeared	   in	   protest	   to	   deteriorating	   economic	   conditions	   and	   started	   to	   seriously	  threaten	  the	  traditional	  voter	  base	  of	  the	  DC	  among	  small	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  region.	  They	  achieved	  remarkable	  advances71	  within	  a	  very	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  based	  on	  an	  electoral	  message	  that	  urged	  a	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  state	  and	  privatisation	  in	  the	  South	  to	  allow	  for	  both	  the	  consolidation	  of	  public	  finances	  and	  low	  tax	  rates,	  appealing	  both	  to	  entrepreneurs	  and	  workers	  in	  the	  region	  by	  identifying	  public	  spending	  in	  the	  South	  as	   the	   main	   target	   for	   the	   consolidation	   efforts	   (Bull	   and	   Newell	   1993).	   The	   unions	  were	  experiencing	  similar	  losses	  of	  support.	  By	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s,	  they	  were	  heavily	   losing	   membership	   among	   active	   workers72	   and	   undergoing	   a	   general	  deterioration	   of	   relations	   with	   their	   remaining	   active	   rank-­‐and-­‐file73	   (Regini	   and	  Regalia	  1997).	  	  Paradoxically,	   the	   clearer	   the	   signs	   of	   the	   disaffection	   of	   supporters	   in	   the	   exposed	  sectors	  became,	  the	  less	  the	  DC	  and	  the	  unions	  could	  do	  to	  help	  them.	  Given	  the	  decline	  of	   its	   Northern	   vote,	   the	   DC	   could	   not	   possibly	   risk	   the	   alienation	   of	   its	   Southern	  electorate	   –	   who	   by	   1987	   gave	   more	   than	   a	   third	   of	   its	   vote	   –	   or	   of	   the	   ranks	   of	  shopkeepers	   and	   other	   self-­‐employed	   in	   sheltered	   sectors	   that	   kept	   supporting	   it	  (Cattaneo).	  Therefore,	  neither	   the	   cutting	  of	  public	   employment,	  nor	   a	   crackdown	  on	  benefit	   fraud	   and	   tax	   evasion	   was	   a	   serious	   option.	   Instead,	   the	   DC	   sponsored	   the	  upgrading	  of	  the	  pension	  entitlements	  of	  the	  self-­‐employed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  in	  a	  feeble	   attempt	   to	   buy	  back	   the	   sympathy	  of	   its	   traditional	   supporters	   (Ferrera	  1997,	  Jessoula	  and	  Alti	  2006).	  This	  made	  the	  fiscal	  problem	  even	  worse	  but	  it	  achieved	  little	  in	   terms	  of	   reversing	   the	   electoral	   losses	   of	   the	  party	   in	   the	  North-­‐Eastern	   industrial	  districts	   (Cattaneo).	   Furthermore,	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   DC	   made	   its	   largest	   coalition	  partner,	   the	   Socialists	   more	   influential	   in	   the	   government.	   Since	   the	   PSI’s	   electoral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	   In	   Lombardy,	   one	   of	   the	   DC’s	   former	   strongholds,	   the	   Lega	   Lombarda	   demonstrated	   spectacular	  progress,	  growing	  from	  just	  under	  three	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  1987	  regional	  election	  to	  six	  and	  a	  half	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  European	  election	  of	  1989,	  to	  over	  sixteen	  percent	  in	  the	  regional	  election	  of	  1990	  and	  to	  over	  twenty	  percent	  in	  the	  1992	  election	  for	  the	  senate.	  	  72	  Between	  1980	  and	  1990,	  the	  unionization	  rate	  of	  workers	  fell	  from	  fifty	  to	  under	  forty	  per	  cent.	  73	  This	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  independent	  unions	  and	  in	  expressions	  of	  discontent	  such	  as	  the	  so-­‐called,	  'self-­‐convened'	  councils.	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997)	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growth	  in	  the	  1980s	  capitalized	  on	  the	  support	  among	  public	  employees,	  white	  collar	  workers	  and	  managers	  –	  often	  organized	  into	  similar	  clientele	  networks	  as	  those	  of	  the	  DC	  in	  the	  South	  –	  the	  growing	  weight	  of	  the	  PSI	  in	  the	  government	  strengthened	  those	  groups	   that	   were	   institutionally	   and	   sectorally	   insulated	   from	   the	   consequences	   of	  declining	   international	   competitiveness	   but	   depended	   on	   public	   spending	   (Ginsborg	  2003	  pp150-­‐153).	  As	  far	  as	  trade	  unions	  were	  concerned,	  their	  weakness	  in	  organizing	  younger	   cohorts	   and	   workers	   with	   less	   regular	   employment	   patterns	   made	   their	  membership	   shift	   ever	  more	   towards	  older	   and	   retired	  workers,	  making	   the	   offering	  concessions	  on	  pensions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  cutting	  the	  deficit	  a	  suicidal	  choice	  for	  unions.	  	  In	   this	   political	   climate	   –	   which	   was	   characterized	   by	   the	   policy-­‐primacy	   of	   groups	  sheltered	   from	   the	   consequences	   of	   declining	   competitiveness	   –	   the	   fiscal	   status	   quo	  momentarily	   seemed	   as	   immutable	   as	   ever	   and	  demands	   for	   fiscal	   consolidation	   and	  disinflation	   appeared	   to	   have	   little	   chance	   of	   prevailing	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	   arena	  towards	  the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s.	  However,	   the	  tension	  among	  those	  who	  were	  suffering	  most	  economically	   from	  the	  paralysis	  of	   the	  political	  system	  did	  not	  cease	   to	  grow.	   It	  manifested	   itself	   in	  various	   forms	  of	  political	  protest.	   Support	   for	  protest	  parties	   like	  the	   Lega	   Nord	   grew.	   The	   share	   of	   empty	   and	   spoiled	   ballots	   in	   various	   elections	  increased74.	  Most	  importantly,	  a	  referendum	  movement	  was	  launched	  that	  called	  for	  a	  reform	   of	   the	   political	   system	   as	   a	   whole75	   (Bull	   and	   Newell	   1993,	   Ginsborg	   2001	  p276).	  	  	  Around	  the	  elections	  of	  April	  1992,	  the	  shifts	  in	  underlying	  commonalities	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  political	  support	  of	  key	  interest	  representing	  organizations	  came	   to	   fruition.	   The	   procession	   of	   events	   accelerated	   and	   the	   political	   system	  suddenly	   radically	   changed.	  The	  elections	  brought	   about	   another	  notable	  drop	   in	   the	  DC’s	   share	   of	   the	   vote	   –	   leaving	   the	   DC	   with	   considerably	   less	   than	   a	   third	   of	   the	  national	  vote	  –	  accompanied	  by	  the	  comet-­‐like	  rise	  of	  the	  Lega.	  Politicians	  and	  political	  scientists	  called	  the	  results	  an	  electoral	  “earthquake”	  (Bull	  and	  Newell	  1993).	  It	  was	  in	  this	   atmosphere	   of	   general	   tension	   that	   the	   so-­‐called	  Mani	   Pulite	   corruption	   scandal	  began.	   The	   waves	   of	   scandal	   exposed	   vast	   networks	   of	   corruption	   and	   clientelistic	  practices,	  discredited	  the	  DC	  and	  ended	  the	  political	  careers	  of	  large	  ranks	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	   (and	   other	   pentapartito)	   politicians	   (Ginsborg	   2003	   pp267-­‐269).	   It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Voter	   turnout	  decreased	  and	   the	  number	  of	   spoiled	  ballots	  doubled	   in	   the	  1980s	  compared	   to	  earlier	  decades.	  (Bardi	  1996)	  75	   Incidentally,	   the	   referendum	   for	   electoral	   change	   was	   also	   initiated	   by	   a	   disillusioned	   Christian	  Democrat,	  Mario	   Segni.	   Sixty-­‐two	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   citizens	   voted,	   ninety-­‐six	   per	   cent	   supported	   electoral	  reform	  (Partridge	  1998	  p76,	  Welhofer	  2001).	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practically	  swept	  away	  the	  largest	  political	  force	  in	  the	  country,	  which	  had	  defined	  the	  policy	  choices	  of	  the	  previous	  half-­‐century.	  The	  DC’s	  coalition	  partners	  suffered	  similar	  fates.	  	  With	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  DC,	  the	  vested	  interests	  of	  large	  business,	  small	  entrepreneurs	  and	   the	   dependents	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   South	   ceased	   to	   be	   politically	   linked	   and	   the	  three	  groups	  were	  freed	  as	  well	  as	  forced	  to	  find	  new	  representatives	  for	  their	  interests	  and	  new	  allies	  in	  the	  political	  space.	  Furthermore,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  old	  party	  system	  also	  ended	   the	   automatic	   electoral	   sidelining	   of	  much	   of	   the	   labour	   vote,	   opening	   up	   the	  possibility	  of	  alternative	  representation	  of	  labour	  interests	  outside	  of	  the	  unions,	  in	  the	  governmental	  sphere.	  	  	  In	   the	   intermediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   political	  meltdown	   of	   1992,	   however,	   the	   party	  political	   space	  was	  empty.	  The	  old	  political	   class	  was	   trying	   to	  deal	  with	   its	   fall	   from	  grace	  and	  with	  the	  series	  of	  criminal	  investigations	  directed	  at	  it.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  new	  parties	  were	  still	   to	   stake	  a	   serious	  claim	   for	  power	   in	   the	  post-­‐DC	  political	   scene.	   In	  this	   political	   void,	   only	   two	   of	   the	   four	   defining	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   retained	  effective	   representation	   of	   their	   interests:	   large	   industry,	   through	   the	   influential	  employers’	   organization,	   and	   labour	   through	   the	   trade	   unions.	   These	   social	   partners	  were	   given	   an	   unprecedented	   opportunity	   to	   work	   together	   with	   technocratic	  governments76	  –	  unshackled	  by	  the	  types	  of	  electoral	  considerations	  that	  had	  so	  tightly	  circumscribed	   the	   room	   for	   manoeuvre	   of	   DC-­‐led	   governments	   –	   in	   order	   to	   shape	  policy	  choices	  to	  their	  preferences.	  	  The	   social	   partners’	   interests	   converged	   on	   the	   need	   to	   restore	   economic	  competitiveness.	  Confindustria	  –	  freed	  from	  its	  political	  ties	  with	  earlier	  governments	  –	  was	  able	  to	  assume	  an	  independent	  political	  role,	  and	  was	  calling	  ever	  more	  insistently	  for	  macroeconomic	  stabilization	  (Ginsborg	  2003,	  p266).	  The	  urgency	  of	  these	  demands	  –	  although	  already	  fairly	  clear	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  –	  were	  definitively	  driven	  home	  to	   the	   unions	   by	   the	   exchange-­‐rate	   crisis	   in	   September	   1992,	   which	   exposed	   Italy’s	  hopelessly	   precarious	   position	   on	   the	   international	   stage	   and	   by	   a	   new	   boost	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	   Although	   the	   government	   formed	   after	   the	   1992	   elections	   under	   Socialist	   Prime	  Minister	   Amato	   still	  incorporated	  four	  of	  the	  five	  permanent	  coalition	  partners	  of	  the	  pentapartito,	  it	  was	  unusually	  “low-­‐key”	  politically,	   enlisting	   technocrats	   rather	   than	  powerful	  party-­‐political	   figures,	  who	  came	  under	   increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  scandal.	  When	  this	  government	  resigned	  after	   less	  than	  a	  year	  –	   in	  response	  to	  public	  outrage	   over	   an	   attempt	   to	   decriminalize	   corruption	   and	   to	   a	   referendum	   signalling	   of	   citizens’	   urge	   to	  change	   the	   political	   system	   –	   a	   caretaker	   government	   took	   over	   under	   former	   central	   bank	   governor	  Ciampi,	  composed	  of	  unaffiliated	  experts	  and	  technocrats	   from	  the	   former	  Communists	   	   (Partridge	  1998	  p77,	  Ginsborg	  2001	  p276)	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unemployment,	   especially	   in	   the	   industrial	   North.	   These	   new	   negative	   developments	  forced	  unions	  –	  and	  most	   importantly,	   the	  CGIL	  –	  to	  face	  up	  to	  their	   internal	  tensions	  and	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  younger	  workers.	  They	  finally	  de	  facto	  acknowledged	  the	  rift	  within	  their	  membership	   between	   older	  workers	  with	   established	  work	   histories	   cushioned	  by	   the	  welfare	   system	   and	  workers	   outside	   of	   the	  most	   protected	   core	   of	   the	   labour	  market.	   They	   adopted	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   strategy	   that	   allowed	   them	   to	   make	   major	  concessions	   on	  welfare	  policies	   on	  behalf	   of	   and	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   the	  more	   vulnerable	  members,	  while	   defending	   the	   rights	   and	   entitlements	   of	   the	   older,	   safer	  members77	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997).	  	  The	  tripartite	  negotiations	  between	  the	  government	  and	  social	  partners	  achieved	  very	  significant	  results	  in	  consolidating	  public	  finances.	  All	  four	  big	  problems	  of	  the	  previous	  two	   decades	  were	   attacked:	   public	   employment,	   tax	   evasion,	   corporate	   tax	   revenues	  and	  to	  some	  extent,	  even	  the	  welfare	  system	  (Bosi	  et	  al	  2003,	  Ginsborg	  2003,	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004)78.	  The	   social	  partners	   achieved	   important	   compromises	   amongst	  themselves	   and	   supported	   technocratic	   governments	   in	   inflicting	   considerable	   fiscal	  pain	  on	  the	  other	  two	  groups	  that	  were	  temporarily	  left	  without	  representation	  in	  the	  policy	   sphere.	   The	   measures	   that	   were	   enacted	   by	   the	   technocratic	   governments	   in	  1992	  and	  1993	  set	   the	  primary	  balance	  on	  an	   increasing	  path,	  stopped	  the	  growth	  of	  debt	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  GDP	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  descent	  of	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  after	  1994.	  	  	  The	   contrast	   between	   these	   years	   and	   the	   1980s	   could	   not	   have	   been	   starker.	   Fiscal	  stalemate	  gave	  way	  to	  radical	  reform,	  the	  opposition	  between	  organized	  labour	  and	  the	  awkward	   coalition	   of	   large	   business,	   small	   enterprises	   and	   the	   Southern	   proletariat	  gave	  way	   to	  cooperation	  between	  organized	   labour	  and	   large	  business,	   sidelining	   the	  two	  other	  groups.	  By	  the	  time	  new	  elections	  were	  called	  under	  the	  new	  electoral	  rules	  to	  inaugurate	  the	  so-­‐called	  Second	  Republic,	  the	  political	  slate	  had	  been	  cleared	  and	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  fiscal	  consolidation	  showed	  that	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  had	  been	  opened	  by	  the	  new	  configuration	  of	  redistributive	  coalitions.	   Italy’s	  decade-­‐long	  fiscal	  problems	  now	  seemed	  solvable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  This	  redefinition	  of	  the	  strategy	  of	  unions	  was	  greatly	  helped	  by	  the	  democratization	  process	  launched	  in	  response	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  crisis	  within	  unions	  in	  the	  early	  nineties.	  This	  allowed	  for	  a	  greater	  voice	  for	  emerging	   policy	   demands	   among	   members.	   Unions	   reorganized	   themselves,	   introducing	   a	   system	   of	  referenda	  and	  other	  channels	  for	  voice	  within	  the	  organization,	  greatly	  increasing	  legitimacy	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997).	  78	  These	  measures	  will	  be	  described	  and	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  outlined	  the	  socio-­‐political	  background	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making	   in	   Italy	   in	  the	  1980s	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  were	  driving	  the	  alarming	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt	  in	  this	  period.	  It	  explored	  the	  factors	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  Parliamentary	  politics	   –	  which	  most	   existing	  accounts	  of	   Italian	   fiscal	  policy	  concentrate	   on	   –	   that	   help	   to	   explain	   the	   approach	  of	   successive	   governments	   to	   the	  escalating	  fiscal	  problems.	  It	  found	  that	  policy	  makers’	  hands	  were	  completely	  tied	  by	  unresolved	  redistributive	  conflicts	  between	   four	  major	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  within	  the	   Italian	   polity.	   It	   also	   showed	   that	   the	   stalemate	   was	   partially	   generated	   by	   the	  presence	   of	   conflicting	   interests	   within	   a	   single	   party,	   Christian	   Democracy,	   and	  partially	   by	   the	   implicit	   veto	   of	   a	   non-­‐Parliamentary	   actor,	   the	   labour	   movement.	   It	  argued	   that	   these	   conflicts	   were	   impossible	   to	   resolve	   in	   the	   political	   context	   of	   the	  First	   Republic,	   because	   the	   system	   of	   interest	   representation	   was	   centred	   on	   the	  defence	   of	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	   the	   four	   groups	   in	   existing	   (formal	   and	   informal)	  policy	   schemes.	   The	   representatives	   of	   each	   group	   insisted	   on	   defending	   their	  constituencies’	  stake	  in	  the	  status	  quo	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  status	  quo	  became	  ever-­‐more	  costly	  for	  certain	  sections	  of	  those	  constituencies.	  	  The	  chapter	  argued	  that	  the	  tension	  between	  main	  political	  actors’	  strategies	  and	  part	  of	   their	   constituencies’	   interests	   undermined	   the	   support	   for	   those	   important	   actors	  and	   contributed	   to	   the	   political	   earthquake	   of	   the	   early	   1990s	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	  rapprochement	  between	  unions	  and	  employers,	  which	  created	   the	  basis	   for	   the	   fiscal	  consolidation	   that	   started	   in	   the	  1990s.	  At	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   Second	  Republic,	   the	  political	   slate	   was	   clean	   and	   the	   political	   space	   was	   open	   for	   new	   strategies	   and	  alliances	  between	  the	  four	  main	  interest	  groups.	  	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  shows	  that	  the	  political	  reordering	  described	  in	  this	  chapter	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  meaningful	  retrenchment	  that	  not	  only	  allowed	  Italy	  to	  stop	  the	  accumulation	  of	  debt	  but	  also	  to	  enter	  the	  euro	  zone	  with	  the	  first	  group	  of	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  new	  alliance	  was	  a	  wasting	  asset	  that	   lost	   its	  raison	  d'être	  as	  soon	  as	   its	  main	  goals	  were	  reached.	  As	  the	  alliance	  disintegrated,	  legacies	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  came	  into	  the	  foreground	  again.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  the	  four	  defining	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  continue	  to	  structure	  politics.	  Vested	   interests	   in	   the	   policies	   created	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   still	   delineate	   the	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constituencies	   for	   the	  new	  actors	  on	   the	  political	  scene	  and	  the	  conflicts	  between	  the	  four	  groups	  continue	  to	  define	  and	  limit	  fiscal	  policy	  choices	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.	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Chapter	  4.	  Fiscal	  roller-­‐coaster:	  Consolidation	  and	  relapse	  in	  Italy	  after	  Maastricht	  	  In	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   Italy	   had	   a	   mixed	   record	   of	   dealing	   with	   its	   excessive	  indebtedness	   and	   fiscal	   imbalances.	   In	   the	   1990s,	   it	   achieved	   a	   remarkable	   fiscal	  turnaround.	  Three	  decades	  of	  uninterrupted	  and	  accelerating	  debt	  accumulation	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  steady	  decline	  of	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  by	  1994.	  Deficits	  that	  still	  amounted	  to	  more	  than	  a	  tenth	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  1990	  were	  almost	  eliminated	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  Revenues	  were	   considerably	   increased	   and	   spending	  was	   cut.	   The	   discipline	   did	   not	  last,	   however.	   In	   the	   2000s,	   net	   borrowing	   progressively	   increased	   and	   by	   2005	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  was	  rising	  again.	  Then,	  a	  renewed	  round	  of	  fiscal	  tightening	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  put	  the	  ratio	  on	  a	  descent	  once	  more,	  before	  the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  evaporated	   all	   hopes	   for	   fiscal	   improvements	   in	   the	  near	   future	   (see	  Figures	  4.1	   and	  4.2).	  This	  chapter	  is	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  this	  series	  of	  dramatic	  policy	  reversals	  and	  the	  puzzling	  combination	  of	  remarkable	  efforts	  to	  cut	  the	  deficit	  and	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  to	  exploit	  these	  efforts	  to	  bring	  debt	  permanently	  down	  to	  safer	  and	  more	  manageable	  levels.	  	  
Figure4.	  1	  –	  Gross	  consolidated	  debt	  general	  government	  (1991-­2008)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	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Figure4.	  2	  -­	  Net	  borrowing,	  cyclically	  adjusted	  net	  borrowing,	  primary	  deficit	  and	  interest	  expenses	  
(1991-­2007)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  	  Most	  scholarly	  accounts	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  Second	  Republic	  were	  written	  around	  the	  turn	   of	   the	   millennium	   and	   were	   aimed	   at	   explaining	   the	   astonishing	   fiscal	  consolidation	   of	   the	   1990s.	   Almost	   invariably,	   they	   emphasize	   the	   role	   of	   the	   EMU	  accession	  process	  in	  making	  the	  previously	  elusive	  stabilization	  possible,	  but	  they	  focus	  on	  different	  aspects	  of	  policy	  making	   that	  were	   transformed	   in	  response	   to	   the	  euro-­‐objective.	  Hallerberg	  (2004	  Chapter	  7)	  argues	  that	  the	  race	  for	  the	  euro	  played	  a	  role	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  parallel	  changes	  in	  the	  electoral	  and	  party	  system.	  He	  underlines	  that	   the	   shift	   towards	   a	  more	  majoritarian	   set	   of	   electoral	   rules	   and	   the	   consequent	  consolidation	   of	   the	   party	   system	   into	   two	   relatively	   stable	   electoral	   blocks	   made	  possible	  the	  centralization	  of	  the	  budget	  process	  under	  a	  strong	  finance	  minister	  who	  restrained	   the	   impulses	   towards	  overspending.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	  he	  emphasizes	   that	  the	  threat	  of	  being	  left	  out	  of	  the	  euro	  zone	  greatly	  enhanced	  the	  successful	  adoption	  of	  this	   “delegation”	   form	   of	   fiscal	   governance	   by	   assigning	   inadmissibly	   high	   political	  costs	   to	   deficits	   and	   thereby	   providing	   the	   newly	   empowered	   finance	   ministers	   an	  important	   stick	   with	   which	   to	   enforce	   fiscal	   discipline	   amongst	   members	   of	   the	  government.	  	  	  Della	  Sala	  (1997),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  attributes	  the	  remarkable	  fiscal	   improvement	  to	  the	   increased	  capacity	  of	  policy	  makers	   to	   ignore	  policy	  demands	   from	  diverse	  socio-­‐
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economic	   groups	   and	   to	   override	   their	   resistance	   to	   fiscal	   pain	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	  national	   imperative	   of	   fulfilling	   the	   Maastricht	   criteria	   in	   time	   for	   the	   first	   round	   of	  euro-­‐accession.	  He	  underlines	  that	  by	  shifting	  the	  authority	  over	  fiscal	  target	  setting	  to	  the	  supranational	   level,	  a	  previously	   impotent	  executive	  obtained	   the	  necessary	  clout	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  measures	  needed	  for	  reaching	  those	  targets.	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  race	  for	  the	  euro	  enhanced	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  weak	  state	  to	  act	  autonomously	  of	  societal	  actors.	  	  By	   logical	   extension,	   these	   theories	   successfully	   explain	   the	   deterioration	   of	   fiscal	  performance	   in	   the	  2000s,	   since	   it	   coincided	  with	   the	  progressive	  discrediting	   of	   the	  post-­‐accession	   fiscal	   rules	   of	   the	   EMU.	   In	   Hallerberg’s	   framework,	   the	   commitment	  devices	  provided	  by	   the	   targets	  and	  procedures	   specified	   in	   the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  are	  not	  aiding	  discipline	  within	  the	  delegation	  form	  of	  fiscal	  governance.	  Since	  the	  Pact	   lacked	   clear	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   that	   would	   strengthen	   the	   hands	   of	   a	  finance	   minister	   in	   the	   face	   of	   spending	   ministers	   but	   it	   limited	   his	   discretion	   in	  adjusting	   the	   fiscal	   course,	   the	   constraints	   it	   imposed	   on	   policy	   making	   were	   not	  helpful	   for	   allowing	   a	   strong	   finance	   minister	   to	   control	   spending	   and	   keeping	   the	  economy	   and	   public	   finances	   on	   an	   even	   keel79.	   In	   Della	   Sala’s	   approach,	   the	   lack	   of	  painful	   punishment	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   Stability	   and	   Growth	   Pact	   diminished	   the	  natural	   imperative	   for	   fiscal	   discipline	   after	   the	   desired	   goal	   of	   euro	   accession	   was	  achieved	  and	  thereby	  removed	  the	  restraint	  on	  interest	  groups	  to	  forcefully	  make	  their	  claims	   on	   the	   government	   again.	   Therefore,	   fiscal	   deterioration	   after	   2000	   is	   an	  unsurprising	   development	   for	   both	   approaches.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   success	   of	   the	  fiscal	  effort	  exerted	   in	  2006	  and	  2007	  pose	  more	  of	  a	  challenge	   for	   this	  EMU-­‐centred	  view.	  	  This	  chapter	  questions	  both	  the	  crucial	   importance	  of	  changes	   in	  political	   institutions	  and	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  regime	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  EMU	  accession	  in	  turning	  the	  tide	   of	   Italian	   fiscal	   policy.	   It	   agrees	   with	   Hallerberg	   that	   the	   centralization	   of	   the	  control	   of	   public	   finances	   was	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   achieving	   the	   desired	   fiscal	  figures.	  However,	   it	   contends	   that	   the	   truly	   crucial	   unity	   of	   purpose	   in	   achieving	   the	  balance	  of	  public	   finances	   is	  not	   the	  one	   that	  was	  achieved	  within	  governments	  –	  via	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  underlying	  electoral	  system	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  delegation	  form	  of	   fiscal	   governance	   –	   but	   the	   one	   that	   was	   created	   among	   the	   societal	   groups	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	   On	   the	   different	   fiscal	   adjustment	   strategies	   in	   delegation	   and	   commitment	   (or	   contract)	   forms	   of	  government	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  fiscal	  targets	  for	  delegation	  states,	  see	  also	  Hallerberg,	  Strauch	  and	  von	  Hagen	  (2009,	  pp	  80-­‐84)	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supported	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  1990s.	  These	  groups	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  sacrifices	  for	   the	   sake	   of	   fiscal	   stability	   and	   lend	   support	   to	   the	   government	   in	   enforcing	   such	  sacrifices	  on	  other	  groups.	  The	  worsening	  of	  fiscal	  results	  after	  2000,	  in	  turn,	  reflect	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  societal	  coalition	  that	  had	  been	  so	  united	  behind	  the	  restoration	  of	  fiscal	  stability,	  rather	  than	  a	  loss	  of	  centralized	  control	  within	  the	  governments.	  	  	  The	  chapter	  also	  agrees	  with	  Della	  Sala	   that	  policy	  makers’	  newfound	  ability	   to	  resist	  policy	  demands	  from	  social	  groups	  disadvantaged	  by	  the	  austerity	  measures	  was	  key	  to	  the	  restoration	  of	  fiscal	  health.	  However,	  it	  claims	  that	  this	  imperviousness	  to	  pressure,	  this	  empowerment	  of	  the	  executive	  to	  inflict	  fiscal	  pain	  on	  large	  sections	  of	  society	  did	  not	  arise	   from	  an	  unquestioned	  external	  constraint	  or	  a	  society-­‐wide	  agreement	  with	  the	  national	   imperative	  of	   early	  euro	  accession.	   Instead,	   it	  was	   strongly	   connected	   to	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  certain	  coalition	  of	  societal	  interests	  to	  fully	  capture	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere	  and	  to	  exclude	  other	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  from	  decision	  making.	  Conversely,	  the	  deterioration	  of	  public	  finances	  in	  the	  2000s	  reflects	  the	  ascendancy	  to	  fiscal	  power	  of	  those	  groups	  whose	  interests	  were	  sidelined	  in	  the	  consolidation	  process.	  	  	  This	   argument	   draws	   on	   Walsh’s	   (1999)	   insight.	   Walsh	   ascribes	   the	   dramatic	   fiscal	  improvements	  of	  the	  1990s	  to	  a	  new	  political	  constellation	  that	  arose	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  First	  Republic,	  which	  allowed	  a	  new	  coalition	  of	  interests	  –	  formed	  across	  class-­‐lines,	   uniting	   labour	   and	   business	   groups	   exposed	   to	   international	   competition	   –	   to	  shape	   macroeconomic	   policies	   (p79).	   The	   chapter	   argues	   that	   both	   the	   decision	   to	  embrace	  Maastricht	  and	   the	  successes	   in	   fiscal	   consolidation	  –	   in	   the	  1990s	  and	   then	  again	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  –	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  this	  coalition	  of	  socio-­‐economic	   groups	   exposed	   to	   the	   consequences	   of	   international	   competition.	  Conversely,	   the	   relapses	   in	   fiscal	   performance	   can	   be	   linked	   to	   the	   coming	   into	  government	  of	  a	  different	  coalition	  of	  interests.	  	  	  Thus,	   the	   study	  presented	  here	   couches	   the	   explanation	   of	   fiscal	   developments	   in	   an	  analysis	   of	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   context	   of	   policymaking.	   It	   traces	   the	  observed	  deficit	  cycles	  to	  the	  polarization	  of	  interests	  between	  two	  societal	  coalitions	  that	  coincide	  with	  the	  core	  constituencies	  of	  the	  two	  large	  and	  broadly	  stable	  political	  blocs	  –	  the	  centre-­‐left	   and	   centre-­‐right	   –	   that	   have	   governed	   in	   the	   first	   two	   decades	   of	   the	   Second	  Republic.	  The	  profound	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  these	  constituencies	  concerning	  spending	  and	  taxation	  induce	  each	  political	  bloc	  to	  fundamentally	  redesign	  fiscal	  policy	  as	  soon	  as	   it	  comes	  to	  power,	   in	  order	  to	  reverse	  crucial	  policy	  decisions	  of	   the	  other	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side	   and	   thereby	   redress	   the	   grievances	   of	   its	   core	   supporters.	   The	   centre-­‐right	   has	  been	  less	  successful	  in	  reconciling	  the	  need	  to	  assert	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  constituencies	  with	  fiscal	  rectitude	  due	  to	  its	  inability	  to	  impose	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  preferred	  policies	  on	  the	   constituencies	   of	   the	   centre-­‐left	   in	   the	   face	   of	   opposition	   from	   trade	   unions.	  Therefore,	   its	   spells	   in	   government	   –	   a	   short	   intermezzo	   in	   1994	   and	   a	   full	   term	  between	  2001	  and	  200680	  –	  were	  marked	  by	  deteriorating	  balances.	  The	  centre-­‐left’s	  policy	  choices	  have	  been	  more	  impervious	  to	  resistance	  from	  the	  opposing	  side,	  leading	  to	  pronouncedly	  better	  fiscal	  results	  under	  its	  governments:	  the	  formally	  technocratic	  cabinet	   of	   1995	   and	   the	   elected	   governments	   between	   1996	   and	   2001	   and	   between	  2006	  and	  2008.	  However,	  the	  relative	  electoral	  weakness	  of	  this	  bloc	  and	  its	  disregard	  for	   the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  groups	  outside	  of	   its	  core	  constituencies	  prevent	   it	   from	  cementing	  its	  achievements	  for	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  	  The	  defining	  coalitions	  of	  interests	  supporting	  the	  two	  blocs	  were	  formed	  in	  the	  crucial	  first	  years	  of	   the	  Second	  Republic.	   In	  1992	  and	  1993	  –	   in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  emergency	  and	  in	  the	  political	  vacuum	  created	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  party	  system	   of	   the	   First	   Republic	   –	   organized	   labour	   joined	   ranks	   with	   big	   business	   to	  support	   technocratic	   governments	   in	   carrying	   out	   painful	   adjustments.	   The	  cooperation	   of	   organized	   labour	   and	   large	   enterprises	   was	   induced	   by	   their	   shared	  interests	  in	  improving	  the	  conditions	  for	  Italian	  industry	  to	  compete	  in	  world	  markets	  via	   resolving	   their	  persistent	  old	   conflicts.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   also	   crucially	   affected	  the	  path	  of	  fiscal	  retrenchment	  taken	  in	  these	  years,	  because	  it	  allowed	  social	  partners	  to	  influence	  fiscal	  decisions	  and	  to	  offload	  the	  costs	  of	  consolidation	  on	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	   temporarily	   excluded	   from	   the	   policy-­‐making	   arena,	   small	   entrepreneurs	   and	  the	   dependents	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   South.	   The	   decisions	   of	   this	   coalition	   of	   interests	  were	  supported	  in	  parliament	  and	  government	  by	  parties	  and	  personalities	  that	  were	  later	   to	   constitute	   the	   centre-­‐left	   bloc.	   The	   centre-­‐right	   bloc	   formed	   largely	   as	   a	  defensive	   reaction	   to	   these	   developments,	   when	   parties	   representing	   groups	   most	  disadvantaged	   by	   the	   fiscal	   tightening	   of	   the	   early	   1990s	   joined	   forces	   in	   the	   1994	  election	   to	   counter	   the	   assault	   on	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	   their	   electorate.	   These	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  and	  political	  blocs	  were	  locked	  into	  place	  for	  most	  of	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  The	  centre-­‐right	  has	  been	  in	  power	  again	  since	  2008,	  but	  that	  period	  will	  not	  be	  analysed	  here	  due	  to	  the	  confounding	  effects	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  downturn.	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In	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  Italy’s	  long-­‐term	  fiscal	  problems,	  the	  policy	  developments	  of	  the	  past	   two	  decades	  underline	   the	  paramount	   importance	  of	   the	  persisting	   conflicts	  between	  the	  vested	   interests	  of	   four	  major	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  –	   large	  businesses,	  small	  enterprises,	  organized	  labour	  and	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  South	  –	  and,	  crucially,	   the	   ability	   of	   each	   of	   these	   groups	   to	   ensure	   the	   effective	   defence	   of	   their	  interests	   in	   the	   policy	  making	   sphere.	   In	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   Second	   Republic	   the	  strength	   of	   the	   alliance	   of	   sectors	   exposed	   to	   foreign	   competition	   –	   uniting	   large	  sections	  of	  business	  and	  labour	  –	  helped	  to	  overcome	  the	  conflicts	  that	  had	  prevented	  governments	   from	   stabilizing	   public	   finances	   in	   the	   1980s.	   However,	   the	   conflicts	  resurfaced	   in	   the	   2000s	   as	   this	   alliance	   disintegrated.	   Up	   to	   the	   most	   recent	   times,	  when	  the	  spectre	  of	  sovereign	  default	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  radical	  action,	  these	  conflicts	  of	   interests	   frustrated	   efforts	   to	   bring	   the	   excessive	   public	   debt	   into	  more	  moderate	  ranges.	  	  	  The	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   helps	   to	   explain	   this	   change	   in	   political	   conditions	   by	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  changing	  costs	  of	  different	  political	  strategies	  for	  different	  socio-­‐economic	   groups.	   Before	   the	   euro,	   the	   negative	   economic	   consequences	   of	   fiscal	  problems	   –	   high	   inflation,	   the	   crowding	   out	   of	   private	   investment	   and	   loss	   of	  competitiveness	  through	  high	  real	  exchange	  rates	  –	  greatly	  outweighed	  the	  pain	  from	  fiscal	   sacrifices	   for	   all	   those	   groups	   whose	   livelihood	   depended	   on	   international	  competition.	  These	  corollary	  costs	  of	  fiscal	  imbalance	  therefore	  provided	  incentives	  for	  these	  groups	  to	  seek	  compromise	  with	  others.	  After	  the	  euro-­‐accession,	  however,	  these	  incentives	  vanished.	  The	  Maastricht	  convergence	  process	  and	  the	  actual	  joining	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  greatly	  diminished	  the	  macroeconomic	  costs	  of	  fiscal	  problems	  for	  each	  group	  by	   insulating	  monetary	  variables	   from	   the	  effects	  of	   fiscal	  policy.	   	   Thereby	   the	  motivation	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  fiscal	  sacrifices	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  better	  economic	  environment	  disappeared.	  	  The	  chapter	  lays	  out	  the	  argument	  in	  three	  parts.	  The	  next	  section	  analyses	  the	  political	  and	   economic	   situation	   of	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   Second	   Republic.	   It	   shows	   how	   the	  social	   partners	   used	   the	   window	   of	   opportunity	   created	   by	   the	   suspension	   of	   party	  politics	   under	   the	   technocratic	   governments	   of	   Amato	   and	   Ciampi	   to	   strike	   bargains	  between	   them	   about	   ways	   to	   address	   the	   most	   pressing	   macroeconomic	   problems,	  with	   far-­‐reaching	   negative	   consequences	   for	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   not	   included	   in	  decision	  making.	  The	  third	  section	  investigates	  the	  way	  party	  politics	  was	  reconfigured	  after	  the	  turmoil	  of	  1992.	  It	  examines	  the	  voter	  base	  and	  programmatic	  outlook	  of	  the	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two	  major	  party-­‐formations	  and	  shows	   that	   the	  new	  political	  alliances	   formed	   in	   this	  period	  arose	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  technocratic	  period.	  It	  points	  out	  the	  strong	   pattern	   of	   policy	   reversals	   between	   the	   two	   sides	   and	   uses	   it	   to	   explain	   the	  observed	  sinusoid	  pattern	  of	  budget	  balances.	  The	  fourth	  section	  turns	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  distributive	  coalitions	  in	  a	  war-­‐of-­‐attrition	  framework	  and	  argues	  that,	  although	  in	  a	  much	   better	   shape	   fiscally	   throughout	   the	   2000s,	   Italy	   was	   caught	   in	   the	   same	  distributive	  gridlock	   that	  had	  generated	   its	   fiscal	  problems	   in	   the	  1980s	  between	   the	  four	  most	  important	  socio-­‐economic	  groups.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes.	  	  
The	  not-­so-­exceptional	  politics	  of	  the	  formative	  years	  of	  the	  Second	  Republic	  	  It	   is	   tempting	   to	  depict	   the	  years	  between	  1992	  and	  1993	  as	  a	  period	  of	   “exceptional	  politics”	   in	   Italy.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  country	   faced	  a	  perilous	  economic	  situation.	   In	  1991,	   real	   growth	   slowed	   considerably	   and	   exports	   had	   shrunk	   in	   real	   terms	   for	   the	  first	  time	  in	  ten	  years.	  The	  country	  went	  through	  a	  major	  currency	  crisis	   in	  1992	  and	  had	  to	  leave	  the	  European	  Monetary	  System.	  The	  government	  had	  difficulty	  in	  raising	  funding	   for	   its	   expiring	   debt	   and	   saw	   confidence	   in	   the	   currency	   and	   the	   banking	  system	  wane81.	   To	  make	  matters	  worse,	   the	   process	   of	   European	   integration	  was	   to	  move	   to	   a	   higher	   level	   and	   Italy	   seemed	   destined	   to	   be	   left	   behind	   due	   to	   its	  macroeconomic	  problems.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  political	  control	  over	  policy	  making	  was	  practically	   suspended.	   Non-­‐aligned	   experts,	   such	   as	   professors	   and	   central	   bank	  executives,	   occupied	   most	   of	   the	   key	   decision-­‐making	   posts.	   Politicians	   themselves	  feared	   the	   end	   of	   their	   political	   carreers	   as	   criminal	   investigations	   discovered	   ever-­‐newer	   corruption	   cases.	   They	   had	   little	   concern	   for	   fighting	   for	   the	   interests	   of	  constituencies	   they	  might	   not	   ever	   receive	   votes	   from	   again.	   Prime	  ministers	   Amato	  and	  Ciampi	  received	  blanket	  authorizations	  from	  the	  Parliament	  to	  reform	  such	  broad	  and	   crucial	   policy	   areas	   as	   pensions,	   health	   care,	   public	   administration	   and	   local	  government	   finances	   (Ferrera	   and	   Gualmini	   2004	   p70)	   and	   had	   a	   free	   hand	   in	  increasing	   taxes.	   The	   economic	   situation	   clearly	   seemed	   to	   demand	   immediate	   and	  resolute	   action,	   the	   transcending	   of	   political	   differences	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   for	  the	  sake	  of	  national	  welfare,	  and	  the	  political	  situation	  seemed	  to	  provide	  exactly	   the	  right	  setting	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  technocratic	  action.	  This	  section	  argues,	  however,	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  technocratic	  policy	  making	  was	  circumscribed	  very	  early	  on	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  social	  partners,	  who	  left	  a	  strong	  imprint	  on	  the	  policies	  of	  consolidation	  in	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ginsborg	  (2003,	  p271)	  notes	   that	   the	  Treasury	  had	  difficulty	   finding	  buyers	  at	   its	  monthly	  bond	  sales	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  Italy	  had	  to	  step	  in	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  last	  resort	  to	  maintain	  confidence	  while	  there	  were	  signs	  of	  a	  possible	  bank-­‐run.	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years	  and	   that	   the	   responses	   to	   the	  economic	  emergency	  were	  emphatically	  political,	  rather	  than	  purely	  technocratic.	  	  The	   limits	   to	   technocratic	   decision	  making	  were	   shown	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   government’s	  attention	  turned	  to	  pensions.	  The	  Amato	  government	  –	  having	  gotten	  a	  free	  hand	  from	  Parliament	   to	   reform	   social	   security	   –	   presented	   a	   pension	   reform	   that	   was	   to	  significantly	   tighten	   eligibility	   criteria	   (raise	   the	   retirement	   age	   and	   lengthen	   the	  required	   contributory	   period)	   and	   decrease	   the	   benefit	   levels	   (by	   expanding	   the	  reference	  period	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  pensions	  were	  to	  be	  calculated	  and	  by	  changing	  the	   indexation	  mechanism	   from	  a	  wage	   based	   one	   to	   an	   inflation-­‐based	   one).	   Such	   a	  move	  was	  to	  be	  expected,	  since	  old-­‐age	  pensions	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  an	  eighth	  of	  the	  GDP	  and	  more	   than	  a	   fourth	  of	   total	   expenditure	   (Brugiavini	   and	  Fornero	  2001),	  the	   deficit	   of	   the	   pension	   funds	   accounted	   for	   half	   of	   the	   total	   deficit	   and	   the	   policy	  discourse	  had	  revolved	  around	  the	  need	  to	  reform	  pensions	  for	  over	  a	  decade	  (Jessoula	  and	  Ferrara	  2006).	  Nevertheless,	   the	  proposed	  measures	  sparked	  wide-­‐scale	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  and	  the	  trade	  unions	  strongly	  denounced	  the	  package.	  In	  response,	  the	   government	   entered	   into	   extensive	   tripartite	   negotiations.	   The	   reform	   that	   was	  finally	  enacted	  included	  most	  of	  the	  elements	  originally	  proposed,	  but	  it	  mandated	  very	  long	  phase-­‐in	  periods82	  and	  exempted	  older	  cohorts	  already	  in	  retirement	  or	   likely	  to	  retire	   within	   the	   next	   decade83,	   which	   meant	   that	   the	   financial	   impact	   of	   the	   new	  measures	  would	   only	   start	   to	   appear	   in	   the	   long	   run.	  Unions	   even	  managed	   to	   block	  plans	  for	  freezing	  the	  indexation	  of	  pensions	  for	  1993.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  it	  was	  an	  important	  breakthrough	   for	   longer-­‐term	  sustainability,	   the	   reform	  practically	  did	  not	  contribute	   to	   the	   immediate	   stabilization	   effort,	   and	   the	   largest	   single	   item	   in	   the	  budget	   was	   left	   virtually	   untouched	   for	   the	   time	   being	   (Ferrera	   and	   Gualmini	   2004	  p144,	   Jessoula	   and	  Alti	   2006).	   Amato’s	   experience	   showed	   that	   unions	  were	   bent	   on	  protecting	   the	  current	  pension	  payments	   to	   their	  members	  and	  would	  not	  consent	   to	  sacrificing	  these	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  consolidation	  process84.	  	  Other	   avenues,	   however,	   remained	   open	   for	   attacking	   the	   deficit.	   The	   Amato	  government	   issued	   a	   decree	   decreasing	   the	   employment	   protection	   of	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  The	  reform	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  fully	  in	  effect	  by	  2032	  (Brugiavini	  and	  Galasso	  2004).	  	  83	  Workers	   with	   at	   least	   15	   years	   contribution	  were	   exempted	   from	   all	   new	   rules,	   for	   employees	   with	  shorter	  contribution	  period,	  the	  new	  rules	  will	  be	  applied	  on	  a	  pro	  rata	  basis	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualimini	  2004	  p114).	  84	  This	  lesson	  seems	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  Ciampi’s	  pension	  reform	  proposal	  of	  1993,	  which	  concentrated	  on	  encouraging	  the	  development	  of	  a	  second	  pillar	  and	  placed	  penalties	  on	  early	  retirement	  but	   left	  regular	  pensions	  fully	  intact.	  
	   111	  
employees	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  wave	  of	  redundancies,	  making	  savings	  on	  compensation	  of	   employees	   an	   important	   pillar	   of	   retrenchment	   throughout	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   decade.	  This	  expenditure	  item	  decreased	  by	  more	  than	  a	  percentage	  point	  of	  the	  GDP	  by	  1995,	  accounting	  for	  half	  of	  the	  savings	  in	  this	  period	  (Ameco).	  Subsidies	  to	  companies	  in	  the	  South	   stopped	   with	   the	   closing	   of	   the	   Cassa	   per	   il	   Mezzogiorno	   in	   1993,	   leading	   to	  savings	  of	  another	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  by	  1994	  and	  further	  ones	  throughout	  the	  decade	  (Bull	  and	  Baudner	  2004).	  Considerable	  cutbacks	  were	  made	  on	  health	  expenditure	  and	  on	   the	   tightening	   of	   the	   eligibility	   conditions	   for	   disability	   benefits	   (Ferrera	   and	  Gualmini	  2004	  p23).	  Significant	  steps	  were	  made	  towards	  privatization	  by	  converting	  the	   large	   public	   corporations	   into	   shareholding	   companies	   and	   placing	   them	   on	   the	  market	  (Ginsborg	  2003,	  p273).	  Privatization	  became	  a	  major	  source	  of	  revenue	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come85.	  Amato	  also	  introduced	  new	  taxes	  on	  real	  estate	  and	  a	  corporate	  tax	  on	  net	   worth,	   and	   increased	   social	   security	   contributions	   by	   a	   tenth	   (Brugiavini	   and	  Galasso	   2004,	   Battilossi	   et	   al	   2005).	   The	   Ciampi	   government	   followed	   suit	   by	  dramatically	   increasing	   tax	   pressure	   on	   corporations	   via	   the	   ending	   the	   tax	  deductibility	   of	   a	   major	   local	   tax	   (ILOR)	   from	   the	   general	   corporate	   tax	   (IRPEG)	  (Bernasconi	  et	  al	  2005).	  Personal	   income	  taxes	  and	  VAT	  were,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   left	  untouched.	  Revenues	  increased	  by	  4	  percentage	  points	  of	   the	  GDP	  between	  1991	  and	  1993.	  	  	  These	  measures	  had	  very	  different	  effects	  across	  different	  groups	  and	  across	  different	  regions.	  The	  South	  was	  especially	  hard-­‐hit.	  The	  state	  had	  been	  a	  provider	  of	  livelihood	  for	  much	  of	   the	  population	   in	   formal	  and	   informal	  ways:	  via	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  state-­‐subsidized	  private	   investment,	  overstaffing	   in	  public	  administration	  or,	  as	  a	   last	  resort,	   the	   fraudulent	   allocation	   of	   disability	   benefits86.	   All	   of	   these	   channels	   were	  threatened	   with	   drying	   up	   completely.	   Unemployment	   in	   the	   region	   rose	   to	  unprecedented	  heights	  in	  the	  five	  years	  to	  follow	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2003,	  Bull	  and	  Baudner	   2004).	   Despite	   the	   dramatic	   effect	   of	   these	   measures,	   they	   were	   politically	  unproblematic.	   The	   benefits	   that	   were	   thus	   taken	   away	   from	   the	   South	   had	   been	  obtained	  and	  channelled	  to	  the	  South	  –	  often	  via	  clientelistic	  networks	  –	  by	  politicians	  of	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   (DC).	   The	   party	   now	   lay	   in	   ruins	   and	  many	   of	   the	  politicians	   were	   under	   investigation	   for	   corruption.	   The	   South	   was	   left	   politically	  abandoned.	   Furthermore,	   the	   transfers	   to	   the	   South	   were	   the	   object	   of	   substantial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	   The	   average	   yearly	   revenue	   from	  privatization	   amounted	   to	   1	   per	   cent	   of	   GDP,	  with	   a	   peak	   between	  1996	  and	  1998.	  (Goldstein	  2003,	  Vasallo	  2007).	  86	  Public	  employment	  accounted	   for	  a	  quarter	  of	   the	   total	  employment	  possibilities	   in	   the	  South	  and	  the	  compensation	  of	  public	  employees	  was	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  local	  GDP,	  even	  in	  1998,	  after	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  (Bibbee	  and	  Goglio	  2002).	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hostility	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  by	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  closing	  of	  the	  “Cassa”	  as	  well	  as	  the	   abolition	   of	   the	   Ministry	   for	   State	   Holdings	   and	   Agriculture	   –	   responsible	   for	  managing	   public	   enterprises	   –	   were	   popular	   demands	   reaffirmed	   by	   referenda	   (Bull	  and	   Baudner	   2004).	   This	   made	   it	   easy	   for	   the	   technocratic	   governments	   to	   place	   a	  significant	   share	  of	   the	  burden	  of	   consolidation	  on	   the	  dependents	  of	   the	  state	   in	   the	  South.	  	  Another	  group	  of	  big	  losers	  of	  the	  retrenchment	  measures	  were	  those	  small	  enterprises	  and	  self-­‐employed87	   that	  had	  benefited	   from	  the	  tacit	   toleration	  of	   tax	  evasion	  during	  the	  1980s	  (Della	  Sala	  1997).	  The	  taxes	  on	  net	  worth	  and	  real	  estate	  introduced	  by	  the	  Amato	   government	   were	   clear	   attempts	   to	   bring	   into	   the	   fold	   of	   taxpayers	   those	  entities	   that	   persistently	   hid	   their	   income88.	   This	   signal	   of	   a	   tougher	   stance	   on	   tax	  evasion,	   the	   increasing	   of	   tax	   rates	   and	   the	   abolition	   of	   exemptions	   and	   reductions	  foreshadowed	  a	  huge	   increase	   in	   the	  de	   facto	   fiscal	  pressure	  on	   these	   tax	  subjects.	   In	  light	   of	   these	   developments,	   the	   future	   looked	   rather	   bleak	   especially	   to	   those	   small	  enterprises	   that	   were	   worst	   hit	   by	   the	   shrinking	   of	   domestic	   demand	   in	   the	   harsh	  economic	   downturn	   that	   was	   affecting	   Italy	   at	   the	   time.	   Shopkeepers	   and	   the	   self-­‐employed	   organised	   protests	   against	   the	   tax	   on	   net	   worth	   (Ginsborg	   2003	   p443).	  However,	   unlike	   in	   the	   1980s,	   when	   the	   government	   watered	   down	   an	   attempt	   to	  strengthen	  tax	  collection	  in	  the	  face	  of	  opposition	  from	  the	  shopkeepers’	  association89,	  this	  time	  no	  one	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere	  felt	  particularly	  compelled	  to	  take	  up	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  self-­‐employed	  against	  a	  tax	  whose	  largest	  apparent	  defect	  was	  that	  it	  was	  difficult	   to	  evade.	  Larger	  enterprises	  also	  had	  to	   take	  a	  share	  of	   the	  consolidation	  bill	  via	  higher	  corporate	  taxation	  and	  higher	  payroll	  taxes.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  increase	  in	  tax	  rates	  was	  less	  of	  a	  shock	  for	  them,	  because	  they	  had	  less	  opportunity	  to	  evade	  taxes	  and	  the	  de	  facto	  increase	  in	  fiscal	  pressure	  was	  therefore	  smaller.	  	  	  Private	   sector	   employees	   stand	   out	   as	   the	   group	   who	   made	   the	   smallest	   direct	   and	  immediate	   contributions	   to	   the	   stabilization	   efforts	   in	   these	   years.	   Pensions,	   income	  replacement	  benefits90	  and	  other	  employment	  related	  schemes91	  were	   left	  unchanged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  In	  Italy,	  self-­‐employment	  is	  unusually	  prevalent.	  It	  accounted	  for	  around	  a	  third	  of	  all	  employment	  at	  the	  mid-­‐nineties	  (Ameco).	  	  88	  Such	  taxes	  had	  been	  absent	  in	  the	  1980s	  due	  to	  strong	  political	  opposition	  (Guerra	  1993).	  89	  For	  details	  of	  the	  protest	  against	  the	  1984	  Visentini	  reform	  of	  tax	  collection,	  see	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  90	   Classical	   unemployment	   benefits	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	   Indennità	   di	   disoccupazione	   ordinaria	   –	   are	   famously	  low	  and	  short	  duration	  in	  Italy.	  However,	  for	  workers	  with	  regular	  employment	  history,	  generous	  income	  replacement	   schemes	   –	   under	   the	   Cassa	   Integrazione	   Guadagni	   and	   Cassa	   Integrazione	   Guadagni	  
Straordinaria	   –	  are	  available	   for	  up	   to	   three	  years	   (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2004).	  CIG	   is	  based	  on	  private	  contributions	   but	   also	   involve	   complementary	   contributions	   from	   the	   state	   (OECD	   2009).	   No	   proposals	  have	  been	  put	  forward	  to	  cut	  back	  on	  any	  of	  these.	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in	  the	  medium	  term	  and	  taxes	  directly	  affecting	  dependent	  employees	  also	  stayed	  the	  same.	   It	   seems	   somewhat	   surprising	   that	   such	   a	   large	   socio-­‐economic	   group	   was	  shielded	   from	  most	  of	   the	   immediate	  costs	  of	  consolidation.	  Why	  did	  the	  government	  back	  down	   in	   the	   face	  of	  union	  opposition	   to	  cutting	  pension	  expenses	  already	   in	   the	  short	   term	   despite	   the	   large	   imbalances	   in	   that	   sector?	   Why	   did	   the	   employers	  acquiesce	   in	   the	   government’s	   retreat	   during	   the	   tripartite	   negotiations	   on	   pensions,	  despite	  their	  own	  contributions	  to	  deficit	  cutting?	  Answering	  these	  questions	  requires	  looking	   at	   the	   deals	   made	   in	   this	   period	   between	   employers,	   employees	   and	   the	  government	  in	  the	  field	  of	  industrial	  relations.	  	  In	   1992,	   shortly	   before	   the	   start	   of	   the	   currency	   crisis	   and	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	  governments’	   first	   difficulties	   in	   refinancing	   its	   debt,	   the	   unions	   consented	   to	   the	  abolition	   of	   the	   wage-­‐indexation	   mechanism,	   the	   scala	   mobile.	   This	   mechanism	   had	  been	  a	  major	  bone	  of	  contention	  between	   labour	  and	  business	   throughout	   the	  1980s,	  due	   to	   the	   constant	   upward	   pressure	   it	   put	   on	   labour	   costs	   and	   the	   attendant	  difficulties	  it	  created	  for	  maintaining	  international	  competitiveness.	  This	  breakthrough	  marked	  a	  crucial	  change	  in	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  potent	  of	  the	  three	  main	  union	  confederations,	  the	  Communist	  CGIL,	  which	  had	  put	  great	  emphasis	  on	  defending	  the	   mechanism	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   The	   new	   approach	   seemed	   to	   reflect	   the	  realization	   that	  maintaining	  an	   intransigent	   line	   in	   the	   face	  of	  high	  and	  ever-­‐growing	  unemployment	  was	  untenable.	  Employment	   in	  manufacturing	  –	  the	  core	  constituency	  of	   the	  CGIL	   –	  had	  decreased	  dramatically	  by	   the	   early	  1990s	   (Ameco).	  The	  CGIL	  was	  under	  contradicting	  pressures.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  had	  to	  safeguard	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  older	   cohorts	   of	   its	   membership92	   by	   defending	   the	   entitlements	   and	   job	   protection	  legislation	  achieved	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  pressed	  to	  assist	  in	  dismantling	  the	  greatest	  obstacles	   to	  restoring	  competitiveness,	   in	  order	   to	  aid	   the	  creation	   of	   new	   jobs	   for	   younger	   cohorts	   of	  workers,	   amongst	  whom	  unemployment	  was	   twice	   as	   high	   as	   among	   older	   cohorts	   (Bertola	   and	   Garibaldi	   2003).	   The	  acquiescence	  in	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  scala	  mobile	  was	  the	  first	  sign	  that	  the	  CGIL	  was	  not	  oblivious	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   the	   younger	   generations.	   This	  move	  was	   followed	   by	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Companies	  have	  to	  set	  aside	  part	  of	  their	  employees’	  gross	  wage	  in	  a	  fund	  for	  the	  severance	  payments,	  payable	   when	   an	   employee	   leaves	   the	   company	   because	   he	   or	   she	   is	   fired,	   retires	   or	   otherwise	   leaves	  voluntarily.	   This	   payment,	   called	   the	   Trattamento	   di	   fine	   rapporto	   (Tfr),	   de	   facto	   serves	   as	   income	  replacement	  in	  the	  case	  of	  redundancy	  or	  as	  additional	  pension	  income	  (if	  the	  worker	  does	  not	  have	  to	  use	  it	   in	  his	  or	  her	  active	   life).	   Successive	  governments	  have	   tried	   to	   redirect	   the	  Tfr	   funds	   into	   the	  pension	  system,	   by	   mandating	   their	   transformation	   into	   a	   second	   pillar,	   but	   these	   attempts	   have	   so	   far	   been	  unsuccessful,	  due	  to	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  social	  partners	  (Brugiavini	  and	  Galasso	  2004).	  	  92	  Notably,	  more	   than	  half	  of	   the	  CGIL	  membership	  consisted	  of	  pensioners	  by	   the	  early	  1990s	   (Chiarini	  1999).	  Their	  interests	  and	  those	  of	  generations	  nearing	  retirement	  were	  therefore	  impossible	  to	  sideline.	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series	  of	  important	  compromises	  with	  employers.	  All	  of	  these	  were	  characterized	  by	  a	  seemingly	   schizophrenic	  urge	  of	   the	  unions	   to	  defend	   the	  welfare	   system	  and	   labour	  regulations	   intact	   for	   true	   labour	  market	   insiders	  –	  primarily	   the	  older	  generations	  –	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  helping	  to	  dismantle	  it	  for	  the	  younger	  cohorts93.	  	  	  The	  abolition	  of	  the	  wage	  indexation	  mechanism	  –	  and	  the	  freezing	  of	  wages	  for	  1992,	  which	  was	  also	  part	  of	  the	  agreement	  signed	  –	  provided	  very	  visible	  immediate	  as	  well	  as	   long-­‐term	   gains	   to	   employers.	   Labour	   costs	   fell	   and	   the	   profit	   share	   and	   the	   net	  return	   on	   the	   capital	   stock	   increased	   (Ameco,	   Torrini	   2005).	   The	   effect	   of	   wage	  restraint	  was	   coupled	  with	   a	  boost	   to	   competitiveness	   via	   real	   depreciation	  once	   the	  lira	  was	   ejected	   from	   the	   EMS	   and	   allowed	   to	   float	   in	   the	  medium	   term.	   An	   export-­‐boom	   followed,	   helping	   export-­‐oriented	   firms	   to	   weather	   the	   shrinking	   of	   domestic	  demand	  in	  1993	  and	  boosted	  profits	  in	  the	  subsequent	  years.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  employers	   –	   especially	   the	   large	   export-­‐oriented	   firms,	   which	   came	   to	   dominate	   the	  employers’	   organization,	   Confindustria,	   in	   the	   1990s	   –	   were	   in	   a	   better	   position	   to	  reciprocate	  the	  change	  in	  unions’	  attitude	  with	  a	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  (Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	  They	  were	  ready	   to	  compromise	  on	   issues	  crucial	   to	   the	  unions,	   in	  the	   hope	   of	   further	   progress	   on	   labour	  market	   liberalization,	   industrial	   peace	   and	   a	  consensus-­‐driven	  wage	   bargaining	   regime	   (Ginsborg	   2001	   p266).	   Such	   progress	  was	  indeed	  achieved	  fairly	  soon.	  A	  tripartite	  pact	  was	  signed	  in	  July	  1993	  that	  formalized	  a	  new	  incomes	  policy	  and	  ensured	  cooperation	  in	  industrial	  relations	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  decade	  (Bertola	  and	  Garibaldi	  2003).	  	  	  The	  rapprochement	  of	  the	  unions	  and	  the	  employers’	  organization	  created	  an	  effective	  tripartite	  sphere	  for	  policy	  making,	  which	  conferred	  benefits	  on	  all	  three	  participants.	  The	  Amato	  government	  needed	  the	  social	  partners’	  support,	  because	  it	  was	  unlikely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  override	  any	  serious	  opposition	  to	  its	  policies	  in	  view	  of	  its	  dubious	  political	  standing	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  constant	  scandals	  and	  new	  revelations	  about	  ministers	  and	  the	  members	   of	   Parliament.	   Large	   companies	   were	   rewarded	   by	   crucial	   concessions	   on	  wages	  and	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  more	  breakthroughs	   in	   labour	  market	  reform	  as	  well	  as	  macroeconomic	   consolidation,	   counterbalancing	   increased	   fiscal	   pressure.	   Unions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  The	  Amato	  pension	  reform	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Furthermore,	  all	  subsequent	  pension	  reforms	  passed	  with	  the	   agreement	   of	   unions	   shielded	   the	   older	   generations	   from	   cuts.	   In	   the	   field	   of	   labour	   market	  liberalization,	  the	  reform	  achieved	  with	  union	  support	  in	  1996	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  Treu-­‐package	  –	  made	  hiring	  and	   training	   young	   workers	   easier	   but	   it	   did	   not	   relax	   restrictions	   on	   firing,	   because	   that	   would	   have	  harmed	   older	   workers.	   When	   a	   subsequent	   package	   of	   liberalizing	   measures	   –	   the	   Biagi-­‐reform	   –	  attempted	   to	   loosen	   the	  conditions	   for	  redundancy,	   the	  CGIL	  became	   intransigent.	   It	   could	  not	  block	   the	  passing	  of	  the	  reform,	  but	  prevented	  its	  implementation	  (Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	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practically	  obtained	  a	  waiver	  for	  labour	  from	  contributing	  to	  fiscal	  stabilization	  in	  the	  short	   run	   in	   exchange	   for	   inevitable	   compromises	   on	   wages	   and	   sacrificing	   distant	  future	  –	  and	   in	  any	   case	   rather	  uncertain	  –	  benefits94.	  The	   tripartite	  alliance	   lived	  on	  under	   the	  Ciampi	   government.	   It	   allowed	   large	   enterprises	   and	  private	   employees	   to	  emerge	   from	   the	   first	   round	   of	   fiscal	   tightening	   with	   a	   relatively	   favourable	   result,	  especially	  in	  view	  of	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  situation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  alliance’s	  success	  in	  reconciling	  internal	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  were	  based	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  on	  offloading	  of	  much	  of	  the	  costs	  –	  practically	  all	  the	  spending	  cuts	  and	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  revenue	  increases	  –	  on	  groups	  temporarily	  lacking	  representatives	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  sphere:	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	   in	  the	  South	  and	  the	  self-­‐employed	  and	  small	  enterprises.	  This	  greatly	  improved	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  bargain	  for	  both	  sides	  of	  the	   social	   partnership.	   The	   next	   section	   shows	   that	   the	   divide	   created	   in	   these	   two	  years	  of	  not-­‐so-­‐technocratic	   governance	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	   the	  mobilization	  of	  each	   of	   these	   groups	   by	   political	   parties	   and	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   coalitions	   between	  parties	  that	  would	  shape	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  and	  policy	  choices.	  	  
The	  two	  fiscal	  poles	  in	  Italian	  politics	  	  An	   interesting	   feature	   of	   the	   political	   life	   of	   the	   Second	   Republic	   is	   the	   remarkable	  stability	  of	  the	  cores	  of	  the	  two	  political	  blocks	  that	  were	  formed	  for	  the	  first	  elections	  in	   1994	   despite	   the	   incessant	   formation,	   reformation	   and	   renaming	   of	   parties	   and	  reformulation	  of	  programmes95.	  The	  centre-­‐right	  has	  consisted	  of	  Forza	  Italia	  (FI),	  the	  National	  Alliance96	   (AN)	  and	   the	  Northern	  League	  (LN)	  ever	  since	  1994,	  although	   the	  League	   ran	   alone	   in	   the	   1996	   elections97.	   The	   centre-­‐left	   is	   made	   up	   of	   the	   two	  successor	  parties	  of	  the	  former	  Communists	  –	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  the	  Left	  (PDS	  –	  later	   renamed	   Democrats	   of	   the	   Left)	   and	   the	   Communist	   Refoundation	   (RC)	   –	   and	  various	   formations	   comprising	  progressive	  groups	  and	  personalities	   from	   the	   former	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	   Formally,	   the	   Amato-­‐reform	   involved	   huge	   concessions	   in	   terms	   of	   younger	   cohorts’	   pension	  wealth	  (Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	  However,	  given	  the	  risks	  surrounding	  the	  younger	  cohorts’	  ability	  to	  fulfill	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  under	  the	  prevailing	  labour	  market	  conditions	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  about	  the	  future	  viability	  of	  pension	  funds,	  the	  de	  facto	  losses	  of	  these	  cohorts	  are	  considerably	  smaller.	  95	   This	   section	   –	   in	   line	   with	   most	   analyses	   of	   Italian	   political	   life	   –	   only	   concentrates	   on	   the	   most	  important	  parties	  in	  each	  political	  block	  and	  ignores,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  the	  innumerable	  small	  parties,	  unions,	  movements	  and	  other	  political	  formations	  that	  are	  included	  in	  each	  electoral	  alliance.	  While	  these	  entities	   occupy	   almost	   a	   fifth	   of	   the	   electoral	   space	   together,	   none	   of	   them	   are	   large	   enough	   or	   have	   a	  distinct	  enough	  policy	  agenda	   to	  decisively	  divert	   the	  development	  of	  policies.	  Therefore,	   their	  omission	  from	  the	  discussion	  should	  not	  distort	  reality	  too	  much.	  96	  The	  National	  Alliance	  was	  called	  Italian	  Social	  Movement	  until	  1995.	  97	   FI	   and	  AN	  merged	   in	   2007	   –	   along	  with	   numerous	   small	   parties	   and	   groups	   –	   creating	   the	  People	   of	  Freedom	  party.	  This	  party	  has	  since	  split,	  with	  the	  erstwhile	  leader	  of	  the	  AN,	  Gianfranco	  Fini,	  creating	  a	  new	  party,	  Future	  and	  Freedom,	  but	  continuing	  to	  support	  the	  centre-­‐right	  government.	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Christian	  Democratic,	  Liberal	  and	  Radical	  parties,	  coalescing	  into	  a	  unified	  party	  under	  the	  name	  Daisy	  only	  in	  200198.	  	  	  The	   constancy	   of	   the	   blocks	   has	   corresponded	   to	   an	   unmistakable	   stability	   of	   fiscal	  preferences	  on	  each	  side,	  evidenced	  by	  a	  consistent	  contrast	  between	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  governments	   given	   by	   each	   block.	   This	   section	   argues	   that	   the	   persistent	   contrast	   of	  fiscal	  preferences	  boils	  down	   to	   the	   rejection	  or	  acceptance	  of	   the	  distribution	  of	   the	  costs	  of	  consolidation	  created	  under	  the	  Amato	  and	  Ciampi	  governments.	  This	  contrast	  in	  preferences,	   in	   turn,	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   conflicts	  of	   interests	  of	   the	   societal	   coalitions	  that	  the	  two	  political	  poles	  represent.	  The	  centre-­‐left	  has	  stood	  for	  the	  competitiveness	  coalition	   between	   large	   business	   and	   labour	   that	   was	   cobbled	   together	   in	   the	   early	  1990s,	   whereas	   the	   centre-­‐right	   has	   been	   bent	   on	   furthering	   the	   interests	   of	   those	  groups	  –	  small	  entrepreneurs	  and	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  South	  –	  that	  have	  suffered	  most	   from	   the	   consolidation	   efforts	   of	   the	   technocratic	   governments.	   These	  divisions	  have	  strongly	  influenced	  political	  alliance-­‐formation	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  
The	  “impossible	  coalition”	  of	  the	  centre-­right	  	  The	   first	   centre-­‐right	   coalition	  was	   practically	   built	   on	   the	   unifying	   theme	   of	   protest	  against	  the	  way	  things	  were	  evolving	  in	  the	  years	  before	  1994.	   It	  consisted	  of	  protest	  parties:	  the	  National	  Alliance,	  which	  had	  been	  “untouchable”	  in	  the	  First	  Republic,	  the	  Lega,	  whose	  rise	  contributed	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  previous	  political	  system	  and	  Forza	  Italia,	  the	  brand-­‐new,	  politically	  untainted	  party	  of	  a	  businessman,	  who	  explicitly	  claimed	  to	  enter	  the	  fray	  to	  fix	  things	  that	  politicians	  got	  wrong	  (Ginsborg	  2003	  p292).	  The	  self-­‐identification	  of	  this	  force	  was	  strongly	  framed	  in	  negative	  terms,	  emphasizing	  anti-­‐Communism	   –	   a	   rejection	   of	   leftist	   parties	   and	   trade	   unions	   –	   and	   demanding	   a	  break	  with	  the	  past	  (Diamanti	  2007,	  Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008).	  The	  parties’	  stances	  on	  redistribution	  –	  although	   in	   contradiction	  with	  each	  other	  –	  were	   reconciled	   through	  the	   unanimous	   rejection	   of	   the	   policy	   developments	   of	   the	   years	   of	   technocratic	  government	   in	   1992	   and	   1993,	   the	   tax	   increases	   hitting	   small	   businesses	   and	   the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  The	   Lega’s	   core	   message	   had	   been	   centred	   on	   an	   anti-­‐tax	   rhetoric	   right	   from	   its	  inception.	  This	  rhetoric	  appealed	  greatly	  to	  the	  dynamic	  small	  enterprises	  and	  the	  self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	   The	   centre-­‐left	   also	   made	   an	   attempt	   to	   unite	   its	   various	   constituent	   parties	   under	   a	   single	   name,	  creating	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  2007.	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employed	   in	   the	   industrial	   districts	   of	   the	   North,	   which	   were	   the	   party’s	   electoral	  heartland	   (Ruzza	  and	  Fella	  2009	  p64).	  When	   the	  Amato	  government	   introduced	  new	  taxes,	  the	  Lega	  went	  as	  far	  as	  attempting	  to	  incite	  a	  tax	  revolt	  (Ginsborg	  2003	  p287).	  It	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  actually	  organizing	  civic	  resistance	  to	  the	  government’s	  measures,	  but	   this	   attempt	   clearly	   underlined	   the	   Lega’s	   claim	   to	   become	   the	   defender	   of	   the	  “overtaxed”	  (tartassati).	  The	  National	  Alliance,	  given	  its	  historical	  roots	  and	  voter	  base	  in	  the	  South	  emphasized	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  employment	  and	  to	  aid	   underdeveloped	   regions.	   This	   message	   naturally	   resonated	   with	   the	   fears	   and	  worries	  of	  a	   large	  section	  of	   the	  Southern	  electorate,	  whose	  sources	  of	   livelihood	  had	  recently	  come	  under	  a	  major	  attack.	  The	  AN	  received	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  vote	  in	  1994	  than	   its	   predecessor	  did	   in	  1992	   and	   continued	   to	  do	   so	   ever	   since	   (Ruzza	   and	  Fella	  2009	   p149).	   Finally,	   Forza	   Italia	   engineered	   its	   electoral	   appeal	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  thorough	   research	   of	   the	   electoral	  market.	   Its	   political	  marketing	   strategy	   combined	  elements	  of	  both	  of	  the	  other	  two	  parties’	  messages.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  put	  forward	  a	  pronouncedly	   neoliberal	   programme,	   focusing	   above	   all	   on	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   tax	  pressure.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   implicitly	   assumed	   responsibility	   for	   employment	   by	  promising	  to	  create	  new	  jobs	  (Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	  These	  messages	  earned	  the	  FI	  sizeable	  vote	  shares	  both	   in	   the	  North	  and	   the	  South	  among	  various	  social	  groups,	  such	  as	  entrepreneurs,	  the	  self-­‐employed	  and	  dependent	  employees	  (Shin	  and	  Agnew	  2007).	   In	   later	   years,	   the	   FI	   “recycled”	   many	   pre-­‐existing	   clientele	   networks	   of	   the	  erstwhile	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  re-­‐established	  the	  old	  practices	  of	  rewarding	  voters	  by	  targeted	  spending	  (Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008).	  	  The	   “impossible	  coalition”	   (Diamanti	  2007	  p736)	  of	   the	  Lega	  and	   the	  AN	  –	  of	  a	  party	  that	  most	  adamantly	  calls	  for	  the	  cutting	  of	  taxes	  and	  another	  that	  demands	  more	  state	  intervention	   and	   transfers	   –	   survived	   up	   to	   the	   present	   date	   under	   Forza	   Italia’s	  leadership.	   It	   also	   continues	   to	  win	   a	   relatively	   stable	   and	   quite	   sizable	   share	   of	   the	  vote,	  which	   is	  consistently	  higher	  than	  the	  share	  of	   the	  core	  parties	  of	   the	  centre-­‐left.	  The	  electoral	  performance	  of	  the	  individual	  parties	  within	  the	  alliance	  displays	  greater	  volatility	  than	  that	  of	  the	  alliance	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  voters	  shift	  between	  the	  Lega	  and	  Forza	  Italia	  or	  between	   the	  National	  Alliance	  and	  Forza	   Italia	   (Cattaneo).	  This	  phenomenon	  was	  especially	  visible	  in	  2001	  when	  the	  FI	  colonized	  a	  sizeable	  share	  of	  the	  Lega’s	  and	  the	   AN’s	   electorate	   (Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   It	   suggests	   that	   the	   electoral	   space	  delineated	  by	  the	  specific	  redistributive	  messages	  of	  each	  party	  –	  which	  have	  a	  crucial	  importance	   in	   defining	   the	   parties’	   identity	   –	   is	   fairly	   fixed	   and	   the	   parties	   of	   the	  coalition	  can	  only	  expand	  at	  each	  other’s	  expense.	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  When	  in	  government	  –	  briefly	  in	  1994	  and	  then	  for	  a	  full	  term	  between	  2001	  and	  2006	  –	  the	  centre-­‐right	  fully	  lived	  up	  to	  its	  anti-­‐tax	  commitments	  and	  to	  its	  professed	  image	  as	  the	  protector	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  small	  businesses.	  During	  its	  first	  brief	  stint	  in	  power	  in	   1994,	   it	   managed	   to	   pass	   a	   three-­‐year	   tax	   credit	   programme	   that	   practically	  eliminated	   taxes	  on	   reinvested	  profits	   and	   set	  back	   the	   revenue	   raising	  efforts	  of	   the	  previous	  governments	  for	  the	  next	  three	  years	  (Bernasconi	  et	  al	  2005,	  Ameco).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  announced	  an	  amnesty	  on	  previous	  tax	  irregularities.	  Within	  one	  year	  of	  its	  next	  electoral	  victory	   in	  2001,	   it	   repealed	   the	   tax	   reform	  of	   the	  centre-­‐left	   cabinet	  that	  was	  very	  unpopular	  amongst	  small	  enterprises	  and	  replaced	   it	  with	  a	  system	  far	  more	   favourable	   to	   them,	   decreased	   the	   corporate	   income	   tax	   rate	   by	   a	   percentage	  point	   and	   launched	   a	   new	   investment	   tax	   credit	   programme	   (Maurizi	   and	  Monacelli	  2003).	   The	   next	   year,	   it	   reformed	   the	   system	   of	   personal	   income	   taxes	   –	   again,	  cancelling	   out	   the	   changes	   made	   by	   the	   previous	   government	   –	   conferring	   benefits	  primarily	  on	  middle	  and	  high	  earners	   (OECD	  2005a).	   In	  2004,	   it	  decreased	  corporate	  rates	  by	   further	   three	  percentage	  points	  and	  proposed	  to	   lower	  tax	  rates	  on	   financial	  income	  (OECD	  2005a).	  As	  a	  corollary	  to	  these	  measures,	  it	  issued	  further	  amnesties	  on	  evasion	   (OECD	   2005a).	   Under	   this	   government,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   direct	   tax	   revenues	  shrunk	  by	  almost	  two	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  (Ameco).	  	  The	  devotion	  of	  the	  centre-­‐right	  to	  helping	  those	  dependent	  on	  public	  employment	  and	  investment	   for	   their	   income	   is	   less	   easy	   to	   gauge.	   The	   spending	   directed	   towards	  clientele	  networks	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  	  Ginsborg	  (2003,	  p298)	  claims	  that	  the	  first	  centre-­‐right	   cabinet	   slowed	   down	   privatization	   under	   pressure	   from	   the	   AN,	   which	  insisted	   on	   keeping	   up	   the	   state’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   South.	   However,	   given	   the	  coalition’s	  short	  stay	  in	  government,	  it	  remains	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  there	  would	  have	  been	  a	  lasting	  willingness	  to	  stop	  or	  considerably	  delay	  privatization,	  especially	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  League’s	  defiance	  of	  its	  coalition	  partner’s	  preferences99.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	   next	   centre-­‐right	   government,	   privatization	   had	   been	   mostly	   completed,	   but	   the	  coalition	  promised	  to	  launch	  major	  infrastructural	  projects	  in	  the	  South.	  Although	  only	  a	   quarter	   of	   all	   envisioned	   projects	   were	   funded	   and	   initiated	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	  government’s	   lifetime,	  the	  total	  capital	  expenditure	  still	   increased	  by	  more	  than	  a	  per	  cent	   of	   the	  GDP	   (Ruzza	   and	   Fella	   2009	  p209,	  Ameco).	   Furthermore,	   spending	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Bull	  and	  Baudner	  (2004)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  Lega	  delegated	  the	  minister	  who	  negotiated	  the	  phasing	  out	  of	   the	   tax	   deductibility	   of	   social	   security	   contributions	   for	   firms	   in	   the	   South,	   which	   were	   deemed	  incompatible	   with	   the	   Single	   Market,	   and	   he	   secured	   a	   much	   faster	   end	   of	   these	   subsidies	   than	   the	  Commission	   insisted	  on,	  exploiting	  European	  pressures	   to	  cut	  one	  more	  channel	  of	   funding	  going	   to	   the	  South.	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compensation	   of	   public	   employees	   started	   to	   grow	   again,	   after	   almost	   a	   decade	   of	  continuous	   decrease.	   Both	   public	   employment	   and	   wages	   increased	   at	   all	   levels	   of	  government,	  raising	  total	  spending	  by	  another	  half	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  (OECD	  2005b,	  Ameco).	   Spending	  on	   the	  purchase	  of	   goods	  and	  services	  also	   increased	  considerably	  (Ameco).	  	  Given	  their	  determination	  to	  keep	  taxes	   low	  and	  their	   inclination	  to	   let	  spending	  rise,	  centre-­‐right	  governments	  were	  bound	  to	  take	  on	  the	  social	  security	  system,	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  budgetary	  counterbalance	  to	  their	  preferences.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  election	  victory	  of	   1994,	   the	   new	   centre-­‐right	   cabinet	   unveiled	   a	   plan	   that	   proposed	   the	   revision	   of	  pension	  formulae,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new,	  less	  favourable	  system	  of	  indexation,	  the	  cutting	  of	  benefits	  for	  early	  retirees	  and	  a	  freeze	  on	  seniority	  pensions.	  The	  plan	  was	  to	  inflict	   large	   losses	   on	   dependent	   workers	   and	   –	   since	   it	   was	   targeted	   at	   generating	  immediate	  fiscal	  savings	  –	  it	  was	  not	  to	  cushion	  retirees	  and	  older	  cohorts	  of	  workers	  like	  the	  Amato	  reform	  had	  done.	  Incidentally,	  the	  schemes	  and	  rules	  covering	  the	  self-­‐employed	  were	   left	  virtually	   intact.	  The	  unions	   instantaneously	   rejected	   the	  plan	  and	  organized	  massive	  demonstrations.	  The	  proposal	  was	  revoked	  and	  the	  government	  fell	  soon	  afterwards	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997,	  Natali	  and	  Rhodes	  2004,	  Molina	  and	  Rhodes	  2007,	   Thompson	   and	   Price	   2009b).	   The	   next	   centre-­‐right	   government	   was	   more	  cautious	   in	   putting	   forward	   its	   new	  pension	   reform.	   The	   Tremonti-­‐Maroni	   reform	   of	  2004	   introduced	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   retirement	   age	   and	   disincentives	   for	   early	  retirement,	   and	   mandated	   the	   channelling	   of	   the	   “severance	   payment	   funds”	  (trattamento	  fine	  rapporto,	  tfr)	  into	  a	  formal	  second	  pension	  pillar.	  	  The	  reform	  was	  to	  come	  into	  effect	  only	  in	  2008.	  The	  unions	  responded	  by	  general	  strikes	  and	  protests	  in	  major	   cities,	  but	   the	  government	   stood	  by	   the	   reform,	  only	   compromising	  on	  making	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  tfr	  funds	  into	  a	  second	  pillar	  elective	  (Jessoula	  and	  Alti	  2006,	  Molina	  and	  Rhodes	  2007).	  However,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  centre-­‐right	  in	  passing	  this	   legislation	  was	   short-­‐lived,	   because	   the	   centre-­‐left	   government	   that	   came	   into	   power	   in	   2006	  postponed	  and	  watered	  down	  the	  measures	  of	  the	  reform	  (EIU	  Country	  Report,	  August	  2007),	  making	  pension	  reform	  a	  continued	  challenge	  for	  the	  centre-­‐right.	  	  Failing	   to	   compensate	   tax	   cuts	   and	   growing	   spending	   on	   public	   employment	   and	  investment	   by	   major	   immediate	   savings	   on	   pensions,	   the	   centre-­‐right’s	   stints	   in	  government	  in	  1994	  and	  between	  2001	  and	  2006	  saw	  the	  budget	  balance	  deteriorate.	  In	   1994,	   the	   previous	   rapid	   improvement	   of	   the	   primary	   balance	   was	   halted	   and	  marginally	   set	   back,	   and	   in	   the	   period	   between	   2001	   and	   2006,	   the	   primary	   surplus	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that	   was	   still	   at	   5.5	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP	   in	   2000	   was	   practically	   completely	   eroded	  (Ameco).	   The	   centre-­‐right’s	   urge	   to	   reverse	   the	   policies	   of	   1992	   and	   1993	   was	   not	  matched	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  overcome	  the	  power	  of	  the	  unions’	  resistance	  to	  cuts	  in	  social	  security.	  This	  had	  tangible	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  efforts	  to	  deal	  with	  excessive	  indebtedness.	  	  
The	  targeted	  austerity	  of	  the	  centre-­left	  	  The	   centre-­‐left’s	   evolution	   was	   equally	   strongly	   determined	   by	   the	   policy	  developments	  of	  1992	  and	  1993	  as	  that	  of	  the	  centre-­‐right.	  However,	  while	  the	  centre-­‐right	   organized	   itself	   in	   protest	   of	   those	   developments,	   the	   centre-­‐left	   coalesced	   in	  defence	   of	   the	   achievements	   and	   distributive	   consequences	   of	   the	   policies	   of	   Amato	  and	   Ciampi,	   once	   the	   threat	   from	   the	   centre-­‐right	   had	   revealed	   itself.	   The	   two	   large	  streams	   of	   what	   later	   became	   the	   centre-­‐left	   bloc	   jointly	   supported	   the	   Ciampi	  government	   and	   the	   tripartite	   deals	   sealed	   during	   its	   time,	   but	   in	   the	   subsequent	  elections	   in	   1994	   they	   decided	   to	   run	   separately100	   (Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   The	  successors	  of	  the	  reformist,	  left-­‐leaning	  segment	  of	  the	  erstwhile	  Christian	  Democrats	  –	  who	  were	   later	   to	   become	   a	   unified	   party,	   the	  Daisy	   –	   coalesced	   under	   the	   “Pact	   for	  Italy”	   banner,	   while	   the	   former	   Communists	   organized	   an	   alliance	   under	   the	  “Progressives”	  electoral	   list	  (Diamanti	  2007).	  However,	   the	  defeat	  of	   these	   lists	  at	   the	  hand	   of	   the	   unified	   centre-­‐right	   bloc	   and	   the	   policy	   developments	   under	   the	   new	  government	  made	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left	  put	  their	  differences	  aside.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	   first	   centre-­‐right	   government	   fell,	   they	   joined	   their	   forces	   in	   propping	   up	   the	  formally	   technocratic	   cabinet	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Dini101	   and	   decided	   to	   contest	   the	  upcoming	  elections	  of	  1996	  under	  a	  unified	  list,	  the	  “Olive	  Tree”.	  	  	  The	  centre-­‐left	  had	  an	  important	  a	  stake	  in	  defending	  and	  perpetuating	  the	  cooperation	  of	  labour	  with	  large	  business,	  primarily	  because	  of	  its	  strong	  ties	  with	  trade	  unions	  and	  its	  voter	  base	  among	  manufacturing	  workers,	  but	  to	  a	  smaller	  extent	  also	  because	  of	  its	  good	  connections	  to	  large	  business.	  The	  ex-­‐Communist	  PDS	  and	  RC	  had	  a	  long-­‐standing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	   Diamanti	   (2007,	   p6)	   explains	   this	   choice	   to	   run	   on	   separate	   list	   with	   the	   parties’	   distinct	   historical	  origins,	  which	   resulted	   in	   “very	   deep	   political,	   cultural,	   organisational	   –	   and	   even	   personal	   –	   divisions”	  amongst	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left.	  101	   Dini	   had	   been	  Minister	   of	   the	   Treasury	   in	   the	   first	   centre-­‐right	   government,	   but	   he	   then	   agreed	   to	  become	  caretaker	  Prime	  Minister	  despite	  the	  insistence	  of	  Forza	  Italia	  that	  new	  elections	  should	  be	  called	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  their	  government	  (Ginsborg	  2003,	  p299).	  The	  Dini	  government	  was	  propped	  up	  primarily	  by	   the	   centre-­‐left,	   its	  policies	   reflected	   the	   centre-­‐left’s	  preferences	  and	   in	   the	  elections	  of	   the	   following	  year,	   Dini	   joined	   the	   centre-­‐left	   electoral	   alliance.	   Therefore,	   the	   Dini	   cabinet	   can	   hardly	   be	   called	  independent.	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close	   relationship	   with	   the	   largest	   and	   most	   important	   union,	   the	   CGIL,	   and	   they	  inherited	  the	  labour	  electorate	  of	  their	  predecessor	  (Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008,	  Shin	  and	  Agnew	  2007).	  They	  were,	  therefore,	  crucially	  interested	  in	  policies	  that	  helped	  to	  deal	  with	  labour’s	  –	  and	  the	  trade	  unions’	  –	  internal	  conflicts	  of	  interests:	  with	  the	  need	  to	  reconcile	   the	   defence	   of	   the	   entitlements	   of	   older	   cohorts	   with	   the	   improvement	   of	  conditions	  for	  the	  employment	  of	  younger	  generations.	  The	  two	  successor	  parties’	  put	  different	   emphasis	   on	   the	   competing	   labour	   goals:	   the	   PDS	   adopted	   a	   considerably	  more	   market-­‐friendly,	   “Third	  Way”	   type	   of	   programme,	   whereas	   the	   RC	   stuck	   more	  adamantly	   to	   old	   Communist	   values	   (Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   The	   Daisy’s	   electoral	  base	   was	   slightly	   harder	   to	   define	   in	   economic	   terms	   –	   as	   its	   most	   defining	  characteristic	   is	   its	   Catholic	   leaning	   –	   but	   the	   party	   had	   tangible	   ties	  with	   labour,	   as	  many	  important	  personalities	  in	  it	  had	  been	  officers	  within	  the	  Catholic	  union,	  the	  CISL.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  association	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left	  bloc	  with	  erstwhile	  central	  bankers,	  like	  Ciampi	   and	  Dini,	   and	   top	   corporate	  executives,	   like	  Prodi	   also	   created	  a	   link	  and	  shared	  understanding	  with	  large	  business.	  	  Accordingly,	   when	   in	   government	   –	   in	   1995,	   between	   1996	   and	   2001	   and	   between	  2006	   and	   2008	   –	   the	   centre-­‐left	   followed	   the	   path	   set	   by	   the	   Amato	   and	   Ciampi	  cabinets	   and	   tried	   to	   balance	   the	   (disparate)	   interests	   of	   labour	   with	   those	   of	   large	  business	   under	   the	   shared	   objective	   of	   increased	   competitiveness.	   This	   involved	  fostering	  the	  dialogue	  between	  the	  social	  partners	  and	  negotiating	  with	  them	  a	  reform	  of	   the	   labour	  market102	  as	  well	  as	  pressing	   forward	  with	   fiscal	  consolidation,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  respecting	   labour’s	  sensitivities.	  Pensions	  remained	   largely	  untouched.	  Cuts	  and	  revenue	  increases	  were	  made	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  centre-­‐right’s	  constituency	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  Although	  fiscal	  pressure	  increased	  on	  big	  business,	  too,	  measures	  aimed	   at	   reducing	   the	   costs	   of	   labour	   were	   put	   into	   place	   in	   order	   to	   partially	  compensate	  large	  firms	  for	  higher	  taxes.	  	  	  Privatization	   efforts	   were	   redoubled.	   Revenues	   from	   this	   source	   reached	   record	  heights	   in	  1997	  and	  1998	  at	  over	  2	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  GDP	   (Vasallo	  2007).	   Spending	  on	  public	  employment	  was	  further	  reduced103.	  In	  1995	  corporate	  tax	  rates	  were	  increased	  by	   1	   percentage	   point	   and	   social	   security	   contributions	   by	   more	   than	   5	   percentage	  points	  (Bernasconi	  et	  al	  2005,	  Brugavini	  and	  Galasso	  2004).	  In	  1997,	  a	  comprehensive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  The	  Treu	  package	  of	  1996	  took	  an	  appreciable	  step	  towards	  freeing	  companies	  from	  the	  rigidities	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  hiring	  and	  created	  better	  circumstances	   for	   the	  employment	  of	   the	  young,	  albeit	   the	  employers	  considered	  its	  measures	  insufficient	  (Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	  103	  Compensation	  of	   employees	  decreased	  by	  more	   than	  1	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  GDP	  between	  1994	  and	  2001	  (Ameco).	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tax	   reform	   was	   launched.	   Health	   contributions	   (and	   several	   other	   taxes)	   were	  abolished	   and	   replaced	   by	   a	   new	   regional	   tax	   (IRAP)	   on	   added	   value.	   Besides	  decreasing	   the	   costs	  of	   labour,	   the	  new	   tax	  was	  designed	   to	  be	  a	  major	  attack	  on	   tax	  evasion.	  It	  not	  only	  made	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  tax	  obligations	  much	  more	  transparent	  but	  also	   reduced	   the	   opportunities	   for	   manipulation	   of	   the	   reported	   tax	   base	   and	   thus	  brought	   into	   the	   fold	   of	   taxpayers	   companies	   that	   consistently	   reported	  non-­‐positive	  profits104.	  In	  order	  to	  further	  prop	  up	  revenues,	  VAT	  rates	  were	  increased.	  The	  personal	  tax	   system	  was	   also	   reformed	   and	   simplified,	   but	   this	  was	   largely	   a	   revenue-­‐neutral	  operation	   (OECD	   2005a).	   The	   issue	   of	   pensions	  was	   carefully	   handled.	   Two	   reforms	  were	   passed105	   in	   close	   cooperation	   with	   the	   unions,	   but	   only	   the	   second	   had	  immediate	  –	   albeit	   limited	  –	   fiscal	   effect	   (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004,	  Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b,	  Radaelli	  2002).	  	  	  In	  the	  period	  between	  1996	  and	  1998,	  the	  fiscal	  efforts	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left	  governments	  were	  reinforced	  by	  the	  imminence	  of	  the	  launching	  of	  the	  euro.	  Efforts	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  consolidation	  already	  underway	  induced	  several	  temporary	  measures,	  such	  as	  the	  oft-­‐mentioned	  one-­‐off	   euro-­‐tax	   levied	   in	  order	   to	  make	   sure	   that	   the	  deficit	   is	  under	   the	  required	  threshold	   in	   the	  crucial	  year	  and	  the	  acceleration	  of	  privatization	  (Goldstein	  2003).	  However,	  most	   initiatives	   taken	  by	   the	   centre-­‐left	   cabinet	   in	   these	  years	   –	   for	  example	  the	  tax	  reform	  of	  1997-­‐1998	  –	  indicated	  the	  intention	  to	  lay	  the	  foundations	  of	  long-­‐term	   fiscal	   consolidation	  and	   to	   reduce	   the	  debt.	   It	   also	   showed	   the	  centre-­‐left’s	  urge	   to	   lock	   in	   its	  preferred	  terms	  of	  redistribution.	   In	  1997,	   the	  year	  of	  qualification	  for	  EMU-­‐entry,	   the	  primary	  balance	   stood	  at	   almost	   seven	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  GDP,	  more	  than	   four	  per	   cent	  higher	   than	   in	  1994.	  Even	  after	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  one-­‐off	  measures	  petered	  out	  and	  the	  government	  has	  returned	  some	  of	  the	  taxes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  rebate,	  the	   surplus	   stayed	   at	   a	   healthy	   five	   and	   a	   half	   per	   cent	   in	   2000	   (OECD	   2005b).	   Net	  borrowing	  was	   almost	   zero	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   decades.	   Due	   to	   the	   dramatic	   fall	   of	  interest	  rates	  charged	  on	  Italy’s	  debt,	  interest	  expenditure	  was	  down	  to	  a	  little	  over	  six	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  and	  falling	  further.	  During	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   fell	   by	   a	   tenth.	   In	   2001,	   however,	   the	   centre-­‐left	   lost	   the	   elections,	   and	  when	   it	   returned	   to	  government	  after	  a	   five-­‐year	  break,	   it	   found	   the	  primary	  surplus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Since	  the	  base	  of	  the	  new	  tax	  was	  turnover	  minus	  the	  cost	  of	  goods	  sold	  minus	  depreciation	  (in	  other	  words,	  labour	  and	  interest	  costs	  were	  not	  deductible),	  overstating	  costs	  to	  conceal	  profits	  would	  not	  help	  companies	  evade	  this	  tax.	  105	   The	   Dini-­‐reform	   of	   1995	   mandated	   the	   phasing	   in	   of	   new,	   contribution-­‐based	   formulae	   for	   the	  calculation	  of	  pensions	  and	  created	  disincentives	  for	  early	  retirement.	  The	  Prodi-­‐reform	  of	  1997	  tightened	  the	   availability	   of	   seniority	   pensions	   in	   the	   public	   sector,	   but	   left	   the	   rules	   covering	   private	   sector	  employees	  intact,	  ignoring	  the	  much	  more	  radical	  recommendations	  of	  a	  commission	  that	  the	  government	  had	  previously	  invited	  to	  work	  out	  a	  blueprint	  for	  comprehensive	  reform	  (Radaelli	  2002)	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practically	   eliminated	   and	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   on	   the	   rise.	   Once	   in	   power	   again,	   it	  tried	   to	   apply	   its	   old	   proven	   formula:	   it	   increased	   direct	   taxes	   and	   cracked	   down	  on	  evasion,	   froze	  expenditure	  on	  public	  employment	  and	  generated	  a	  primary	  surplus	  of	  more	  than	  3	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  within	  two	  years	  (EIU	  Country	  Report,	  October	  2006).	  However,	   its	   successes	   in	   engineering	   fiscal	   consolidation	   were	   not	   matched	   by	   its	  ability	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   power	   and	   by	   2008,	   the	   centre-­‐right	   took	   over	   the	   government	  again.	  	  	  
The	  policy	  reversals	  of	  the	  opposing	  poles	  	  The	   polarization	   of	   the	   two	   political	   blocs’	   policy	   preferences	   becomes	   even	   more	  tangible	  when	   their	  policy	  decisions	   are	  presented	   in	   chronological	   order,	   due	   to	   the	  contrast	   between	   measures	   of	   successive	   governments.	   Policies	   were	   regularly	  reversed,	  giving	  rise	  to	  large	  swings	  of	  revenues	  and	  expenses.	  At	  times,	  the	  undoing	  of	  the	  previous	  government’s	  policy	  choices	  already	  formed	  part	  of	  election	  programmes,	  like	   the	   centre-­‐right’s	   pledge	   in	   2001	   to	   abolish	   the	   new	   value-­‐added	   tax	   IRAP	  introduced	   in	   1997	   by	   the	   centre-­‐left.	   At	   other	   times,	   the	   reversals	   were	   less	  advertised,	   but	   could	   nevertheless	   be	   expected,	   like	   the	   regular	   tax	   amnesties	   of	   the	  centre-­‐right	  after	  each	  spell	  of	  stringency	  on	  evaders	  by	  the	  centre-­‐left,	  or	  the	  decision	  of	   the	   centre-­‐left	   in	   2006	   to	   practically	   annul	   the	   immediate	   effects	   of	   the	   pension	  reforms	  pushed	  through	  by	  the	  centre-­‐right	  in	  2004.	  	  	  Incidentally,	   the	   scope	   of	   such	   policy	   reversals	   was	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   field	   of	   fiscal	  policy	  only,	  but	  involved	  any	  measures	  that	  affected	  important	  interests	  of	  each	  bloc’s	  core	  electoral	  base,	   further	  reinforcing	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  blocs	  were	  completely	  beholden	   to	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	   their	   constituencies	   and	   were	   unwilling	   to	  compromise	  on	  them.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2006	  the	  centre-­‐left	  decided	  to	  water	  down	  the	  most	   contentious	   elements	   of	   an	   important	   labour	   market	   reform	   achieved	   by	   the	  centre	   right	   in	   defiance	   of	   union	   protests	   in	   2004	   (EUI	   Country	   Report,	   November	  2007).	  The	  centre-­‐right	  in	  turn	  failed	  to	  follow	  up	  on	  the	  programme	  of	  liberalization	  of	  protected	   services,	   which	   was	   hurting	   many	   self-­‐employed	   groups	   (EIU	   Country	  Report,	   July	  2011).	  Figure	  4.3	  summarizes	   in	  chronological	  order	   the	  most	   important	  policy	  decisions	  of	  successive	  governments	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  sections,	   in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  picture	  of	  the	  full	  scale	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  policy	  reversals.	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  The	  entrenched	  practice	  of	  policy	  reversals	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  observed	  sinusoid	  pattern	   of	   the	   budget	   balance.	   Since	   the	   centre-­‐right	   has	   been	   unable	   to	   take	   on	  pensions,	   its	   preferred	   tax	   cuts	   and	   spending	   increases	   are	   not	   counterbalanced	   by	  significant	  savings	  in	  other	  areas	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  bound	  to	  worsen	  the	  balance,	  whereas	   the	  centre-­‐left	   is	   relatively	   free	   to	   cut	  many	  expenditure	   items	  –	   it	  has	  been	  especially	   efficient	   in	   keeping	   the	   compensation	   of	   public	   employees	   in	   check	   –	   and	  does	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  tax	  increases	  and	  campaigns	  against	  tax	  evasion.	  Therefore,	  its	  
Figure4.	  3	  -­	  Chronology	  of	  the	  main	  fiscal	  policy	  measures	  of	  successive	  governments	  &	  labour	  
market	  developments	  1992-­2008	  	  
	   1992-­1994	   1994	   1995-­1996	   1996-­2001	   2001-­2006	   2006-­2008	  
	   technocracy	   centre-­right	   	  de	  facto	  
centre-­left	  




hiring-­‐freeze	  salary-­‐growth	  under	  inflation	  
hiring-­‐freeze	  salary-­‐growth	  under	  inflation	  
hiring-­‐freeze	  salary-­‐growth	  under	  inflation	  
salary-­‐growth	  slightly	  above	  inflation	  
salary-­‐growth	  double	  of	  inflation	  
hiring-­‐freeze	  salary-­‐growth	  under	  inflation	  
taxation	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
corporate2	   CIT	  pressure	  up	  +	  tax	  on	  net	  worth	   investment	  tax	  credit	   increase	  of	  CIT	  rate	  
IRAP	  on	  added	  value	  (revenue	  neutral)	  
IRAP	  watered	  down	  +	  CIT	  decreased	  +	  investment	  tax	  credit	  	   no	  change	  
personal3	   tax	  on	  real	  estate	   no	  change	   no	  change	   compression	  of	  brackets,	  tax-­‐shields	  on	  low	  incomes	  
cuts	  in	  rates,	  upper-­‐middle	  and	  high	  incomes	  favoured	  
reform	  in	  favour	  of	  lower	  &	  middle	  incomes	  	  +	  reintroduction	  of	  inheritance	  tax	  
payroll	  costs4	   increase	  in	  social	  security	  contribution	  rates	   no	  change	  
increase	  in	  social	  security	  contribution	  rates	  
health	  contributions	  replaced	  by	  IRAP	   no	  change	   no	  change	  indirect	  taxes5	   no	  change	   no	  change	   no	  change	  	   VAT	  increased	  	   no	  change	   no	  change	  
tax	  evasion6	   new	  non-­‐evadable	  taxes	  (on	  real	  estate	  and	  net	  worth)	   amnesty	  on	  evaded	  taxes	   no	  change	  
transparency-­‐increasing	  and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐evade	  new	  tax	  (IRAP)	  
modifications	  in	  IRAP	  +	  amnesty	  on	  evaded	  taxes,	  repatriated	  capital,	  	  breach	  of	  regulations	  
crackdown	  on	  evasion	  
pension	  reform7	  
Amato	  and	  Ciampi	  reforms:	  consensual,	  only	  long-­‐term	  savings	  
Berlusconi	  reform:	  unilateral,	  immediate	  savings	  ⇔	  fails!	  
Dini	  reform:	  consensual,	  only	  long-­‐term	  savings	  
Prodi	  reform:	  consensual,	  a	  few	  immediate	  savings	  
Maroni-­‐Tremonti	  reform:	  unilateral,	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  savings	  
Maroni-­‐Tremonti	  watered	  down	  and	  postponed	  
labour	  market	  
reform8	  
consensual	  abolition	  of	  scala	  mobile	  +	  long-­‐term	  pact	  on	  tripartite	  cooperation	  
no	  change	   no	  change	  
Treu	  package:	  consensual,	  hiring	  more	  flexible,	  implemented	  
Biagi	  package:	  unilateral,	  strong	  CGIL	  opposition,	  passed	  but	  not	  implemented	  
most	  contentious	  elements	  of	  Biagi	  package	  repealed	  
Sources	  1.	  EUKlems,	  OECD	  (2001),	  OECD	  (2005b)	  2.	  Bernasconi	  et	  al	  (2005,	  p748),	  OECD	  (1999),	  OECD	  (2005a)	  3.	  OECD	  (1999),	  OECD	  (2005a),	  EUI	  Country	  Reports	  (various	  issues)	  4.	  Brugiavini	  and	  Galasso	  (2004),	  OECD	  (1999)	  5.	  OECD	  (1999)	  6.	  OECD	  (1999),	  OECD	  (2005a),	  7.	  Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  (2004),	  Brugiavini	  and	  Galasso	  (2004),	  Jessoula	  and	  Alti	  (2006),	  EUI	  Country	  Reports	  (various	  issues)	  8.	  Thompson	  and	  Price	  (2009b)	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governments	   produce	   improving	   balances.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   these	   measures	  predictably	  generate	  resentment	  and	  are	  sure	  to	  be	  reversed	  once	  the	  centre-­‐left	  loses	  power.	  
	  
	  Figure	  4.4	  and	  4.5	  demonstrate	  the	  temporal	  evolution	  of	  net	  borrowing,	   the	  primary	  balance,	  revenues	  and	  expenditure	  over	  the	  government	  terms	  of	   the	  two	  sides.	  They	  show	   that	   although	   the	   continued	   decrease	   of	   interest	   rates	   charged	   on	   outstanding	  debt	  dampened	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  the	  deterioration	  of	  balances	  under	  the	  centre-­‐right,	  the	  period	  between	  2001	  and	  2006	  caused	  a	  considerable	  setback	  to	  the	  effort	  to	  deal	  with	  excessive	  indebtedness.	  It	  almost	  completely	  eroded	  the	  primary	  surplus	  generated	  in	  the	  previous	  decade.	  Although	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  part	  of	  this	  worsening	   is	  a	   consequence	  of	   the	  considerable	   slowing	  of	  growth	   in	   this	  period,	   the	  cyclically	  adjusted	  deficit	   figures	  show	  that	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  cycle	  were	  negligible	  on	  fiscal	   balances	   during	   this	   period	   and	   the	   above	   table	   gives	   evidence	   that	   the	  discretionary	  measures	  of	  the	  government	  –	  tax	  cuts	  and	  expenditure	  increases	  –	  gave	  a	  strong	  impetus	  to	  decreasing	  balances.	  
	  
Figure4.	  4	  -­	  Net	  borrowing,	  cyclically	  adjusted	  net	  borrowing,	  primary	  deficit	  and	  interest	  expenses	  
(1990-­2008)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	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Figure4.	  5	  -­	  	  Revenues	  and	  non-­interest	  expenses	  (1990-­2008)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Ameco	  
	  Notes:	  the	  dashed	  vertical	  lines	  represent	  changes	  in	  government,	  T=technocracy,	  CL=centre-­‐left,	  CR=centre-­‐right	  	  The	  entrenched	  pattern	  of	  policy	  reversals	  is	  problematic	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  policy	   stability	   and	   the	  volatility	  of	   the	   economic	   environment,	   but	   also	  because	   it	  undermines	  the	  possibility	  of	  lasting	  achievements	  in	  reducing	  the	  excessive	  debt	  level,	  which	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   major	   source	   of	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   risk.	   Even	   though	  governments	  are	  ready	  to	  undertake	  bold	  reforms	  and	  to	  make	  difficult	  decisions	  with	  dire	   consequences	   for	   different	   social	   groups,	   their	   initiatives	   add	  up	   to	   policy	   stasis	  over	  the	   longer	  term,	  as	  the	  measures	  do	  not	  have	  time	  to	  exercise	   lasting	  effect.	  The	  next	   section	   examines	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   bases	   of	   this	   political	   and	   policy	   gridlock,	  and	  investigates	  the	  role	  of	  EMU	  within	  in.	  	  
Making	  sense	  of	  dynamic	  stasis:	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests,	  the	  euro	  and	  the	  
war	  of	  attrition	  	  	  Although	  the	  Second	  Republic	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  regime	  that	  collapsed	  in	  1992	  –	  its	  bi-­‐polar	  party	  structure	  and	  the	  regular	  alternation	  of	  the	  two	  sides	  in	  government	  stand	  in	  marked	  contrast	  with	  the	  blocked	  political	  system	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  –	  the	  fundamental	   underlying	   social	   conflicts	   that	   drive	   electoral	   competition	   and	   policy	  making	   in	   the	  new	  regime	  changed	   little	  since	  the	  1980s.	  This	  section	  shows	  that	   the	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redistributive	   conflicts	   that	   arose	   in	   the	   later	   decades	   of	   the	   First	   Republic	   between	  four	  major	  socioeconomic	  groups	  –	  organized	  labour,	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  South,	  small	  and	  large	  business	  –	  continue	  to	  structure	  the	  policy	  space	  even	  after	  the	  complete	   transformation	  of	   the	  party	  system.	  There	  was	  one	  crucial	  difference	   in	   the	  socio-­‐economic	   forces	   shaping	   policy	   making	   in	   the	   1990s.	   A	   coalition	   of	   societal	  interests	   emerged	   that	   depended	   on	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   macroeconomic	  preconditions	   of	   international	   competitiveness	   and	  was	   therefore	   strongly	   interested	  in	   fiscal	   consolidation.	   This	   coalition	   managed	   to	   suppress	   the	   paralysing	   conflict	  between	  the	  four	  defining	  groups	  of	  vested	  interests	  and	  achieved	  considerable	  results	  in	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  This	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  definitive	  decision	  to	  join	  the	  single	  currency	   –	   only	   taken	   relatively	   late	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   euro	   –	   also	  reflected	   the	   incentives	  of	   this	   coalition.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	  membership	   in	   the	  EMU	  –	  which	  insulates	  international	  competitiveness	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  problems	  –	  has	  since	   undermined	   the	   drive	   of	   the	   groups	   in	   this	   coalition	   for	   further	   fiscal	  improvements.	  The	  weakening	  of	  this	  coalition	  allowed	  the	  old	  redistributive	  conflicts	  to	   define	   the	   policy	   space	   and	   block	   further	   fiscal	   consolidation.	   Policy	   makers’	  attempts	  to	  achieve	  lasting	  fiscal	  stabilization	  are	  now	  frustrated	  by	  the	  same	  societal	  deadlock	  that	  had	  caused	  the	  debt	  accumulation	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  Below	  the	  surface	  of	  remarkable	  political	  transformation,	  the	  break	  between	  the	  First	  and	   the	   Second	   Republic	   left	   largely	   untouched	   the	   foundations	   of	   political	   interest	  representation.	   One	   important	   source	   of	   continuity	   was	   the	   trade	   unions,	   most	  importantly	   the	   CGIL,	   which	   were	   strengthened,	   rather	   than	   shaken	   by	   the	   political	  turmoil	   and	   continued	   to	   be	   the	  main	   representative	   of	   labour	   interest	   in	   politics.	   In	  order	  to	  hold	  its	  membership	  together,	  the	  CGIL	  had	  to	  adopt	  a	  two-­‐faced	  strategy.	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   it	   was	   urged	   to	   intransigently	   defend	   the	   acquired	   rights	   of	   the	   older	  labour	   market	   insiders.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   was	   ready	   to	   make	   circumscribed	  concessions	   for	  the	  sake	  of	   increasing	  employment	  among	  groups	   in	  more	  precarious	  position.	   This	   schizophrenic	   strategy	   allowed	   unions	   to	   continue	   to	   act	   as	   the	   main	  representatives	  of	  labour,	  even	  though	  the	  linking	  of	  the	  fate	  of	  labour	  market	  insiders	  and	   outsiders	   had	   disadvantages	   for	   the	   latter	   group,	   and	   even	   though	   labour	   now	  gained	  proper	  representation	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  and	  governmental	  scene	  by	  parties	  that	  defined	   labour	   interest	   in	   their	   own	  way	   (Molina	   and	  Rhodes	  2007,	  Hopkin	   and	  Ignazi	   2008)106.	   Moreover,	   via	   their	   mobilizing	   capacities	   unions	   held	   onto	   their	   de	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  An	  important	  example	  of	  how	  unions	  dominated	  labour	  issues	  and	  why	  this	  was	  often	  disadvantageous	  to	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  is	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  safety	  net	  for	  workers	  with	  irregular	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facto	   veto	  on	  policy	  measures	   contrary	   to	   their	  mission	   to	  protect	  workers’	   acquired	  rights.	  Therefore,	  the	  group	  with	  vested	  interests	  in	  maintaining	  the	  generous	  –	  albeit	  exclusive	  –	  welfare	  system	  remained	  a	  very	  strong	  factor	  in	  politics.	  	  Another	   source	   of	   continuity	  with	   the	   old	   system	   of	   interest	   representation	  was	   the	  entrenched	   political	   infrastructures	   left	   behind	   by	   the	   old	   parties,	   which	   the	   newly	  born	   or	   refashioned	   parties	   could	   easily	   take	   over	   and	   use	   to	   build	   up	   their	   own	  electoral	   strength.	   The	   best	   example	   of	   this	   is	   the	   “colonization”	   of	   the	   clientele	  networks	   used	   to	   distribute	   state	   resources	   under	   Christian	   Democracy	   and	   the	  Socialist	   Party	   by	   Forza	   Italia	   (Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   This	   ensured	   renewed	  representation	   in	   the	   policy	  making	   sphere	   of	   the	   interests	   tied	   into	   these	   networks	  and	  created	  political	  incentives	  for	  the	  FI	  to	  subscribe	  to	  continued	  spending	  on	  public	  employment	   and	   large-­‐scale	   public	   investments.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   provided	   a	   basis	   for	  allying	  with	  the	  National	  Alliance,	  which	  built	  on	  its	  predecessor’s	  capacity	  to	  organize	  the	   discontented	   urban	   proletariat	   in	   the	   South	   and	   captured	   the	   growth	   of	   the	  unemployed	   vote	   in	   the	   region	   that	   is	   crucially	   dependent	   on	   public	   funds	   for	   its	  livelihood.	  The	   alliance	  of	   these	   two	  parties	   created	   strong	   representation	   for	   vested	  interests	  in	  continued	  high	  public	  employment	  and	  public	  investments.	  	  	  	  A	   third	   source	   of	   continuity	  was	   Forza	   Italia’s	   decision	   to	   engineer	   its	   own	   electoral	  base	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  market	  research,	  which	  led	  the	  party	  to	  the	  “orphans”	  of	  the	   DC	   and	   the	   PSI	   (Diamanti	   2007,	   Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   FI	  embraced	   the	  anti-­‐tax	   sentiment	  of	   small	  businesses	  and	   the	   self-­‐employed,	  who	  had	  been	   core	   supporters	   of	   the	   DC.	   This	   created	   a	   link	   –	   albeit	   also	   an	   aspect	   of	  competition	   –	   between	   FI	   the	   LN,	   whose	   electorate	   was	   also	   mostly	   based	   on	   the	  erstwhile	   voter	   base	   of	   the	   DC	   in	   the	   North.	   Together,	   the	   two	   parties	   formed	   a	  powerful	  anti-­‐tax	  alliance	  within	  Italian	  politics.	  	  	  Thus,	   the	   new	   party	   system	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   first	   years	   of	   the	   Second	   Republic,	  continued	   to	   provide	   strong	   representation	   for	   all	   the	   vested	   interests	   that	   were	  created	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  and	  to	  structure	  political	  life	  along	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  employment	  histories.	  When	  the	  centre-­‐left	  government	  wanted	  to	  address	  this	  oft-­‐lamented	  weak	  point	  of	  the	  Italian	  welfare	  system	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Treu-­‐package	  of	  reforms	  of	  the	  labour	  market,	  its	  efforts	  were	  received	  with	   suspicion	   in	   the	   labour	  movement	   because	   they	  were	   seen	   as	   a	   prequel	   to	   trimming	   the	  generous	   income	   replacement	   schemes	   of	   welfare-­‐insiders	   under	   the	   CIGS	   and	   to	   a	   more	   radical	  liberalization	   of	   the	   labour	   market	   (Jessoula	   and	   Alti	   2006,	   OECD	   2009).	   In	   the	   event,	   the	   universal	  unemployment	   scheme	   remained	  marginal.	   The	   failure	   of	   this	   attempt	   suggests	   that	   the	   CGIL’s	   position	  largely	  determined	  the	  manoeuvring	  space	  of	  the	  parties	  that	  relied	  on	  labour	  vote,	  despite	  signs	  that	  the	  PDS	  wanted	  to	  loosen	  its	  ties	  with	  the	  CGIL	  (Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008).	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fault	  lines	  between	  anti-­‐tax,	  state	  dependency	  and	  welfare-­‐system	  constituencies.	  Even	  though	   the	   erstwhile	   core	   constituencies	   of	   the	   DC	   were	   now	   represented	   by	   three	  different	  parties,	  these	  were	  allied	  in	  one	  political	  block,	  thanks	  to	  the	  success	  of	  Forza	  Italia	  in	  recycling	  many	  of	  the	  political	  assets	  of	  the	  DC	  and	  the	  PSI,	  which	  allowed	  it	  to	  find	  commonalities	  of	  interests	  with	  parties	  as	  far	  apart	  as	  the	  LN	  and	  the	  AN	  and	  hold	  together	   the	   anti-­‐tax	   and	   the	   state-­‐dependency	   constituencies	   once	   their	   vested	  interests	   came	  under	   attack.	   Similarly,	   the	  DC’s	   erstwhile	  main	   adversary,	   the	   labour	  movement	   also	   stayed	   largely	   intact	   and	   continued	   to	   define	   labour	   interests	   –	   even	  though	   labour	   gained	   important	   electoral	   representation	   after	   decades	   of	   being	  blocked	   from	   government	   in	   the	   First	   Republic	   –	   by	   retaining	   a	   veto	   on	   short-­‐	   and	  medium-­‐term	   welfare	   retrenchment	   against	   governments	   of	   any	   colour.	   Strong	  political	   representation	   for	   these	  polarized	   interests	  augured	   ill	   for	   the	  restoration	  of	  fiscal	  health.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  were	  three	  significant	  novelties	  in	  the	  new	  political	  system	  that	  made	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Second	  Republic	  considerably	  different	  from	  the	  First.	  First	  of	  all,	  a	  major	  party,	   the	  Lega	  Nord	  drew	  its	  support	   from	  a	  cross-­‐class	  electoral	  base	  that	  belonged	  partially	  to	  the	  anti-­‐tax,	  partially	  to	  the	  welfare-­‐system	  constituency	  and	  was	   unified	   by	   its	   uniformly	   strong	   interest	   in	   policies	   to	   secure	   the	  macroeconomic	  bases	  of	  international	  competitiveness.	  In	  fact,	  the	  party	  had	  risen	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s	  on	  the	  wave	  of	  profound	  discontent	  of	  owners	  and	  workers	  of	  small	   enterprises	   in	   the	   industrial	   districts	   of	   the	   North	   with	   the	   policies	   of	   DC-­‐led	  governments,	  which	  were	  a	  continuous	  threat	  to	  the	  foreign	  competitiveness	  of	  those	  districts	   (Diamanti	   2007,	   Hopkin	   and	   Ignazi	   2008).	   This	   introduced	   an	   aspect	   into	  electoral	   competition	   that	   was	   not	   exclusively	   focused	   on	   the	   conflicts	   between	   the	  constituencies	  of	  vested	  interests,	  but	  was	  also	  directed	  towards	  sound	  macroeconomic	  policies.	  Second,	  unlike	  in	  the	  First	  Republic,	  large	  business	  chose	  to	  remain	  politically	  unaligned	   and	   –	   under	   pressure	   from	   failing	   international	   competitiveness	   –	   was	  particularly	   open	   for	   cooperation	   with	   labour	   (Regini	   and	   Regalia	   1997,	   Molina	   and	  Rhodes	   2007).	   Third,	   labour	   itself	   accommodated	   within	   its	   strategy	   the	   need	   to	  achieve	  some	  compromises	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  increased	  employment.	  	  	  These	   novelties	   created	   room	   for	   the	   competitiveness-­‐alliance	   of	   large	   business	   and	  labour	   by	   the	   early	   1990s	   under	   the	   political	   umbrella	   of	   the	   centre-­‐left	   coalition,	  which	  managed	  to	  defeat	  the	  centre-­‐right	  and	  to	  turn	  the	  fiscal	  situation	  around	  at	  the	  expense	   of	   the	   anti-­‐tax	   and	   state-­‐dependency	   constituencies	   as	   explained	   in	   the	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previous	  sections.	  The	  Lega	  never	  became	  part	  of	  this	  alliance	  and	  its	  voters	  observed	  the	  tax	  policies	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left	  with	  great	  aversion.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  party	  was	  not	   ready	   to	   cooperate	   too	   closely	   with	   the	   AN	   and	   FI	   either,	   in	   these	   years.	   It	   was	  opposed	  to	  the	  centre-­‐right’s	  readiness	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  erstwhile	  DC’s	  policies,	  which	  had	   fuelled	   discontent	   among	   its	   constituency	   in	   the	   1980s.	   In	   these	   early	   years,	   the	  anti-­‐tax	  motive	  was	   in	   itself	   not	   strong	   enough	   to	   ensure	   the	   cohesion	  of	   the	   centre-­‐right	   bloc.	   The	   Lega	   brought	   down	   the	   first	   centre-­‐right	   government	   in	   1994	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   attempted	   pension	   reform	   that	   was	   to	   affect	   its	   blue-­‐collar	   voters	   too	  harshly.	   It	   then	   supported	   the	   “traitor”	   Dini’s	   technocratic	   government	   along	   with	  parties	  of	  the	  left	  in	  pursuing	  further	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  Finally,	  it	  refused	  to	  join	  the	  centre-­‐right	   electoral	   alliance	   in	   the	   1996,	   keeping	   over	   ten	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   national	  vote	  out	  of	   the	  centre-­‐right	  camp	  (Ginsborg	  2003	  p298-­‐300).	  These	  decisions	  greatly	  contributed	  to	  the	  electoral	  and	  governmental	  viability	  of	  the	  centre-­‐left	  coalition	  that	  fostered	   the	   competitiveness-­‐alliance	   and	   achieved	   profound	   fiscal	   improvements,	  because	   they	   allowed	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   anti-­‐tax	   and	   state-­‐dependency	  constituencies	  from	  policy	  making.	  	  The	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   competitiveness-­‐alliance	   and	   the	   centre-­‐left	   in	   the	   1990s	  was	  crucially	  important	  not	   just	   in	  achieving	  the	  fiscal	  turnaround	  but	  also	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  join	  the	  euro	  with	  the	  first	  group	  of	  countries.	  The	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  bid	  for	  early	  accession	   was	   not	   an	   easy	   one	   for	   a	   political	   force	   for	   whom	   international	  competitiveness	  was	  a	  first	  priority	  and	  the	  centre-­‐left	  government	  dithered	  quite	  long	  before	  it	  definitively	  decided	  to	  aim	  for	  accession	  in	  1999	  (Quaglia	  2004).	  Irrevocably	  fixing	  the	  exchange	  rate	  between	  Italy	  and	  its	  largest	  trade	  partners	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	   country’s	   persistent	   macroeconomic	   imbalances	   entailed	   the	   danger	   of	  undermining	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   Italian	   industry	   in	   the	   long	   term107.	  However,	   in	  the	   broader	   context	   of	   Italian	   realities,	   shaped	   by	   the	   country’s	   daunting	   fiscal	  problems,	   by	   the	   economics	   and	   politics	   of	   European	   integration	   and	   by	   domestic	  political	  uncertainties,	  joining	  early	  was	  a	  safer	  option	  for	  those	  exposed	  to	  the	  effects	  of	   foreign	   competition	   –	   business	   and	  workers	   alike	   –	   than	   to	   postpone	   the	   decision	  into	  the	  distant	  future.	  	  	  First	   of	   all,	   given	   its	   precarious	   fiscal	   position	   –	  with	  debt	   above	  120	  per	   cent	   of	   the	  GDP	  –	   Italy	   could	  not	  afford	   to	   forego	   the	  opportunity	   to	  bolster	   the	   credibility	  of	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	   For	   detailed	   studies	   on	   the	   debate	   over	   Italy’s	   decision	   to	   join	   in	   the	   first	   round,	   especially	   on	  business’s,	   Banca	   d’Italia’s	   and	   even	   centre-­‐left	   Prime	   Minister	   Prodi’s	   doubts	   about	   this	   choice,	   see	  Radaelli	  (2002)	  and	  Quaglia	  (2004).	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macroeconomic	  policies	  by	  committing	  to	  the	  accession	  target	  and	  to	  thereby	  decrease	  the	  risk	  premium	  on	  its	  outstanding	  debt	  stock.	  Faced	  with	  interest	  expenses	  in	  excess	  of	  11	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP,	  Italy’s	  only	  realistic	  chance	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  debt	  spiral	  and	  to	  create	   stable	   macroeconomic	   conditions	   for	   economic	   vitality	   was	   to	   convince	   the	  markets	  to	  charge	  lower	  rates	  on	  Italian	  public	  debt	  (Ferrera	  and	  Gualmini	  2004).	  The	  decrease	  of	   interest	  rates	  on	  public	  debt	  could	  also	  confer	  direct	  benefits	  on	   industry	  through	   lowering	   the	   general	   rates	   of	   interest	   and	   thereby	   reducing	   the	   costs	   of	  investment.	  	  	  Second,	   missing	   out	   on	   the	   next	   round	   of	   economic	   integration	   with	   the	   country’s	  largest	   trade	   partners	   and	   competitors	   might	   have	   conferred	   a	   real	   competitive	  disadvantage	  on	  Italian	  industry.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  foregoing	  the	  potential	  decrease	  in	  transaction	   costs	   or	   the	   benefits	   of	   exchange	   rate	   stability	  would	   have	   generated	   an	  economic	  handicap	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  firms	  within	  the	  Eurozone.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  Italy’s	  ability	  to	  influence	  important	  economic	  decisions	  in	  the	  Single	  Market	   could	   have	   been	   reduced,	   if	   it	   had	   failed	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   innermost	   circle	   of	  integration108.	   Furthermore,	   the	   lack	  of	   irrevocable	   fixing	  would	  not	  necessarily	  have	  meant	  free	  adjustment	  of	  exchange	  rates	  as	  Italy’s	  European	  trade	  partners	  –	  especially	  as	  a	  unified	  bloc	  –	  could	  always	  put	  pressure	  on	  Italy	  not	  to	  use	  its	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  as	  a	  means	  of	  boosting	  competitiveness.	  	  Third,	   the	   surprising	   success	   of	   the	   centre-­‐right	   in	   the	   1994	   elections	   and	   its	   policy	  choices	   during	   its	   brief	   stay	   in	   power	   highlighted	   the	   risks	   to	   international	  competitiveness	   from	  an	  electorally	  strong	  alternative	  policy	  platform.	  This	   increased	  the	   appeal	   of	   locking	   in	   certain	   policy	   choices.	   The	   first	   centre-­‐right	   government	   not	  only	  set	  back	  the	  stabilization	  efforts	  with	  its	  tax	  cuts	  –	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Italy	  had	  barely	  emerged	  from	  the	  crisis	  of	  1992	  and	  the	  clock	  for	  euro-­‐accession	  was	  ticking	  –	  but	  also	  attacked	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   central	   bank,	   raising	   fears	   about	   its	   anti-­‐inflation	  commitment	   (Ginsborg	   2003	   p298).	   Given	   Italy’s	   experiences	   with	   persistent	   fiscal	  problems	   and	   with	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	   monetization	   of	   deficits	   on	  competitiveness,	   these	  choices	  were	  alarming	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  actors	  exposed	  to	   international	  competition.	  Therefore,	  opting	   into	  a	  system	  that	  delegates	  monetary	  policy	  to	  a	  supranational	  entity	  and	  thereby	  severs	  the	  link	  between	  debt	  and	  inflation	  in	   the	   future	  was	   an	   attractive	   choice.	   This	   option	  would	  need	   to	   be	   taken	  while	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  These	  factors	  are	  what	  Amato’s	  oft-­‐quoted	  statement	  referred	  to	  by	  saying	  that	  –	  if	  left	  out	  of	  the	  euro	  zone	  –	  Italy	  will	  become	  Europe’s	  “Disneyland”	  (Della	  Sala	  1997).	  
	   132	  
competitiveness-­‐minded	   centre-­‐left	   government	  was	   in	   power.	   The	   other	   side	  might	  indefinitely	  put	  off	  joining	  the	  euro	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  binding	  deadline,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  of	  its	  voter	  base	  and	  the	  professed	  scepticism	  of	  some	  of	  its	  key	  politicians	  about	  the	  euro-­‐project	  (Radaelli	  2002).	  	  The	  euro	  accession	  benefitted	  the	  competitiveness-­‐alliance	  in	  many	  ways.	  It	  delivered	  the	   expected	   confidence	   premium	   of	  much	   lower	   interest	   rates	   on	   outstanding	   debt.	  The	   inflation-­‐adjusted	   yield	   on	   10-­‐year	   government	   bonds	   dropped	   270	   basis	   points	  between	   the	   decision	   to	   join	   the	   EMU	   in	   the	   first	   round	   in	   September	   1996	   and	   the	  January	  1999	  (Global	  Financial	  Data).	  This	  drop	  permanently	  eased	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  budget	   by	   seven	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP	   over	   the	   following	   decade.	   Thereby,	   it	   had	   a	  greater	   impact	   on	   fiscal	   stabilization	   than	   the	   cuts	   in	   non-­‐interest	   spending	   and	  revenue	   increases	   taken	   together.	   Furthermore,	   the	   euro	   insulated	   international	  competitiveness	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   fiscal	   problems.	   Once	   monetary	   policy	   was	  delegated	   to	   the	   ECB,	   deficits	   would	   not	   generate	   inflationary	   pressures	   and	   in	   the	  integrated	  European	  financial	  markets	  the	  crowding-­‐out	  effect	  of	  public	  debt	  on	  private	  investment	  would	   be	   dispersed.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   exactly	   because	   it	   largely	   insured	  foreign	  competitiveness	   from	  future	   fiscal	  policy	  mistakes	  and	  because	   it	  reduced	  the	  gravity	   of	   existing	   problems	   via	   the	   dramatic	   fall	   on	   outstanding	   debt,	   the	   EMU-­‐accession	  diminished	   the	  motivation	   to	  maintain	  a	   strong	  competitiveness-­‐alliance	   to	  safeguard	   fiscal	   policy	   choices	   and	   allowed	  old	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   to	   resurface	   and	  eclipse	  the	  objective	  of	  further	  reducing	  the	  debt.	  	  By	   shielding	   international	   competitiveness	   from	   the	   negative	   side	   effects	   of	   fiscal	  outcomes,	   membership	   in	   the	   monetary	   union	   undermined	   the	   demand	   for	   fiscal	  discipline	  among	  the	  groups	  that	  had	  been	  the	  main	  supporters	  of	  consolidation	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Even	  though	  fiscal	  rules	  under	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  and	  the	  Excessive	  Deficit	  Procedure	  required	   Italy	   to	   limit	   its	  deficits	   to	  under	   three	  per	  cent	  and	  work	  towards	  medium	  term	  objectives	  close	  to	  balance	  or	   in	  surplus,	   these	  constraints	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  politics	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  after	   the	  2000s.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  credible	  punishment	  mechanism	   that	  would	  have	   interfered	  with	   the	  material	   interests	  of	   the	  important	   interest	   groups,	   violation	   of	   the	   rules	   could	   not	   generate	   the	   impetus	   for	  compromises	   needed	   to	   maintain	   a	   strong	   societal	   coalition	   behind	   continued	  consolidation.	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In	  the	  2000s,	  all	  of	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  that	  made	  the	  1990s	  different	   from	  the	  1980s	  disappeared.	   In	  the	  2001	  elections,	   the	  Lega	   joined	   the	  centre-­‐right	  bloc	  again	  and	  cooperated	   faithfully	  with	   its	  government	  partners	   throughout	   the	   electoral	   term,	   delivering	   tax	   amnesties	   and	   tax	   cuts	   to	   its	  constituency.	   Its	   concerns	   for	   international	   competitiveness	   of	   producers	   in	   the	  industrial	   districts	   were	   now	   expressed	   by	   empty	   gestures	   such	   as	   criticising	   the	  decision	   to	   join	   the	   euro	   and	  advocating	   the	   imposition	  of	   tariffs	   on	  Chinese	   imports	  (Ruzza	   and	   Fella	   2009	   p79).	   The	   employers’	   organization,	   Confindustria	   became	  increasingly	   critical	   of	   concertation	   and	   under	   the	   new	   centre-­‐right	   government	  became	   more	   confrontational	   and	   pushed	   more	   aggressively	   for	   faster	   and	   more	  extensive	   reforms	   (Molina	  and	  Rhodes	  2007,	  Thompson	  and	  Price	  2009b).	  The	   three	  union	  confederations	  drifted	  apart,	  with	  the	  CGIL	  adopting	  intransigent	  positions	  on	  all	  contentious	   issues,	   in	   defiance	   of	   the	   two	   other	   two	   confederations’	   readiness	   to	  compromise	  with	  employers	  and	  the	  government.	  	  	  The	  situation	  under	  the	  centre-­‐right	  government	  could	  not	  have	  resembled	  the	  1980s	  more:	  the	  awkward	  coalition	  of	  anti-­‐tax	  and	  state-­‐dependency	  constituencies	  of	  the	  FI,	  AN	   and	   LN	   was	   facing	   a	   militant	   CGIL,	   while	   the	   government	   was	   borrowing	  extensively	   to	   satisfy	   the	   demands	   of	   its	   own	   constituencies,	   since	   it	   was	   unable	   to	  place	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  preferred	  policies	  on	  its	  opponents.	  Even	  though	  the	  new	  centre-­‐left	  government	  that	  came	  to	  power	  in	  2006	  made	  an	  aggressive	  attempt	  to	  restore	  the	  fiscal	  achievements	  of	   the	  1990s	  and	  to	  undo	  the	  harm	  to	   labour	   interests,	   it	  was	  not	  strong	  enough	  electorally	  to	  hold	  onto	  power	  for	  long.	  Once	  more,	  the	  long-­‐term	  health	  of	  Italian	  public	  finances	  was	  undermined	  by	  the	  conflicts	  between	  the	  vested	  interests	  of	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  groups:	  centre-­‐right	  governments	  were	  weak	  in	  the	  face	  of	  labour’s	  veto,	  whereas	  centre-­‐left	  governments	  were	  weak	  electorally.	  	  In	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model,	  the	  fiscal	  history	  of	  Italy	  of	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  underlines	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  corollary	  costs	  of	   fiscal	  problems	  in	  driving	  the	  solution	  to	  persistent	  fiscal	  imbalances.	  The	  model	  predicts	  that	  the	  willingness	  of	  major	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   to	   bear	   a	   share	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   fiscal	   stabilization	  depends	  on	  the	  secondary	  harm	  that	  they	  suffer	  from	  persistent	  deficits.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Italy,	  the	  partial	  monetization	  of	  persistent	  deficits	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  eroded	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  Italian	  industry	  in	  the	  quasi-­‐fixed	  exchange	   rate	   regime	   of	   the	   European	   Monetary	   System.	   This	   helped	   to	   gradually	  undermine	  the	  system	  of	  interest	  representation,	  because	  it	   forced	  groups	  exposed	  to	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international	   competition	   –	  within	   large	   and	   small	   businesses	   as	  well	   as	   labour	   –	   to	  withdraw	   their	   support	   from	   parties	   and	   unions	   that	   intransigently	   defended	   the	  redistributive	  status	  quo.	  This	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  a	  different	  political	  constellation	  and	  for	  compromises	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  	  
	  This	  chapter	  showed	   that	  even	   though	   the	  system	  of	   interest	   representation	  changed	  much	   less	   than	   could	   be	   expected	   from	   the	   profound	   political	   transformation	   of	   the	  early	   1990s,	   the	   groups	   exposed	   to	   international	   competition	   managed	   to	   reach	  important	   compromises	   amongst	   themselves	   and	   sacrificed	   some	   of	   their	   vested	  interests	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   better	   macroeconomic	   conditions.	   However,	   as	   soon	   as	   the	  EMU	   insulated	   them	   from	   the	   costs	   of	   fiscal	   problems,	   they	   rediscovered	   the	  importance	  of	   their	   vested	   interests	   and	   realigned	  with	  groups	  with	   the	   same	  vested	  interests	  as	  themselves	  in	  the	  sheltered	  sectors.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  further	  progress	  on	  fiscal	  consolidation	  became	  politically	  inconceivable	  until	  the	  start	  of	  the	  current	  fiscal	  emergency	  triggered	  by	  a	  loss	  of	  investor	  confidence	  and	  a	  hike	  in	  interest	  rates.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  This	   chapter	   explained	   the	   puzzling	   volatility	   of	   fiscal	   outcomes	   in	   Italy’s	   Second	  Republic	  by	  analysing	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  context	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  as	  the	  party	   system	   underwent	   profound	   restructuring	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   and	   the	   country	  made	  a	  bid	   to	   join	   the	  euro	  along	  with	   the	   first	  group	  of	  member	  states.	  The	  chapter	  argued	   that	   political	   realignment	   was	   of	   primary	   importance	   in	   the	   astonishing	  improvement	   of	   fiscal	   outcomes	   of	   the	   1990s,	   whereas	   euro-­‐accession	   played	   a	  secondary	   role.	   In	   the	   early	   1990s	   a	   coalition	   of	   societal	   groups	   emerged	   under	   the	  centre-­‐left	   political	   umbrella	  with	   a	   very	   strong	   shared	   interest	   in	   the	   restoration	   of	  international	   competitiveness	   and	   therefore	   in	   fiscal	   stabilization.	   Socio-­‐economic	  groups	  in	  this	  coalition	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  sacrifices	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  consolidation	  and	  had	  the	  necessary	  political	  clout	  to	  impose	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  stabilization	  on	  other	   groups.	   This	   opened	   the	   way	   both	   for	   spending	   cuts	   and	   tax	   increases.	   The	  political	  ascendancy	  of	  these	  groups	  and	  their	  crucial	  stake	  in	  competitiveness	  explains	  both	  the	  success	  of	  fiscal	  austerity	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  join	  the	  euro	  early.	  	  	  However,	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  this	  coalition	  of	  interests	  were	  also	  its	  undoing.	  After	  the	   alarming	   debt	   growth	   had	   been	   reversed,	   the	   interest	   burden	   was	   brought	  considerably	  down	  and	  monetary	   stability	  had	  been	  guaranteed	   for	   the	   long	   term	  by	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the	   euro-­‐accession,	   the	   coalition	   that	   had	   required	   considerable	   sacrifices	   and	  compromises	   from	   its	   constituent	   groups	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   disintegrated.	   This	  allowed	   the	  groups	  hitherto	  excluded	   from	  policy	  making	   to	   capture	   the	  government	  under	   the	   centre-­‐right	   political	   bloc	   and	   redress	   their	   grievances.	   Many	   of	   the	   cost-­‐cutting	  and	   tax	  measures	  of	   the	  1990s	  were	  undone	   in	   the	  2000s	  and	   the	   favourable	  fiscal	   trends	  were	   reversed,	   albeit	   interest	   costs	   remained	   low	   until	   the	  most	   recent	  waves	  of	  the	  European	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  	  	  This	  evolution	  of	  societal	  coalitions	  of	  interest	  explains	  the	  astonishing	  consolidation	  of	  the	   1990s	   as	   well	   as	   the	   relapse	   of	   the	   2000s	   and	   even	   the	   short	   intermezzo	   of	  austerity	  between	  2006	  and	  2008.	  Furthermore,	  it	  accounts	  for	  the	  curious	  pattern	  of	  policy	   reversals	   between	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s:	   for	   the	   U-­‐turns	   in	   tax	   laws,	   pension	  measures,	   expenditure	   cuts	   and	   so	   on	   as	   governments	   representing	   one	   coalition	   of	  societal	   groups	   replaced	   governments	   standing	   for	   the	  others.	  Moreover,	   the	   societal	  analysis	   helps	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   momentous	   political	   realignment	   that	   took	  place	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  party	  system	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  and	  the	  creation	  and	  composition	  of	  the	  two	  solid	  political	  blocks	  of	  the	  Second	  Republic.	  	  	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   several	   interest	   rate	   hikes	   in	   the	   past	   months,	   the	   country’s	   fiscal	  fortunes	  look	  alarming	  again.	  Balancing	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  default,	  the	  current	  centre-­‐right	  government	  has	  passed	  three	  austerity	  packages	  within	  one	  and	  a	  half	  months,	  undoing	  many	   of	   the	   measures	   the	   centre-­‐right	   itself	   had	   introduced	   in	   the	   2000s	   to	  compensate	   its	   supporters	   for	   the	   sacrifices	   of	   the	   1990s.	   Despite	   all	   the	   fiscal	   pain	  dealt	  out	   to	  different	  parts	  of	   the	   society	   in	   the	  1990s,	   Italy	  was	  not	  able	   to	   leave	   its	  fiscal	   problems	  behind.	   Its	   enormous	  debt	   stock	  places	   the	   country	   –	   and	  potentially	  the	  whole	  euro-­‐zone	  –	  into	  an	  infinitely	  dangerous	  situation	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  present	  turmoil	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  and	  the	  international	  financial	  markets.	  	  	  Italy’s	  present	  calamities	  confirm	  the	  worst	  fears	  of	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  euro.	  They	  felt	  it	  necessary	   to	   set	   strong	   fiscal	   criteria	   for	  accession	   to	   the	   common	  currency	  and	   to	  perpetuate	   those	   criteria	   in	   the	   form	   of	   fiscal	   rules	   for	  members.	  When	   the	   present	  crisis	   hit,	   the	   first	   reactions	   were	   once	   again	   calls	   for	   better	   rules	   and	   better	  monitoring.	   This	   chapter	   and	   previous	   one	   argued,	   however,	   that	   in	   Italy’s	   case,	   the	  fiscal	   issues	  were	   rooted	   in	  deep-­‐seated	   societal	   conflicts	   about	   redistribution.	  When	  discipline	   worked,	   it	   was	   imposed	   by	   a	   strong	   domestic	   coalition	   of	   interests.	   This	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suggests	  that	  rules	  and	  targets	  would	  also	  only	  work	  if	  a	  societal	  coalition	  of	  interests	  was	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  enforce	  them.	  	  	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  look	  at	  a	  case,	  where	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  and	  the	  fiscal	  rules	  within	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  did	  seem	  to	  make	  an	  important	  difference	  to	  fiscal	  performance.	  In	  Belgium,	  the	  fiscal	  consolidation	  associated	  with	  joining	  the	  euro	  had	  a	  lasting	   effect.	   Debt	   –	   which	   had	   reached	   record-­‐setting	   proportions	   in	   1993	   –	   had	  relentlessly	   decreased	   until	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   global	   economic	   downturn	   in	   2008.	   The	  next	   chapter	   investigates	   the	   nature	   of	   Belgium’s	   fiscal	   problems	   in	   the	   1980s.	   The	  chapter	   after	   it	   explores	   the	   way	   Maastricht	   and	   the	   euro-­‐accession	   shaped	   policy	  making	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  fiscal	  rules	  on	  that	  country’s	  fiscal	  performance.	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Chapter	  5.	  Lopsided	  austerity:	  Belgium’s	  experience	  with	  unstoppable	  debt	  growth	  in	  the	  1980s	  	  	  Between	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   and	   the	   early	   1990s,	   Belgium	   had	   the	   most	   severe	   fiscal	  problems	   in	   the	   entire	   developed	   world.	   Its	   debt	   was	   higher	   and	   surging	   more	  dramatically	  than	  that	  of	  any	  other	  developed	  country.	  The	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  started	  to	  increase	  after	  the	  first	  oil	  shock	  and	  took	  a	  frightening	  new	  boost	  after	  the	  second	  one.	  Between	  1979	  and	  1983,	  the	  ratio	  grew	  by	  ten	  percentage	  points	  each	  year.	  This	  rate	  was	   slightly	   moderated	   afterwards,	   but	   by	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   next	   decade,	   the	   ratio	  reached	  126	  per	  cent	  and	  showed	  no	  sign	  of	  ceasing	  to	  grow,	  apart	  from	  a	  moment	  of	  respite	  around	  the	  boom	  years	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  (see	  Figure	  5.1).	  Successive	  governments	   laboured	   hard	   to	   turn	   the	   tide	   and	   the	   primary	   balance	   improved	   by	  almost	  13	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  over	  the	  decade.	  Yet,	  these	  efforts	  were	  countervailed	  by	  the	   relentless	  growth	  of	   the	   interest	  burden	   (see	  Figure	  5.2).	  Eventually,	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  peaked	  at	  134	  per	  cent	  in	  1993	  and	  started	  to	  decline	  gradually	  thanks	  to	  the	  combined	  effect	  of	  one	  last	  stepping-­‐up	  of	  the	  retrenchment	  effort	  and	  the	  steep	  drop	  of	  interest	  rates	  charged	  on	  Belgian	  debt.	  Yet,	  at	  that	  point,	  Belgium	  was	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  a	   fiscal	   abyss.	  This	   chapter	  provides	  an	  explanation	  why	  Belgium	  was	  unable	   to	   stop	  the	  snowballing	  of	  its	  debt	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  why	  governments	  failed	  to	  turn	  public	   finances	   around	   sufficiently	   to	   stabilize	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   despite	   their	  demonstrated	  readiness	  to	  take	  painful	  fiscal	  adjustment	  measures.	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Figure5.	  1	  -­	  Gross	  consolidated	  debt	  general	  government	  (1974-­1993)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  
	  
	  
Figure5.	  2	  –	  Net	  borrowing,	  cyclically	  adjusted	  net	  borrowing,	  primary	  deficit	  and	  interest	  expenses	  
(1974-­1993)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
	   	   Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  and	  Ameco	  
	  
	  	  	  The	   issue	   of	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	   in	   Belgium	   in	   the	   1980s	   has	   already	   been	  addressed	   by	   Hallerberg	   (2000,	   2004).	   He	   argued	   that	   the	   inability	   of	   successive	  Belgian	   governments	   to	   overcome	   fiscal	   imbalances	   arose	   from	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   suitable	  institutional	   mechanism	   to	   keep	   under	   control	   the	   divergent	   interests	   of	   a	   large	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number	  of	  political	  actors	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  fiscal	  policy	  making.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  in	   the	   highly	   fragmented	   Belgian	   political	   scene	   –	   where	   government	   coalitions	  comprise	  numerous	  parties	  representing	  disparate	  social	  and	  territorial	  constituencies	  –	   fiscal	   rigour	  was	   liable	   to	   fall	   prey	   to	   the	   temptation	   of	   the	   coalition	   partners	   and	  individual	   ministers	   to	   give	   preference	   to	   their	   own	   spending	   priorities	   over	   the	  collective	  objective	  of	  stemming	  debt	  growth.	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  although	  there	  were	  repeated	   attempts	   to	   set	   fiscal	   targets	   to	   keep	   spending	   under	   control,	   parties	   in	  successive	   coalitions	   lacked	   the	  necessary	   incentives	   and	   coalition-­‐building	   flexibility	  to	  adopt	  a	  mechanism	  to	  punish	  individual	  spending	  ministers	  who	  defected	  from	  the	  agreed	   targets.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   entrenched	   position	   of	   Christian	   Democrats	   in	  successive	   governments	   ostensibly	   reduced	   the	   party’s	   electoral	   sensitivity	   to	   fiscal	  outcomes.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	  was	   difficult	   to	   threaten	   to	   break	   up	   a	   coalition	   and	  form	  a	  new	  one	  over	  the	  missing	  of	  fiscal	  targets	  in	  a	  system	  where	  the	  rules	  requiring	  parity	   of	  ministers	   between	   the	   Flemish	   and	  Walloon	   linguistic	   communities	   greatly	  constrained	   the	   options	   to	   reshuffle	   coalitions.	   This	   made	   territorially	   targeted	  spending	  especially	  difficult	  to	  restrain	  (Hallerberg	  2004	  p31).	  	  	  Hallerberg’s	  analysis	  sheds	   light	  on	   important	   tensions	  and	  conflicts	  of	   interests	  over	  fiscal	  policy	  within	  successive	  governments	  in	  the	  period	  under	  investigation.	  His	  basic	  approach,	   however	   is	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   sustained	   and	   significant	   improvement	   of	   the	  primary	  balance	  observed	  from	  1983	  onwards.	  While	  Hallerberg	  sees	  the	  Belgian	  debt	  accumulation	  problem	  as	  one	  rooted	  in	  a	  chronic	  spending	  control	   issue,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  drastic	  improvement	  in	  the	  primary	  balance	  was	  achieved	  mainly	  by	  spending	  cuts	  belies	   this	   assumption.	   Therefore,	   this	   chapter	   revisits	   the	   Belgian	   puzzle.	   Instead	   of	  focusing	  on	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  coalition	  cabinets,	  it	  concentrates	  on	   the	   constraints	   that	   successive	   governments	   faced	   when	   trying	   to	   reshape	   fiscal	  policy.	  It	  analyses	  the	  societal	  pressures	  on	  policy	  makers	  of	  the	  time	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  these	   pressures	   constrained	   available	   policy	   options	   and	   produced	   the	   puzzling	  outcome	  of	  painful	  but	  insufficient	  fiscal	  stabilization.	  It	  makes	  a	  two-­‐step	  argument.	  	  	  The	   first	  part	  of	   the	  argument	   is	   that	  Belgium’s	  persistent	   fiscal	  woes	   throughout	   the	  1980s	  arose	  primarily	  from	  the	  failure	  to	  consolidate	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  that	  had	  been	  destabilized	  by	   the	  surge	   in	  unemployment	  and	  early	  retirement	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  the	   economic	   shocks	   of	   the	   1970s.	   The	   lack	   of	   stabilization	   of	   this	   part	   of	   the	   public	  budget	   stands	   in	   marked	   contrast	   with	   the	   huge	   progress	   achieved	   in	   restraining	  spending	  on	   collective	   consumption	  and	  public	   investment.	  The	  enormous	  gap	   in	   the	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social	  security	  sector	  soaked	  up	  much	  of	  the	  funds	  successfully	  freed	  by	  retrenchment	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  public	  spending,	  and	  set	  back	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  snowballing	  of	  debt.	  The	   evolution	   of	   fiscal	   figures	   throughout	   the	   decade	   –	   i.e.	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  composition	  of	  revenues	  and	  expenditure	  –	  clearly	  demonstrate	  the	  lopsided	  nature	  of	  the	  stabilization	  effort.	  Collective	  consumption	  and	  public	   investment	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	   GDP	   decreased	   dramatically,	   whereas	   revenues	   and	   expenditures	   of	   the	   social	  security	  system	  were	  only	  marginally	  adjusted.	   In	  other	  words,	   spending	  control	  was	  very	   effective	   in	   the	   discretionary	   areas	   of	   the	   budget,	   whereas	   the	   welfare	   system	  continued	  to	  generate	  enormous	  problems	  for	  public	  finances.	  	  The	   second	  part	   of	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   consolidation	  of	   the	  welfare	   system	  was	  prevented	  by	   the	  unresolved	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	  business	  over	   the	  question	  whether	   it	   should	   be	   done	   via	   increasing	   taxes	   and	   contributions	   or	   via	   cutting	  entitlements.	   In	   a	   period	   of	   large	   economic	   upheaval	   characterized	   by	   waves	   of	  bankruptcies,	  business	  was	  squarely	  opposed	  to	  any	  changes	  in	  taxes	  or	  contributions	  that	   further	   endangered	   profit	  margins,	  whereas	   labour	  was	   unwilling	   to	   give	   up	   on	  welfare	  entitlements	  and	  the	  safety	  net	  they	  provided	  in	  the	  face	  of	  dramatically	  rising	  unemployment	   and	   shrinking	   employment	   opportunities.	   Both	   interest	   groups	   had	  significant	  leverage	  over	  policy	  making	  and	  their	  failure	  to	  compromise	  created	  policy	  paralysis	  in	  this	  field,	  which	  entrenched	  the	  deleterious	  fiscal	  effects	  of	  the	  oil	  crises	  for	  the	  longer	  term	  and	  undermined	  efforts	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  of	  public	  finances	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  swiftly	  growing	  interest	  burden.	  	  	  This	   explanation	   relies	   on	   Jones’s	   (2008)	   analysis	   of	   the	   political	   background	   of	   the	  economic	   adjustment	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Belgium	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Jones	   underlines	   how	  important	  the	  simultaneous	  influence	  of	  organized	  labour	  and	  of	  business	  was	  for	  the	  political	   choices	   of	   parties	   and,	   consequently,	   also	   for	   the	   policy	   choices	   made	   by	  different	  government	  coalitions109,	  suggesting	  that	  governments’	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  was	   limited	  to	  measures	  that	  had	  the	  support	  –	  or	  at	   least	   the	  tacit	  acquiescence	  –	  of	  both	  organized	  labour	  and	  business.	  Although	  Jones	  does	  not	  specifically	  analyse	  fiscal	  or	  welfare	   choices,	   scholarly	   accounts	   of	   the	   attempts	   to	   reform	   the	  welfare	   state110	  clearly	   show	   that	   social	   security	  was	  an	  area	  where	  neither	   labour	  nor	  business	  was	  willing	  to	  make	  significant	  compromises.	   In	   light	  of	   this,	   Jones’s	  emphasis	  on	   labour’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  He	  points	   out	   that	   although	   economic	   policies	   took	   a	   pronounced	  neoliberal	   turn	   in	   response	   to	   the	  protracted	  crisis	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  oil	  shocks	  –	  reflecting	  the	  strong	  influence	  of	  business	  on	  policy	  making	  –	  this	  shift	  was	  possible	  only	  because	  the	  largest	  trade	  union	  secretly	  gave	  its	  consent	  (Jones	  2008	  pp187-­‐188).	  	  110	  See	  for	  example	  Kuipers	  (2006),	  Anderson	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  or	  Marier	  (2008)	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and	  capital’s	  policy	  clout	  provides	  an	  important	  clue	  to	  the	  enduring	  policy	  stalemate	  in	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  despite	  the	  destructive	  fiscal	  effects	  of	  policy	  passivity.	  	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   identifying	   two	   important	   societal	  groups	  within	   the	  Belgian	  polity	  with	   diametrically	   opposed	   preferences	   towards	   welfare	   consolidation	   and	   the	  necessary	   political	   influence	   to	   shape	   policy	   choices	   in	   defence	   of	   their	   divergent	  interests	  is	  only	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  explaining	  the	  observed	  policy	  trajectory	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  deadlock	  in	  the	  social	  security	  sector.	  The	  aversion	  of	  powerful	  business	  groups	   to	   further	   concessions	   towards	   financing	   the	   social	   security	   system	   and	   the	  attachment	  of	  a	  strong	  labour	  movement	  to	  existing	  entitlements	  explains	  why	  conflict	  between	  them	  could	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  fiscal	  consolidation	  of	  the	  sector.	  However,	  it	  leaves	  the	  question	  open	  how	  these	  groups	  could	  afford	  to	  maintain	  their	  resistance	  to	  fiscal	  pain	  in	  the	  face	  of	  dangerously	  mounting	  debt.	  This	  question	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	   an	   open	   economy,	   like	   the	   Belgian,	   where	   international	   competitiveness	   is	   a	   key	  priority	  both	  for	  business	  and	  for	  labour.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   shows	   that	   concern	   over	   competitiveness	   was	   initially	   very	   high,	   as	   a	  currency	  crisis	  exposed	   the	   link	  between	   fiscal	  problems	  and	  external	   stability	   in	   the	  early	   1980s.	   The	   ensuing	   threat	   to	   employment	   bent	   those	   sections	   of	   labour	   in	   the	  exposed	   sectors	   towards	   compromise	   and	   thereby	   created	   conflicts	   with	   workers	  unaffected	  by	   international	   competition.	  This	   resulted	   in	   the	   successful	   launch	  of	   the	  sustained	  austerity	  campaign	  that	  led	  to	  the	  dramatic	  decrease	  in	  public	  consumption	  and	   investment	   spending.	  After	   the	  experience	  with	   the	  currency	  crisis,	  however,	   the	  government	  made	   international	   competitiveness	   a	   first	   priority	   under	   joint	   pressure	  from	  labour	  and	  business	  and	  maintained	  monetary	  stability.	  From	  then	  on,	  problems	  of	   public	   finances	   did	   not	   threaten	   with	   spilling	   over	   into	   problems	   for	   the	   private	  sector	   and	  neither	   business	   nor	   labour	   had	   an	   incentive	   to	   reconsider	   its	   strategy	   of	  intransigence	   over	   social	   security,	   because	   neither	   suffered	   direct	   harm	   from	   the	  accumulation	   of	   debt.	   The	   fissures	   that	   had	   opened	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   labour	  disappeared	  and	  both	  interest	  groups	  formed	  united	  fronts	  in	  their	  conflict	  over	  social	  security.	  	  While	   the	  private	   sector	  was	   thus	   spared	  of	   the	   consequences	  of	   fiscal	  problems	  and	  therefore	   had	   no	   incentives	   to	   alter	   its	   behaviour,	   political	   changes	   nevertheless	  ensued	  that	  slowly	  but	  surely	  changed	  the	  context	  of	  the	  fiscal	  stabilization	  by	  the	  end	  of	   the	   1980s.	   The	   drastic	   cuts	   in	   public	   consumption	   and	   investment	   that	   made	   it	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possible	  to	  keep	  the	  private	  sector	  shielded	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  problems	  in	  directly	  redistributive	  areas	  amplified	  political	   tensions	  between	  regional	  political	  actors.	  Due	  to	   the	   radical	   reduction	   of	   public	   funds,	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   linguistic-­‐regional	   cleavage	  within	   society	  gradually	   assumed	  an	  ever-­‐stronger	  economic	  dimension	  as	   linguistic-­‐regional	   groups	  were	   competing	   for	   shrinking	   funds.	  The	  new	  economic	   relevance	  of	  the	   old	   cleavage	   was	   seized	   upon	   by	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   –	   the	  country’s	   largest	   party	   and	   the	   pivot	   of	   every	   government	   in	   the	   period	   –	   to	   drive	   a	  wedge	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  labour	  and	  create	  new,	  regional	  coalitions	  across	  classes.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  it	  had	  successfully	  redefined	  the	  fiscal	  conflict	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  specific	   redistributive	  conflict	  within	  social	   security	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  regions	  rather	  than	  classes.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   presents	   these	   arguments	   in	   four	   parts.	   The	   next	   section	   analyses	   fiscal	  trends	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  Belgium’s	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  rooted	   in	   the	   persistent	   deficits	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system,	   which	   had	   been	  destabilized	   by	   economic	   shocks.	   The	   third	   section	   identifies	   the	   key	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	   that	   determined	   the	   evolution	   of	   fiscal	   policies	   and	   it	   explains	   the	   policy	  passivity	   in	   the	   field	  of	  welfare	   finances	  as	   the	  result	  of	  a	  political	  stalemate	  between	  labour	  and	  business.	  The	  fourth	  section	  uses	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  to	  explain	  both	  groups’	   intransigence	   in	   the	   social	   security	   issue.	   It	   also	   investigates	   the	   strategic	  response	   of	   the	   pivotal	   party	   of	   the	   political	   system	   to	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	   fiscal	  problem,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   redefinition	   of	   the	   issue	   along	   regional,	   rather	   than	   class	  lines.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  even	  though	  the	  1980s	  ended	  with	  no	  visible	  sign	  of	  an	  end	   to	   the	   fiscal	  problem,	  considerable	  headway	  had	  been	  made	  towards	   resolving	   the	   underlying	   political	   problem	   through	   the	   rechanneling	   of	   the	  issue	  into	  a	  new,	  potentially	  more	  manageable	  dimension.	  	  
Fiscal	  policies	  in	  the	  1980s:	  fiscal	  pain	  in	  vain111	  
	  Belgium’s	  serious	  fiscal	  troubles	  began	  with	  the	  oil	  crises.	  The	  country	  had	  previously	  been	  on	  a	  favourable	  fiscal	  path.	  Although	  it	  inherited	  a	  large	  debt	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  war,	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   dwindled	   swiftly	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   decades	   due	   to	   robust	  economic	  growth	  and	  moderate	  deficits	  (Reinhart	  2010	  p23).	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1970s,	   however,	   the	   budget	   was	   thrown	   out	   of	   balance	   by	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  fiscal	  data	  cited	  in	  this	  section	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  database	  of	  the	  National	  Bank	  of	  Belgium	  (www.nbb.be/belgostat).	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economic	   downturn	   triggered	   by	   the	   two	   oil	   crises	   and	   by	   a	   jump	   in	   the	   costs	   of	  outstanding	   debt	   (see	   Figure	   5.3).	   Expenditure	   was	   set	   on	   an	   explosive	   trajectory,	  growing	  by	  a	  half	  from	  45	  to	  64	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  within	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  first	  oil	  shock.	  Social	  expenditure	  grew	  by	  8	  percentage	  points	  of	  the	  GDP	  as	  the	  welfare	  system	  was	   flooded	   with	   unemployed	   and	   early	   retirees	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   economic	  downturn.	   Non-­‐social	   security	   expenditure	   also	   increased	   by	   5	   percentage	   points	   as	  successive	   governments	   tried	   to	   remove	   excess	   workforce	   from	   the	   job	   market	   by	  boosting	  public	  employment.	  The	  increase	  in	  primary	  expenditure	  was	  compounded	  by	  a	  jump	  in	  the	  interest	  burden	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  decade	  –	  from	  4	  to	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  the	   GDP	   –	   due	   partly	   to	   increased	   borrowing	   but,	   more	   importantly,	   also	   to	   a	   two-­‐thirds	  increase	  in	  the	  interest	  rates	  charged	  on	  Belgian	  sovereign	  debt.	  	  	  Initially,	   the	   expenditure	   explosion	   was	   partially	   counterbalanced	   by	   a	   surge	   of	  revenues,	   because	   double-­‐digit	   inflation	   generated	   extra	   tax	   income	   via	   fiscal	   drag	  (Blöndal	  1986	  p117).	  However,	  when	  Belgium	  joined	  the	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  regime	  of	  the	   European	   Monetary	   System	   in	   1979,	   it	   became	   crucial	   to	   rein	   in	   inflation	   to	  maintain	  parity	  with	  low-­‐inflation	  Germany.	  As	   inflation	  was	  brought	  down,	  revenues	  levelled	   and	   the	   full	   scale	   of	   the	   fiscal	   damage	   of	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   shocks	  became	  visible.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s,	  it	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  damage	  would	  last	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  crisis	  years.	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Figure5.	  3	  -­	  Total	  spending,	  primary	  spending	  and	  revenues	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  oil	  crises	  (1970-­
1982)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  	  
	  This	   section	   describes	   the	   Belgian	   policy	   response	   given	   to	   this	   massive	   problem.	  Analysing	   spending	   and	   revenue	   trends	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   reveals	   a	   curiously	  lopsided	   adjustment	   effort.	   This	   effort	   left	   virtually	   unaddressed	   the	   enormous	  imbalances	   in	   the	  social	   security	  sector	  created	  by	   the	   fivefold	   increase	   in	   the	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  and	   it	   shied	  back	   from	  tax	   increases.	  Public	   investment	  and	  collective	  consumption	  expenditures,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  drastically	  cut	  back,	  bringing	  them	  far	   below	   their	   pre-­‐crisis	   levels.	   In	   these	   years,	   Belgium	   moved	   from	   spending	   on	  public	   consumption	   and	   investment	   on	   par	   with	   countries	   of	   similar	   levels	   of	  development	  to	  spending	  the	  least	  on	  public	  consumption	  and	  by	  far	  the	  least	  on	  public	  investment,	   whereas	   social	   security	   spending	   remained	   significantly	   higher	   than	   in	  comparable	   countries	   (IMF	  1998	  p17,	   IMF	  2004	  p6).	  The	   sizable	  deficit	   of	   the	   sector	  continued	  to	  create	  a	  huge	  drain	  on	  public	  resources	  and	  –	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  revenue	  increases	   –	   considerably	   undermined	   efforts	   to	   rebalance	   the	   general	   budget.	  Therefore,	   the	   second	  half	   of	   this	   section	   looks	  more	   in	  detail	   at	   the	  policy	   approach	  taken	  to	  social	  security	  and	  taxation	  throughout	  the	  decade.	  	  	  The	  year	  1982	  marks	  a	  significant	  turning	  point	  in	  Belgian	  fiscal	  history	  and	  the	  start	  of	  a	  period	  of	  drastic	  austerity.	  In	  that	  year,	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  had	  grown	  close	  to	  100	  per	   cent	   and	   borrowing	   was	   above	   10	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP.	   Fiscal	   imbalances	   had	  started	  to	  cause	  problems	  with	  maintaining	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  within	  the	  EMS,	  due	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to	   high	   inflation	   and	   balance	   of	   payments	   issues.	   Belgium	  was	   forced	   to	   devalue	   the	  franc	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  several	  currency	  crises,	  but	  other	  member	  states	  only	  consented	  to	  such	  realignment	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  austerity	  measures	  were	  taken	  (Hemerijck	  and	  Unger	  2000	  p236,	  McNamara	  1998	  p142).	  Although	  a	  year	  earlier	  the	  government	  fell	  over	   its	   inability	   to	   agree	   on	   the	   details	   of	   a	   “Disaster	   Plan”,	   the	   time	   for	   political	  dithering	  seemed	  to	  have	  run	  out	  and	  decisive	  action	  was	  unavoidable	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p321).	   In	   view	  of	   the	   direness	   of	   the	   situation,	   the	   Parliament	   granted	   “special	  powers”	  to	  the	  government	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  radical	  consolidation	  path.	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  austerity	  had	  yielded	  savings	  worth	  13	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP.	  Non-­‐social	  security	  expenses	  were	  cut	  back	  by	  11	  percentage	  points	  to	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP,	   a	   fifth	   lower	   than	   their	  pre-­‐crisis	   level	   in	   the	  early	  1970s.	  Two	  norms	  were	  introduced	   to	   achieve	   considerable	   savings.	   One	  was	   a	   general	   rule	   that	   expenditure	  cannot	  grow	  in	  real	  terms,	  the	  other	  was	  that	  additional	  cuts	  would	  be	  made	  whenever	  this	  was	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   nominal	   value	   of	   the	   deficit	   does	   not	   increase	  (European	  Economy	  1993).	  This	  gradually	  eroded	  the	  share	  of	  collective	  consumption	  and	  public	  investment	  in	  the	  GDP	  and	  in	  total	  spending.	  Investments	  were	  cut	  by	  two-­‐thirds;	  subsidies	  to	  firms	  were	  halved,	  the	  compensation	  of	  employees	  decreased	  by	  a	  fifth	   (Ameco).	   All	   functional	   spending	   categories	   suffered,	   but	   transport	   and	  communication	  and	  defence	  were	  especially	  hard	  hit,	  with	  education	  expenses	  being	  a	  distant	  third	  (Frank	  1993	  p18).	  	  	  Social	   security	   outlays	   also	   decreased	   slightly	   during	   the	   decade,	   but	   only	   by	   2	  percentage	  points,	  which	  was	   a	   rather	   small	   improvement	   in	   light	   of	   their	   preceding	  surge.	   Importantly,	   the	   reduction	   happened	  mostly	   endogenously:	   family	   allowances	  dwindled	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   number	   of	   births,	   while	   unemployment	  transfers	  decreased	  thanks	  to	  the	  relative	  improvement	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  situation	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s	  (Festjens	  1993	  p236).	  Some	  adjustments	  were	  made	  to	  the	   system	   of	   social	   entitlements	   in	   1982,	   but	   these	  made	   relatively	   little	   impact	   on	  overall	  social	  spending	  levels.	  The	  revenue	  side	  was	  not	   involved	  in	  the	  consolidation	  effort.	  On	  the	  contrary:	  after	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  growth,	  revenues	  declined	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	   onwards	   due	   to	   two	   personal	   income	   tax	   reforms	   (European	   Economy	  1993).	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  an	   increase	   in	  social	  contributions	  enacted	   in	  1982	  partially	  offset	  the	  decrease	  in	  direct	  taxes	  (see	  Figure	  5.4,	  Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p322).	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Figure5.	  4	  -­	  Social	  security	  expenditure,	  non-­social	  security	  expenditure	  and	  revenues	  (1980-­1990)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  	  
	  As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   sustained	   campaign	   of	   austerity,	   the	   primary	   balance	   climbed	   to	   a	  surplus	  of	  5	  per	  cent	  in	  1990,	  13	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  decade.	  Nevertheless,	  net	  borrowing	  still	  amounted	  to	  7	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  GDP,	  because	  the	  interest	  burden	  had	  kept	  steadily	  growing	  throughout	  the	  decade,	  to	  12	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  by	  1990.	  The	  country	  still	  seemed	  to	  be	  losing	  the	  race	  against	  the	  debt	  spiral.	  The	  steady	  growth	  of	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  was	  only	  paused	   for	  a	  single	  year,	  on	   the	  peak	  of	  an	  economic	  boom	  in	  1989,	  but	  it	  was	  rising	  to	  new	  heights	  again	  in	  1990.	  The	  efforts	  made	   in	   the	  preceding	  decade	  –	  however	  drastic	  –	  were	  clearly	   insufficient	   to	  stop	  the	  country’s	  drift	  towards	  fiscal	  disaster.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  revenue	  increases	  or	  a	  cut	  in	  transfer	  payments	  out	  of	  the	  public	  purse,	  turning	  the	  fiscal	  situation	  around	  in	  the	  face	  of	  soaring	  interest	  costs	  was	  not	  possible.	  	  Increasing	  taxes	  and	  contributions	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  ailing	  public	  finances	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  an	  unpalatable	  option	  to	  successive	  governments	  of	  the	  period,	  who	  were	  worried	  about	  the	  vulnerable	  competitiveness	  of	  Belgian	  industry	  (Jones	  2008	  pp141-­‐143).	  The	  so-­‐called	   “Maribel	   operation”	   –	   introduced	   in	   1981	   –	   granted	   employers	   of	   manual	  workers	   exemption	   from	   contribution	   to	   social	   security.	   This	   demonstrates	   that	  limiting	   fiscal	   pressure	  was	   given	   priority	   over	   rebalancing	   public	   finances	   (Festjens	  1993,	  p238).	  The	  Grootjans	  tax-­‐reform	  of	  1985	  and	  the	  Maystadt	  tax-­‐reform	  of	  1988	  –	  which	   led	   to	   a	   significant	   decline	   in	   direct	   tax	   revenues	   –	   provide	   other	   important	  
	   147	  
examples	   (European	  Economy,	   1993).	   Indirect	   taxes	  were	   left	   untouched	   throughout	  the	   decade	   to	   avoid	   detrimental	   impacts	   on	   inflation	   and	   competitiveness.	   The	   only	  instance	   when	   revenues	   were	   raised	   was	   the	   decision	   to	   increase	   pension	  contributions	   and	   to	   create	   new	   levies	   as	   part	   of	   the	   emergency	   measures	   enacted	  under	  the	  Special	  Powers	  Act	  of	  1982	  (see	  Figure	  5.5,	  Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p322).	  	  
	  
Figure5.	  5	  -­	  Direct	  and	  indirect	  taxes	  and	  social	  contributions	  (1980-­1990)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  
	  
	  	  With	   respect	   to	   adjusting	   transfer	   payments,	   successive	   governments	   demonstrated	  greater	  readiness.	  The	  1980s	  saw	  four	  attempts	  to	  retrench	  the	  social	  security	  sector.	  However,	   only	   one	   of	   these	   achieved	   visible	   results,	  while	   the	   other	   three	   initiatives	  were	   never	   put	   into	   practice.	   The	   1981	   Disaster	   Plan,	   which	   attempted	   to	   freeze	  pension	   expenses	   and	   tighten	   conditions	   on	   several	   social	   security	   benefits	   failed,	  because	  coalition	  partners	  disagreed	  over	  how	  radical	  the	  retrenchment	  should	  be	  and	  the	  government	  fell	  over	  the	  issue.	  A	  proposal	  to	  reform	  the	  pensions	  of	  civil	  servants	  put	  forward	  in	  1983	  was	  withdrawn	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strikes.	  The	  St.	  Anna	  Plan	  of	  1986	  –	  which	  included	  heavy	  cuts	  in	  the	  unemployment	  insurance	  and	  limited	  future	  pension	  entitlements	  –	  also	  stirred	  up	  fervent	   labour	  demonstrations	  and	  was	  left	  unexecuted	  after	   the	   government	   that	   proposed	   it	   had	   to	   resign.	   It	   was	   only	   under	   the	   Special	  Powers	  Act	   in	   1982,	   that	   cuts	   in	   social	   security	  were	   actually	   enacted,	   although	   they	  proved	  ultimately	  insufficient	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p321-­‐323,	  Marier	  2008	  p88).	  	  	  In	   sum,	   Belgian	   fiscal	   policy	   in	   this	   period	   was	   extremely	   austere	   and	   astonishingly	  reckless	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  While	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment	  was	  painfully	  cut	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back,	  directly	  redistributive	  items	  were	  spared.	  The	  parameters	  of	  social	  security	  were	  only	   slightly	   changed	   despite	   the	   greatly	   increased	   pressure	   on	   the	   existing	   system.	  Taxes	  were	  even	  reduced	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  earlier	  growth	  of	  fiscal	  pressure	  under	  the	  effect	  of	  fiscal	  drag	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  This,	  however,	  was	  a	  dangerous	  luxury.	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  deficit	  of	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  exceeded	  11	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  it	  shrank	  somewhat,	  but	  still	  stood	  above	  7	  per	  cent	  and	  the	  gap	  started	  to	  widen	  again112	  (see	  Figure	  5.6.).	  	  
Figure5.	  6	  -­	  Social	  benefits,	  contributions	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  sector	  (1980-­1990)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  	  
	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  taxes	  or	  contributions	  to	  subsidize	  this	  deficit,	  much	  of	  the	  resources	  gradually	  freed	  by	  the	  enormous	  effort	  exerted	  on	  the	  non-­‐social	  security	  front	  were	  swallowed	  in	  this	  black	  hole	  and	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  fight	  the	  self-­‐fuelling	  growth	  of	   debt.	  Given	   a	  debt-­‐stock	  of	   125	  per	   cent	   of	   the	  GDP	  and	   interest	   expenses	  equivalent	   to	   12	   per	   cent,	   this	   did	   not	   augur	   well	   for	   the	   future.	   The	   next	   section	  investigates	   the	   political	   background	   of	   policy	   making	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   why	  successive	   governments	   failed	   to	   confront	   the	   imbalances	   of	   the	   system	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	   These	   financing	   gap	   figures	   are	   not	   the	   official	   consolidated	   deficit	   figures	   for	   the	   different	   social	  security	   funds,	   because	   the	   central	   government	   covers	   the	   financing	   gap	   of	   the	   social	   security	   sector	  through	   yearly	   subsidies.	   Therefore	   the	   official	   budget	   for	   the	   social	   security	   always	   balances.	   Instead,	  these	   figures	   reflect	   the	   balance	   of	   social	   security	   contributions	   and	   social	   benefits	   paid	   (source:	  www.nbb.be/belgostat)	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redistribution	  –	  and	  raise	  revenues	  or	  forcefully	  push	  through	  cuts	  in	  entitlements	  –	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  constant	  escalation	  of	  indebtedness.	  	  
	  
Labour,	   business,	   Flanders	   and	  Wallonia:	   The	   politics	   of	   welfare-­consolidation	  
Belgian-­style	  
	  It	   goes	   without	   saying	   that	   consolidating	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   is	   a	   challenging	  political	  task,	  since	  it	  involves	  asking	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  society	  to	  give	  up	  income:	  to	  lose	  transfers	  or	  pay	  more	  in	  taxes	  and	  contributions.	  In	  the	  Belgian	  case,	  the	  order	  of	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem	  itself	  was	  also	  daunting	  as	  the	  deficit	  of	  the	  sector	  amounted	  to	  more	   than	  a	   tenth	  of	   the	  national	   income	   in	   the	  early	  1980s.	  Social	   security	  was	  a	  particularly	  sensitive	  issue	  in	  Belgium	  due	  to	  its	  historical	  role	  in	  achieving	  cooperation	  between	   labour	   and	   business	   throughout	   the	   post-­‐war	   period.	   The	   expansion	   of	   the	  welfare	   safety	   net	   had	   been	   important	   in	   compensating	   workers	   for	   wage	   restraint	  exercised	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   international	   competitiveness,	   especially	   under	   the	   tight	  labour	  market	  conditions	  of	  the	  1960s	  (Jones	  1998,	  p48).	  Revoking	  these	  entitlements	  exactly	  when	  unemployment	  skyrocketed	  was	  a	  major	  menace	   to	   industrial	  peace.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   businesses	  were	   struggling	   to	   survive	   in	   a	  wave	   of	   bankruptcies	   and	  were	  likely	  to	  resist	  both	  higher	  payroll	  taxes	  that	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  labour	  and	  taxes	  on	   capital	   income.	   The	   conflicts	   about	   consolidating	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   were,	  therefore,	   formidable.	   However,	   in	   1982	   –	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   unemployment	   and	   in	   the	  midst	  of	  the	  wave	  of	  bankruptcies	  –	  both	  cuts	  and	  revenue	  increasing	  measures	  were	  successfully	   enacted	   under	   the	   Special	   Powers	   Act.	   When	   sacrifices	   hurt	   most,	   they	  were	   made.	   Later	   in	   the	   decade,	   when	   growth	   and	   profitability	   picked	   up	   and	  unemployment	   somewhat	   subsided	   –	   and	   the	   opposing	   sides	   could	   have	   better	  afforded	   to	   thrash	  out	   a	   compromise	   –	   the	   stalemate	  became	  entrenched	  despite	   the	  escalation	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problem.	  	  This	  section	  explains	  this	  apparent	  contradiction.	  It	  shows	  that	  even	  though	  the	  conflict	  over	   social	   security	   pitted	   business	   and	   labour	   against	   each	   other	   throughout	   the	  decade,	   neither	   of	   the	   two	   camps	   was	   a	   monolithic	   interest	   group	   due	   to	   internal	  variations	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  different	  subgroups	  to	  the	  economic	  side	  effects	  of	  debt.	  Evolving	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	   groups	  within	   and	   across	  the	   two	   camps	   is	   crucial	   for	   understanding	   both	   the	   early	   compromise	   and	   the	   later	  stalemate.	   Divisions	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   labour	   are	   of	   special	   relevance.	   Economic	  divergence	  between	   the	  North	  and	   the	  South	  of	   the	   country	   induced	  a	  modulation	  of	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interests	   among	   workers	   in	   the	   two	   regions.	   For	   workers	   in	   the	   economically	   more	  dynamic	  and	  open	  Flanders,	  safeguarding	  international	  competitiveness	  was	  a	  priority	  they	   shared	   with	   business,	   and	   therefore	   they	   were	   amenable	   to	   compromise	   when	  competitiveness	  was	  at	  stake.	  For	  labour	  in	  the	  depressed	  Wallonia,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  compromising	   the	  social	  safety	  net	  entailed	  no	  gains,	  only	   losses,	  as	   it	  would	  do	   little	  against	  the	  structural	  unemployment	  problems	  in	  their	  region	  but	  would	  endanger	  the	  livelihood	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  unemployed.	  This	  situation	  accorded	  pivotal	  importance	  to	  Flemish	  workers	  in	  the	  conflict	  over	  social	  security.	  Whenever	  they	  sided	  with	  business	  in	   defence	   of	   international	   competitiveness	   –	   as	  was	   the	   case	   in	   1982	   –	   compromise	  was	   possible.	   When	   the	   risks	   to	   the	   economic	   viability	   of	   industry	   in	   their	   region	  subsided,	   they	   rediscovered	   worker	   solidarity	   and	   joined	   in	   the	   defence	   of	   welfare	  benefits.	  	  	  In	  order	   to	  understand	  how	  different	   labour	  and	  business	   interests	  permeated	  policy	  making	   and	   shaped	   the	   politics	   of	   social	   security	   consolidation	   in	   the	   1980s,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  analyse	  the	  political	  scene	  in	  some	  detail.	  Clusters	  of	  labour	  and	  business	  interests	  were	  represented	  by	  an	  intricate	  web	  of	  interest	  representing	  organizations,	  which	   allowed	   the	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   different	  clusters	   play	   out	   in	   a	   complicated	   pattern	   within	   the	   political	   scene.	   The	   societal	  cleavage	   between	   capital	   and	   labour	   had	   historically	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	  structuring	  Belgian	  political	   life,	   creating	  a	   significant	   left-­‐right	  opposition	  within	   the	  party	  system	  as	  well	  as	  nurturing	  a	  strong	  trade	  union	  movement	  and	  a	  corresponding	  employers’	   organization.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   labour-­‐capital	   opposition	   was	  modulated	   by	   religious-­‐laical	   conflicts	   and	   linguistic	   divisions	   between	   Flemish-­‐speakers	  and	  Francophones,	  which	   fragmented	  both	   the	  party-­‐political	   scene	  and	   the	  system	  of	  social	  partnership.	  	  	  The	  party	  system	  came	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  three	  pairs	  of	  parties:	  Christian-­‐Democratic,	  Socialist	  and	  Liberal,	  with	  a	  separate	  Flemish	  and	  Francophone	  party	  in	  each	  family113.	  Parties	  of	  different	   linguistic	  affiliation	  competed	   in	   largely	   isolated	  electoral	   spheres	  since	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1980	  designated	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  as	  exclusive	  electoral	   territories	   for	   Flemish	   and	   Francophone	   parties,	   respectively,	   leaving	   the	  Brussels-­‐capital	  region	  as	  the	  only	  shared	  electoral	  turf.	  This	  caused	  the	  “sister	  parties”	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  linguistic	  divide	  to	  drift	  slightly	  apart	  as	  they	  adjusted	  to	  electoral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Since	  all	  of	  the	  parties	  described	  here	  changed	  their	  names	  several	  times	  in	  the	  past	  decades,	  I	  refer	  to	  them	  by	   their	   linguistic	   and	   ideological	   affiliation	   rather	   than	   the	  different	  names	   they	   took	   at	   different	  times.	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pressures	   in	   their	   own	   competitive	   arenas.	   Despite	   their	   linguistic,	   electoral	   and	  organizational	   separation,	   the	   “sister	   parties”	   entered	   the	   government	   together	  because	   of	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   the	   linguistic	   parity	   among	   minsters	   of	   the	   national	  government	  that	  the	  constitution	  prescribes	  (Fitzmaurice	  1996).	  Electoral	  competition	  between	  the	  three	  pairs	  of	  parties	  was	  relatively	  balanced	  in	  the	  1980s.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  1980s,	   the	   Christian	  Democrats	  maintained	   their	   primacy.	   This	  was	   primarily	   due	   to	  the	   overwhelming	   electoral	   strength	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democrats.	   The	  Francophone	   counterpart	  was	  a	   relatively	  minor	  party	   (Claeys	  1996).	   Socialists	  were	  not	   far	   behind	   –	   in	   fact	   they	   pulled	   ahead	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   in	   the	   1987	  elections	   –	   mostly	   due	   to	   their	   solid	   performance	   in	  Wallonia,	   but	   also	   due	   to	   their	  reasonable	   showing	   in	   Flanders.	   Liberals	   were	   firmly	   in	   third	   place	   throughout	   the	  decade,	  with	  no	  clear	  linguistic	  domination	  between	  the	  two	  parties,	  as	  the	  Flemish	  and	  Francophone	   parties	   attracted	   votes	   in	   approximately	   the	   same	   order	   of	   magnitude	  (Delwit	  1996,	  Deschouwer	  2009).	  	  The	  trade	  union	  movement	  was	  also	  divided	  along	  ideological	  lines,	  but	  all	  three	  unions	  –Christian,	   Socialist	   and	   Liberal	   –	   retained	   their	   national	   unity,	   despite	   different	  linguistic	   proportions	   within	   their	   memberships.	   Unionization	   was	   traditionally	   and	  persistently	  high,	  due	  to	  the	  role	  of	  unions	  in	  administering	  social	  benefits	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007).	  The	  Christian	  Democratic	  union	  was	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  three,	  the	  Socialist	  a	  close	   second,	   while	   the	   Liberal	   unions	   were	   rather	   insignificant	   (Marier	   2008).	   The	  membership	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  union	  was	  biased	  towards	  the	  Flemish,	  while	  that	   of	   the	   Socialist	   trade	   union	   is	   balanced	   between	   the	   two	   linguistic	   communities	  (Claeys	   1996,	   Marier	   2008).	   On	   the	   employers’	   side,	   a	   single	   national	   organization	  participated	  in	  the	  system	  of	  social	  partnership,	  representing	  enterprises	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  linguistic	  divide.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  organization	  has	  been	  in	  competition	  with	  an	   alternative	   Flemish	   organization	   for	   the	   support	   of	   Flemish	   business.	   The	   social	  partners	  wielded	  policy-­‐making	  power	   in	   their	   institutionalized	   roles,	   for	   example	   in	  the	   National	   Labour	   Council	   or	   in	   the	   Central	   Economic	   Council.	   More	   importantly,	  however,	   they	   achieved	   policy	   clout	   through	   cultivating	   strong	   ties	  with	   the	   political	  parties,	  achieving	  synergies	  from	  the	  mobilization	  capacity	  and	  the	  electoral	  power	  of	  their	  membership.	  	  Despite	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   political	   scene	   into	   a	   large	   number	   of	   influential	  actors,	   the	   social	   security	   issue	   was	   still	   quite	   clearly	   dominated	   by	   the	   three	  ideological	  poles	  –	  Liberal,	   Socialist,	  Christian	  Democratic	  –	   in	   the	  1980s.	  The	  Liberal	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camp	  stood	  for	  business	  interests.	  It	  demanded	  a	  significant	  shrinking	  of	  the	  system	  of	  entitlements	   and	   lower	   taxes	   and	   contributions.	   This	   strategy	   ensured	   a	   steady	  electoral	   support	   for	  both	   the	  Flemish	  and	   the	  Francophone	  party	  amongst	   relatively	  younger,	   better	   educated	   white-­‐collar	   employees,	   managers	   and	   self-­‐employed	   –	   in	  general	   the	  middle-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐middle	  classes	  –	   from	  the	  economically	  most	  dynamic	  areas	  of	  each	  region	  and	  the	  Brussels	  area	  (Fitzmaurice	  1996).	  	  	  The	  Socialist	  camp	  uncompromisingly	  fought	  for	  keeping	  up	  the	  social	  security	  system.	  Socialist	   parties	   and	   the	   Socialist	   trade	   union	   traditionally	   relied	   on	   a	   largely	  homogenous	   labour	   base,	   somewhat	   biased	   towards	   older	   workers	   in	   declining	  industries.	   The	  Parti	   Socialiste	  was	   the	   strongest	   party	   in	   the	   Francophone	   electoral	  sphere	   throughout	   the	   1980s,	   relying	   on	   a	   strong	   electoral	   base	   in	   the	   large	   heavy	  industrial	   towns	   (especially	   in	   Hainaut	   and	   Liége).	   These	   areas	   suffered	   from	   an	  enormous	   structural	   unemployment	   problem	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   and	   half	   of	   the	  jobless	   were	   long-­‐term	   unemployed	   (Fitzmaurice	   1996).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  Wallonia	  had	   a	   large	   share	   of	   pensioners	   with	   above-­‐average	   pensions	   due	   to	   higher-­‐than-­‐average	  wages	  among	   industrial	  workers	   in	   the	  past	   and	  due	   to	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  civil	  servants	  (Marier	  2008).	  Consequently,	  few	  issues	  could	  be	  more	  important	  for	  the	  Walloon	   Socialist	   constituency	   than	   unemployment	   benefits	   and	   the	   generosity	   of	  pensions	  (Delwit	  1996).	  The	  Flemish	  Socialists	  were	  similarly	  relying	  on	  a	  worker	  base	  in	   the	   industrial	   areas	   of	   Antwerp	   and	   Ghent	   (Delwit	   1996).	   Both	   parties	   cultivated	  strong	  ties	  with	  the	  Socialist	  trade	  union,	  the	  membership	  of	  which	  largely	  overlapped	  with	   their	   voter	   base.	   The	   Socialist	   union	   has	   been	   a	  militant	   defender	   of	   the	  acquis	  
sociaux	   and	   frequently	  mobilized	   its	  membership	   against	   attempts	   to	   retrench	   social	  security	  entitlements.	  	  	  The	   Christian	   Democratic	   camp	  was	   torn	   over	   the	   social	   security	   issue.	   The	   Flemish	  Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   represented	   very	   different	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	  within	  Flanders:	  a	  large	  section	  of	  labour,	  business	  interests	  and	  the	  self-­‐employed.	  Naturally,	  these	   groups	   (usually	   referred	   to	   as	   standen)	   exerted	   influence	   on	   the	   party’s	   policy	  choices	   via	   electoral	   channels.	  More	   importantly,	   however,	   the	   interest	   organizations	  representing	   the	   standen	  –	   the	  Christian	  workers	  movement,	   the	  union	  of	   the	  middle	  classes	  and	  the	  agricultural	  association	  –	  also	  had	  their	  own	  representatives	  within	  the	  party,	  because	  they	  had	  the	  right	  to	  select	  candidates	  on	  the	  party’s	  electoral	  lists	  (De	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Winter	  1996,	  Claeys	  1996)114.	  Consequently,	  the	  party	  had	  to	  reconcile	  within	  its	  own	  ranks	  profound	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  as	  regards	  the	  consolidation	  of	  social	  security.	  	  	  To	  complicate	  things	  further,	  the	  Christian	  trade	  union	  was	  itself	  ambivalent	  between	  the	   defence	   of	   social	   entitlements	   and	   cooperation	   with	   employers	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  better	   employment	  opportunities.	   Its	   Flemish	  majority	   could	  potentially	   benefit	   from	  the	  latter,	  whereas	  its	  Walloon	  minority	  would	  only	  gain	  from	  the	  former.	  Similarly,	  the	  business	  constituencies	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  were	  also	  hesitant	  in	  their	  policy	   preferences,	   because	   they	  were	   reluctant	   to	   push	   for	   harsh	   retrenchment	   that	  might	  trigger	   large-­‐scale	   labour	  unrest	  at	  a	   time	  when	  businesses	  were	  barely	  coping	  (Jones	  2008,	  p170).	  	  Its	   internal	   contradictions	   and	   conflicts	   notwithstanding,	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	  camp	  was	  bound	  to	  play	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  the	  social	  security	  issue.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   occupied	   a	   pivotal	   governmental	   position	   due	   to	   their	  electoral	   strength	   –	   in	   particular,	   the	   electoral	   strength	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats,	  the	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  country	  by	  far	  –	  and	  because	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  other	  two	  camps	  were	  so	  strongly	  opposed	  that	  they	  could	  not	  have	  formed	  a	  coalition	  with	   each	   other	   in	   these	   years.	   In	   effect,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democrats	   were	   to	  decide	   over	   government	   strategy	   towards	   social	   security	   consolidation	   by	   choosing	  between	  potential	  coalition	  partners	  to	  their	  left	  or	  right.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Christian	  trade	  union	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  level	  of	   labour	   militancy	   and	   thereby	   the	   viability	   of	   specific	   policy	   choices.	   Christian	  workers	   constituted	   more	   than	   half	   of	   organized	   labour	   and,	   therefore,	   the	  participation	   of	   Christian	   unions	   was	   crucial	   to	   make	   strikes	   effective.	   For	   all	   its	  militancy,	   the	  Socialist	  union	  was	  unlikely	   to	  be	  able	   to	  place	  meaningful	  pressure	  on	  the	   government	   on	   its	   own.	   In	   this	   political	   situation,	   the	   social	   security	   issue	   was	  practically	   subject	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   Flemish	   workers	   and	   businesses:	   successful	  consolidation	   hinged	   upon	   a	   compromise	   between	   these	   two	   groups.	   Whenever	  Flemish	   workers	   in	   the	   Christian	   union	   were	   ready	   to	   make	   concessions	   on	   their	  welfare	  entitlements	  and	  Flemish	  employers	  consented	  to	  some	  increases	  in	  the	  fiscal	  pressure,	  they	  made	  deals	  that	  affected	  workers	  and	  businesses	  in	  the	  entire	  country.	  However,	  when	  they	  had	  more	  to	  gain	  from	  resisting	  policy	  measures	  that	  would	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Up	  to	  the	  1990s,	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  candidates	  were	  nominated	  by	  the	  standen.	  The	  remaining	  10	  per	  cent	  was	  usually	   filled	  by	   the	  narrow	   leadership	  of	   the	  party	   and	   former/present	  ministers	   (De	  Winter,	  1996,	  Claeys,	  1996).	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restored	   the	   balance	   of	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   at	   their	   cost,	   consolidation	   was	  blocked	  and	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  forge	  a	  coalition	  of	  interests	  that	  could	  overcome	  the	  resistance	  of	   either	  of	   these	   two	  groups,	   especially	   since	  both	   could	   always	   count	  on	  the	  support	  of	  groups	  even	  less	  amenable	  to	  compromise	  than	  themselves.	  	  This	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  political	  and	  policy	  developments	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Different	  government	   coalitions,	   different	   levels	   of	   labour	  militancy	   and	   differential	   success	   of	  governments	   in	   consolidating	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   can	   be	   explained	   via	   the	  incentives	  of	  Flemish	  labour	  and	  business	  within	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  camp	  under	  changing	  economic	  conditions.	  The	  successful	  adjustments	  to	  social	  security	  under	  the	  Special	  Powers	  Act	  of	  1982	  were	  achieved	   in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  economic	  emergency,	  when	   unemployment	   soared	   due	   to	   a	  wave	   of	   bankruptcies	   and	   fiscal	   troubles	  were	  threatening	  the	  Belgian	  currency’s	  stability	  and	  its	  place	  within	  the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  (Sneessens	  and	  Dreze	  1986	  pS97,	  McNamara	  1998	  p142,	  Hemerijck	  and	  Unger	  2000	   p236).	   The	   Christian	   worker	   movement	   could	   not	   take	   the	   responsibility	   for	  undermining	   the	   recovery	   in	   the	   otherwise	   strong	   and	   dynamic	   Flanders.	   It	   secretly	  consented	  to	  opening	  to	  the	  Liberals	  and	  to	  some	  welfare	  sacrifices115,	  laid	  down	  in	  an	  economic	  recovery	  plan	  developed	  by	  the	  workers’	  movement	  (Jones	  2008	  p170-­‐171).	  Under	   these	   conditions,	   the	   business	   constituencies	   of	   the	   Christian	  Democrats	  were	  more	   confidently	   pushing	   the	   party	   to	   break	   up	   its	   decade-­‐old	   coalition	   with	   the	  Socialists,	  which	  the	  party	  did	  after	  it	  failed	  to	  achieve	  consensus	  on	  a	  “Disaster	  Plan”	  in	  1981	  because	  of	  Socialist	  resistance	  to	  pension	  cuts.	  In	  1982,	  a	  new	  coalition	  with	  the	  Liberals	  was	  formed	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p321).	  This	  new	  coalition	  passed	  the	  Special	  Powers	   Act,	   cut	   pensions,	   increased	   social	   contributions	   and	   launched	   a	   general	  austerity	   programme	   that	   decreased	   non-­‐social	   security	   expenditure	   dramatically	  throughout	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  decade.	  Socialist	  unions	  organized	   large-­‐scale	  protests,	  but	  Christian	  unions	  kept	  themselves	  to	  the	  secret	  promise	  made	  by	  their	  leaders	  and	  did	  not	   join	   the	   strikes	   (Anderson	   et	   al	   2007	   p322).	   The	   austerity	   measures	   were	   thus	  successfully	  executed.	  	  However,	  this	  breakthrough	  was	  not	  repeated	  again,	  as	  Christian	  unions	  had	  much	  less	  incentives	  to	  consent	  to	  further	  sacrifices	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  members	  after	  the	  threat	  to	  international	  competitiveness	  had	  been	  successfully	  averted,	  growth	  gradually	  picked	  up	  and	  unemployment	   started	   to	  decline	   in	  Flanders	   (Jones	  1998	  p52).	  The	   renewed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  This	  secret	  consent	  given	  by	  trade	  union	  leaders	  only	  became	  known	  to	  the	  wider	  public	  in	  1991	  (Jones	  2008,	  p188).	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Christian	  Democratic	  and	  Liberal	  coalition	  tried	  to	  push	  for	  further	  consolidation	  when	  it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   measures	   of	   the	   Special	   Powers	   Act	   were	   insufficient	   to	  significantly	  improve	  the	  balance	  of	  social	  security.	  They	  adopted	  the	  so-­‐called	  St.	  Anna	  Plan	   in	  1986,	  which	   included	  heavy	   cuts	   in	   the	  unemployment	   insurance,	   limited	   the	  accumulation	   of	   benefits	   and	   decreased	   the	   level	   of	   future	   pensions.	   However,	   the	  Christian	   unions	  would	   have	   none	   of	   these	   sacrifices	   and	   this	   time	   they	   did	   join	   the	  Socialist	  unions	  in	  the	  mobilisation	  for	  strikes.	  The	  government	  had	  to	  resign	  not	  long	  afterwards	  due	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  Christian	  workers	  movement	  on	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	   to	  break	  with	   the	  Liberals	   (Marier	  2008	  p88).	  The	  St.	  Anna	  Plan	  remained	  unexecuted	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p325).	  After	  the	  new	  elections	  in	  1987,	   the	   Socialists	   joined	   the	   Christian	  Democrats	   in	   government	   again.	   Cuts	   to	   the	  social	   security	   system	   were	   off	   the	   agenda	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   decade.	   In	   fact,	   the	  Socialists	   even	   achieved	   some	   corrections	   in	   entitlements	   that	   had	   not	   been	   indexed	  under	   the	   previous	   governments.	   Business	   managed	   to	   use	   its	   influence	   on	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  fiscal	  pressure	  did	  not	  increase,	  but	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  generate	  the	  political	  will	  to	  take	  on	  social	  entitlements.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   in	   Belgium	  was	  driven	   by	   a	   curious	   dynamic	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Class	   conflict	   dominated	   the	   issue,	   but	  economic	  divergence	  between	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  weakened	  the	  cohesion	  of	  the	  coalitions	  of	   interests	  within	  classes.	  Although	  the	  shocks	  of	  the	  1970s	  hit	  both	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  hard,	  the	  1980s	  made	  it	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  Flanders	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  rebound	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  export	  industries	  whereas	  Wallonia	  faced	  lasting	  problems	   and	   became	   increasingly	   dependent	   on	   public	   funds,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short	  term.	   Under	   such	   circumstances,	   international	   competitiveness	   created	   a	   pole	   of	  common	  interest	  between	  business	  and	  labour	  in	  Flanders	  and	  a	  source	  of	  conflict	  with	  Wallonia.	  However,	  this	  new	  dimension	  of	  conflicts	  and	  commonalities	  of	  interests	  only	  played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   consolidation	   in	   the	   emergency	   years	   at	   the	   very	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Then	  Flemish	  business	  and	  labour	  managed	  to	  seal	  a	  deal	  about	  a	  drastic	  austerity	  programme	  that	  even	  managed	  to	  cut	  some	  entitlements	  and	  raise	  the	  revenues	  of	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  despite	  the	  protests	  of	  groups	  not	  involved	  in	  this	   deal.	   For	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   1980s,	   however,	   the	   front	   lines	   followed	   class	   divisions	  again	  and	  further	  adjustments	  to	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  remained	  elusive.	  Along	  the	  class	   dimension,	   the	   social	   security	   issue	   was	   intractable,	   because	   both	   labour	   and	  business	  had	  the	  political	  power	  to	  defend	  its	  redistributive	  position	  and	  both	  refused	  to	  pay	  more	  into	  or	  take	  less	  out	  of	  the	  welfare	  system.	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  Neither	   labour,	   nor	   business	   showed	   a	   willingness	   to	   make	   further	   sacrifices,	   even	  though	   the	   debt	   situation	   turned	   progressively	  more	  menacing.	   By	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   it	  became	   clear	   that	   the	   initial	   compromises	  made	   under	   the	   Special	   Powers	   Act	  were	  insufficient	  to	  meaningfully	  stabilize	  the	  sector,	  since	  unemployment	  persisted	  at	  very	  high	   levels	   in	  Wallonia	   and	   stayed	   higher	   than	   its	   pre-­‐crisis	   levels	   in	   Flanders.	   Since	  interest	  costs	  were	  still	  rapidly	  increasing,	  the	  persistent	  deficits	  of	  the	  social	  security	  sector	  looked	  ever-­‐less	  affordable,	  even	  when	  heavy	  cuts	  were	  made	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  spending	   to	   stop	   the	   snowballing	   of	   debt.	   However,	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   that	  showed	   such	   concern	   when	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   currency	   was	   at	   risk	   from	   the	   fiscal	  problems	  now	  seemed	  much	  less	  bothered	  by	  the	  alarming	  debt	   issue	  in	  and	  of	   itself.	  The	   next	   section	   argues	   that	   the	   competitiveness-­‐alliance	   between	   Flemish	   business	  and	   labour	   lost	   its	   raison	   d'être	   once	   policies	   were	   put	   into	   place	   to	   cushion	  international	   competitiveness	   from	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   fiscal	   troubles.	   As	   both	  groups	   lost	   interest	   in	   further	   compromises,	   a	   radically	   new	   political	   solution	   was	  needed	  if	  the	  structural	  imbalances	  in	  Belgian	  public	  finances	  were	  to	  be	  sorted	  out.	  
	  
Fiscal	   trouble	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   political	   change:	   The	   emergence	   of	   the	   Flemish-­
Walloon	  redistributive	  conflict	  	  By	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s,	  fiscal	  prospects	  looked	  worse	  than	  ever.	  The	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	   had	   grown	   above	   120	   per	   cent	   and	   showed	   no	   sign	   of	   levelling	   off.	  Eliminating	  the	  social	  security	  deficit	  would	  have	  been	  crucial,	  but	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  St.	  Anna	   Plan	   and	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democratic-­‐Liberal	   coalition	   signalled	   a	  breakdown	   in	   cooperation	   between	   powerful	   labour	   and	   business	   groups	   over	   this	  issue.	  Surprisingly,	  despite	  the	  daunting	  situation,	  the	  focus	  of	  politics	  seemed	  to	  have	  shifted	   from	   fiscal	   issues	   to	  other	  matters.	  Parties	  were	  bickering	  about	   further	   state	  reform:	  government	   formation	  took	  a	  record	  five	  months	   in	  1988116	  as	  coalition	  talks	  were	   dragging	   on	   about	   interregional	   and	   intercommunity	   matters117	   (Covell	   1993).	  Welfare	  consolidation	  seemed	  to	  receive	  low	  priority.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  The	  1988	  record	  has	  since	  been	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  present	  stalemate	  –	  over	  another	  round	  of	  state	  reforms	  –	  that	  has	  kept	  Belgium	  governmentless	  for	  fourteen	  months.	  117	   Since	   the	   1980	   state	   reform,	   Belgium	   has	   a	   curious,	   two-­‐layer	   federalized	   structure	   that	   divides	   the	  country	   into	   3	   linguistic	   communities	   (Flemish,	   francophone	   and	   German)	   and	   3	   regions,	   Flanders,	  Wallonia	  and	  Brussels.	  Communities	  are	  administrative	  units	  with	  authority	  over	  so-­‐called	  ‘personalizable’	  matters	   such	   as	   education,	   health	   etc.	   	   Regions	   are	   administrative	   units	   with	   authority	   over	   territorial	  matters	  such	  as	   local	  economic	  policy,	   infrastructure	  etc.	  To	  make	  things	  more	  complicated,	   the	  Flemish	  Community	   and	   Flanders	   (the	   region)	   have	   been	   merged.	   Since	   for	   the	   arguments	   made	   here,	   these	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  However,	  the	  seemingly	  unrelated	  new	  state	  reform	  was	  in	  fact	  strongly	  connected	  to	  the	  fiscal	  stalemate	  that	  beset	  the	  country.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  reflected	  the	  scramble	  of	  regional	  political	  actors	  for	  dwindling	  funds	  for	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment	  in	  the	  midst	  of	   “permanent	  austerity”	   118.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	   represented	   the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats’	  quest	  for	  an	  alternative	  solution	  to	  the	  social	  security	  deficit	  once	  interclass	   cooperation	   in	   Flanders	   broke	   down:	   one	   that	   would	   shift	   the	   costs	   of	  stabilization	   fully	   out	   of	   Flanders,	   into	   Wallonia.	   Using	   the	   insights	   of	   the	   war	   of	  attrition	  model,	  this	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  redefinition	  of	  the	  social	  security	  problem	  as	  one	  of	  interregional	  rather	  than	  interclass	  redistribution	  was	  likely	  the	  only	  avenue	  through	  which	  the	  country’s	  fiscal	  problem	  could	  be	  tackled.	  	  The	   logic	   of	   the	   political	   and	   policy	   events	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   can	   best	   be	   understood	  through	  analysing	  the	  pressures	  weighing	  on	  and	  the	  options	  available	  to	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  at	  the	  time.	  As	  explained	  above,	  the	  party	  housed	  within	  its	  ranks	  the	  forces	  that	  had	  defining	  importance	  for	  Belgian	  politics	  and	  policy-­‐making	  in	  the	  1980s	  –	  Flemish	  business	  and	  labour	  –	  and	  used	  its	  permanent	  dominance	  within	  the	  government	   to	  put	   into	  practice	   the	  policy	  choices	  arising	   from	  the	   interaction	  of	  these	   forces.	   Therefore,	   the	   party’s	   incentives	   and	   constraints	   accurately	   reflect	   the	  evolution	   of	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   two	   pivotal	   societal	   groups	   as	   well	   as	   the	  consequences	  of	  this	  conflict	  for	  national	  policy	  making.	  	  	  After	  being	  pressured	  by	  its	  labour	  flank	  to	  break	  with	  the	  Liberals	  –	  and	  thereby	  with	  a	   programme	   of	   welfare	   retrenchment	   –	   the	   party	   was	   in	   an	   immensely	   difficult	  situation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  was	  fairly	  clear	  that	  eliciting	  voluntary	  sacrifices	  from	  its	  two	   constituencies	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   further	   fiscal	   stabilization	  was	   not	   possible	   in	   the	  foreseeable	   future.	   Extorting	   concessions	   from	   either	   side	   by	   force	   was	   out	   of	   the	  question.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  party	  could	  not	  be	  oblivious	  of	  the	  mounting	  debt,	  not	  only	  because	  it	  was	  the	  dominant	  partner	  in	  every	  government	  and	  would	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  debt	  crises	   in	   the	   future,	  but	  also	  because	  a	   fiscal	  crisis	  was	   likely	   to	  have	  grave	  consequences	  for	  its	  own	  supporters.	  Unable	  to	  convince	  and	  unwilling	  to	  force	  its	  own	  powerful	  constituencies	  to	  pay	  for	  consolidation,	  the	  party	  had	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  target	  groups	  outside	  of	  its	  own	  electoral	  sphere,	  i.e.	  in	  Wallonia.	  This	  required	  the	  separation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  administrative	   specifications	   make	   little	   difference,	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   regions	   and	   communities	  interchangeably.	  118	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  Pierson	  (2001)	  to	  describe	  the	  pressures	  on	  public	  consumption	  arising	  from	  imbalances	  in	  social	  security.	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of	  fiscal	  matters	  between	  the	  two	  regions.	  Therefore,	  a	  state	  reform	  was	  the	  only	  way	  forward.	  	  At	  first	  sight,	  it	  might	  seem	  puzzling	  why	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	  gave	  up	  on	  attempting	   to	   resolve	   the	   fiscal	   issue	  by	   trying	   to	  bridge	   the	  class	  divide	  within	   their	  own	  constituencies.	  After	  all,	  this	  strategy	  had	  worked	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  so	  they	  could	  have	   tried	   to	  elicit	  new	  compromises	   from	  each	  side.	  Why	  did	   they	  choose	   instead	  to	  enter	   a	   cumbersome,	   potentially	   lengthy	   and	   open-­‐ended	   conflict	   over	   regional	  financing	  and	  the	  regionalization	  of	  social	  security?	  The	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  provides	  a	   clue	   why	   the	   latter	   option	   was	  more	   promising.	   The	  model	   proposes	   that	   societal	  groups	  will	  only	  acquiesce	  readily	  in	  sacrifices	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fiscal	  stabilization	  if	  they	  suffer	  considerable	  harm	  from	  the	  side	  effects	  of	   fiscal	   imbalances.	  Unless	   they	  suffer	  private	   pain	   from	   the	   public	   debt	   problem,	   influential	   groups	   will	   put	   up	   fierce	  resistance	   to	   tax	   increases	   and/or	   cuts	   in	   transfers	   that	   negatively	   affect	   them.	  Therefore,	  if	  policies	  are	  put	  into	  place	  to	  minimize	  side	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  problems,	  the	  different	  groups	  will	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  resisting	  sacrifices	  despite	  the	  ballooning	  of	  debt	  and	   wait	   for	   other	   groups	   to	   make	   the	   necessary	   concessions	   to	   prevent	   national	  bankruptcy.	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  first	  priority	  of	  both	  Flemish	  business	  and	  labour	  –	  and,	  thus,	  of	  Christian	  Democrat-­‐led	  governments	  –	  was	  to	  put	  into	  place	  exactly	  such	  policies.	   Once	   this	   was	   done,	   both	   interest	   groups	   were	   able	   to	   adopt	   intransigent	  stances	  on	   taxes	   and	  entitlements.	  Unless	   the	   government	   got	   rid	  of	   the	  policies	   that	  cushioned	   these	   groups	   –	   which	   was	   inconceivable	   while	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	  retained	   their	  pre-­‐eminence	  –	   it	  would	  have	  been	  exceedingly	  difficult	   to	   sell	   further	  sacrifices	  to	  either	  group.	  	  The	  insulation	  of	  the	  two	  interest	  groups	  had	  been	  achieved	  by	  the	  Special	  Powers	  Act	  of	  1982	  and	  by	  the	  consistent	  austerity	  efforts	   in	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment	  that	  followed	  in	  its	  wake.	  In	  the	  years	  before	  the	  Act,	  fiscal	  problems	  and	  relatively	  high	  inflation	   had	   undermined	   the	   exchange	   rate	   stability	   of	   the	   franc.	   By	   1982,	   the	  currency’s	   position	   within	   the	   EMS	   was	   untenable	   after	   several	   currency	   crises	  (McNamara	   1998	   p	   142,	   Hemerijck	   and	   Unger	   2000	   p236).	   The	   government	   faced	   a	  choice	  between	  falling	  out	  of	  the	  system	  and	  a	  one-­‐off	  large	  devaluation	  combined	  with	  disinflation	   to	   stabilize	   the	   currency’s	   position	   within	   the	   system.	   The	   latter	   choice	  entailed	  a	   likely	  worsening	  of	  the	  fiscal	  situation,	  because	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  higher	  real	  interest	   rates	   paid	   on	   the	   outstanding	   debt	   stock.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   stability	   of	   the	  currency	  was	   so	   crucial	   to	   industry	   –	   especially	   to	   dynamic	   Flemish	   industry,	  which,	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unlike	  its	  Walloon	  counterpart,	  was	  structurally	  fit	  for	  international	  competition	  –	  that	  the	  government	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  choose	  devaluation,	  monetary	  tightening	  and	  higher	  interest	   rates	   on	   debt	   (Pochet	   2004).	   From	   that	   point	   on,	   inflation	   was	   kept	   tightly	  under	  control	  and	  exchange	  rate	  stability	  was	  safeguarded.	  Flemish	  industry	  regained	  its	  competitiveness,	  allowing	  businesses	   to	  recover	   their	  margins	  and	  employment	   to	  rebound,	  freeing	  labour	  and	  capital	  from	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problem.	  	  	  It	   is	   notable	   that	   even	   though	   the	   constituencies	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	  had	  a	  high	   stake	   in	   the	  Special	  Powers	  Act	   and	  were	   therefore	  willing	   to	  make	   some	  sacrifices,	   the	   actual	   fiscal	   pain	   that	   the	   policy	   package	   had	   in	   store	   for	   them	   were	  relatively	  minor	  compared	  to	  the	  adjustments	  affecting	  other	  societal	  interests.	  It	  was	  public	   investment,	   the	   compensation	   of	   public	   employees	   and	   subsidies	   that	   were	  drastically	   cut,	   whereas	   adjustment	   to	   pensions	   and	   payroll	   taxes	   were	   relatively	  minor.	   In	   later	   years,	   when	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   fiscal	   measures	   of	   the	   Special	  Powers	  Act	  were	  insufficient	  to	  stop	  the	  snowballing	  of	  debt,	  successive	  governments	  kept	  tightening	  the	  screw	  on	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment.	  This	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  keep	  debt	  growth	  more	  or	  less	  under	  control	  without	  having	  to	  resort	  to	  monetary	  financing	   that	   would	   undermine	   exchange	   rate	   stability.	   Economic	   policy	   was	   quite	  clearly	   tailored	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   constituencies	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats.	  This	  was	  exactly	  what	  made	   it	  possible	   for	   them	   to	   intransigently	  defend	  their	   redistributive	   interests.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   much	   pain	   from	   fiscal	   imbalances,	  neither	   group	   was	   pressed	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   social	   security	  sector	  and	  to	  agree	   to	  entitlement	  cuts	  or	   tax	   increases.	  Both	  could	  afford	   to	  wait	   for	  other	  groups	  to	  make	  sacrifices.	  	  The	  insulation	  of	  the	  two	  pivotal	  societal	  groups	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  created	  an	  irresolvable	  stalemate.	  Not	  only	  were	  both	  resolute	  in	  resisting	  concessions	  to	   the	   other	   side,	   but	   also	  both	  had	   reasons	   to	   avoid	   a	   dramatic	   showdown	  over	   the	  social	  security	  issue.	  Business	  constituencies	  were	  wary	  of	  protracted	  industrial	  unrest	  over	  welfare	  cuts	  and	  labour	  had	  a	  lot	  to	  lose	  if	  rising	  costs	  of	  financing	  social	  security	  induced	  businesses	  to	  relocate	  abroad.	  Both	  constituencies	  thus	  continued	  to	  support	  the	   party,	   which	   kept	   its	   vote	   share	   approximately	   stable	   throughout	   the	   decade	  (Deschouwer	  2009	  p128).	  These	  factors	  locked	  the	  Christian	  Democrats’	  policy	  choices	  into	  place:	  monetary	  and	  exchange	  rate	  discipline	  continued	  to	  enjoy	  absolute	  priority,	  the	   question	   of	   the	   social	   security	   deficit	   was	   put	   on	   ice,	   austerity	   in	   public	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consumption	  and	  investment	  intensified	  in	  line	  with	  the	  increasing	  interest	  burden	  and	  –	  most	  importantly	  –	  the	  debt	  continued	  to	  grow	  incessantly.	  	  Although	  this	  situation	  seemed	  to	  create	  no	  immediate	  political	  threat	  for	  the	  Christian	  Democrats’	  electoral	  standing,	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  be	  complacent.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	   fiscal	   situation	  was	  very	  serious,	  which	   the	  dominant	  party	  of	  present	  and	   future	  governments	  and	  the	  representative	  of	  influential	  societal	  groups	  could	  not	  ignore.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  unrelenting	  rigour	  in	  collective	  consumption	  and	  public	  investment	  was	  likely	  to	  sooner	  or	  later	  take	  its	  toll.	  Even	  though	  austerity	  in	  these	  fields	  did	  not	  directly	  affect	  the	  private	  welfare	  of	  the	  party’s	  constituencies,	  the	  persistent	  squeezing	  of	  public	  services	  and	  especially	  of	  public	  infrastructure	  was	  threatening	  to	  undermine	  the	  party’s	  electoral	  position	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  The	  only	  way	  out	  of	  this	  tight	  corner	  was	  to	   find	   a	   solution	   that	   would	   not	   require	   sacrifices	   from	   the	   two	   pivotal	   Flemish	  interest	   groups,	   that	   is,	   to	   engineer	   a	   way	   to	   make	   Walloon	   groups	   pay	   for	   fiscal	  consolidation.	  	  	  Tension	  between	   the	   two	   linguistic	   communities	   had	  been	   an	   increasingly	   important	  factor	  in	  Belgian	  political	  life	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  This	  is	  best	  reflected	  in	  the	  state	  reforms	  of	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  which	  introduced	  official	  divisions	  into	  the	  administrative	  and	   political	   structures	   of	   the	   country	   (Deschouwer	   2009	   pp48-­‐53).	   However,	   the	  divisions	   had	   not	   gained	   economic-­‐redistributive	   relevance	   before	   the	   1980s,	   when	  fiscal	   difficulties	   highlighted	   the	   unequal	   fiscal	   capacities	   of	   dynamic	   Flanders	   and	  stagnating	   Wallonia	   (Beland	   and	   Lecours	   2008	   p153).	   The	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	   started	   to	  put	  ever	  more	  emphasis	  on	   the	   redistribution	  between	   the	   two	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia.	  They	  launched	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   campaign	   for	   devolution,	   which	   concentrated	   on	   the	   social	  security	  sector	  and	  on	  the	  different	  tax	  capacities	  of	  the	  two	  regions.	  	  Attempts	  to	  redefine	  the	  social	  security	  problem	  as	  one	  of	  interregional	  redistribution	  started	  with	  the	  commissioning	  of	  a	   large	  number	  of	  studies	   in	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	  1980s	   by	   Flemish	   organizations.	   These	   were	   conducted	   by	   Flemish	   academics	   and	  clearly	   showed	   that	   that	   Flanders	   was	   paying	   the	   bills	   of	   high	   unemployment	   and	  disproportionately	  high	  health	  costs	  in	  Wallonia119	  (Kuipers	  2006,	  Marier	  2008,	  Beland	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	   The	   first	   Flemish	   study	   on	   interregional	   financial	   transfers	   appeared	   in	   1984	   and	   focused	   on	   the	  discrepancy	   between	   the	   social	   insurance	   revenues	   and	   expenditures	   ratio	   between	   Wallonia	   and	  Flanders.	   In	   1989–90,	   the	   Centrum	   voor	   Sociaal	   Beleid	  published	   a	   study	   that	  put	   the	   difference	   in	   per	  capita	   social	   insurance	   expenditures	   between	   Flanders	   and	  Wallonia	   close	   to	   30	   per	   cent	   (Beland	   and	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and	  Lecours	  2008).	  This	  implied	  that	  it	  is	  unfair	  to	  ask	  Flemish	  workers	  and	  businesses	  to	  contribute	  more	   to	   the	  system	  or	   take	   less	  out	  of	   it,	  when	   the	  root	  of	   the	  problem	  was	  Wallonia.	  This	  idea	  gained	  ethnic	  overtones	  as	  structural	  unemployment	  plaguing	  Wallonia	   and	   the	   inability	   to	   control	   health	   care	   costs	   started	   to	   be	   traced	   back	   to	  factors	  like	  “bad	  life	  habits”	  or	  a	  “culture	  of	  dependency”	  (Beland	  and	  Lecours	  2005).	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  redefinition	  of	  the	  problem	  did	  not	  immediately	  bring	  a	  solution	  closer.	  Although	   it	  was	  a	   tool	   to	  undermine	  class-­‐solidarity	  across	  regions,	   it	  had	   few	  immediate	   implications.	   The	   social	   security	   system	   was	   national	   and	   it	   was	  administered	  by	  the	  social	  partners,	  who	  had	  retained	  their	  national	  unity	  (Vilrokx	  and	  van	  Lemput	  1998).	  Therefore,	  making	  changes	  that	  would	  only	  affect	  workers	  and/or	  businesses	   on	   the	  Walloon	   side	   was	   inconceivable	   without	   far-­‐reaching	   institutional	  and	   structural	   reform	   that	   separates	   Flemish	   and	  Walloon	   social	   security	   funds	   and	  insurance.	  However,	   such	   reforms	  would	  need	   the	   cooperation	  of	   the	   social	   partners	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  require	  the	  blessing	  of	  the	  Walloon	  partners	  in	  the	  government.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  it	  was	  inconceivable	  that	  any	  Walloon	  party	  would	  voluntarily	  agree	   to	   reforms	   that	   allow	   for	   making	   the	   social	   security	   deficit	   a	   purely	   Walloon	  problem.	  Therefore,	  the	  splitting	  of	  the	  social	  security	  was	  to	  be	  a	  longer-­‐term	  project,	  for	  which	  the	  right	  political	  preconditions	  had	  to	  be	  created.	  	  The	  more	  immediate	  objective	  was	  to	  redistribute	  the	  costs	  of	  fiscal	  austerity	  between	  the	   two	   regions.	   This	   was	   accomplished	   via	   the	   state	   reform	   embodied	   in	   the	   1988	  Special	  Law	  and	  the	  1989	  Finance	  Act.	  The	  reform	  devolved	  many	  important	  functions	  and	  the	  funds	  to	  finance	  them	  from	  the	  federal	  level	  to	  the	  regions	  and	  communities120.	  The	   functions	   that	   were	   now	   placed	   under	   the	   exclusive	   authority	   of	   sub-­‐national	  entities	   included,	   most	   importantly,	   economic	   affairs	   (including	   transport	   and	  communication	   infrastructure)	   and	   education,	   items	   that	   were	   hardest	   hit	   by	   the	  expenditure	  cuts	  since	  1982.	  Funds	  for	  education	  were	  allocated	  to	  the	  communities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  number	  of	  students	  and	  were,	  therefore,	  independent	  on	  tax	  generating	  capacity.	   Funds	   for	   economic	   affairs	   were,	   however,	   distributed	   among	   regions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Lecours	  2008).	  Other	   studies	  were	   less	  dramatic	   but	   still	   quite	   striking:	   the	  Club	  van	  Leuven	   report	   for	  example	  claims	  that	  Walloons	  on	  average	  have	  more	  disposable	  income	  after	  taxes	  and	  benefits	  than	  the	  Flemish	  despite	  lower	  wages	  and	  much	  higher	  unemployment	  in	  Wallonia.	  (Kuipers	  2006).	  Such	  findings	  gave	   ample	   material	   for	   inciting	   nationalist	   indignation	   towards	   the	   issue	   social	   security	   in	   Flanders.	  Building	  on	  such	  publications,	  a	  Flemish	  newspaper	  carried	  the	  headline	  that	  each	  Flemish	  family	  is	  buying	  a	  new	  car	  for	  each	  Walloon	  family	  per	  year	  (Marier	  2008).	  	  120	  Forty	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  value	  added	  tax	  and	  personal	  income	  tax	  was	  assigned	  to	  communities	  and	  regions	  to	  finance	  education	  and	  economic	  affairs	  respectively.	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according	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  personal	  income	  tax	  paid	  in	  the	  given	  region121.	  In	  addition,	  regions	   were	   given	   the	   right	   to	   levy	   and	   collect	   certain	   minor	   taxes	   (OECD	   2007,	  Hooghe	  1991).	  	  	  This	  new	  system	  had	   two	   important	  consequences.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   it	  exempted	  the	  devolved	  spending	  items	  from	  further	  cuts	  made	  in	  order	  to	  cross-­‐subsidize	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  social	  security	  sector,	  since	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  transfer	  the	  pre-­‐defined	   funds	   to	   the	  sub-­‐national	  entities.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	  meant	   that	   funds	  available	  for	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment	  in	  Flanders	  would	  be	  able	  to	  recover	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  funds	  channelled	  to	  Wallonia,	  because	  personal	  income	  tax	  revenues	  per	  capita	  are	  higher	  in	  Flanders	  and,	  therefore,	  Flanders	  was	  to	  receive	  higher	  funding	  than	  it	  did	  before	  the	  decentralization,	  while	  Wallonia	  was	  to	  receive	  less.	  	  	  These	  changes	  had	  two	  important	  advantages	  for	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  reform	  secured	  more	  funds	  to	  spend	  in	  Flanders.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  it	  also	  promised	  to	  give	  the	  Flemish	  side	  more	  leverage	  in	  future	  negotiations	  about	   social	   security.	   Once	   the	   new	   system	   was	   fully	   phased	   in,	   Wallonia	   would	   be	  starved	   of	   funds	   even	   more	   than	   it	   was	   after	   almost	   a	   decade	   of	   austerity	   in	   1989,	  possibly	  making	  it	  more	  amenable	  to	  discussion	  about	  splitting	  up	  the	  social	  security.	  In	   this	   sense,	   this	   agreement	   was	   a	   very	   important	   breakthrough	   in	   the	   Flemish	  Christian	   Democratic	   project	   to	   resolve	   the	   social	   security	   stalemate	   and	   the	  imbalances	  of	  the	  public	  finances	  in	  general	  by	  forcing	  Wallonia	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  	  In	   light	   of	   this	   big	   step	   forward	   in	   redefining	   the	   fiscal	   issue	   as	   a	   conflict	   between	  Wallonia	   and	   Flanders,	   the	  Walloon	   side	   of	   the	   political	   struggles	   also	   gains	   special	  relevance.	   Understanding	  what	   the	   Flemish	   attempts	   to	   shift	   the	   fiscal	   problem	   into	  Walloon	  political	   territory	  would	  mean	   for	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	  Belgium	  as	  a	  whole	  requires	  clarifying	  what	  kind	  of	  options	  this	  strategic	  turn	  on	  the	  Flemish	  side	  left	  open	  for	   Walloon	   political	   actors.	   Two	   questions	   need	   to	   be	   answered.	   One	   is	   why	   the	  Walloon	  counterpart	  to	  the	  negotiations	  agreed	  to	  the	  state	  reforms	  of	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Constitutional	  changes	   like	  this	  require	  the	  support	  of	  at	   least	  half	  of	   the	  members	  of	  parliament	  from	  each	  linguistic	  community	  (Anderson	  et	  al.	  2007).	  The	  Walloons	  could,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	   The	   starting	   amount	   of	   the	   total	   funds	   was	   based	   on	   the	   spending	   on	   these	   functions	   when	   the	  agreement	  was	  reached.	  With	  time,	  the	  amounts	  would	  be	  indexed	  –	  first	  to	  the	  consumer	  price	  index	  and	  after	  a	  transition	  period	  to	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP.	  The	  repartitioning	  keys	  for	  these	  funds	  were	  fixed	  and	  would	   only	   change	   subject	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   number	   of	   students	   in	   the	   communities	   and	   the	   regions’	  contribution	  to	  total	  tax	  revenue.	  This	  repartition	  of	  funds	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  subnational	  levels	  was	  to	  be	  phased	  in	  over	  ten	  years.	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therefore,	   have	   vetoed	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democrats’	   plans.	   The	   other	   important	  question	   is	  what	   this	  regional	  separation	  of	   funds	  really	  meant	   for	   the	  distribution	  of	  fiscal	  sacrifices	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  pressures	  would	  arise	  for	  Walloon	  policy	  makers	  from	  the	  regional	  separation	  of	  the	  social	  security	  sector.	  After	  all,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  the	  reforms	   of	   1988	   and	   1989	   amounted	   to	   little	   more	   than	   book	   keeping	   adjustments.	  Given	   the	  soft	  budget	  constraints	  of	  sovereigns,	   limiting	   the	   funds	   to	  one	  region	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  tightening	  of	  policies	  there.	  Wallonia	  could	  borrow	   and	   secure	   funding	   for	   its	   spending	   from	   external	   resources.	   Therefore,	   the	  consolidated	  debt	  of	  the	  general	  government	  could	  continue	  to	  grow	  and	  threaten	  the	  fiscal	  stability	  of	   the	  country,	  even	   if	   the	  problems	  showed	  up	   in	  the	   ‘books’	  of	  a	  sub-­‐national,	  rather	  than	  the	  federal	  entity.	  	  	  The	   two	   questions	   are	   interconnected.	   The	   Parti	   Socialiste	   –	   the	   Walloon	   partner	  participating	   in	   the	  coalition	  talks	  of	  1987-­‐88	   in	   the	  course	  of	  which	  the	  state	  reform	  was	  agreed	  upon	  –	  could	  afford	  to	  agree	  to	   the	  separation	  of	   funds	  exactly	  because	   it	  remained	  unclear	  how	  the	  reforms	  would	  be	  put	  into	  practice,	  how	  Wallonia	  could	  be	  prevented	  from	  spending	  beyond	  its	  means	  and	  how	  much	  flexibility	  there	  would	  be	  in	  the	  future	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  deal.	  After	  all,	  nothing	  was	  irreversible	  in	  the	  agreement.	   Taxes	   were	   still	   levied	   and	   collected	   by	   the	   federal	   level,	   so	   the	  renegotiation	  of	   the	  key	   for	  allocating	   funds	  would	  remain	   technically	  possible	   in	   the	  future.	   Therefore,	   the	   sacrifice	   entailed	   in	   the	   agreement	   with	   such	   changes	   was	  uncertain.	  	  	  Moreover,	   the	   Walloon	   Socialists	   got	   two	   very	   important	   concessions	   in	   return	   for	  agreeing	  to	   the	  devolution.	  The	   first	  was	  the	  revalorization	  of	  all	   transfers	  and	  public	  servant	   pay-­‐scales	   (Covell	   1993,	   Callatay	   2002).	   The	   postponement	   of	   indexation	   of	  social	   security	   benefits	   and	   public	   sector	   salaries	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   eroded	   the	  incomes	  of	   large	  parts	  of	  the	  Socialist	  constituencies.	  Restoring	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  these	  incomes	  to	  their	  earlier	  levels	  was	  a	  very	  important	  achievement	  for	  the	  party.	  The	   second	   concession	   concerned	   the	   securing	   of	   stable	   funding	   for	   education,	  independently	  of	  Wallonia’s	  tax	  generating	  capacity.	  The	  drastic	  fall	   in	  the	  availability	  of	   funds	   for	   education	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   had	   been	   a	   major	   preoccupation	   of	  Walloon	   Socialists	   (Fitzmaurice	   1996).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	   made	   quite	   significant	   pecuniary	   concessions	   to	   their	   Walloon	   Socialist	  counterpart	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  putting	  into	  place	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  the	  constitutional	  separation	  of	  fiscal	  and	  social	  security	  matters.	  They	  were	  even	  willing	  to	  compromise	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on	   the	   efforts	   to	   rein	   in	   public	   debt,	   by	   consenting	   to	   higher	   transfers	   and	   public	  salaries.	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   what	   the	   institutional	   changes	   would	   mean	   for	   Belgian	   public	  finances	   in	   the	   longer	   term	   hinged	   on	   the	   enforcement	   of	   fiscal	   constraints	   on	   the	  Walloon	  side.	   If	   the	  decreased	  funding	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  binding	  constraint,	   it	  would	  assign	   a	   large	   share	   of	   the	   sacrifices	   needed	   for	   fiscal	   stabilization	   to	   Wallonia	   and	  might	  even	  create	  more	  readiness	  for	  welfare	  retrenchment	  on	  the	  Walloon	  side.	  In	  this	  case,	   the	   quest	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   to	   offload	   the	   costs	   of	  stabilization	  on	  the	  Walloon	  population	  might	  even	  be	  fiscally	  beneficial	  for	  Belgium	  as	  a	  whole,	  because	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  consolidation	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  persistent	  cross-­‐class	  conflicts	  had	  blocked	  other	  solutions.	  	  The	   state	   reform	   did	   create	   a	   mechanism	   to	   make	   the	   fiscal	   constraints	   binding.	   It	  instituted	  an	  oversight	  committee,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Public	  Sector	  Borrowing	  Requirement	  Section	   within	   the	   High	   Council	   of	   Finance	   to	   keep	   the	   deficit	   of	   each	   region,	  community	  and	  the	  federal	  level	  under	  control.	  Since	  this	  body	  had	  the	  right	  to	  initiate	  suspending	  any	  entities’	  right	   to	  borrow	  for	  two	  years,	   the	  constraints	  created	  by	  the	  new	  partitioning	   of	   funds	   could	   in	   principle	   be	   enforced	   on	   the	  Walloons	   (IMF	  1998	  and	   2003).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   committee	   comprised	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	  federal,	  regional	  and	  community	  governments	  as	  well	  as	  the	  central	  bank.	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  essentially	  a	  political	  question	  –	  subject	  to	  the	  negotiations	  of	  these	  political	  actors	  –	  whether	  and	  how	  this	  right	  would	  be	  exercised	  to	  restrain	  spending	  and	  borrowing	  in	  each	  region.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	  to	  redefine	  the	  fiscal	  problem	  as	  a	   conflict	   between	   Flanders	   and	   Wallonia	   rather	   than	   one	   between	   classes	   yielded	  some	  very	  important	  results	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  political	  deadlock	  that	   had	   prevented	   progress	   in	   dealing	  with	   the	   snowballing	   of	   debt	   for	  most	   of	   the	  1980s,	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   institutional	   framework	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   tackle	   the	  problem	  from	  a	  new	  dimension	  was	  a	  promising	  development.	  In	  the	  new	  framework,	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  problem	  depended	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	  Flemish	  political	  forces	  –	  first	   and	   foremost	   the	   dominant	   Christian	   Democrats	   –	   to	   use	   their	   electoral	  preponderance	   and	   their	   position	   in	   the	   new	   oversight	   committee	   to	   force	   the	  Francophone	  community	  and	  the	  Walloon	  region	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  constraints	  defined	  by	  their	   decreased	   funding.	   The	   struggle	   over	   how	   to	   resolve	   Belgium’s	   daunting	   debt	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problem	   was	   now	   ready	   to	   start	   again,	   with	   fundamentally	   rearranged	   coalitions	   of	  societal	  interests	  on	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  front.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Throughout	  the	  1980s,	  Belgium	  was	  fighting	  a	  losing	  battle	  against	  debt	  accumulation.	  Despite	   astonishing	   expenditure	   cuts	   and	   increasing	   primary	   surpluses,	   the	  government	  could	  not	  stop	  borrowing,	  because	  savings	  were	  always	  a	  step	  behind	  the	  growth	   of	   the	   interest	   burden	   on	   outstanding	   debt.	   This	   chapter	   showed	   that	   the	  government’s	  efforts	  were	  hamstrung	  by	  its	  inability	  to	  consolidate	  the	  social	  security	  system,	  which	   had	   been	   destabilized	   by	   the	   oil	   shocks	   of	   the	   1970s.	   Since	   organized	  labour	  and	  business	   took	   intransigent	  positions	  on	  benefit	  cuts	  and	  payroll	   taxes,	   the	  government	   was	   unable	   to	   tackle	   the	   deficit	   of	   the	   system,	   even	   though	   it	   was	   an	  enormous	   drain	   on	   public	   finances.	   The	   prolonged	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	  business	  over	   the	  social	   security	   issue	  contrasted	  sharply	  with	   the	  unified	  support	  of	  Flemish	   labour	   and	   business	   for	   austerity	   in	   public	   consumption.	   In	   view	   of	   the	  impossibility	   of	   resolving	   the	   stalemate	   between	   labour	   and	   business	   over	   the	   issue,	  the	  Flemish	  political	  elite	  attempted	  to	  open	  up	  a	  new	  front	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue.	  At	  the	  end	   of	   the	   decade,	   it	   made	   a	   great	   step	   forward	   in	   creating	   the	   institutional	  preconditions	   for	   separating	   the	   funds	   between	   the	   two	   halves	   of	   the	   country	   and	  redefining	  the	  fiscal	  issue	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia.	  	  	  The	  enduring	  conflict	  between	  influential	  labour	  and	  business	  groups	  in	  Flanders	  over	  social	   security	   explains	   not	   only	   the	   inability	   of	   successive	   governments	   to	   halt	   debt	  accumulation	   throughout	   the	  1980s,	  but	   also	   the	   lopsided	  pattern	  of	   adjustment	   that	  was	   put	   into	   place:	   the	   contrast	   between	   strict	   austerity	   in	   public	   consumption	   and	  investment	  and	  the	  widening	  gap	  in	  the	  social	  security	  budget.	  Observers	  often	  pointed	  out	   this	   asymmetrical	   pattern	   (IMF	   1998,	   European	   Economy	   1993,	   Reynders1993),	  but	   hitherto	   no	   explanation	   had	   been	   offered.	   The	   irresolvability	   of	   the	   profound	  societal	   conflict	   over	   social	   security	   also	   helps	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   progressive	  intensification	  of	  the	  economic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  regional	  cleavage,	  which	  first	  became	  the	  main	  axis	  of	  the	  conflict	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  system	  around	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  	  The	  next	   chapter	  presents	   the	   fiscal	   trajectory	  of	   the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  and	  evaluates	  the	   effect	   of	   the	   euro-­‐accession	   and	   the	  Maastricht	   criteria	   on	   policies	   in	   Belgium.	   It	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shows	  that	  the	  sustained	  austerity	  efforts	  of	  the	  1980s	  finally	  bore	  fruit	   in	  the	  1990s,	  when	   interest	  rates	  charged	  on	  Belgian	  government	  debt	   fell	  precipitously.	  Thanks	  to	  the	   sizeable	   primary	   surplus	   that	   sustained	   cuts	   in	   collective	   consumption	   and	  investments	  had	  generated,	  Belgium	  could	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  easing	  of	  pressure	  from	  interest	  costs	  and	  rapidly	  decreased	  its	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio.	  However,	   the	  chapter	  also	  underlines	   that	   this	   improvement	  was	  not	   connected	   to	  a	  policy	   change	   induced	  either	  by	  the	  euro	  accession	  or	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria.	  The	  strengths	  and	   weaknesses	   of	   Belgian	   fiscal	   policy	   remained	   essentially	   the	   same:	   remarkable	  determination	  at	  controlling	  and	  restraining	  discretionary	  spending	  still	  stood	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   adjustment	   in	   the	   fundamentally	   unbalanced	   social	   security	  sector.	   The	   chapter	   contends,	   that	   Maastricht’s	   effect	   on	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   policy	  making	  in	  Belgium	  was	  in	  fact	  negative.	  The	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  fiscal	  criteria	   in	  time	  for	  accession	  delayed	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  social	  security	  question,	  because	  it	  set	  back	   Flemish	   efforts	   to	   reallocate	   the	   responsibility	   for	   fiscal	   austerity	   to	   Wallonia.	  Therefore,	  the	  issue	  that	  had	  such	  dire	  consequences	  for	  Belgian	  public	  finances	  in	  the	  1980s	  lives	  on,	  albeit	  it	  has	  so	  far	  been	  much	  more	  affordable	  under	  the	  more	  clement	  market	  conditions.	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Chapter	  6.	  The	  undeserving	  poster	  child?	  Fiscal	  relief	  and	  persistent	  problems	  in	  Belgium	  after	  Maastricht	  	  	  	  If	  the	  1980s	  were	  a	  fiscal	  nightmare	  for	  Belgium,	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  2000s	  represented	  the	  awakening	  from	  the	  bad	  dream.	  The	  country’s	  debt	  –	  which	  had	  relentlessly	  grown	  from	  the	  mid-­‐seventies	  to	  the	  early	  nineties	  despite	  ever-­‐stricter	  austerity	  –	  started	  to	  decrease	   steadily	   and	   rapidly.	  The	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	   ratio	  peaked	  at	  134	  per	   cent	   in	  1993	  and	   then	  descended	   to	  84	  per	   cent	  by	  2007,	  before	   the	  banking	   crisis	   and	   the	  global	  economic	   downturn	   paused	   this	   favourable	   trend	   (see	   Figure	   6.1).	   The	   interest-­‐debt	  spiral	   that	  successive	  governments	  were	  unable	   to	  stop	   in	   the	  eighties	  reversed	   itself	  when	   interest	   rates	   on	   outstanding	   debt	   dropped.	   Two	   thirds	   of	   the	   interest	   burden	  evaporated	  from	  the	  early	  nineties	  to	  the	  late	  2000s.	  Net	  borrowing	  steeply	  decreased,	  reached	  zero	  by	  2000	  and	  stayed	  firmly	  there	  until	  the	  crisis	  hit,	  except	  in	  2005	  when	  the	  state	  bailed	  out	  the	  national	  railway	  company	  (see	  Figure	  6.2).	  Belgium	  seemed	  to	  have	   put	   its	   fiscal	   troubles	   definitively	   behind	   itself.	   It	   fulfilled	   the	  Maastricht	   deficit	  criterion	   comfortably	   in	   time	   for	   accession	  with	   the	   first	   group	  of	   countries	   and	   –	   in	  contrast	   to	  many	  other	  euro-­‐members	  –	  consistently	  kept	  up	   its	   fiscal	  discipline	  even	  after	   it	   joined	   the	   Economic	   and	   Monetary	   Union.	   From	   the	   fiscally	   most	   troubled	  country	  of	   the	  entire	  developed	  world,	   it	  graduated	   to	  being	   the	  poster	  child	  of	   fiscal	  discipline	   in	   the	  eurozone.	  This	  chapter	  analyses	   the	  policy	   trajectory	  underlying	   this	  remarkable	  improvement	  and	  investigates	  whether,	  how	  and	  why	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  changed	  in	  this	  period.	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Figure6.	  1	  -­	  Gross	  consolidated	  debt	  general	  government	  (1990-­2008)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  
	  
	  
Figure6.	  2	  –	  Net	  borrowing,	  cyclically	  adjusted	  net	  borrowing,	  primary	  deficit	  and	  interest	  expenses	  
(1990-­2008)	  
per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  
Source:	  Belgian	  Statistics	  Office	  
	  
	  	  Scholarly	  accounts	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  Belgium	  in	  the	  1990s	  depict	  the	  period	  as	  one	  of	  important	  breakthroughs.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  euro-­‐accession	  and	  the	  need	  to	  comply	  with	   the	  Maastricht	   deficit	   criterion	   helped	   to	   resolve	   long-­‐standing	   problems.	   They	  underline	  that	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  joining	  the	  common	  currency	  with	  the	  first	  group	  of	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countries	   forced	  different	  actors	   involved	  in	  policy	  making	  to	  set	  aside	  their	  conflicts,	  which	   had	   interfered	   with	   efficient	   policy	   making	   in	   the	   past.	   In	   explaining	   the	  improvement	   in	   fiscal	   results,	  Hallerberg	  (2004)	  contends	   that	   the	  urge	   to	  satisfy	   the	  Maastricht	  deficit	  criterion	  in	  time	  made	  possible	  the	  adoption	  and	  effective	  operation	  of	   a	   range	   of	   budgetary	   institutions	   that	   helped	   the	   representatives	   of	   different	  electoral	  constituencies	  to	  reach	  and	  enforce	  agreements	  about	  spending122.	  He	  argues	  that	  since	   the	  electoral	   relevance	  of	   fiscal	  balance	  became	  enormous	   in	   the	  run-­‐up	   to	  the	   euro,	   policy	   makers	   both	   at	   the	   federal	   and	   at	   the	   regional	   level	   had	   a	   strong	  incentive	   to	   make	   and	   enforce	   binding	   commitments.	   Therefore,	   they	   put	   into	   place	  mechanisms	   –	   most	   importantly	   by	   strengthening	   the	   consultative	   and	   oversight	  functions	   of	   the	   High	   Council	   of	   Finance	   –	   that	   allowed	   for	   setting	   and	   monitoring	  targets	   for	  different	   federal	  and	  regional	   spending	  actors,	   thereby	  restoring	  spending	  discipline.	  Pochet	  (2004),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  concentrates	  on	  issues	  involving	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  workers	  and	  employers.	  He	  invokes	  the	  vincolo	  esterno	  argument	  to	   contend	   that	   the	   euro-­‐accession	  made	   it	   possible	   to	   carry	   out	   long-­‐overdue	  policy	  reforms	  in	  certain	  areas,	  because	  the	  overriding	  interest	  in	  joining	  the	  single	  currency	  area	  forced	  unions	  and	  employers’	  organizations	  to	  resolve	  their	  differences.	  He	  argues	  that	   the	   accession	   process	   thus	   opened	   up	   new	   political	   opportunities	   to	   tackle	  previously	  intractable	  problems	  in	  various	  fields.	  	  This	  chapter	  gives	  a	  much	  less	  optimistic	  interpretation	  of	  how	  the	  euro-­‐accession	  and	  the	  Maastricht	  deficit	   criterion	  affected	   the	  political	   context	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making	   in	  the	  1990s.	  It	  agrees	  with	  the	  above	  authors	  that	  the	  need	  to	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  for	  participating	   in	   monetary	   integration	   left	   no	   room	   for	   disagreement	   either	   between	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  or	  between	  labour	  and	  business.	  Successful	  accession	  depended	  on	  the	  cooperation	  of	  political	  actors	  across	  the	  regional	  and	  class	  divides.	  However,	  it	  contends	   that	   the	   fundamental	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   that	   had	   undermined	   efforts	   to	  regain	  control	  over	   the	  country’s	   indebtedness	   in	   the	  1980s	  were	  not	  resolved	   in	   the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro.	  Instead,	  they	  were	  put	  on	  ice,	  while	  policy	  makers	  concentrated	  on	  the	  euro-­‐deadline.	  Keeping	  these	  conflicts	  dormant	  implied	  that	  crucial	  policy	  issues	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  conflicts	  had	  to	  remain	  untouched.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	   the	   imbalances	   in	   the	   social	   security	   system	   had	   been	   the	   main	   driver	   of	   debt	  growth	   as	  well	   as	   the	  most	   important	   source	   of	   contention	   between	   societal	   groups	  across	  both	  the	  class	  and	  regional	  divide	  in	  the	  1980s.	  These	  imbalances	  were	  allowed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  On	  budgetary	  institutional	  changes	  introduced	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  compliance	  with	  the	  Maastricht	  deficit	  criterion,	  see	  also	  Bogaert	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  Stienlet	  (1999),	  Reynders	  (2002),	  IMF	  (1998	  and	  2003).	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to	  worsen	  in	  the	  years	  after	  Maastricht.	  Changing	  the	  social	  security	  system	  would	  have	  been	  a	  too	  risky	  undertaking	  at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  was	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  secure	  all	  political	  actors’	  assistance	   in	  getting	  the	  headline	  deficit	   figures	  right	   for	   the	  euro-­‐test.	   The	   issue	  was	   shelved	   until	   after	   the	   euro-­‐accession.	   Thus,	  Maastricht	   retarded,	  rather	  than	  facilitated	  the	  resolution	  of	   this	   fundamental	  structural	  problem	  in	  public	  finances,	   by	   suppressing	   social	   conflicts	   and	   deferring	   their	   resolution.	   Under	  favourable	  financial	  conditions,	  this	  delay	  in	  resolving	  the	  social	  security	  issue	  has	  not	  stopped	   Belgium	   from	   reversing	   the	   explosive	   debt	   path	   of	   the	   1980s,	   given	   its	  sustained	  success	  in	  controlling	  discretionary	  spending.	  However,	  significant	  problems	  in	  social	  security	  exist	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day	  and	  interregional	  conflict	  over	  this	  issue	  is	  currently	  causing	  massive	  problems	  in	  putting	  together	  a	  workable	  government.	  In	  this	  sense,	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   fiscal	   criteria	   of	   Maastricht	   were	   detrimental,	   rather	   than	  helpful.	  	  In	   the	   regional	   conflict	   over	   social	   security,	   the	   race	   for	   the	   euro	   enforced	   a	   decade-­‐long	  suspension.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  significant	  institutional	  reforms	  were	  in	  place	  that	  provided	   considerable	   means	   to	   politically	   and	   economically	   dominant	   Flanders	   to	  force	  Wallonia	   to	  bear	   the	  costs	  of	  consolidating	   the	  social	  security	  system.	  However,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  changed	  with	  Maastricht,	  because	  Flanders	  became	  dependent	  on	  the	   cooperation	   of	  Wallonia	   in	   the	   quest	   for	   euro-­‐compatible	   fiscal	   figures.	   Regional	  fiscal	  autonomy	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  shift	  the	  burdens	  of	  austerity	  to	  Wallonia	  became	  a	  liability	   to	  Flanders,	  because	   it	  dispersed	  control	  over	   the	  general	  government	  deficit	  figures	   across	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   government.	   Since	   dynamic	   and	   export-­‐oriented	  Flanders	  had	  a	  much	  greater	  stake	   in	  participating	   in	   the	  common	  currency	   from	  the	  start	   than	   stagnant	   and	   state-­‐dependent	   Wallonia,	   the	   deficit	   criterion	   gave	   an	  important	   political	   trump	   card	   to	   the	   latter.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   regional	   conflict	   over	  social	   security	   was	   put	   on	   ice	   and	   the	   Flemish	   even	   made	   fiscal	   concessions	   to	   the	  Walloons,	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  agreements	  on	  fiscal	  targets	  each	  year	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro.	  The	  social	  security	  issue	  was	  next	  taken	  up	  with	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  of	  delay,	  only	  after	  successful	  euro-­‐accession	  and	  the	  de	  facto	  demise	  of	  fiscal	  rules	  in	  the	  EMU	  freed	  Flanders	  from	  having	  to	  show	  restraint	  towards	  Wallonia.	  	  In	   the	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	  business	  over	   the	   consolidation	  of	   social	   security,	  the	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  deficit	  criterion	  had	  a	  less	  tangible	  negative	  effect,	  because	  the	   chances	   of	   a	   breakthrough	   had	   already	   been	   rather	   low	   before	   Maastricht.	   The	  1980s	  had	  demonstrated	   that	   the	  headline	  deficit	   figures	  were	  possible	   to	  drastically	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adjust	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   significant	   cuts	   to	   welfare	   entitlements	   or	   significant	  increases	   in	   the	   fiscal	   pressure	   on	   business.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	  both	   labour	   and	  business	   had	   a	   crucial	   stake	   in	   international	   competitiveness	   and	   in	   early	   euro-­‐accession,	   neither	   had	   a	   major	   incentive	   to	   make	   sacrifices	   in	   the	   social	   security	  question.	  When	   the	   Christian	   Democratic-­‐Socialist	   coalition	   government	   of	   the	   early	  1990s	   proposed	   changes	   to	   the	   system	   of	   unemployment	   and	   pensions,	   both	   unions	  and	   employers’	   organizations	   resisted	   the	   initiative.	   Given	   that	   government	   stability	  was	   crucial	   to	   producing	   the	   budgetary	   figures	   needed	   for	   the	   euro-­‐test,	   neither	  coalition	  partner	  was	  interested	  in	  escalating	  the	  situation.	  The	  government	  remained	  unshaken	  by	  the	  fiasco	  and	  found	  alternative	  ways	  to	  cut	  expenses	  and	  raise	  revenues.	  Throughout	   the	   decade	   and	   the	   one	   to	   follow,	   no	   new	   reforms	   of	   the	   social	   security	  system	  were	  proposed.	  	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   need	   for	   fiscal	   convergence	   delayed	   effective	   consolidation	   of	   the	   social	  security	   sector	   in	   both	   the	   interregional	   and	   the	   class	   context.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  structural	  problems	  of	  Belgian	  public	  finances	  remained	  the	  same.	  The	  large	  deficit	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  has	  even	  widened	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  demographic	   and	   economic	   conditions.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   structural	   strengths	   –	  primarily	   the	   strong	   political	   will	   to	   rein	   in	   discretionary	   spending	   –	   have	   also	  persisted	  and	  allowed	  Belgium	  to	  cross-­‐finance	  the	  social-­‐security	  deficit	  and	  erode	  its	  debt	   level	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   once	   the	   interest	   burden	   on	   the	   budget	   exogenously	  decreased.	  	  	  It	  bears	  explaining	  how	  this	  chapter	  can	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  the	  political	  and	  policy	  effects	   of	   Maastricht	   that	   are	   in	   such	   pronounced	   contrast	   to	   the	   work	   of	   previous	  scholars.	  The	  root	  of	   the	  difference	   lies	   in	   the	  theoretical	  approach	  applied	  here.	  This	  chapter	   seeks	   to	  explain	   the	  observed	  policy	   trajectory	  by	   investigating	   the	   interests,	  incentives	  and	  constraints	  of	  different	  societal	  groups	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  who	  should	  pay	  for	  the	  lasting	  consolidation	  of	  public	  finances.	  Therefore,	  it	  explores	  the	  effects	  of	  the	   euro-­‐accession	   on	   policy	   choices	   in	   light	   of	   how	   they	   influenced	   the	   strategic	  opportunities	   of	   each	   group.	   This	   approach	   questions	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   of	   the	  theories	  that	  see	  Maastricht	  as	  an	  unambiguously	  positive	  influence	  on	  domestic	  policy	  making.	  These	   arguments	   consider	   early	   euro-­‐accession	   a	  national	   imperative,	  which	  helps	  to	  silence	  the	  particularistic	  squabbles	  and	  provides	  strong	  incentives	  for	  sorting	  out	   long-­‐standing	  policy	  problems.	  This	   chapter	  points	   out,	   however	   that	   early	   euro-­‐accession	  was	  not	  equally	  important	  for	  every	  group	  in	  Belgium.	  Flanders	  had	  a	  much	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greater	   stake	   in	   it	   than	   Wallonia.	   Therefore,	   the	   need	   to	   cooperate	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  producing	  the	  right	  headline	  figures	  constrained	  Flanders’	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  while	  giving	   a	   breather	   to	   Wallonia.	   Furthermore,	   the	   resolution	   of	   long	   standing	   policy	  problems	  –	  such	  as	  the	  long-­‐term	  structural	  consolidation	  of	  public	  finances	  –	  was	  not	  a	   precondition	   for	   entry	   to	   EMU123.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   the	   stakes	   of	   early	   entry	  were	  equally	  high	  for	  business	  and	  for	  labour,	  they	  provided	  no	  incentives	  for	  painful	  compromises	  in	  the	  social	  security	  issue.	  	  	  The	  rest	  of	   the	  chapter	   lays	  out	   this	  argument	   in	   three	  steps.	  The	  next	  section	  shows	  that	  –	  in	  line	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  vincolo	  esterno	  argument	  –	  the	  first	  political	  reaction	  to	  the	  Maastricht	  challenge	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  cobble	  together	  a	  social	  pact	  to	  find	  a	   “global”	  solution	   to	   the	  country’s	  structural	  problems,	  whereas	   the	  second	  was	  the	   restoration	   of	   consensus	   in	   fiscal	   relations	   between	   the	   Flemish	   and	   Walloon	  community	  via	   concessions	   to	   the	  Walloon	  side.	  However,	   the	   former	   failed,	  whereas	  the	   latter	   could	   only	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	   agreement	   of	   one	   actor	   –	   the	   federal	  government	   –	   to	   bear	   all	   the	   burdens	   of	   austerity.	   The	   third	   section	   shows	   that	   the	  failure	  of	  the	  1993	  “Global	  Pact”	  drove	  home	  how	  hopeless	  it	  was	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  social	   security	   issue	  via	  a	   compromise	  between	   labour	  and	  business	  and	  political	  actors	   gave	   up	   on	   pursuing	   such	   a	   solution.	   The	   interregional	   conflict,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   was	   opened	   up	  with	   renewed	   intensity	   after	   the	   country	   acceded	   to	   the	   euro.	  Conflict	  over	  this	  issue	  culminated	  in	  the	  years	  since	  2007.	  The	  fourth	  section	  uses	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  to	  account	  for	  the	  way	  the	  interests	  and	  strategic	  position	   of	   different	   societal	   interest	   groups	   led	   to	   these	   outcomes.	   The	   last	   section	  concludes.	  	  
The	  Maastricht	  moment:	  opportunity	  or	  constraint?	  	  When	  the	  decision	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  monetary	  union	  in	  Europe	  was	  made	  and	  the	  conditions	   for	   countries	   wishing	   to	   participate	   were	   adopted	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1991,	  Belgium	  was	   in	  worse	   fiscal	   and	  monetary	   shape	   –	   and	   therefore	   farther	   away	   from	  meeting	   the	   relevant	   criteria	   –	   than	   almost	   any	  other	   country.	   The	  proportion	  of	   net	  borrowing	  and	  outstanding	  debt	  stock	  to	  GDP	  was	  more	  than	  double	  as	  high	  as	  the	  3	  per	  cent	  and	  60	  per	  cent	  limits	  stipulated	  in	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty.	  Inflation	  had	  risen	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  the	  country	  experienced	  problems	  with	  keeping	  parity	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  For	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	   the	  discrepancy	  between	  numerical	  criteria	  and	  the	  structural	  stability	  of	  public	  finances,	  see	  for	  example	  Easterly	  (1999).	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the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Pochet	  2004	  p207,	  Kuipers	  2005).	  The	   large	   reductions	   in	   borrowing	   and	   inflation	   achieved	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	  were	   set	  back	   by	   1990	   as	   fiscal	   matters	   took	   a	   back	   seat	   behind	   interregional	   issues.	   In	   the	  course	  of	  government	  formation	  in	  1988,	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  made	  large	  concessions	   to	   its	  Walloon	  Socialist	   coalition	  partner	   in	  exchange	   for	   important	  institutional	   reforms	   concerning	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	   funds	   across	   the	   different	  regions	   of	   the	   country.	   Social	   security	   transfers	   and	  wages	   in	   the	   public	   sector	  were	  corrected	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  cumulative	  inflation	  for	  many	  years	  back	  to	  please	  Socialist	  constituencies,	  eroding	  some	  of	  the	  results	  of	  previous	  years	  of	  austerity	  and	  monetary	  discipline	  (Callatay	  2002).	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   few	   countries	   could	   have	   afforded	   missing	   the	   first	   round	   of	  accession	   less	   than	   Belgium.	   Early	   accession	  was	   vital	   both	   because	   of	   the	   country’s	  exceptional	  openness	  to	  trade	  and	  because	  of	   its	  exceptional	   indebtedness.	  Sharing	  in	  the	   benefits	   of	   permanent	   exchange	   rate	   stability	   and	   the	   elimination	   of	   transaction	  costs	  with	  the	  country’s	  main	  trade	  partners	  was	  central	   to	  maintaining	   international	  competitiveness.	  It	  was	  a	  question	  of	  life	  and	  death	  for	  the	  Flemish	  economy,	  where	  the	  share	  of	  exports	  reached	  over	  three	  quarters	  of	  the	  gross	  regional	  product	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   imports	  were	  of	  the	  same	  order	  of	  magnitude	  and	  both	  were	  expanding	  faster	  than	  the	  regional	  economy124.	  For	  Wallonia	  the	   issue	  was	   less	  dramatic,	  since	  exports	  accounted	   for	   a	   third	   of	   the	   gross	   regional	   product	   and	   an	   even	   smaller	   share	   of	   the	  total	   income,	  given	   that	   the	  Walloon	  population	  was	  a	  net	   recipient	  of	   transfers	   from	  the	   federal	   funds	   (Reynders	   2002).	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   debt-­‐management,	   the	  euro-­‐deadline	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   joining	   a	   ‘stability	   community’	   safeguarded	   by	  fiscal	  rules	  was	  an	  unmissable	  chance	  to	  gain	  credibility	  for	  fiscal	  discipline	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	   the	   financial	   markets	   and	   convincing	   them	   to	   charge	   a	   lower	   risk	   premium	   on	  Belgian	  debt.	  With	  outstanding	  debt	  exceeding	  120	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  and	  an	  interest	  bill	   above	   11	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   GDP,	   foregoing	   the	   opportunity	   to	   decrease	   the	   debt	  burden	  would	  have	  been	  a	  luxury.	  	  	  While	  the	  task	  facing	  policy	  makers	  was	  truly	  daunting,	  the	  stakes	  involved	  seemed	  to	  create	   an	   unparalleled	   opportunity	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   alarming	   fiscal	   problem.	   In	   the	  decade	   preceding	  Maastricht,	   a	   series	   of	   governments	   had	   been	   fighting	   to	   stem	   the	  accumulation	  of	  debt,	  but	   their	  efforts	  were	   frustrated	  by	   the	  resistance	  of	  organized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  For	  regional	  trade	  data	  in	  the	  1990s,	  see	  the	  Belgostat	  website	  http://www.nbb.be/belgostat/PublicatieSelectieLinker?prop=treeviewArch&LinkID=621000016|520000068&Lang=E.	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labour	  and	  business	  to	  the	  benefit	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases	  that	  would	  have	  been	  needed	  to	  eliminate	  the	  huge	  deficit	  in	  the	  social	  security	  system.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  austerity	  in	   other	   areas	   of	   spending	   intensified	   conflicts	   over	   the	   geographic	   distribution	   of	  funds	   for	   collective	   consumption	   and	   investment	   between	   the	   two	   linguistic	  communities	  of	  the	  country.	  Euro-­‐accession	  was	  an	  objective	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  elicit	   compromises	   in	   both	   types	   of	   conflicts.	   Labour	   and	   business	   –	   especially	   of	  Flemish	   labour	  and	  business,	  which	  had	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	   in	  the	  battle	  over	  social	  security	   in	   the	  1980s	   –	   shared	  a	   crucial	   interest	   in	   the	   competitiveness	   aspect	  of	   the	  common	  currency,	  whereas	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  were	  equally	   interested	   in	  getting	  rid	  of	  some	  of	  the	  interest	  burden,	  which	  at	  the	  time	  was	  eating	  up	  more	  than	  a	  tenth	  of	  the	   gross	   domestic	   product	   and	  more	   than	   a	   fifth	   of	   total	   expenditure.	  However,	   the	  need	  to	  compromise	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  common	  goal	  did	  not	  eventually	  work	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  resolution	  of	  their	  conflicts.	  	  
The	  attempted	  breakthrough	  in	  the	  labour-­business	  deadlock	  over	  social	  security	  	  The	   dominant	   party	   in	   the	   government,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	  was	  keen	  on	  seizing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  forge	  a	  voluntary	  compromise	  between	  labour	  and	  business	  in	  the	  social	  security	  question.	  The	  stalemate	  over	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  1980s	  had	  been	  a	  major	  headache	  for	  the	  party	  not	  only	  because	  it	  created	  a	  huge	  policy	  problem	  for	  the	  governments	  it	  led	  but	  also	  because	  it	  was	  a	  constant	  source	  of	  tension	  between	  the	   two	   halves	   of	   its	   cross-­‐class	   electoral	   base.	   By	   the	   early	   1990s,	   its	   business	  constituencies	  were	   increasingly	   turning	   their	   backs	  on	   the	  party	   and	   flocking	   to	   the	  (Flemish)	  Liberals,	  but	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  were	  unable	  to	  win	  them	  back	  without	  alienating	   their	   labour	   section	   (Fitzmaurice	   1996).	   The	   Maastricht	   moment	   and	   the	  imperative	   of	  maintaining	   competitiveness	   at	   a	   critical	   juncture	   of	   European	  market	  integration	   seemed	   the	   perfect	   excuse	   both	   to	   ask	   labour	   for	  major	   sacrifices	   and	   to	  spare	  business	   from	  payroll	   tax	  hikes.	   In	   this	   exceptional	  moment,	   even	   the	   coalition	  with	  the	  Socialists	  seemed	  more	  an	  asset	  than	  a	  liability	  for	  retrenchment	  in	  the	  social	  security	  sector.	   It	  would	  have	  been	  very	  difficult	   for	  the	  Socialists	  to	  protest	  violently	  against	  a	  plan	  that	  was	  to	  ensure	  early	  euro	  accession.	  Their	  acquiescence,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  allowed	  for	  engineering	  a	  ‘Nixon	  goes	  to	  China’	  scenario.	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1993,	  the	  government	  announced	  a	  ‘Global	  Pact	  on	  Employment,	  Competitiveness	   and	   Social	   Security’.	   It	   was	   presented	   as	   a	   historic	   compromise	  between	  labour	  and	  business	  at	  a	  time	  of	  great	  crisis	  and	  at	  an	  important	  turning	  point	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in	  (economic)	  history125.	  It	  contained	  plans	  to	  reform	  the	  structure	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system,	  to	  make	  it	  more	  selective,	  to	  limit	  expenditures	  and	  thus	  to	  restore	  the	  system’s	  financial	  balance.	  It	  was	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  unemployment	  benefits	   that	   substantial	   retrenchment	   of	   entitlements	   was	   to	   take	   place.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  plan	  proposed	  to	  decrease	  social	  security	  contributions	  on	  specific	  types	   of	   employment	   in	   order	   to	   decrease	   the	   costs	   of	   labour	   for	   business	   (Kuipers	  2005	  Ch5,	  Marier	  2008	  p89).	  	  The	   plan	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	   miscalculation	   though.	   The	   crisis-­‐discourse	   of	   the	  government	  did	  not	  soften	  labour	  enough	  for	  such	  an	  unbalanced	  ‘compromise’.	  Unions	  rejected	  the	  Pact.	  Even	  though	  they	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  preliminary	  bargaining,	  their	  demands	  were	  left	  out	  of	  the	  final	  proposal	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  leadership	  was	  coming	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  the	  rank	  and	  file	  for	  strikes	  (Kuipers	  2005	  p97).	  There	  was	  practically	  no	  hope	   that	   the	  Pact	   could	  be	  adopted.	  Christian	  unions	  had	   historically	   shown	   willingness	   to	   accept	   sacrifices	   whenever	   unemployment	  figures	  were	  truly	  menacing	  in	  Flanders,	  where	  most	  of	  their	  members	  were	  employed.	  However,	   the	   proposed	   plans	   were	   too	   unbalanced	   and	   the	   Flemish	   unemployment	  figures	   of	   the	   time	   were	   not	   dramatic	   enough	   to	   justify	   the	   sacrifices	   demanded126.	  Asking	   Catholic	   union	   members	   to	   show	   self-­‐restraint	   under	   these	   conditions	   –	  especially	  when	  the	  Socialist	  unions	  were	  out	  on	  strike	  –	  was	   impossible.	  The	  radical	  Socialist	  unions	  would	  certainly	  not	  retreat.	  Given	  the	  large	  share	  of	  Walloon	  workers	  within	   their	   membership	   and	   the	   permanently	   high	   unemployment	   in	   Wallonia,	  defending	  social	  security	  was	  their	  main	  priority.	  	  As	   the	   unions	   went	   on	   strike,	   the	   Maastricht	   deadline	   and	   the	   coalition	   with	   the	  Socialists	  suddenly	  turned	  into	  a	  major	  constraint	  for	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats,	  who	   now	   had	   no	   other	   choice	   than	   to	   back	   down.	   They	   could	   not	   afford	   to	   risk	   the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  coalition	  over	  a	  struggle	  with	  the	  unions	  at	  a	  time	  when	  swift	  action	  was	  needed	  to	  bring	  the	  deficit	  down	  from	  over	  eight	  per	  cent	  (in	  1992)	  to	  under	  three.	  Even	   if	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   had	   been	   prepared	   for	   a	   drawn-­‐out	   conflict,	   their	  Socialist	   coalition	   partners	   were	   already	   compromised	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   their	   labour	  supporters	   by	   their	   acquiescence	   in	   the	   original	   proposal	   and	   they	   could	   not	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  The	  word	  ‘pact’	  had	  only	  been	  used	  once	  before,	  in	  1944	  when	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Belgian	  welfare	  state	  were	   laid	  down.	  By	  referring	  back	  to	  this	  earlier,	  highly	   important	  agreement,	   the	  government	  was	  symbolically	  emphasizing	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  moment	  (Kuipers	  2005	  p96)	  126	  For	  regional	  and	  federal	  unemployment	  figures	  see	  Dejemeppe-­‐Saks	  (2002).	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possibly	  stood	  by	  any	  effort	  to	  break	  union	  resistance	  to	  the	  plan.	  Therefore,	  the	  bold	  attempt	  to	  reform	  social	  security	  had	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  	  	  The	  government	  adopted	  a	   ‘Global	  Plan’	  that	  was	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  ‘Global	  Pact’	  only	  in	  its	  name	  and	  introduced	  only	  marginal	  adjustments	  to	  social	  security	  benefits.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  social	  security	  contributions	  were	  decreased	  on	  several	  different	  categories	  of	   employment	   in	   the	   exposed	   sector	   (IMF	   2005).	   In	   the	   following	   year,	   plans	   were	  discussed	  to	  increase	  the	  financial	  viability	  of	  the	  pension	  system	  through	  an	  increase	  of	   the	   retirement	   age,	   higher	   taxes	   on	   the	   highest	   pensions	   and	   a	   decrease	   in	   civil	  servants’	   pensions,	   but	   when	   the	   unions	   expressed	   their	   disapproval	   the	   plan	   was	  dropped	  (Anderson	  et	  al	  2007	  p331,	  Marier	  2008	  pp90-­‐24).	  In	  the	  years	  that	  remained	  until	   the	   euro	   accession,	   no	   other	   proposals	   were	   put	   forward.	   The	   hoped	  breakthrough	  in	  the	  social	  security	  issue	  failed	  to	  materialize.	  	  In	  sum,	   far	   from	  helping	  to	  resolve	   it,	  Maastricht	  reconfirmed	  the	   intractability	  of	   the	  stalemate	   over	   social	   security	   between	   labour	   and	   business.	   This	   must	   have	   been	   a	  bitter	   disappointment	   to	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   leaders.	   The	   unbalanced	  design	  of	  the	  Global	  Pact	  they	  offered	  to	  unions	  clearly	  suggests	  that	  they	  expected	  that	  the	   case	   was	   obvious	   for	   large	   sacrifices	   from	   organised	   labour	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	  country’s	   economic	   future	   in	   the	   eurozone.	   In	   fact,	   they	   doubly	   miscalculated.	   They	  misjudged	  not	  only	  labour’s	  readiness	  to	  make	  sacrifices,	  but	  even	  employers’	  interest	  in	   a	   settlement	   of	   the	   social	   security	   question.	   The	   national	   employers’	   organization	  rejected	   the	   Pact	   from	   the	   start	   –	   despite	   the	   absence	   of	   pecuniary	   sacrifices	   on	  business’s	  side	  –	  because	   it	  deemed	  that	   it	  granted	  too	  much	   influence	  to	   the	  state	   in	  the	   future	   management	   of	   the	   social	   security	   funds	   (Kuipers	   2005	   p96).	   Employers	  achieved	  decreases	  in	  payroll	  taxes	  even	  without	  the	  Pact	  and	  it	  seemed	  that	  they	  were	  reluctant	   to	   make	   any	   concessions	   for	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   fiscal	   balance	   of	   the	  system.	  	  	  
Compromise	  in	  the	  interregional	  conflict	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  funds	  	  	  The	  fiasco	  of	  the	  plan	  to	  consolidate	  the	  social	  security	  system	  and	  the	  attendant	  need	  to	   find	   the	   savings	   elsewhere	   was	   especially	   painful	   for	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	   due	   to	   concurrent	   developments	   in	   the	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   fiscal	   relations,	  which	   changed	   the	   distribution	   of	   fiscal	   pain	   across	   the	   linguistic	   groups	   to	   the	  disadvantage	   of	   the	   Flemish	   constituencies.	   Conflicts	   over	   the	   allocation	   of	   funds	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available	   for	  collective	  consumption	  and	  public	   investments	  had	  grown	  by	   the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  as	  cross-­‐financing	  the	  deficit	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  had	  progressively	  squeezed	   resources	   available	   for	   such	   uses.	   In	   1988	   and	  1989,	   the	   Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	   achieved	   federal	   reforms	   that	  made	   sure	   that	   the	  distribution	  of	   available	  funds	  would	  be	  progressively	  brought	  in	   line	  with	  the	  tax-­‐generating	  capacity	  of	  each	  region.	  In	  other	  words,	  Flanders	  would	  receive	  progressively	  more,	  whereas	  Wallonia	  would	  have	  to	  do	  with	  less.	  This	  would	  also	  imply	  that	  a	  progressively	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  burdens	  of	  ‘permanent	  austerity’	  arising	  from	  the	  social	  security	  problem	  would	  be	  borne	   by	   the	   Walloon	   population.	   In	   the	   Maastricht	   moment,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	   had	   to	   surrender	   some	   of	   these	   benefits	   they	   had	   previously	   secured	   for	  their	  region.	  	  The	  federal	  reforms	  of	  1988-­‐89	  devolved	  decisions	  over	  more	  than	  forty	  percent	  of	  the	  funds	  to	  the	  subnational	  level	  (IMF	  2003).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Maastricht,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	   quest	   for	   the	   deficit	   target	   was	   doomed	   to	   failure	   unless	   all	   federated	   entities	  coordinated	  their	  plans,	  agreed	  on	  the	  contribution	  of	  each	  to	  the	  needed	  improvement	  and	  –	  most	   importantly	  –	   stuck	   to	   the	  pre-­‐agreed	   targets.	  The	   reforms	  had	   created	  a	  forum	  for	  organizing	  such	  matters,	  but	   it	  had	  been	   left	  open	  how	  coordination	  would	  work	   in	   practice.	   The	   so-­‐called	   Public	   Sector	   Borrowing	   Requirement	   section	   of	   the	  High	  Council	   of	   Finance	  –	  made	  up	  of	   the	   representatives	  of	   the	   federal	   government,	  the	   regions,	   the	   communities	   and	   the	   central	   bank	   –	   was	   a	   consultative	   forum	   for	  setting	   fiscal	   targets.	   In	   principle,	   it	   also	   had	   the	   power	   to	   penalize	   non-­‐compliant	  subnational	   governments	   by	   suspending	   their	   right	   to	   borrow	   (IMF	  1998	   and	  2003).	  However,	   passing	   such	   a	   resolution	   would	   inherently	   be	   very	   difficult	   politically,	  because	   it	  would	   imply	  all-­‐out	  conflict	  between	  the	   two	   linguistic	  communities	  of	   the	  country.	   Short	  of	  a	  determination	   to	   succumb	   into	   such	  conflict,	   there	  was	  no	  way	   in	  which	   any	   federated	   entity	   –	   or	   the	   federal	   government	   itself	   –	   could	   be	   forced	   to	  submit	  itself	  to	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  the	  committee.	  The	  fiscal	  results	  of	  the	  year	  right	  after	  Maastricht	   highlighted	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   system	   in	   terms	   of	   coordination	   and	  enforcement.	  In	  1992	  all	  entities	  exceeded	  their	  targeted	  deficit	  figures	  and	  the	  deficit	  of	   the	   general	   government	   was	   more	   than	   a	   percentage	   point	   higher	   than	   planned	  (Hallerberg	  2004).	  	  	  Due	   to	   the	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	   institutional	   enforcement	   mechanism,	   the	   risk	   of	  defection	   was	   built	   into	   the	   system.	   It	   was	   especially	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Francophone	  community	  and	  the	  Walloon	  region	  could	  be	  readily	  convinced	  to	  cut	  back	  on	  its	  deficit.	  
	   178	  
The	   laws	   of	   1988-­‐89	   that	   regulated	   the	   distribution	   of	   federal	   funds	   stipulated	   that	  these	   entities	   would	   be	   increasingly	   underfunded	   and	   therefore	   it	   would	   require	  increasing	  effort	  from	  them	  just	  to	  keep	  their	  deficits	  stable	  (IMF	  1998	  and	  2003).	  The	  position	   of	   the	   Francophone	   community	   was	   made	   all	   the	   more	   difficult	   by	   the	  upgrading	  of	   the	  public	  sector	  pay	  scales	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s,	  since	  more	  than	  80	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  community’s	  budget	  was	  wage	  costs	  (IMF	  1998	  and	  2003).	  Cutting	   its	  deficit	  would	   inevitably	   involve	   firing	  public	   servants	  –	  a	  politically	  highly	  dangerous	  move	   in	   a	   region	  where	   unemployment	  was	  more	   than	   double	   the	   national	   average.	  The	   Flemish	   side	  was	   initially	   also	   underfunded.	   However,	   since	   the	   community	   and	  the	   region	   were	   merged	   –	   unlike	   on	   the	   Walloon-­‐Francophone	   side	   –	   it	   had	   much	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  funds	  it	  was	  entitled	  to.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  to	  receive	   ever-­‐larger	   sums	   as	   time	   went	   by	   (IMF	   1998).	   Therefore,	   Wallonia	   and	   the	  Francophone	  community	  would	  need	  to	  make	  much	  greater	  sacrifices	  than	  Flanders,	  if	  each	   federated	  entity	  was	  asked	   to	  make	   ‘equal’	   contributions	   to	   the	  reduction	  of	   the	  general	  government	  deficit	   for	   the	  sake	  of	   reaching	   the	  Maastricht	   target.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  politically	  completely	  unacceptable	  in	  Wallonia,	  especially	  as	  it	  had	  a	  much	  smaller	  stake	  in	  early	  euro-­‐accession	  than	  Flanders.	  	  Under	   different	   circumstances,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democrats	   –	   who	   represented	  both	   the	   federal	   and	   the	   Flemish	   government	   in	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Borrowing	  Requirement	   committee	   –	   might	   have	   taken	   an	   intransigent	   stance	   over	   the	   fiscal	  discipline	  of	  each	  federated	  entity.	  After	  all,	  the	  agreement	  of	  1988-­‐89	  over	  the	  division	  of	  funds	  was	  meant	  to	  assign	  larger	  responsibility	  for	  fiscal	  adjustment	  to	  Wallonia	  and	  the	  Francophone	  community.	  	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  deficit	  had	  to	  be	  cut	  drastically	  in	  very	  limited	  time,	  the	  urge	  to	  achieve	  every	  decisive	  actor’s	  cooperation	  won	  out.	  In	  1993,	   the	   so-­‐called	   St.	   Michel	   agreement	   increased	   the	   funding	   available	   to	  communities	   –	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   federal	   level	   –	   allowing	   the	   Francophone	  community	   to	   postpone	   dramatic	   expenditure	   cuts	   into	   the	   indefinite	   future	   (IMF	  2003).	   Furthermore,	   the	   Walloon	   region	   and	   the	   Francophone	   community	   were	  allowed	  to	  run	  deficits	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  which	  were	  offset	  by	  increased	  efforts	  at	  the	  federal	   level	  and	  after	  1995	  –	  when	  the	  funds	  available	  to	  Flanders	  had	  increased	  sufficiently	  –	  in	  Flanders	  (Savage	  2002).	  	  	  The	   concessions	   given	   to	   the	   Walloon	   side	   in	   the	   Maastricht	   moment	   largely	   freed	  Wallonia	   and	   the	   Francophone	   community	   from	   the	   extra	   constraints	   that	   the	  federalizing	   reforms	   were	   to	   place	   on	   their	   spending.	   Paradoxically,	   this	   also	   meant	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that	  some	  of	  the	  expenditure	  items	  that	  had	  suffered	  great	  cuts	  in	  the	  1980s	  –	  such	  as	  education	  or	  transport	  –	  were	  now	  exempted	  from	  further	  austerity,	  because	  they	  were	  under	   the	   control	   of	   regional	   or	   community	   authorities	   that	   were	   treated	   leniently	  when	   the	   contribution	   of	   each	   federated	   entity	   to	   stabilization	   was	   determined.	  Therefore,	   the	   burden	   of	   austerity	   on	   the	   federal	   level	   –	   where	   it	   affected	   both	   the	  Flemish	   and	   the	   Walloon	   population	   equally	   –	   was	   even	   higher	   than	   before.	   These	  developments	   represented	   a	   setback	   to	   Flanders	   in	   its	   redistributive	   conflict	   with	  Wallonia.	  	  	  
The	  fiscal	  consequences	  of	  Maastricht	  	  Since	   the	   social	   security	   system	   was	   not	   consolidated	   and	   the	   compromise	   deal	  between	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  exempted	  many	  items	  from	  further	  spending	  cuts,	  the	  federal	   government	   resorted	   to	   what	   it	   had	   been	   most	   successful	   at	   in	   the	   1980s:	  ensuring	   strict	   control	   over	   discretionary	   expenditure	   and	   complemented	   this	   with	  largely	  one-­‐off	  measures	   to	   increase	   revenues.	  Fiscal	   efforts	   to	  achieve	   the	  necessary	  convergence	  to	  the	  Maastricht	  target	  were	  composed	  of	  a	  mixture	  of	  expenditure	  cuts,	  limited	   revenue	   increases	   and	   several	  one-­‐off	  measures	  achieved	  at	   the	   federal	   level.	  The	  marginal	  changes	  the	  ‘Global	  Plan’	  of	  1993	  introduced	  to	  social	  security	  spending	  included	  a	   reduction	  of	   the	  highest	  pensions	  and	  a	  one	  per	   cent	   solidarity	   tax	  on	   the	  highest	  early	  retirement	  benefits.	  The	  ‘Global	  Plan’	  also	  increased	  VAT	  by	  a	  percentage	  point,	  raised	  the	  rates	  of	  excises	  on	  alcohol,	  tobacco	  and	  energy	  and	  introduced	  a	  new	  real	  estate	  tax.	  One-­‐off	  measures	   included	  the	  sale	  of	   the	  central	  bank’s	  gold	  reserves	  and	  privatization	  (IMF	  2005,	  Kuipers	  2005	  Ch5,	  Marier	  2008	  pp89-­‐90).	  	  	  The	   consolidation	   achieved	   by	   these	   measures	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   euro	   was	   much	  smaller	   than	   the	  headway	  made	   in	  stabilization	   in	   the	  1980s.	  While	   in	   the	  1980s,	   the	  primary	  balance	  was	  improved	  by	  more	  than	  twelve	  percentage	  points	  of	  the	  GDP,	  the	  adjustment	   between	   1992	   and	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   euro	   in	   1999	   was	   less	   than	   four	  percentage	  points.	  However,	  in	  the	  1990s	  the	  external	  financial	  environment	  was	  much	  more	   benign.	  While	   the	   constant	   growth	   of	   interest	   rates	   persistently	   frustrated	   the	  government’s	   enormous	   efforts	   to	   restrain	   borrowing	   in	   the	   1980s,	   their	   sharp	   drop	  drove	  consolidation	  despite	  the	  more	  modest	  adjustment	  in	  the	  primary	  surplus	  in	  the	  1990s.	   The	   credibility-­‐effect	   of	   the	   euro-­‐deadline	   worked	   and	   the	   interest	   burden	  quickly	   melted	   away	   as	   the	   rates	   charged	   on	   the	   outstanding	   debt	   stock	   dropped.	  Between	  Maastricht	  and	  the	  date	  of	  the	  euro-­‐accession,	  interest	  expenditure	  decreased	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by	   five	   percentage	   points	   of	   the	   GDP,	   greatly	   helping	   Belgium	   to	   meet	   the	   deficit	  criterion	  in	  time.	  	  	  The	   positive	   exogenous	   effect	   of	   changes	   in	   the	   financial	   market	   sentiments	   and	  renewed	  efforts	  in	  spending	  control	  counterbalanced	  the	  policy	  paralysis	   in	  the	  social	  security	   issue	   fuelled	   by	  Maastricht.	   By	   the	   time	   the	   euro	  was	   launched	   in	   1999,	   the	  budget	  was	  practically	  out	  of	  the	  red	  and	  debt	  was	  down	  to	  a	  level	  last	  seen	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	   After	   more	   than	   twenty	   years	   of	   continuous	   fiscal	   emergency,	   Belgium	   was	  freed	  from	  the	  interest-­‐debt	  spiral.	  However,	  its	  high	  level	  of	  debt	  and	  the	  large	  deficit	  of	   social	   security	   continue	   to	   make	   the	   country	   vulnerable	   to	   exogenous	   changes.	  Therefore,	  the	  next	  section	  investigates	  the	  progress	  made	  in	  resolving	  these	  issues	  in	  the	   decade	   since	   the	   euro-­‐accession.	   It	   explores	   the	   political	   context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	  making	   in	   order	   to	   see	   how	   the	   legacies	   of	   the	   Maastricht-­‐moment	   influenced	   the	  country’s	   ability	   to	   deal	   with	   its	   redistributive	   conflicts	   and	   its	   structural	   fiscal	  problems.	  	  
The	  changing	  dimensions	  of	  the	  social	  security	  problem	  since	  the	  euro-­accession	  	  Belgium’s	  accession	  to	  the	  EMU	  not	  only	  signalled	  the	  end	  to	  the	  Belgian	  franc,	   it	  also	  stood	   for	   the	   end	   of	   a	   political	   era.	   In	   1999,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   fell	   out	   of	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  four	  decades,	  the	  Liberals	  headed	  the	  new	  government	  for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   the	  war,	   and	   fringe	  parties	   like	   the	  environmentalists	   and	   the	  extreme	  right	  Vlaams	  Blok/Belang	  captured	  respectable	  shares	  of	   the	   total	  vote.	  This	  section	  suggests	  that	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  the	  political	  sea	  change	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  race	  for	   the	   euro	   might	   be	   more	   than	   a	   coincidence.	   It	   argues	   that	   the	   conflicts	   and	  compromises	  of	   the	  Maastricht	  moment	  made	  explicit	   the	   changes	   that	  were	   latently	  underway	  in	  the	  constellation	  of	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  since	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	   1980s.	   The	   failure	   of	   the	   ‘Global	   Pact’	   definitively	   drove	   home	   the	   futility	   of	  insisting	   on	   finding	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   labour-­‐business	   conflict	   over	   the	   social	   security	  issue,	  whereas	  the	  forced	  compromises	  between	  the	  Walloon	  and	  Flemish	  regions	  and	  communities	  made	   clear	   the	   stakes	   involved	   in	   the	   interregional	   conflict	   over	   public	  finances.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  forced	  cooperation	  allowed	  these	  underlying	  societal	  changes	  come	  to	  the	  surface	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  dramatic	  political	  transformation.	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The	  political	  changes	  emanated	  from	  Flanders,	  but	  they	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  redistribution	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  in	  the	  Flemish-­‐Walloon	  context,	  too.	   The	   essence	   of	   the	   change	  was	   that	   class	   conflict	   lost	  much	   of	   its	   importance	   in	  structuring	  political	  competition	  in	  Flanders.	  Instead,	  the	  ability	  of	  parties	  to	  represent	  their	   constituency	   in	   the	   interregional	   conflict	   gained	   larger	   significance.	   The	  project	  that	  was	  started	   in	   the	  second	  half	  of	   the	  1980s	  by	   the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	   to	   redefine	   conflicts	   and	   commonalities	   of	   fiscal	   interests	   between	   its	   own	  constituencies	  and	  groups	  outside	  of	  Flanders	  now	  bore	  fruit.	  However,	  the	  party	  itself	  could	  not	  reap	  the	  benefits.	  Its	  role	  in	  the	  Maastricht	  intermezzo	  as	  the	  self-­‐appointed	  broker	  of	  compromises	  –	  and	  the	  elicitor	  of	  painful	  sacrifices	  –	  in	  the	  labour-­‐business	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  its	  readiness	  to	  make	  concessions	  to	  the	  Walloon	  side	  undermined	  its	  image	   as	   the	   defender	   of	   Flemish	   (labour	   and	   business)	   interests.	   Even	   though	   it	  managed	  to	  secure	  early	  euro-­‐accession,	  which	  was	  so	  crucial	  to	  its	  constituencies,	  the	  price	   it	   paid	   became	  more	   important	   than	   its	   accomplishment	   once	   the	   country	  was	  safely	  inside	  the	  EMU.	  	  	  The	   Flemish	   Liberals	   were	   able	   to	   present	   themselves	   as	   better	   Flemings.	   They	  rebranded	  the	  party	  and	  created	  a	  strong	  nationalist	  and	  populist	  appeal	   for	   it	  (Jones	  2005	  p205).	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  Liberals	  and	  the	  backsliding	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  Flanders	  was	  also	   facilitated	  by	   the	  electoral	   strengthening	  of	   the	  Flemish	  nationalist	  Volksunie	   and	   Vlaams	   Blok,	   who	   scored	   record	   votes	   amongst	   themselves,	   further	  underlining	   the	   increased	   importance	   of	   the	   regional	   divide	   over	   class	   conflict.	   The	  Christian	   Democrats	   responded	   to	   these	   challenges	   by	   further	   strengthening	   their	  Flemish	   identity	   and	   distancing	   themselves	   from	   their	   role	   as	   brokers	   in	   the	   labour-­‐business	  conflict.	  They	  progressively	  weakened	  their	  political	  and	  organizational	  ties	  to	  the	  Catholic	  unions,	  adopted	  a	  new	  name,	  which	  –	  unlike	  the	  earlier	  one	  –	  explicitly	  had	  the	   word	   “Flemish”	   in	   it,	   and	   entered	   into	   electoral	   cooperation	   with	   one	   of	   the	  successor	   parties	   of	   the	   nationalist	   Volksunie,	   the	  New	  Flemish	  Alliance	   (Jones	   2008	  p218).	  The	  other	  half	  of	  Volksunie,	  Spirit	   joined	  the	  Socialist	  party.	  Now	  all	   the	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  Flemish	  electoral	  sphere	  showed	  strong	  regionalist	  traits.	  	  Due	   to	   the	  diminishing	   significance	  of	   class	   conflict,	   the	  Liberals	  were	   able	   to	   form	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  Socialists	  after	  they	  won	  the	  1999	  national	  elections.	  The	  previously	  contentious	   welfare	   issue	   ceased	   to	   stand	   in	   the	   way	   of	   a	   coalition	   agreement.	   The	  Liberals	  –	  who	  had	  pushed	  so	  ardently	  for	  welfare	  retrenchment	   in	  the	  early	  1980s	  –	  seemed	   to	   have	   lost	   interest	   in	   downsizing	   reforms.	   They	   only	   passed	   one	   reform	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explicitly	   dealing	   with	   the	   sustainability	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system,	   but	   it	   did	   not	  require	  sacrifices	  either	  from	  labour	  or	  from	  business.	  The	  Vandenbroucke	  law	  of	  2003	  created	   the	   legal	   framework	   for	   a	   company	   funded	   secondary	  pension	  pillar,	   but	   the	  system	   is	   not	  mandatory	   and	   does	   not	   have	   any	   implications	   for	   the	   state’s	   pension	  expenses	  (Marier	  2008).	  	  	  The	   Christian	   Democratic-­‐Liberal-­‐Socialist	   coalition	   that	   took	   over	   in	   2007	   also	  refrained	   from	   addressing	   the	   imbalances	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system.	   The	   issue	  seems	   definitively	   off	   the	   agenda	   despite	  warnings	   that	   the	   first	   budgetary	   effects	   of	  aging	  would	  kick	  in	  as	  early	  as	  2011127.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  this	  question,	  the	  Liberal-­‐	  Socialist	   coalition	   created	   the	   so-­‐called	   Silver	   Fund	   in	  2001	   to	  pre-­‐fund	   the	   expected	  increases	  in	  pension	  expenditure.	  Budgetary	  surpluses	  that	  were	  expected	  arise	  in	  the	  future	  with	  the	  continued	  fall	  in	  the	  interest	  rate	  expenses	  were	  to	  be	  set	  aside	  (Marier	  2008).	   However,	   these	   surpluses	   never	   materialized	   and	   the	   filling	   up	   of	   the	   Silver	  Fund	  has	  been	  behind	  schedule	  ever	  since	  its	  creation,	  because	  the	  windfall	  gains	  have	  been	  used	  to	  finance	  tax	  cuts	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  spending	  (IMF	  2005).	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  revealed	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  consolidating	  the	  national	  social	  security	  system,	  the	  issue	  of	  splitting	  it	  up	  and	  ending	  the	  flow	  of	  funds	  between	  the	  two	  halves	  of	   the	   country	   received	   increasing	   attention	   after	   the	   involuntary	   suspension	   of	   the	  conflict	   in	   this	  dimension	  during	   the	  1990s.	  The	   issue	  had	  been	  dormant	   since	  1993,	  when	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  sealed	  the	  institutional	  reforms	  put	  into	  place	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  without	  tackling	  further	  separation	  of	   funds	  or	  the	  social	  security	   issue.	   In	  1996,	   the	   Christian	   Democratic-­‐led	   Flemish	   government	   released	   a	   document	  signalling	   its	   intention	   to	   launch	   a	   new	   round	   of	   state	   reforms,	   but	   this	   was	   not	  followed	  up	  by	  any	  concrete	  action	  (Beland	  and	  Lecours	  2008	  p176).	  	  	  New	   developments	   came	   only	   after	   the	   entry	   into	   EMU.	   Initially,	   they	   concerned	  adjustments	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  existing	  taxes	  and	  a	  gradual	  broadening	  of	  the	  fiscal	  autonomy	   of	   the	   federated	   entities.	   In	   1999,	   the	   St.	   Eloi	   agreement	   corrected	   the	  allocation	  rates	  of	  VAT	  and	  personal	  income	  taxes	  so	  that	  Flanders	  would	  get	  more	  of	  the	  income	  taxes	  –	  reflecting	  its	  higher	  tax-­‐generating	  capacities	  –	  in	  return	  for	  higher	  VAT	  receipts	  going	  to	  the	  Walloon	  side.	  The	  2001	  Lambermont	  agreement,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   increased	   the	  proportion	  of	   revenues	  over	  which	   the	   regions	   and	   communities	  have	   total	  autonomy	  and	  allowed	   the	  regions	   to	  set	   rates	  and	  grant	  exemptions	   for	  a	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  See	  for	  example	  Public	  Finances	  in	  EMU	  2005.	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range	   of	   taxes	   (IMF	  2003).	  Obtaining	   the	   (limited)	   right	   to	   grant	   specific	   exemptions	  and	  to	  lower	  tax	  rates	  was	  an	  especially	  important	  achievement	  for	  Flanders,	  because	  it	  was	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  gaining	  the	  ability	  to	  reduce	  the	  fiscal	  pressure	  on	  the	  Flemish	  population	  independently	  of	  Walloon	  concessions.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   these	   compromises	   failed	   to	   tackle	   the	   real	   issue	   of	   redistribution,	  which	  takes	  place	  via	  the	  social	  security	  system.	  In	  1999,	  the	  Flemish	  Parliament	  made	  a	   strong	   statement	   for	   more	   substantial	   institutional	   change	   calling	   for	   the	  federalization	  of	  health	  insurance	  and	  family	  allowances.	  It	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  strong	  majority	   of	   Flemish	  parliamentarians,	  with	  practically	   all	   the	   large	  parties	   voting	   yes	  (Beland	   and	   Lecours	   2008	   p177).	   However,	   putting	   into	   place	   such	   changes	   is	  technically	   difficult	   because	   of	   the	   strong	   parafiscal	   character	   of	   the	   Belgian	   social	  security	   system.	  Funds	  are	   financed	  by	  a	   range	  of	   specific	   contributions	  and	   they	  are	  managed	  by	  the	  social	  partners.	  Therefore,	  splitting	  up	  the	  system	  necessitates	  a	  whole	  series	   of	   institutional	   reforms:	   the	   abolishing	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   social	   partners	   over	  health	   care	   and	   family	   allowances	  and	   the	   shifting	  of	   financing	   from	  contributions	   to	  taxes.	  Such	  reforms	  require	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  social	  partners	  and	  the	  agreement	  of	  Walloon	  political	  actors.	  	  	  Perhaps	   surprisingly,	   securing	   the	   cooperation	   of	   the	   social	   partners	   proves	   to	   be	   a	  manageable	   challenge.	  Even	   though	  all	   the	   social	  partners	  have	  a	   strong	   institutional	  interest	   in	   retaining	   their	   central	   role	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   funds,	   political	  motivations	  make	  the	  Catholic	  trade	  unions	  and	  –	  to	  a	  smaller	  extent	  –	  the	  employers’	  organization	  amenable	   to	  accepting	   the	  changes	  proposed	  by	   the	  Flemish	  Parliament,	  leaving	  the	  Socialist	  unions	  isolated	  in	  this	  question.	  The	  political	  realignment	  –	  away	  from	  class	  conflict	  towards	  regional	  conflict	  –	  has	  made	  its	  impact	  felt	  even	  in	  the	  world	  of	   social	   partnership.	   The	   Catholic	   unions	   support	   the	   devolution	   of	   health	   care	   and	  family	  allowances	  to	  the	  regional	  governments	  in	  order	  to	  please	  the	  Flemish	  majority	  of	   their	  membership.	   In	  the	  national	  employers’	  organization,	   the	  balance	  of	  power	   is	  more	  equitable	  between	  Flemish	  and	  Walloon	  businesses,	  but	  strong	  competition	  from	  an	  alternative	  Flemish	  business	  organization	  motivates	  the	  national	  organization	  to	  be	  more	  attentive	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  former.	  Flemish	  members	  want	  a	  cheaper,	   leaner	  health	  insurance	  and	  family	  support	  system,	  and	  their	   interests	  overshadow	  the	  fears	  of	  the	  Walloon	  members	  about	  having	  to	  finance	  the	  Walloon	  system	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  Socialist	  unions	  consistently	  oppose	  the	  proposed	  reforms	  due	  to	  their	  strong	  Walloon	  membership	  and	  due	  to	  their	  political	  ties	  to	  the	  Walloon	  Socialist	  party.	  However,	  they	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are	  not	  strong	  enough	  on	  their	  own	  to	  put	  up	  meaningful	  resistance	  (Kuipers	  2005	  Ch5,	  Beland	  and	  Lecours	  2008	  pp181-­‐187).	  	  	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  resistance	  coming	   from	  Walloon	  political	  actors	   is	   formidable.	  Due	  to	  constitutional	  rules	  that	  ensure	  that	  major	  decisions	  are	  based	  on	  a	  consensus	  between	   the	   two	   linguistic	   communities,	   the	   Walloon	   side	   has	   a	   veto	   on	   further	  devolution	  (Anderson	  et	  al.	  2007).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  splitting	  the	  social	  security	  system,	  the	  veto	  is	  sure	  to	  be	  applied.	  The	  interregional	  transfers	  increase	  the	  per	  capita	  disposable	  income	  of	  an	  average	  Walloon	  household	  by	  more	  than	  eight	  per	  cent	  (Caruso	  2002).	  No	   political	   actor	   in	  Wallonia	   can	   agree	   to	   reforms	   that	   potentially	   lead	   to	   giving	   up	  these	   funds	   on	   any	   time	   horizon.	   Consequently,	   Flemish	   intransigence	   on	   this	   issue	  threatens	   with	   major	   political	   crisis	   and	   –	   ultimately	   –	   even	   the	   breaking	   up	   of	   the	  Belgian	  federation	  altogether.	  	  	  It	   was	   perhaps	   because	   of	   such	   risks,	   but	   the	   matter	   was	   not	   seriously	   brought	   up	  under	   the	   Liberal-­‐Socialist	   governments	   between	   1999	   and	   2007.	   The	   Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats,	  however,	  decided	  to	  make	  it	  a	  key	  issue	  for	  coalition	  talks,	  when	  they	  won	   the	  2007	  elections	   in	   cartel	  with	   the	  nationalist	  New	  Flemish	  Alliance.	  The	  question	  has	  been	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  political	  struggles128	  more	  or	  less	  continuously	  ever	  since	  and	  there	  is	  no	  end	  in	  sight.	  The	  coalition	  formation	  after	  the	  2007	  elections	  took	  a	   record	   nine	   months,	   as	   the	   parties	   involved	   were	   unable	   to	   compromise	   on	   the	  question	   of	   state	   reforms.	   Finally,	   they	   formed	   a	   government	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   an	  agreement	  and	  postponed	  the	  resolution	  of	  their	  differences.	  When	  this	  failed,	  the	  New	  Flemish	   Alliance	  withdrew	   its	   support	   from	   the	   government,	   which	   fell	   soon	   after	   –	  incidentally	   over	   a	   matter	   unrelated	   to	   state	   reform	   –	   and	   was	   replaced	   with	   a	  caretaker	  government.	  The	  2010	  elections	  brought	  an	  astonishing	  victory	   to	   the	  New	  Flemish	  Alliance	  –	  now	  running	  alone	  –	   suggesting	   that	   the	   issue	  of	   state	   reform	  has	  tangible	  electoral	   traction	   in	  Flanders.	  The	  emergence	  of	   the	  New	  Flemish	  Alliance	  as	  the	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  country	  triggered	  a	  new	  crisis	  and	  led	  to	  a	  coalition	  formation	  process	  that	  broke	  the	  record	  of	  2007	  by	  keeping	  the	  country	  without	  a	  government	  for	  much	  longer	  than	  a	  year.	  The	  question	  of	  state	  reform	  has	  practically	  paralyzed	  politics	  since	  2007,	  while	  a	  succession	  of	  caretaker	  governments	  navigate	  the	  country	  through	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  Strictly	  speaking,	  the	  range	  of	  issues	  involved	  in	  the	  conflict	  is	  broader	  than	  just	  further	  devolution.	  A	  perennial	  bone	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  two	  communities	  since	  the	  1980s	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  BHV-­‐issue	  that	  concerns	  the	  –	  electoral,	  linguistic	  etc.	  status	  –	  of	  a	  small	  Francophone	  enclave	  in	  a	  Flemish-­‐speaking	  area.	  This	  issue	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  current	  conflict,	  too.	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the	  dangers	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  European	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  	  The	   experience	   of	   the	   past	   few	   years	   and	   especially	   the	   comet-­‐like	   rise	   of	   the	   New	  Flemish	   Alliance	   clearly	   show	   how	   important	   the	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   redistributive	  conflict	  has	  become	  since	  the	  euro-­‐accession.	  This	  section	  underlined	  that	  the	  flipside	  of	   this	  development	   is	   the	  complete	   loss	  of	   interest	   in	   finding	  a	  solution	   for	   the	   large	  and	   ever	   widening	   deficit	   of	   the	   national	   social	   security	   system	   in	   its	   present	   form.	  Political	   attention	   is	   centred	   on	  whose	   problem	   the	   imbalances	   of	   the	   redistributive	  system	   should	   be,	   not	   how	   they	   can	   be	   resolved.	   Arguably,	   however,	   as	   soon	   as	   the	  problem	   is	   institutionally	   assigned	   to	   Wallonia,	   its	   resolution	   is	   likely	   to	   come	   into	  sight.	  The	  region	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  persistently	  borrow	  from	  the	  market	  the	  funds	  that	   are	   currently	   transferred	   from	   Flanders.	   Therefore,	   Walloon	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  about	  retrenchment	  and/or	  increased	  fiscal	   pressure	   amongst	   them.	   In	   this	   sense,	   due	   to	   the	   intransigence	   of	   the	   New	  Flemish	  Alliance,	   Belgium’s	   persistent	   structural	   problems	  with	   social	   security	  might	  be	   closer	   to	   their	   resolution	   than	  at	  any	   time	  since	   the	   late	  1970s.	  While	   this	   section	  has	   shown	   the	   party-­‐political	   face	   of	   the	   conflict,	   the	   next	   one	   explains	   its	   evolving	  societal	  basis	  and	  its	  potential	  resolution,	  relying	  on	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model.	  	  
The	   changing	   faces	   of	   redistributive	  politics	   in	  Belgium:	   societal	   coalitions,	   the	  
war	  of	  attrition	  and	  the	  euro	  	  In	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  Belgium	  is	  a	  very	  different	  polity	  from	  the	  one	  it	  was	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth.	  More	  than	  two	  decades	  of	  struggles	  with	  intractable	  fiscal	  problems	   redefined	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	  between	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	   within	   Belgian	   society	   to	   an	   extent	   that	   transformed	   the	   entire	   structure	   of	  politics.	  The	  deep	  labour-­‐capital	  cleavage	  that	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  organizing	  forces	   of	   the	   party	   system	   and	   political	   competition	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era	   has	   now	  completely	  ceded	  primacy	  to	  regionally	  focused	  politics.	  Redistributive	  battles	  are	  now	  fought	  between	  Flemings	   and	  Walloons,	   instead	  of	  workers	   and	  businesses.	  Whereas	  the	   institutional	   reforms	   of	   the	   late	   1980s	   to	   reallocate	   authority	   over	   locally	   spent	  funds	  might	   have	   seemed	   like	   a	   squabble	  between	  politicians	  with	   little	   relevance	   to	  the	  electorate,	   the	  newest	   initiative	   for	  state	  reform	  and	   for	   the	  ending	  of	   the	   flow	  of	  funds	   between	   the	   two	   halves	   of	   the	   country	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   decided	   the	   latest	  elections.	   This	   section	   uses	   the	   insights	   of	   the	  war	   of	   attrition	  model	   to	   explore	   the	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pressures	   that	   bore	   on	   the	   different	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   to	   reconsider	   their	  coalitions	   with	   other	   groups	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   evaluates	   the	   role	   of	   political	  engineering	   in	   the	   transformation.	   Finally,	   it	   looks	   at	   the	   role	   of	   Maastricht	   and	   the	  euro	  accession	  in	  this	  process.	  	  In	   a	   certain	   sense,	   the	   fundamental	   transformation	   of	   Belgian	   politics	   was	   an	   elite-­‐driven	  project.	  It	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  struggle	  of	  political	  parties	  to	  gain	  and	  maintain	  an	  edge	   in	   electoral	   competition	   and	   reflected	   the	   efforts	   of	   policy	  makers	   to	   find	   new	  ways	   to	   attack	   intractable	   policy	   problems.	   The	   previous	   chapter	   argued	   that	   the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	  embarked	  on	  the	  first	  steps	  of	  the	  federalization	  of	  public	  funds	  in	  1988	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  having	  to	  generate	  further	  tension	  between	  the	  labour	  and	  business	  groups	  within	  their	  constituencies	  and	  in	  order	  to	  find	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	   dealing	   with	   unstoppable	   debt	   growth.	   Their	   manoeuvres	   endowed	   the	   issue	   of	  interregional	  redistribution	  with	  political	  salience.	  Without	  the	  campaign	  to	  make	  the	  electorate	  conscious	  of	  how	  massive	  the	  imbalances	  in	  the	  tax	  generating	  capacities	  of	  the	  two	  halves	  of	  the	  country	  were	  and	  how	  different	  the	  spending	  on	  certain	  big-­‐ticket	  items	  in	  each	  was,	  the	  fiscal	  conflict	  between	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  could	  hardly	  have	  emerged.	   Similarly,	  without	   the	   institutional	   separation	   of	   funds,	   it	  would	   have	   been	  difficult	   to	  define	  a	   target	   for	  adjustments	   in	   the	   redistributive	   relations	  between	   the	  regions.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  politicians	  at	  the	  head	  of	  this	  project	  responded	  to	  real	  pressures	   in	  the	  societal	  bases	  of	   their	  electorate.	  The	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  ambivalent	  structure	  of	  commonalities	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  within	  the	  population.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  Belgian	  political	  system	  and	  regional	  economic	  disparities,	   it	  helps	  to	  explain,	   the	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  of	  political	  actors	  in	  engineering	  societal	  coalitions	  to	  garner	  political	  support.	  	  The	  key	  insight	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  is	  that	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  influential	  groups	  within	   society	   are	   subject	   to	   two	   countervailing	   forces.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  attachment	  of	  members	  of	  the	  group	  to	  their	  vested	  interests	  makes	  them	  support	  the	  policy	  status	  quo.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  fiscal	  imbalances	  harms	  their	  well-­‐being	  and	  creates	  pressures	   for	   change.	  As	  explained	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   in	  Belgium	  neither	  workers	  nor	  businesses	  supported	  change	  that	  would	  involve	  making	  sacrifices	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   restoring	   the	   equilibrium	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system,	  because	   neither	   group	   suffered	   significant	   private	   harm	   from	   its	   imbalances.	   At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	   social	   security	   problem	   was	   not	   entirely	   costless.	   Keeping	   the	   social	  security	   system	   intact	   and	   insulating	   labour	   and	   business	   from	   potential	   negative	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economic	   side	   effects	   required	   enormous	   cuts	   in	   collective	   consumption	   and	   public	  investment.	   This	   had	   repercussions	   on	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods,	   generating	  discontent	   and	   pressures	   for	   change.	   Since	   most	   of	   the	   public	   goods	   are	   provided	  locally,	   the	   harm	   from	   austerity	   affected	   territorially	   delineated	   societal	   groups.	  Therefore,	   the	   harm	   arising	   from	   austerity	   created	   the	   basis	   for	   territorially	   based	  coalitions	  of	  interests,	  independent	  of	  class.	  It	  was	  this	  basis	  that	  the	  Flemish	  political	  elite	  built	  upon	  when	  redefining	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  as	  an	  interregional	  redistribution	  issue	  and	  trying	  to	  focus	  austerity	  on	  Wallonia.	  	  This	  redefinition	  first	  gained	  practical	  relevance	  when	  agreement	  was	  reached	  over	  the	  repartitioning	  of	   some	  of	   the	   tax	   revenues	  and	   the	  devolution	  of	  authority	  over	  most	  collective	  consumption	  and	  public	  investment	  items	  to	  the	  regions	  and	  communities	  in	  1988.	   Dividing	   up	   taxes	   –	   and	   channelling	   a	   higher	   share	   to	   Flanders	   –	   was	   an	  important	   step	   in	   promoting	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   Flemish	   societal	   coalition	   for	   two	  interconnected	  reasons.	   In	  the	  short	  run,	   it	  would	  ensure	  that	  the	  Flemish	  population	  bears	   a	   smaller	   share	   of	   the	   burdens	   of	   ‘permanent	   austerity’	   that	   the	   deficit	   in	   the	  social	  security	  system	  necessitated.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  however,	  it	  could	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  eliciting	  sacrifices	  from	  Wallonia	  in	  the	  social	  security	  question	  itself.	  Since	  the	  Francophone	  community	  was	  to	  be	  increasingly	  underfunded	  according	  to	  the	  original	  tax-­‐sharing	   settlement,	   the	   toll	   on	   public	   consumption	   and	   investment	   would	   be	  progressively	   increasing.	  This	  would	  step	  up	   the	  pressure	  on	   the	  Walloon	  population	  and	  gradually	  create	  the	  political	  conditions	  for	  a	  new	  settlement	  in	  which	  concessions	  in	  the	  social	  security	  issue	  could	  be	  achieved	  in	  return	  for	  renegotiating	  the	  tax	  sharing	  agreements	  or	  possibly	  for	  bailing	  out	  a	  bankrupt	  Wallonia.	  This	  longer-­‐term	  aspect	  is	  important,	   because	   of	   the	   constitutional	   veto	   power	   of	   each	   linguistic	   group,	   which	  makes	   compromise	   a	   precondition	   for	   important	   institutional	   changes.	   Unless	   the	  Walloon	  side	  is	  manoeuvred	  into	  a	  position	  in	  which	  it	  consents	  to	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  system	  of	  redistribution,	  forcing	  a	  change	  risks	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  country.	  	  The	  institutional	  changes	  of	  1988	  were	  just	  put	  into	  place	  when	  Maastricht	  temporarily	  changed	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   the	   two	   halves	   of	   the	   country.	   Ironically,	   the	  institutional	  framework	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  give	  Flanders	  fiscal	  leverage	  over	  Wallonia	  became	  a	  major	  liability.	  Given	  that	  authority	  of	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  spending	  items	  had	  been	  devolved	  to	  the	  regional	  level,	  Wallonia’s	  cooperation	  in	  budget	  management	  was	  essential.	  Since	  Flanders	  had	  a	  much	  larger	  stake	  in	  early	  euro-­‐accession	  than	  Wallonia,	  Flemish	   politicians	   made	   concessions	   in	   budgetary	   negotiations	   and	   expanded	   the	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funds	   available	   to	   the	   Walloon	   and	   Francophone	   entities.	   Far	   from	   increasing	   the	  pressure	  on	  the	  Walloon	  side,	  devolution	  ended	  up	  giving	  Wallonia	  more	  fiscal	  ease	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro.	  	  	  The	   Maastricht	   moment	   reinforced	   the	   Flemish	   societal	   coalition	   and	   polarized	   its	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  with	  the	  Walloon	  population.	  It	  underlined	  the	  common	  interest	  of	  different	  sections	  of	  the	  Flemish	  society	  in	  international	  competitiveness	  and	  therefore	  in	  early	  euro-­‐accession.	  Simultaneously,	  it	  highlighted	  the	  contrast	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  economically	  stagnant	  Wallonia,	  dependent	  on	  the	  flow	  of	  funds	  from	  Flanders.	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   Maastricht	   also	   forced	   political	   actors	   to	   keep	   the	   intensifying	   conflict	  dormant	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   quest	   to	   meet	   the	   deficit	   criterion	   in	   time	   for	   early	  accession	   and	   constrained	   the	   Flemish	   coalition	   from	   pursuing	   a	   settlement	   in	   its	  redistributive	   conflicts	   with	   the	   Walloon	   coalition.	   After	   euro-­‐accession,	   the	   conflict	  erupted	  with	  new	  intensity	  and	  is	  currently	  threatening	  to	  break	  up	  the	  country.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  2000s,	  Belgium	  left	  its	  fiscal	  problems	  behind.	  It	  got	  rid	  of	  practically	  all	  of	  the	  debt	  that	  it	  had	  accumulated	  in	  the	  fiscally	  disastrous	  1980s.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	   structural	   problem	   that	   had	  made	   governments	   helpless	   in	   the	   face	   of	   alarming	  debt	   growth	   in	   the	   1980s	   lives	   on	   into	   the	   2010s.	   The	   deficit	   of	   the	   social	   security	  budget	  is	  large	  and	  widening.	  Only	  time	  will	  tell	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  structural	  problem	  will	   cause	   future	   governments	   further	   headaches	   in	   the	   face	   of	   deteriorating	   growth	  prospects	  and	   increasing	   interest	   rates	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  European	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  The	  debt	  ratio	  deteriorated	   in	  the	  past	  years,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  stabilized	  before	  reaching	  the	  hundred	  per	  cent	  mark	  again.	  	  While	   the	  country	  shows	  remarkable	  composure	   in	   its	   fiscal	  matters	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  turmoil,	  politically	  it	  has	  been	  in	  constant	  crisis	  for	  the	  past	  few	   years.	   This	   chapter	   has	   argued	   that	   the	  most	   recent	   developments	   reflect	   latent	  processes	  underway	   in	   the	  past	  decades,	   and	   that	   the	   country’s	  past	  persistent	   fiscal	  problems	   as	   well	   as	   the	   euro	   accession	   contributed	   to	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   present	  political	  crisis.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  chapter	  shed	  interesting	  light	  on	  the	  unexpected	  side	  effects	   of	   the	   convergence	   process.	   By	   ‘tying	   the	   hands’	   of	   the	   federal	   government,	  Maastricht	  gave	  a	  huge	  advantage	  to	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  the	  fiscal	  stabilization.	  Wallonia	  was	  able	   to	  strengthen	   its	  –	  otherwise	  weaker	  –	  position	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and	  put	  up	  more	  effective	  resistance	  to	  Flemish	  initiatives	  to	  reduce	  the	  flow	  of	  funds	  to	  Wallonia	   and	   force	   the	  Walloon	   side	   to	   engage	   in	   retrenchment.	  By	   intervening	   in	  this	   domestic	   redistributive	   struggle,	  Maastricht	   indirectly	   retarded	   the	   resolution	   of	  the	  country’s	  structural	  problems	  within	  the	  social	  security	  sector.	  	  	  The	  case	  studies	   in	   the	  past	   four	  chapters	  presented	  a	  society-­‐centred	  analysis	  of	   the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  in	  two	  countries	  with	  the	  most	  severe	  fiscal	  problems	  in	  Europe	   in	   the	   decades	   before	   the	   current	   age	   of	   turmoil	   and	   crises.	   The	   analysis	  highlighted	   the	   tight	   limits	   on	   governments’	   room	   for	   manoeuvre	   in	   resolving	   fiscal	  problems	   in	   both	   countries	   and	   underlined	   the	   importance	   for	   the	   success	   of	  stabilization	  of	  securing	  the	  support	  of	  strong	  societal	  coalitions.	  The	  case	  studies	  also	  evaluated	  the	  two	  countries’	  experience	  with	  adopting	  binding	  (external)	  fiscal	  rules	  in	  the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	  euro	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  societal	   struggles	  over	   fiscal	  policy.	  They	  concluded	  that	  Maastricht’s	  impact	  on	  policy	  choices	  depended	  on	  how	  the	  race	  for	  the	  euro	   affected	   the	   different	   societal	   coalitions	   involved	   in	   the	   fiscal	   conflicts.	   In	   Italy,	  early	   euro-­‐accession	   was	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   strong	   coalition	   that	   had	   captured	   policy	  making	   completely	   and	   had	   pushed	   through	   stabilizing	   policies	   even	   before	   the	  decision	   was	   made	   to	   join	   the	   common	   currency	   early.	   In	   Italy’s	   case,	   therefore,	  Maastricht	   made	   little	   difference	   to	   fiscal	   results.	   In	   Belgium,	   the	   quest	   for	   early	  accession	  strengthened	  a	  societal	  coalition	  that	  had	  been	  likely	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  bear	  the	  burdens	  of	  consolidation	  and	  allowed	   it	   to	  resist	  such	  an	  outcome.	  Maastricht’s	  effect	  was	   therefore	   to	   delay	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   issue.	   The	   next,	   chapter	   evaluates	   these	  lessons	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective.	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Chapter	  7.	  Conclusion:	  Societal	  coalitions	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  fiscal	  pain	  	  	  Excessive	   public	   indebtedness	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   policy	   problem:	   it	   is	   a	   socio-­‐political	  issue.	  Governments	  may	  borrow	  for	  all	  sorts	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  reasons	   in	  any	  given	   year,	   but	   failure	   to	   restore	   fiscal	   balance	   and	   stop	   borrowing	   once	   the	   level	   of	  indebtedness	  reaches	  proportions	  that	  expose	  a	  country	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  sovereign	  default	  is	  an	  altogether	  different	  matter.	  Such	  failure	  indicates	  stubborn	  redistributive	  conflicts	  among	   societal	   groups	   within	   the	   given	   polity,	   which	   render	   policy	   makers	   helpless	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasing	  fiscal	  vulnerability.	  Closing	  a	  persistent	  large	  gap	  in	  public	  finances	  involves	  forcing	  or	  convincing	  considerable	  sections	  of	  society	  to	  permanently	  pay	  more	  into	  or	  take	  less	  out	  of	  the	  public	  purse.	  Since	  societal	  groups	  have	  numerous	  ways	   of	   defending	   themselves	   against	   onslaughts	   on	   their	   interests	   in	   a	   democratic	  system,	   major	   budgetary	   adjustments	   require	   political	   support	   or	   at	   least	   tacit	  acquiescence	  from	  a	  large	  part	  of	  society.	  Until	  a	  specific	  stabilization	  package	  is	  found	  that	  can	  rely	  on	   the	  support	  of	  a	  strong	  enough	  societal	   coalition,	   imbalances	  persist,	  debt	   accumulates	   and	   risks	   mount.	   Therefore,	   understanding	   why	   a	   country	   would	  drift	  close	  to	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  fiscal	  abyss	  and	  when	  it	  would	  finally	  turn	  back	  requires	  studying	  the	  incentives	  of	  different	  societal	  groups	  to	  ally	  with	  other	  groups	  in	  resisting	  or	   supporting	   certain	   consolidation	  packages.	   Consequently,	   it	   requires	   exploring	   the	  costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   different	   stabilization	   programmes	   for	   each	   group.	   This	   thesis	  used	  this	  approach	  to	  account	  for	  the	  extraordinary	  fiscal	  troubles	  of	  two	  of	  the	  most	  indebted	   countries	   of	   the	   developed	   world,	   Italy	   and	   Belgium,	   and	   to	   explain	   their	  dissimilar	   experiences	   with	   correcting	   their	   fiscal	   performance	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  evolving	  European	  fiscal	  architecture.	  	  This	   theoretical	   approach	   combines	   the	   society-­‐centred	   tradition	   of	   studying	   policy	  choices	   –	  more	   specifically,	   the	   line	   of	   inquiry	   proposed	   by	   Gourevitch	   in	   Politics	   in	  Hard	  Times	  (1986)	  –	  with	  the	  analytical	  tools	  provided	  by	  the	  “war	  of	  attrition”	  model	  of	   delayed	   stabilization	   developed	   by	   Alesina	   and	   Drazen	   (1991).	   Gourevitch’s	  approach	  provides	  a	  conceptual	  template	  for	  mapping	  the	  constellation	  of	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  within	  a	  polity,	  for	  analysing	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  them	  and	  for	   using	   this	   information	   to	   explain	   observed	   policy	   choices.	   The	   war	   of	   attrition	  model,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  helps	  to	  understand	  how	  coalitions	  realign	  as	  the	  interests	  of	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individual	  groups	  evolve	  with	  time	  under	  pressure	  from	  a	  persistent	  fiscal	  problem.	  In	  other	   words,	   the	   model	   helps	   to	   investigate	   the	   formation,	   break-­‐up	   and	   the	  reconfiguration	  of	  societal	  coalitions	   in	  a	  dynamic	  context	  and	  to	  explain	   the	  opening	  up	   –	   or	   potentially	   the	   closing	   down	   –	   of	  windows	   of	   political	   opportunity	   for	   fiscal	  stabilization.	  	  	  This	  theoretical	  approach	  provided	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  debt	  problem	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  by	  uncovering	  the	  link	  between	  observed	  policy	  changes	  and	  shifts	   in	  societal	  coalitions.	  This	  explanation	  outperformed	  alternative	  theories	   in	  its	  goodness	  of	   fit	  with	  the	  details	  of	   the	  observed	  fiscal	  developments.	   It	  was	  able	   to	  account	  not	  only	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  headline	  deficit	  and	  debt	  figures,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  specific	  composition	  of	  expenditures	  and	  revenues.	  Furthermore,	   investigating	  the	   empirical	   cases	   through	   the	   theoretical	   lens	   of	   this	   approach	   yielded	   interesting	  insights	   beyond	   the	   narrow	   field	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   helped	   to	   better	   understand	  momentous	  changes	   in	   the	  political	   life	  and	  political	   institutions	  of	   the	   two	  countries	  during	   the	   three	   decades	   under	   consideration.	   It	   shed	   light	   on	   how	   realignments	   in	  societal	  coalitions	  of	  interests	  were	  reflected	  in	  realignments	  in	  the	  political	  sphere	  and	  how	  the	  societal	  and	  political	  shifts	  sometimes	  resulted	  in	  institutional	  reform.	  	  	  The	  empirical	  case	  studies	  underlined	  three	  core	  elements	  of	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  employed	   here.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   control	   of	   the	   government	   over	   fiscal	  stabilization.	   In	   both	   countries,	   several	   examples	   of	   botched	   fiscal	   reforms	  demonstrated	  that	  governmental	  determination	  on	  its	  own	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  carry	  out	  successful	  stabilization	  programmes	  and	  strong	  societal	  backing	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  inflict	  fiscal	  pain.	  Conversely,	  these	  episodes	  also	  bore	  witness	  to	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  choices	  of	  societal	  groups	  and	  highlighted	  several	  non-­‐electoral	  sources	  and	  channels	  of	  policy	  influence	  they	  can	  avail	  of.	  These	  results	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  need	  to	   understand	   debt	   accumulation	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   influential	   societal	  groups	   in	   supporting	   or	   opposing	   certain	   stabilization	  programmes.	   Second,	   the	   case	  studies	   highlighted	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   the	   macroeconomic	   side	   effects	   of	   debt	  accumulation	  in	  inducing	  societal	  groups	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  stabilization	  programmes	  that	  require	  considerable	  sacrifices	  from	  them.	  They	  suggested	  that	  if	  such	  side	  effects	  are	  absent,	   the	   chances	   of	   a	   successful	   stabilization	   are	   very	   low.	   Third,	   the	   case	   studies	  called	   into	   question	   the	   significance	   of	   fiscal	   governance,	   electoral	   institutions,	   party	  political	  and	  corporatist	  arrangements	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  for	  fiscal	  performance.	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Finally,	  the	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  surprising	  phenomena.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Belgian	   fiscal	   patterns	   and	   political	   events	   revealed	   a	  remarkable	  continuity	  in	  the	  country’s	  fiscal	  path	  across	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  despite	  the	  common	  perception	  that	  Belgium	  underwent	  profound	  fiscal	  transformation	  since	  the	   1980s.	   In	   fact,	   little	   changed	   about	   the	   substance	   of	   Belgian	   fiscal	   policies	   in	   the	  past	   decades	   and	   the	   defining	   redistributive	   conflicts	   that	   had	   stood	   in	   the	   way	   of	  consolidation	   in	   the	  1980s	   survived	  until	   the	  present	  day.	  The	   favourable	   changes	   in	  the	   country’s	   headline	   figures	   mostly	   reflect	   an	   exogenous	   fall	   in	   the	   interest	   rates,	  while	   the	   underlying	   spending	   and	   revenue	   trends	   are	   fairly	   constant.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  the	  same	  case	  study	  called	  attention	  to	  unexpected	  counterproductive	  effects	  of	  the	   binding	   external	   fiscal	   constraints	   that	   the	   Maastricht	   criteria	   placed	   on	   Belgian	  policy	   makers.	   Although	   commonly	   associated	   with	   the	   abrupt	   turnaround	   in	   the	  country’s	  fiscal	  performance,	  these	  constraints	  actually	  helped	  to	  entrench	  the	  societal	  conflict	   about	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   social	   security	   sector,	   which	   had	   been	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  Belgium’s	  fiscal	  woes	  since	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  thereby	  retarded	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  This	  chapter	  evaluates	   the	   findings	  of	   the	  case	  studies	  and	  uses	   them	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  proposed	  in	  this	  thesis	  enriched	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  politics	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  making	   in	  general	  and	  of	  excessive	   indebtedness	   in	  particular.	  The	   second	   section	   summarizes	   the	   two	   country	   narratives	   elaborated	   on	   in	   the	  previous	  chapters	  The	  third	  and	  the	  fourth	  sections	  look	  at	  the	  way	  the	  two	  constituent	  parts	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   –	   Gourevitch’s	   coalition	   of	   societal	   interests	  approach	   and	   the	  war	   of	   attrition	  model	   –	   helped	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   concrete	  cases	  and	  how	  the	  two	  cases	  helped	  to	  fill	  the	  theoretical	  frame	  with	  concrete	  meaning.	  The	  fifth	  section	  analyses	  the	  complementarities	  and	  contradictions	  of	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  with	   alternative	   explanations	   for	  debt	   accumulation	  by	   critically	   evaluating	  institutionalist	  and	  ideational	  studies	  of	  Italy	  and	  Belgium.	  The	  last	  section	  enumerates	  the	  contributions	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  theoretical,	  methodological	  and	  policy	  debates.	  	  
Tracing	  the	  politics	  of	  debt	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  	  The	  Italian	  and	  Belgian	  case	  studies	  combined	  Gourevitch’s	  theoretical	  approach	  with	  the	   insights	   of	   the	   game	   theoretic	   model	   in	   a	   framework	   of	   iterative	   analysis.	   The	  starting	  point	  for	  each	  case	  study	  was	  the	  early	  1980s,	  when	  fiscal	  imbalances	  grew	  to	  alarming	   proportions	   in	   both	   countries.	   The	   investigations	   identified	   influential	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societal	   groups	   within	   the	   given	   polity,	   determined	   their	   interests	   towards	   public	  finances,	   and	  clarified	  political	   ties	  and	  oppositions	  between	   them.	  This	  provided	   the	  basis	  for	  explaining	  the	  initial	  policy	  responses	  given	  to	  the	  growing	  fiscal	  problems	  in	  both	  countries.	  The	  next	  step	  was	  to	  analyse	  –	  using	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	   –	   how	   the	   interests	   of	   each	   of	   these	   groups	   evolved	   as	   the	   initial	   policy	  responses	   made	   their	   impact	   felt	   on	   the	   general	   economic	   environment	   and	   on	   the	  wellbeing	   of	   each	   group.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   exposed	   new	   constellations	   of	   commonalities	  and	   conflicts	   of	   interest,	   which	   explained	   observed	   political	   realignments	   and	   policy	  adjustments	   that	   followed	   in	   their	  wake.	   The	   exogenous	   effect	   of	   the	   euro-­‐accession	  and	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  fiscal	  rules	  in	  each	  country	  was	  examined	  in	  the	  same	  iterative	  framework,	  starting	  with	  the	   influence	  of	   the	  euro	  on	  the	   interests	  of	  specific	  societal	  groups	   towards	   fiscal	   policy,	   leading	   to	   a	   potential	   reconfiguration	   of	   coalitions	   of	  interests	   and	   triggering	   a	   change	   in	   policies	   that	   would	   once	   again	   impact	   the	  constellation	  of	  interest	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  resulted	  in	  a	  theoretically	  informed	  tracing	  of	  the	   process	   of	   debt	   accumulation	   and	   decumulation,	   which	   discovered	   sources	   of	  stability	  and	  change	  in	  the	  sociological	  context	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  In	   Italy,	   the	   analysis	   identified	   four	  major	   societal	   groups,	  whose	   influence	   on	   policy	  making	   initially	  precluded	  any	  meaningful	   response	   to	   the	  escalating	   fiscal	  problems.	  Three	  of	  these	  groups	  –	  large	  enterprises,	  small	  businesses	  and	  the	  self-­‐employed,	  and	  a	  clientele	  network	   in	   the	  South	  –	  had	   leverage	  on	  policy	  makers	  via	   their	   ties	   to	   the	  dominant	  party	   in	   the	  government,	  Christian	  Democracy,	  whereas	   the	   fourth	  group	  –	  organized	   labour	   in	   large	   enterprises	   –	   maintained	   de	   facto	   veto	   power	   over	   policy	  choices	  via	  the	  threat	  of	  mass	  mobilization.	  Each	  of	  the	  four	  groups	  had	  strong	  vested	  interest	   in	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   extant	   fiscal	   arrangements:	   large	   businesses	   were	  attached	   to	   a	   system	  of	   tax	   exemptions	   and	   subsidies,	   small	   businesses	   and	   the	   self-­‐employed	  were	  dependent	  on	  the	  tacit	  toleration	  of	  tax	  evasion,	  the	  clientele	  network	  in	  the	  South	  drew	  its	  livelihood	  from	  public	  employment	  and	  public	  projects,	  whereas	  organized	  labour	  insisted	  on	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  social	  insurance	  system.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  first	   three	  groups	  continued	  to	  prop	  up	  and	  hold	  hostage	  the	  dominant	  party	  and	  organized	  labour	  refused	  to	  relax	  its	  resistance,	  practically	  no	  item	  in	  the	  budget	  could	  be	  meaningfully	  adjusted.	  	  	  However,	  since	  high	  deficits	   led	  to	  high	  inflation	  –	  which	  in	  turn	  eroded	  international	  competitiveness	  –	  both	  the	  support	  for	  the	  government	  and	  the	  intransigence	  of	  unions	  were	  weakened	  by	  increasing	  discontent	  within	  those	  sections	  of	  business	  and	  labour	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that	   were	   exposed	   to	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   declining	   competitiveness.	  Eventually,	   this	   led	   to	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   awkward	   alliance	   of	   large	   and	   small	  businesses	   with	   the	   Southern	   clientele	   within	   Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   and	   a	  strategic	   shift	   in	   the	   labour	  movement.	   A	   new	   political	   pole	  was	   created	   around	   the	  objective	  of	  restoring	  fiscal	  equilibrium	  and	  international	  competitiveness.	  It	  relied	  on	  a	   coalition	   of	   labour	   with	   some	   sections	   of	   business	   and	   carried	   out	   a	   successful	  programme	  of	  stabilization	  that	  placed	  the	  burden	  of	  consolidation	  predominantly	  on	  the	   Southern	   population	   and	   on	   tax	   evaders.	   However,	   the	   competitiveness	   coalition	  disintegrated	  as	  soon	  as	  competitiveness	  had	  been	  restored	  and	  cemented	  for	  the	  long	  term	  thanks	  to	  Italy’s	  euro	  accession.	  The	  awkward	  alliance	  of	  large	  enterprises,	  small	  businesses	  and	  the	  Southern	  clientele	  networks	  re-­‐coalesced	  and	  many	  of	  the	  features	  of	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   1980s	  were	   restored	   and	   the	   fiscal	   improvements	   of	   the	   1990s	  were	   largely	   undone.	   The	  political	   forces	   that	   used	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   support	   of	   societal	  groups	   with	   a	   stake	   in	   international	   competitiveness	   tried	   to	   stage	   a	   comeback	   and	  won	  the	  2006	  election,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  backing	  they	  had	  enjoyed	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  government	  fell	  in	  2008.	  	  	  This	   evolution	   of	   societal	   coalitions	   of	   interest	   fully	   explains	   the	   fiscal	   patterns	  observed	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  past	  three	  decades:	  the	  complete	  policy	  passivity	  of	  the	  1980s	  in	   the	   face	   of	   alarming	   debt	   growth,	   the	   astonishing	   consolidation	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	  relapse	   of	   the	   2000s	   and	   even	   the	   short	   intermezzo	   of	   austerity	   between	   2006	   and	  2008.	  Furthermore,	  it	  accounts	  for	  the	  curious	  pattern	  of	  policy	  reversals	  between	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s:	  for	  the	  U-­‐turns	  in	  tax	  laws,	  pension	  measures,	  expenditure	  cuts	  and	  so	   on	   as	   governments	   representing	   one	   coalition	   of	   societal	   groups	   replaced	  governments	   standing	   for	   the	   others.	   Moreover,	   the	   societal	   analysis	   helps	   to	   better	  understand	   the	  momentous	   political	   realignment	   that	   took	   place	   in	   the	   early	   1990s.	  Naturally,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  party	  system	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  had	  more	  varied	  causes	  than	  what	  can	  be	  captured	  by	   this	  narrative.	  However,	   the	   interest	  group	  dynamics	  –	  and	  especially	   the	  emergence	  of	   a	  division	  between	  groups	  exposed	   to	  and	   sheltered	  from	  international	  competition	  within	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  camp	  –	  provides	  clues	  to	  why	  the	  electorate	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  split	  and	  ended	  up	  supporting	  two	  opposing	  poles	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  of	  the	  Second	  Republic.	  	  	  In	  Belgium,	   the	   investigations	  revealed	  a	  societal	  context	  structured	  by	  a	  complicated	  interplay	  of	  class	  conflict	  with	  regional	  divisions.	  Throughout	  most	  of	  the	  1980s,	  class	  conflict	   dominated	   policy-­‐making.	   Business	   and	   labour	   groups	   had	   strong	   ties	   with	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political	  parties	  in	  both	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia,	  but	  it	  was	  Flemish	  labour	  and	  business	  that	  had	  a	  de	   facto	  veto	  power	  over	  policy	  making	  due	   to	   their	   joint	   control	  over	   the	  pivotal	   actor	   in	   the	   Belgian	   political	   scene,	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   party.	  These	  two	  groups	  were	  in	  conflict	  over	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system,	  which	   had	   been	   dramatically	   destabilized	   by	   the	   economic	   shocks	   of	   the	   1970s	   and	  were	   a	   huge	   drain	   on	   public	   finances.	   Labour	  was	   reluctant	   to	  make	   concessions	   on	  benefit	  payments,	  whereas	  business	  refused	  to	  pay	  more	  to	  cover	  the	  financing	  gap.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   the	   two	   groups	   were	   united	   in	   their	   concern	   for	   international	  competitiveness	   and	   were	   eager	   to	   avoid	   that	   fiscal	   problems	   undermine	   it.	   This	  resulted	   in	   a	   curious	   pattern	   of	   fiscal	   policies.	   Successive	   governments	   enjoyed	   the	  support	   of	   both	   Flemish	   labour	   and	   business	   in	   retrenching	   public	   employment,	  subsidies	  and	  public	  investment	  –	  areas	  of	  spending	  that	  neither	  Flemish	  group	  had	  an	  important	   stake	   in	   –	   and	   therefore	   they	   were	   able	   to	   impose	   austerity	   on	   the	  discretionary	   part	   of	   the	   budget.	   The	  huge	  deficit	   in	  welfare	   spending,	   however,	  was	  left	   virtually	   untouched,	   due	   to	   the	   contradicting	   interests	   of	   the	   two	   groups	   in	   this	  issue.	   In	  other	  words,	   in	   the	  Belgian	   case,	   societal	   conflicts	  only	  paralysed	  policies	   in	  one	  area.	  However,	   the	  order	  of	  magnitude	  of	  problems	  in	  this	  area	  was	  so	   large	  that	  retrenchment	   in	   collective	   consumption	   and	   investment	   was	   insufficient	   to	  counterbalance	   it	   and	   restore	   the	   balance	   of	   public	   finances.	   Consequently,	   the	   debt	  continued	  to	  grow	  despite	  significant	  austerity	  measures.	  	  	  Unlike	   in	   the	   Italian	   case,	   persistent	   fiscal	   imbalances	   did	   not	   trigger	   an	   automatic	  political	   adjustment,	   because	   successive	   governments	   made	   sure	   –	   under	   pressure	  from	   competitiveness-­‐oriented	   Flemish	   groups	   –	   that	   fiscal	   problems	   never	   spilled	  over	   into	  monetary	   issues	  that	  could	   jeopardize	  the	   international	  standing	  of	  Flemish	  industry.	   Flemish	   labour	   and	   business	   could	   afford	   to	   persistently	   disagree	   over	   the	  social	  security	  issue,	  because	  it	  caused	  no	  direct	  harm	  to	  them.	  However,	  the	  alarming	  accumulation	   of	   debt	   could	   not	   be	   completely	   ignored.	   The	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democratic	   Party	   launched	   a	   political	   campaign	   to	   redefine	   the	   issue	   as	   a	   conflict	  between	   Flanders	   and	   Wallonia	   –	   referring	   to	   the	   imbalances	   in	   the	   amounts	  contributed	  to	  and	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  system	  in	  the	  two	  halves	  of	  the	  country	  –	  in	  order	  to	  escape	   the	   deadlock	   in	   the	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	   business.	   Splitting	   social	  security	  regionally	  would	  have	  double	  benefits	  for	  Flemish	  business	  and	  labour.	  If	  the	  deficit	  of	  the	  system	  was	  Wallonia’s	  problem	  alone,	  Walloon	  business	  and	  labour	  would	  likely	  be	  forced	  swiftly	  to	  come	  to	  agreement	  over	  consolidation,	  because	  the	  Walloon	  government	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	  secure	   financing	   for	   the	  deficit	   for	   long.	  This	  would	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both	   resolve	   the	   problem	   and	   spare	   Flemish	   groups	   from	   the	   costs.	   A	   process	   of	  federalization	  of	  public	  spending	  was	  started	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  but	  the	  advances	  made	  by	  the	  Flemish	  were	  halted	  when	  the	  imperative	  of	  early	  euro-­‐accession	  and	  the	  need	  to	   produce	   the	   right	   headline	   deficit	   figures	   made	   Flanders	   dependent	   on	   Walloon	  cooperation.	   The	   issue	   of	   splitting	   social	   security	   was	   put	   on	   ice	   until	   Belgium	   was	  safely	  within	  the	  euro	  and	  the	  Flemish-­‐Walloon	  conflict	  over	  it	  culminated	  in	  the	  recent	  years.	   For	   the	   moment,	   the	   deficit	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system	   persists	   although	  struggles	  over	   it	  between	   the	   regional	   actors	  are	   fiercer	   than	  ever.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  the	  problem	  itself	  is	  more	  affordable	  than	  before	  since	  interest	  rates	  have	  fallen,	  which	  freed	  up	  large	  amounts	  of	  funds	  in	  the	  budget.	  	  	  The	  enduring	  conflict	  between	  influential	  labour	  and	  business	  groups	  in	  Flanders	  over	  social	   security	   explains	   the	   lopsided	   adjustment	   pattern	   observed	   in	   Belgium	  throughout	  the	  past	  three	  decades:	  the	  contrast	  between	  persistently	  strict	  austerity	  in	  public	   consumption	   and	   investment	   and	   the	  widen	   gap	   in	   the	   social	   security	   budget.	  Observers	  often	  pointed	  out	  this	  asymmetrical	  pattern	  (IMF	  1998,	  European	  Economy	  1993,	  Reynders1993),	  but	  hitherto	  no	  explanation	  had	  been	  offered.	  The	  irresolvability	  of	  the	  profound	  societal	  conflict	  over	  social	  security	  also	  helps	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  stakes	   involved	   in	   and	   the	   motivation	   behind	   the	   fiscal	   federalization	   process	  underway	   in	   Belgium	   in	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   It	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   progressive	  intensification	  of	  the	  economic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  regional	  cleavage,	  which	  became	  the	  main	  axis	  of	  the	  conflict	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  system.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  convergence	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  euro-­‐accession	  also	  gains	  different	  connotations	   from	   the	   ones	   usually	   attributed	   to	   it.	   Because	   early	   accession	   was	   of	  different	  importance	  for	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  due	  to	  profound	  differences	  in	  the	  two	  economies,	   Maastricht	   changed	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   them	   so	   that	   the	  resolution	  of	   the	   fundamental	  policy	  problem	  was	  delayed.	  Flanders	  could	  not	  use	   its	  economic	  and	  political	  ascendancy	  to	  force	  Wallonia	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  bill	  of	  consolidating	  the	   social	   security	   system.	   Finally,	   the	   society-­‐centred	   narrative	   of	   Belgian	   fiscal	  problems	  also	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  motivations	  for	  the	  intransigence	  of	  political	  elites	  in	   the	   current	   political	   crisis	   in	   Belgium	   and	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   compromise	   over	   state	  reforms	  despite	  the	  daunting	  international	  economic	  and	  financial	  circumstances.	  	  	  Last	   but	   not	   least,	   the	   Italian	   and	   Belgian	   case	   studies	   help	   to	   understand	   the	  differential	   performance	   of	   the	   two	   countries	   in	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   In	   Belgium,	  societal	  conflict	  affected	  –	  and	  blocked	  adjustment	  in	  –	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  the	  budget:	  the	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social	   security	   sector.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   successive	   governments	   enjoyed	   strong	  societal	   support	   for	   strict	   austerity	   in	   public	   consumption	   and	   investment.	   This	  resulted	   in	   a	   lopsided	   adjustment	   effort	   that	   involved	   large	   adjustments	   in	   the	  discretionary	  part	  of	  the	  budget,	  but	  was	  not	  supported	  either	  by	  revenue	  measures,	  or	  by	   a	   trimming	   back	   of	   the	   social	   security	   transfers.	   This	   effort	   fell	   short	   of	   the	  requirements	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation	  as	   long	  as	   the	   interest	   costs	  on	  outstanding	  debt	  stayed	   prohibitive	   up	   to	   the	   early	   1990s,	   but	   it	   sufficed	   to	   halt	   and	   reverse	   the	  escalation	  of	  the	  problem	  once	  interest	  rates	  fell	  into	  more	  moderate	  ranges.	  Therefore,	  the	   observed	   changes	   in	   fiscal	   performance	   took	   place	   due	   to	   changes	   in	   exogenous	  conditions,	  without	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  policy	  path.	  The	  austerity	  campaign	  that	  finally	   yielded	   results	   in	   the	   1990s	   had	   been	   launched	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	   and	   was	  sustained	   through	  most	  of	   the	  period	  under	   study.	   In	  other	  words,	  Belgium	  was	  well	  placed	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   favourable	   changes	   in	   the	   international	   financial	  markets	   due	   to	   the	   sustained	   ability	   of	   governments	   to	   control	   and	   adjust	   the	  discretionary	   part	   of	   the	   budget.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   has	  remained	  a	  persistent	  source	  of	  vulnerability	  ever	  since	  it	  was	  fiscally	  destabilized	  by	  the	  oil	  shocks.	  	  In	   Italy,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   all	   the	   important	   aspects	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   –	  welfare	  policy,	  public	  employment	  and	  investment	  as	  well	  as	  most	  items	  of	  taxation	  –	  were	  hostage	  to	  some	   powerful	   societal	   group	   that	   had	   the	   policy	   leverage	   to	   protect	   its	   vested	  interests.	  This	  prevented	  meaningful	  adjustment	  in	  any	  significant	  field	  of	  spending	  or	  taxation	  until	  a	  realignment	  of	  societal	  coalitions	  allowed	  some	  groups	  –	  those	  sectors	  of	  business	  and	  labour	  that	  were	  exposed	  to	  international	  competition	  –	  to	  force	  large	  sacrifices	   on	   other	   groups,	   while	   also	   acquiescing	   in	   some	   sacrifices	   themselves.	   As	  long	   as	   the	   competitiveness	   coalition	   stayed	   cohesive,	   large	   adjustments	   –	   including	  several	   structural	   reforms	   –	   were	   possible	   and	   Italy’s	   fiscal	   performance	   improved	  radically.	  However,	   as	   soon	   as	   this	   coalition	   fell	   apart	   and	   each	  major	   societal	   group	  regained	   its	   ability	   to	   fend	   for	   its	   vested	   interests,	   the	   achievements	   of	   the	   previous	  austerity	   were	   eroded.	   The	   decumulation	   of	   debt	   stopped	   despite	   continuously	  improving	  external	  financial	  conditions	  throughout	  the	  2000s.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  while	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  involved	  every	  aspect	  of	   fiscal	  policy	  in	  Italy,	   it	  was	  limited	   to	   one	   sector	   of	   the	   budget	   in	   Belgium.	   Belgium	   performed	   better	   than	   Italy	  once	  exogenous	  conditions	  turned	  more	  clement,	  because	  its	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  allowed	   it	   to	   sustain	   (quite	   significant)	   austerity	   in	   discretionary	   spending,	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notwithstanding	  its	  persistent	  structural	  problems	  with	  social	  security.	  Italy’s	  window	  of	   opportunity,	   however,	   closed	   completely	   once	   its	   reform-­‐coalition	   lost	   its	   raison	  d’être	  after	  the	   link	  between	  fiscal	   issues	  and	  competitiveness	  had	  been	  cut.	  The	  next	  section	  disentangles	  the	  narratives	  given	  here	  and	  explains	  how	  they	  helped	  to	  fill	  the	  abstract	  theoretical	  framework	  with	  concrete	  content.	  	  
Fiscal	   policy	   making	   in	   hard	   times:	   Societal	   groups,	   policy	   influence	   and	  
coalitions	  of	  interest	  	  This	   thesis	   argued	   –	   following	   Gourevitch	   –	   that	   policy	   choices	   of	   a	   country	   can	   be	  explained	   by	   examining	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   coalitions	   of	   societal	   groups	  behind	  and	  against	  different	  policy	   initiatives.	  While	   the	   idea	   is	   intuitively	   appealing,	  using	   it	   to	   analyse	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making	   in	   different	   countries	   and	   to	  explain	   fiscal	   trajectories	   that	   lead	   to	  excessive	   indebtedness	   is	   challenging.	  Focusing	  on	  societal	  groups	  as	  the	  main	  unit	  of	  analysis	  is	  problematic,	  since	  societal	  groups	  are	  not	   “actors”	   with	   the	   capacity	   to	   make	   and	   carry	   out	   decisions	   and	   therefore	   their	  influence	   on	   policy	   making	   is	   not	   directly	   observable.	   It	   is	   not	   immediately	   obvious	  which	  groups	  within	  society	  are	  relevant	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making,	  how	   the	   relevant	   groups	   exercise	   influence	   on	   policy	   choices,	   how	   coalitions	   are	  formed	  behind	  and	  against	  given	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  how	  they	  break	  up	  and	  realign.	  This	   section	   spells	   out	   the	   lessons	   of	   the	  Belgian	   and	   Italian	   case	   studies	   for	   each	   of	  these	  questions.	  	  	  The	  overall	  conclusion	  of	  both	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  problems	  involved	  in	  investigating	  the	  preferences	  and	  behaviour	  of	  societal	  groups,	  substituting	  them	  with	  political	  organizations	  –	   such	  as	  parties,	   trade	  unions	  or	   lobbies	  –	   is	  not	  a	  good	   alternative	   for	   three	   reasons.	   First,	   there	   is	   no	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   correspondence	  between	   societal	   groups	   and	   political	   organizations.	   A	   single	   organization	   can	  represent	   several	   societal	   groups	  with	  different	   fiscal	   interests	   and	   the	   same	   societal	  group	  can	  support	  different	  political	  organizations	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Furthermore,	  the	  links	  between	  societal	  groups	  and	  political	  organizations	  are	   likely	  to	  change	  through	  time.	  Second,	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  social	  group	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  manifold:	  electoral	  power,	  lobbying,	  mobilization	  capacities	  and	  economic	   leverage	  are	  all	   likely	  to	  play	  a	  role	  at	  the	  same	   time	  and	  not	  all	  of	   these	  are	  wielded	   through	  political	  organizations.	  Third,	  coalitions	  of	  societal	  interests	  do	  not	  always	  correspond	  to	  alliances	  between	  political	  actors.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  elaborates	  on	  these	  three	  points.	  
	   199	  
	  
Societal	  groups	  and	  fiscal	  policy	  preferences	  	  The	  basic	  –	  and	  arguably	  the	  most	  difficult	  –	  question	  to	  clarify	  is	  which	  societal	  groups	  are	   relevant	   for	   fiscal	   policy	   making	   in	   general	   and	   for	   the	   restoration	   of	   fiscal	  equilibrium	   in	   particular.	   The	   thesis	   followed	   a	   pragmatic	   approach	   in	   identifying	  crucial	  groups	   in	  each	  polity.	   Instead	  of	  working	  with	   a	  priori	  categories	   like	  class	  or	  sector	   it	   analysed	   extant	   fiscal	   policies	   at	   the	   time	  when	   fiscal	   imbalances	   started	   to	  grow	  to	  alarming	  proportions	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  societal	  groups	  with	  vested	  interests	  in	   different	   aspects	   of	   the	   existing	   arrangements	   and	   to	   detect	   possible	   sources	   of	  resistance	  to	  consolidation	  efforts.	  Looking	  back	  in	  recent	  history	  at	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  most	  important	  spending	  programmes	  and/or	  tax	  arrangements	  also	  helped	  to	  clarify	  which	   groups	  had	   exercised	   influence	  on	  policy	  making	   in	   the	  past	   and	  what	   kind	  of	  political	   channels	   they	   had	   been	   using	   to	   promote	   their	   interests.	   This	   preliminary	  analysis	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   explaining	   the	   policy	   responses	   given	   to	   alarming	   debt	  growth	  in	  the	  following	  decades.	  	  In	  Italy,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  societal	  interests	  towards	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  vindicated	  the	  pragmatic	  approach,	  because	  the	  four	  key	  groups	  identified	  there	  were	   separated	   along	   rather	   idiosyncratic	   dimensions	   due	   to	   historical	   factors.	  Business	   was	   divided	   into	   two	   distinct	   groups	   according	   to	   size.	   Historically,	   large	  business	   had	   shared	   an	   interest	  with	   small	   enterprises	   and	   the	   self-­‐employed	   in	   low	  taxes.	  However,	  when	  a	   tax	   reform	   increased	  de	   jure	   fiscal	   pressure	  on	  personal	   and	  corporate	  incomes,	  the	  two	  size	  classes	  reacted	  very	  differently.	  Large	  enterprises	  used	  their	   economic	  weight	   and	   lobby	  power	   to	   achieve	   exemptions	   and	   rebates,	  whereas	  small	  businesses	  simply	  evaded	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  new	  taxes.	  Therefore,	  by	  the	  time	  when	  fiscal	  problems	  got	  truly	  out	  of	  hand	  in	  the	  1980s,	  they	  had	  very	  different	  vested	  interests.	   Small	   business	   cared	   about	  maintaining	   the	   tacit	   toleration	   of	   tax	   evasion,	  whereas	  large	  business	  was	  wedded	  to	  the	  system	  of	  targeted	  exemptions.	  Labour	  was	  divided	  regionally.	  Workers	  in	  the	  industrial	  North	  and	  the	  stagnant	  South	  had	  vested	  interests	  in	  very	  different	  spending	  programmes.	  The	  extensive	  welfare	  system	  created	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  limited	  eligibility	  to	  workers	  with	  stable	  employment	  and	   therefore	  mostly	   benefited	   labour	   in	   the	   dynamic	   North.	   In	   the	   South,	   however,	  most	   of	   the	   labour	   force	   was	   legally	   excluded	   from	   the	   benefits	   because	   of	   the	   dire	  employment	  situation	  in	  the	  region.	  Instead,	  their	  livelihood	  depended	  on	  public	  sector	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employment	   and	   on	   public	   investment	   projects	   in	   the	   region,	   both	   of	   which	   were	  expanded	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  	  In	  Belgium,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  structure	  of	  societal	  interests	  towards	  fiscal	  policies	  was	  determined	  along	  standard	  class	  lines	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Business	  was	  focused	  on	  keeping	  taxes	  and	  payroll	  costs	  low,	  whereas	  labour	  was	  strongly	  attached	  to	  the	  generous	  welfare	  system	  that	  had	  been	  created	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Public	  employment	  and	  investment	  did	  not	  historically	  have	  a	  redistributive,	  income-­‐replacing	  role	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Italian	  South.	  After	  the	  oil	  shocks,	  the	  number	  of	  public	  employees	  was	  expanded	  to	  siphon	  off	  some	  of	   the	  unemployed	  from	  the	   labour	  market	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  public	   employment	   increased,	   especially	   in	   the	   Walloon	   region,	   where	   other	  employment	   opportunities	   stayed	   stubbornly	   depressed.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	  availability	   of	   unlimited	   unemployment	   benefits	   and	   generous	   early	   and	   regular	  pensions,	  public	  employment	  never	  quite	  played	  a	  role	  in	  Belgium	  like	  in	  the	  South	  of	  Italy.	  Interestingly,	  the	  regional	  conflict	  of	  interests	  that	  has	  played	  such	  an	  important	  role	   in	   Belgian	   politics	   in	   the	   past	   decades	  was	   not	   coded	   into	   the	   status	   quo	   of	   the	  1980s	  in	  any	  way.	  Instead,	  it	  has	  been	  constructed	  politically	  as	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  policy	  conundrum	  of	  unstoppable	  debt	  for	  the	  Flemish	  political	  elite.	  	  	  While	   the	   crucial	   groups	  were	   primarily	   defined	   by	   their	   economic	   positions	   in	   both	  polities,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   historical	   policy	   decisions	   –	   and	   by	   implication	   historical	  political	   struggles	   –	   also	   played	   a	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   societal	   context	   in	  which	   fiscal	  consolidation	  was	  to	   take	  place	   in	  both	  countries.	  For	  example,	   the	  decision	  to	  create	  an	   exclusive	   welfare	   system	   divided	   labour	   in	   Italy,	   or	   rather,	   further	   entrenched	  divisions	  between	  “insiders”	   in	   the	  North	  and	  regionally	  delineated	  “outsiders”	   in	   the	  South.	   In	   Belgium,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   inclusive	   social	   security	   system	   kept	   the	  vested	   interests	   of	   Flemish	   and	  Walloon	  workers	   in	   the	   social	   security	   status	   quo	   in	  sync	   despite	   the	   strong	   divergence	   of	   their	   economic	   positions	   by	   the	  mid-­‐1980s.	   In	  fact,	  this	  is	  exactly	  why	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  between	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	   would	   be	   key	   to	   breaking	   the	   solidarity	   over	   the	   social	   security	   issue	  among	  workers	  in	  the	  two	  halves	  of	  the	  country.	  Beyond	  past	  policy	  decisions,	  historic	  contingencies	   also	   play	   a	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   societal	   context	   of	   policy	   making	   by	  influencing	   the	   economic	   architecture	   of	   the	   country	   itself.	   For	   example,	   in	   Italy,	   the	  self-­‐employed	  represent	  an	  unusually	  large	  share	  of	  the	  population	  and,	  therefore,	  they	  (along	   with	   small	   family	   businesses)	   embody	   a	   significant	   and	   powerful	   cluster	   of	  interests.	  Similarly,	  the	  regional	  economic	  disparities	  in	  both	  countries	  are	  historically	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determined.	   Therefore,	   while	   some	   of	   the	   criteria	   for	   delineating	   groups	   with	  homogeneous	   interests	   towards	   the	   fiscal	   status	   quo	   are	   generalizable,	   others	   are	  country-­‐specific.	  	  
Influence	  on	  policy	  making	  	  The	   clusters	   of	   interests	   towards	   fiscal	   policy	   are	   important	   in	   determining	   actual	  policy	   trajectories	   insofar	  as	   the	  societal	  groups	  holding	   these	   interests	  can	   influence	  policy	  making.	  The	  groups	  identified	  in	  the	  Belgian	  and	  Italian	  cases	  availed	  of	  different	  channels	  of	  influencing	  policies.	  Some	  worked	  through	  the	  standard	  electoral	  channels,	  whereas	  others	  were	  linked	  to	  the	  control	  of	  the	  given	  group	  over	  economic	  resources.	  Organized	   labour	   exercised	   leverage	   predominantly	   via	   the	   threat	   of	   strikes	   in	   both	  countries.	  The	  electoral	  weight	  of	  workers	  was	  secondary,	  but	  for	  different	  reasons	  in	  the	   two	   cases.	   In	   Italy,	   organized	   labour	   was	   electorally	   neutralized	   in	   the	   First	  Republic	   due	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   Communists	   from	   government.	   Workers’	   votes	  only	   became	   truly	   important	   in	   the	   Second	   Republic.	   However,	   even	   in	   that	   period,	  strikes	  remained	  a	  crucial	  source	  of	  veto-­‐power,	  especially	  under	  centre-­‐right	  cabinets.	  In	  Belgium,	   organized	   labour	  had	   a	   strong	   voice	  within	   the	  pivotal	   Flemish	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  and	  therefore	  within	  government.	  However,	  even	  there,	  the	  threat	  of	  strikes	  represented	  a	  crucial	  source	  of	  labour’s	  influence,	  because	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	   also	   had	   a	   strong	   business	   section,	   whose	   weight	   was	   primarily	   kept	   in	  check	  by	  the	  strike	  threat	  from	  labour.	  	  	  Business	   groups	   –	   large	   and	   small	   –	   promoted	   their	   interests	   in	   both	   countries	  primarily	  via	  lobbying	  the	  government	  and	  supporting	  right-­‐wing	  and	  centrist	  parties.	  Importantly,	  however,	  the	  de	  facto	  power	  of	  business	  to	  defend	  its	   interests	  exceeded	  its	   electoral	   and	   lobby	   influence	   on	   the	   legislative	   process	   due	   to	   the	   ability	   of	  enterprises	  to	  adapt	  their	  strategies	  to	  new	  policies.	  The	  most	  telling	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  wave	   of	   outsourcing	   and	  downsizing	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Italy	   in	   the	   1980s,	  which	  reflected	  the	  efforts	  of	  businesses	  to	  escape	  tightened	  labour	  regulations	  and	  increased	  fiscal	  pressure	  that	  the	  reforms	  of	  the	  1970s	  had	  brought	  about.	  Clearly,	  the	  ability	  of	  small	  businesses	  to	  evade	  taxes	  reflects	  a	  certain	  leniency	  of	  governments	  that	  counted	  on	   the	   electoral	   support	   of	   small	   entrepreneurs	   and	   the	   self-­‐employed.	  However,	   the	  industrial	  restructuring	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  many	  enterprises	  to	  avail	  themselves	  of	   this	   tolerance	   towards	   small	   businesses	   is	   a	   forceful	   illustration	   of	   the	   ability	   of	  businesses	  to	  shape	  the	  policy	  environment	  to	  their	  needs.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  in	  Belgium	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the	   ability	   of	   businesses	   to	   substitute	   labour	  with	  machines,	   to	   relocate	   abroad	  or	   to	  move	  capital	  from	  productive	  investment	  into	  other	  forms	  of	  savings	  was	  an	  important	  deterrent	  against	  policy	  choices	  that	  would	  drastically	  impinge	  on	  business	  interests.	  	  It	  was	  the	  groups	  without	  major	  sources	  of	  economic	  power	  –	  like	  the	  population	  of	  the	  economically	  stagnant	  South	  in	  Italy	  –	  that	  relied	  fully	  on	  its	  electoral	  position,	  but	  even	  in	   their	   case,	   the	   electoral	   leverage	   they	   yielded	   depended	   more	   on	   the	   balance	   of	  power	   between	   the	   different	   groups	   than	   the	   sheer	   number	   of	   votes	   the	   group	  provided.	   In	   the	   First	   Republic,	   this	   position	   provided	   surprisingly	   large	   political	  leverage	   when	   the	   Southern	   vote	   became	   key	   to	   maintaining	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  Communists	  from	  government	  and	  to	  keeping	  the	  extreme	  right	  in	  check.	  In	  the	  Second	  Republic,	   the	  Southern	  vote	  was	  crucial	   to	   the	  electoral	   successes	  of	   the	  centre-­‐right.	  Harnessing	   the	   electoral	   power	   of	   this	   section	   of	   the	   electorate	   was	   all	   the	   easier	  because	   of	   the	   traditions	   of	   clientelism	   in	   the	   region,	   which	   made	   it	   possible	   to	  specifically	   target	   public	   funds	   at	   this	   section	   of	   the	   population.	   The	   established	  clientele	  networks	  in	  the	  region	  played	  a	  central	  role	  both	  in	  gathering	  votes	  for	  and	  in	  channelling	  demands	   to	   the	  parties	   it	   supported,	   i.e.	   to	  ruling	  Christian	  Democracy	   in	  the	  First	  Republic	  and	  parties	  in	  the	  centre-­‐right	  coalition	  in	  the	  Second	  Republic.	  The	  presence	   of	   this	   type	   of	   “political	   infrastructure”	   made	   it	   possible	   for	   the	   Southern	  population	  to	  have	  considerable	  political	  weight	  in	  Italian	  politics.	  	  
Societal	  coalitions	  of	  interests	  	  The	  main	  clusters	  of	  societal	  interests	  towards	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  the	  power	  each	  cluster	  is	   able	   to	   wield	   in	   service	   of	   those	   interests	   determine	   the	   political	   space	   in	   which	  policies	  are	  made.	  Having	  explored	   this	  space,	  policy	  choices	  can	  be	  accounted	   for	  by	  identifying	  societal	  coalitions	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  policy	   choices	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	  way	   different	   clusters	   of	   interests	   unite	   their	  forces	   to	   achieve	   the	   political	   ascendancy	   needed	   for	   putting	   into	   place	   their	   policy	  preferences.	   The	   case	   studies	   showed	   that	   such	   coalitions	   can	   appear	   in	   the	   cloak	   of	  diverse	  political	  phenomena.	  It	  can	  be	  an	  alliance	  among	  parties	  representing	  different	  societal	   groups	   but	   a	   single	   party	   can	   also	   stand	   for	   a	   societal	   coalition	   in	   itself,	   if	   it	  represents	   different	   constituencies.	   A	   coalition	   can	   also	   emerge	   as	   a	   social	   pact	  between	   employers’	   organizations	   and	   trade	   unions	   in	   the	   service	   of	   specific	   policy	  priorities.	   The	   Belgian	   example	   demonstrated	   that	   establishing	   a	   new	   coalition	   can	  even	  be	  the	  objective	  of	  a	  conscious	  political	  project.	  Similarly,	   the	  disintegration	  of	  a	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coalition	   can	   be	   signified	   by	   the	   break-­‐up	   of	   a	   multi-­‐constituency	   party	   and	   its	  replacement	   with	   parties	   that	   refuse	   to	   enter	   into	   alliance	   with	   each	   other,	   by	   the	  abandonment	  of	  a	  party	  by	  part	  of	  its	  constituency	  or	  by	  the	  breakdown	  of	  a	  social	  pact,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  In	  the	  1980s	  in	  Italy,	  the	  two	  business	  groups	  and	  the	  proletariat	  of	  the	  South	  formed	  an	  awkward	  coalition	  by	  jointly	  supporting	  the	  dominant	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  its	  perennial	   junior	  partners	   in	   government.	  This	   enabled	   them	   to	   continue	   to	  block	   the	  Communists	  –	  and	  thus	   labour	  –	   from	  government	  and	  thereby	  to	  retain	   low	  de	   facto	  fiscal	  pressure	  for	  business	  and	  to	  secure	  clientelistic	  benefits	  for	  the	  South.	  However,	  since	   labour	   possessed	   an	   implicit	   veto	   over	   policies	   via	   its	   capacity	   to	  mobilize	   and	  cause	  economic	  disruption,	  this	  coalition	  was	  unable	  to	  take	  on	  welfare	  policies	  or	  raise	  the	  fiscal	  pressure	  on	  labour.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  space	  for	  adjusting	  either	  revenues	  or	  expenses,	   the	   fiscal	   imbalances	   inherited	   from	   the	   seventies	   persisted.	   By	   the	   early	  1990s,	   however,	   the	   awkward	   coalition	   was	   fraying	   as	   the	   electoral	   support	   of	   the	  Christian	  Democracy	  declined.	  	  Adjustment	  took	  place	  when	  large	  business	  teamed	  up	  with	  labour	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  This	  coalition	  was	  originally	  formed	  as	  a	  series	  of	  agreements	  between	  employers	  and	  trade	   unions	   in	   a	   party-­‐political	   vacuum	   under	   technocratic	   caretaker	   governments.	  Later,	  it	  took	  the	  form	  of	  party-­‐political	  cooperation	  within	  the	  centre-­‐left	  coalition,	  but	  negotiations	  between	   the	   social	  partners	   continued	   to	  be	   an	   important	   element.	  This	  coalition	  managed	   to	  push	   through	  a	   series	  of	   austerity	  measures	   that	  drastically	   cut	  spending	   in	   the	  South	  and	   increased	   the	   tax	  pressure	  by	   introducing	   taxes	   that	  were	  difficult	   to	   evade.	   The	   groups	   disadvantaged	   by	   these	   policies	   could	   not	   put	   up	   any	  immediate	   resistance	   as	   they	   had	   no	   representatives	   in	   government	   and	   no	   non-­‐electoral	  sources	  of	   influence.	  They	  united	  politically	  under	  the	  centre-­‐right	  umbrella,	  but	   they	   were	   unable	   to	   firmly	   recapture	   government	   until	   the	   coalition	   of	   large	  business	   and	   labour	   disintegrated.	   The	   drifting	   apart	   of	   labour	   and	   business	   was	  evident	  in	  the	  breakdown	  of	  talks	  between	  trade	  unions	  and	  employers	  after	  2000.	  In	  the	   2000s,	   the	   coalition	   of	   large	   and	   small	   business	   with	   Southerners	   was	   restored	  under	  a	  series	  of	  centre-­‐right	  governments.	  However,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  1980s,	  this	  societal	  coalition	  was	  only	  able	  to	  put	  into	  place	  some	  of	  its	  preferred	  policies,	  due	  to	  labour’s	  veto	   on	   welfare	   adjustments.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   conflicts	   over	   spending	   and	  taxation	  overflowed	  into	  debt	  accumulation	  once	  again.	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The	  Belgian	  case	  is	  peculiar	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  societal	  coalitions	  because	  both	  of	  the	  large	  societal	  groups	  –	  business	  and	  labour	  –	  have	  historically	  been	  represented	  in	  every	   government,	   via	   the	   cross-­‐class	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   in	   coalition	   with	  either	   the	   Liberals	   or	   the	   Socialists,	   and	   via	   a	   Liberal-­‐Socialist	   government	   between	  1999	  and	  2007.	   In	  a	  sense,	   the	   two	  sides	  have	   formed	  a	  permanent	  all-­‐encompassing	  societal	  “grand	  coalition”	  that	  reflects	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  sides.	  This	  balance	   is	   present	   both	   electorally	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   interdependence.	   The	  permanent	   power	   sharing	   explains	   both	   why	   the	   social	   security	   issue	   has	   been	   so	  intractable	  in	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  and	  why	  retrenchment	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  spending	  encountered	  so	  little	  resistance.	  The	  campaign	  of	  the	  Flemish	  political	  elites	  to	  redefine	  the	   fiscal	  –	  and	  within	   it	   the	   social	   security	  –	   issue	  as	  a	  Walloon-­‐Flemish	  conflict	  has	  been	  directed	  at	  opening	  up	  a	  new	  front	  along	  which	  the	  problem	  could	  be	  tackled.	  It	  created	  a	  Flemish	  societal	  coalition	  in	  opposition	  to	  Wallonia.	  	  	  The	   investigation	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   coalitions	   between	  different	   societal	   groups	  thus	  helps	   to	  account	   for	   the	  observed	  stability	  and	  change	   in	  politics	  and	  policies	   in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium.	  It	  shows	  that	  fiscal	  stabilization	  only	  happens	  when	  a	  strong	  enough	  societal	  coalition	  can	  agree	  on	  a	  given	  austerity	  package	  and	  can	  enforce	  it,	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  protest	  from	  groups	  outside	  of	  the	  coalition.	  However,	  an	  investigation	  that	  stops	   here	   only	   registers	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   supporters	   and	   power	   behind	  government	  policies	  and	  fails	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  coalitions	  last	  and	  others	  give	  way	  to	  new	  ones.	  Why	  did	  the	  curious	  coalition	  of	  business	  groups	  with	  the	  dependents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  South	  last	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  in	  Italy,	  disintegrate	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  only	  to	  be	  reassembled	  a	  decade	  later?	  And	  why	  did	  the	  coalition	  of	  large	  business	  and	  labour	   last	   for	   a	   whole	   decade	   in	   between?	  Why	   has	   the	   “grand	   coalition”	   lasted	   in	  Belgium	   in	   the	   past	   decades?	   Why	   do	   labour	   and	   business	   permanently	   “agree	   to	  disagree”	  over	  social	  security	  while	  agreeing	  about	  austerity?	  What	  did	  the	  success	  of	  redefining	  the	  social	  security	  issue	  as	  a	  Flemish-­‐Walloon	  conflict	  depend	  on?	  	  	  The	  societal	   coalitions	  approach	  presented	  here	  has	  difficulties	  explaining	  changes	   in	  the	  configuration	  of	  coalitions,	  because	   it	  concentrates	  only	  on	  the	  vested	   interests	  of	  the	   different	   sections	   of	   society	   in	   extant	   fiscal	   arrangements,	   in	   existing	   spending	  programmes	   and	   tax	   practices.	   These	   automatically	   generate	   a	   force	   for	   the	  preservation	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  –	  in	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  in	  coalitions.	  Fully	  understanding	  the	   preferences	   of	   societal	   groups	   towards	   fiscal	   policies	   –	   and	   the	   conflicts	   and	  commonalities	   of	   interests	   between	   different	   groups	   –	   requires	   taking	   into	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consideration	  the	  potential	  losses	  that	  a	  group	  suffers	  from	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  large	  imbalances,	  the	  fiscal	  status	  quo	  is	  practically	  equivalent	  to	  the	  persistent	   deterioration	   of	   the	   country’s	   public	   finances	   as	   debt	   grows	   and	   interest	  expenses	   mount.	   The	   next	   section	   uses	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   to	   analyse	   under	  what	   conditions	   the	   accumulation	   of	   public	   debt	   induces	   societal	   groups	   to	   rethink	  their	  allegiance	  to	  an	  existing	  societal	  coalition	  in	  favour	  of	  another	  one.	  	  
Political	  reconfigurations	  and	  wars	  of	  attrition	  over	  fiscal	  stabilization	  	  The	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  does	  not	  directly	  relate	  to	  societal	  coalitions.	  It	  treats	  social	  groups	  as	   isolated	  actors	  and	  explores	   the	   conditions	  under	  which	   it	   is	   rational	   for	   a	  given	  group	   to	   take	  upon	   itself	   (some	  of)	   the	   costs	  of	   stabilizing	  public	   finances	  –	  by	  paying	  more	  into	  or	  taking	  less	  out	  of	  the	  public	  purse	  –	  even	  when	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  defend	  itself	  against	  policy	  changes	  that	  encroach	  on	  its	  interests.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  model’s	  findings	  can	  be	  easily	  extended	  to	  explain	  the	  motivation	  of	  groups	  to	  form	  or	  break	  up	  coalitions.	  The	  coalitions	  of	   interests	  approach	  underlines	   that	   the	  ability	  of	  societal	   groups	   to	   defend	   their	   vested	   interests	   is	   rooted	   in	   their	   capacity	   to	   form	  powerful	  coalitions.	  Therefore,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	  can	  be	  used	  to	  answer	   the	   question	   under	   what	   conditions	   it	   is	   rational	   for	   a	   group	   to	   dissolve	   an	  existing	   societal	   coalition	   that	   ensures	   the	  defence	  of	   its	   vested	   interests	   and	  enter	   a	  new	   one	   that	   promises	   to	   restore	   the	   balance	   of	   public	   finances,	   even	   if	   the	   new	  coalition	  involves	  compromises	  on	  the	  group’s	  fiscal	  preferences.	  	  The	   model	   shows	   that	   a	   group	   is	   ready	   to	   sacrifice	   its	   vested	   interests	   in	   existing	  policies	  if	  it	  suffers	  considerable	  harm	  from	  the	  fiscal	  imbalances	  and	  is	  convinced	  that	  if	  it	  does	  not	  pay	  the	  price	  of	  consolidation,	  no	  other	  group	  will.	  In	  a	  societal	  coalitions	  context,	  this	  can	  be	  read	  to	  mean	  that	   it	   is	  rational	  for	  a	  group	  to	  abandon	  a	  coalition	  that	  provides	   it	  with	  the	  necessary	  political	  clout	  to	  protect	   its	  vested	   interests,	   if	   the	  group	   has	   a	   large	   stake	   in	   consolidation	   but	   the	   political	   status	   quo	   clearly	   does	   not	  allow	  for	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  fiscal	  matters.	  This	  section	  looks	  at	  how	  this	  prediction	  of	  the	  war	   of	   attrition	  model	   helped	   to	   understand	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	  policies	  and	  the	  realignment	  of	  coalitions	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Italy.	  	  The	   two	  case	   studies	   showed	   that	   the	  negative	   side	  effects	  of	   the	   fiscal	  problems	  are	  indeed	  a	  very	  important	  factor	  in	  engendering	  political	  change	  and	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  societal	  coalitions	  of	  interests.	  In	  both	  countries,	  the	  most	  relevant	  side	  effects	  arose	  in	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the	   form	   of	   pressures	   on	   international	   competitiveness.	   In	   Italy,	   the	   erosion	   of	   the	  international	   competitiveness	   of	   industry	   in	   a	   high-­‐inflation	   environment	   played	   a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  rapprochement	  between	  large	  business	  and	  organized	  labour	  at	  the	  beginning	   of	   the	   1990s.	   The	   loss	   of	   manufacturing	   jobs	   and	   the	   shrinking	   of	  employment	   possibilities	   led	   to	   discontent	   and	   even	   defection	   among	   younger	   union	  members	  exposed	  to	  these	  unfavourable	  changes,	  forcing	  unions	  to	  start	  to	  cooperate	  with	  business	  in	  finding	  solutions.	  Business	  in	  the	  exposed	  sectors	  was	  open	  to	  striking	  deals	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  restoring	  price	  competitiveness	  and	  profits.	  Compromise	  involved	  large	   sacrifices	   on	   both	   sides	   –	   business	   acquiesced	   in	   higher	   taxes,	   whereas	   labour	  accepted	  cuts	  in	  future	  welfare	  payments	  and	  made	  concessions	  in	  wage	  bargaining	  –	  but	  it	  also	  allowed	  the	  two	  groups	  to	  wield	  the	  necessary	  power	  to	  foist	  large	  sacrifices	  upon	  groups	  that	  were	  not	  concerned	  with	  international	  competitiveness.	   In	  Belgium,	  concerns	  about	  international	  competitiveness	  became	  intense	  when	  the	  country	  faced	  major	   difficulties	   in	  maintaining	   exchange	   rate	   parity	  within	   the	   European	  Monetary	  System	   in	   the	   early	   1980s.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   temporary	   realignment	   of	   coalitions	   of	  interests.	  Labour	   solidarity	  was	  briefly	   compromised	  as	  Flemish-­‐dominated	  Christian	  unions	  made	  concessions	  on	  the	  social	  security	  system	  despite	  the	  protest	  of	  Walloon-­‐led	  Socialist	  unions	  under	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  (secret)	  deal	  with	  business	  over	  a	  stabilization	  package.	  	  Conversely,	   the	   case	   studies	   also	   underlined	   that	   insulation	   from	   the	   negative	   side	  effects	   of	   fiscal	   problems	   enhances	   political	   stasis	   and	   the	   intransigence	   of	   societal	  groups	  over	  changing	  the	  policy	  status	  quo.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  older	  generations	  of	  organized	  workers	  whose	  employment	  was	  protected	  by	   stringent	   redundancy	   laws	  and	  whose	  wages	  were	  indexed	  against	   inflation	  were	  immune	  to	  the	  problems	  generated	  by	  the	  monetization	  of	  deficits.	  They	  remained	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  reform.	  Even	  in	  the	  1990s,	  when	   business	   and	   labour	   achieved	   great	   breakthroughs	   in	   fiscal	   consolidation,	   the	  deals	   struck	  between	   the	   two	   sides	  had	   to	  make	   special	   arrangements	   to	  protect	   the	  entitlements	  of	  older	  workers,	  without	  whom	  the	  competitiveness	  coalition	  could	  not	  have	   functioned.	   This	   finding	   underlines	   the	   curious	   intertwining	   of	   political	   and	  institutional	  power	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  struggle	  between	  different	  societal	  groups	  over	  fiscal	   consolidation.	   The	   job	   and	   wage	   protection	   systems	   protecting	   older	   workers	  were	   a	   major	   source	   of	   advantage,	   because	   they	   allowed	   these	   workers	   to	   dig	   their	  heels	   in	   indefinitely	   in	   the	   conflict	   over	   social	   security	   reform.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  ability	  of	  these	  workers	  to	  secure	  these	  privileges	  and	  then	  to	  defend	  them	  through	  the	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decades	  suggests	  that	  even	  these	  institutional	  advantages	  are	  just	  manifestations	  of	  the	  underlying	  political	  clout	  of	  labour.	  	  	  In	   Belgium,	   practically	   the	   entire	   economy	   was	   insulated	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   fiscal	  problems	  after	  the	  start	  of	  austerity	  in	  1982,	  because	  successive	  governments	  resisted	  the	   temptation	   to	   monetize	   the	   deficits.	   Therefore,	   neither	   labour	   nor	   business	   was	  under	  pressure	  to	  soften	  up	  its	  resistance	  to	  reform	  and	  neither	  did.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  policy	   choices	   that	   allowed	   for	   persistent	   stalemate	  were	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   shared	  interest	  of	  labour	  and	  business	  in	  protecting	  international	  competitiveness	  from	  fiscal	  problems.	   They	   reflected	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   two	   sides	   to	   use	   their	   unified	   political	  influence	  to	  achieve	  such	  outcomes.	  This	  sheds	  important	   light	  on	  the	  deeper	  sources	  of	  the	  political	  problem	  in	  Belgium,	  namely	  the	  complete	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  and	  the	  interdependence	  of	  their	  economic	  fates.	  Interestingly,	  in	  Italy,	  it	  was	  the	  euro	  accession	  that	  created	  a	  similar	  situation	  in	  the	  2000s.	  It	  allowed	  labour	  and	  business	  to	  guarantee	  for	  the	  long	  term	  that	  their	   joint	  interests	  in	  monetary	  stability	  be	  protected.	  As	  soon	  as	  this	  was	  achieved,	  they	  rediscovered	  their	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  concerning	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  the	  competitiveness	  coalition	  disintegrated.	  	  In	   sum,	   both	   case	   studies	   suggest	   that	   the	   harmful	   side	   effects	   of	   deficits	   can	   make	  societal	  groups	  rethink	  their	  allegiances	  to	  existing	  socio-­‐political	  coalitions	  and	  form	  new	  ones	  capable	  of	  resolving	  the	  issue,	  even	  if	  such	  realignment	  comes	  at	  the	  price	  of	  painful	   compromises.	   Conversely,	   if	   a	   group	   incurs	   no	   private	   costs	   from	   the	   public	  problem,	  there	  are	  no	  incentives	  to	  change	  its	  political	  strategies.	  The	  war	  of	  attrition	  model	   allows	   for	   even	   more	   concrete	   predictions	   about	   when	   a	   group	   would	   be	  induced	  to	  accept	  sacrifices.	  Even	  when	  a	  group	  suffers	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  fiscal	  problems,	  it	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  remaining	  passive	  if	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  consolidation	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  other	  groups.	  It	  will	  only	  be	  induced	  to	   give	   up	   on	   (some	   of)	   its	   vested	   interests	   if	   it	   is	   convinced	   that	   consolidation	   is	  dependent	   on	   its	   contributions.	   Strictly	   speaking,	   this	   is	   an	   untestable	   and	  unobservable	   prediction,	   but	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   in	   both	   the	   Italian	   and	   the	  Belgian	  cases,	  major	  political	  changes	  started	  when	  the	  chances	  for	  meaningful	  reform	  were	   lowest.	   In	   Italy	   the	   breakthrough	   came	   after	   groups	   in	   the	   sheltered	   sectors	  gained	   dominant	   control	   over	   the	   government,	   making	   it	   less	   likely	   than	   ever	   that	  stabilizing	   reforms	   will	   be	   made.	   In	   Belgium,	   the	   campaign	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	  for	  federalization	  started	  after	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  St.	  Anna	  Plan	  for	  pension	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reform	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic-­‐Liberal	  coalition	  had	  signalled	  the	  end	  of	  labour-­‐business	  cooperation	  in	  fiscal	  matters.	  	  Combined	   with	   the	   insights	   of	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	   model,	   the	   societal	   coalitions	  approach	   helps	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   underlying	   mechanism	   driving	   changes	   in	  politics	  and	  in	  policy	  choices	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  by	  uncovering	  the	  societal	  pressures	  for	  and	  against	  given	  policy	  options	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  pressures.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   this	   theoretical	   approach	   paid	   little	   explicit	   attention	   to	  many	   other	   aspects	   of	  and	  actors	   involved	   in	  policy	  making	   that	  other	   theories	   focus	  on	   in	   explaining	   fiscal	  outcomes.	   The	   governmental	   machinery	   of	   policy	   making	   as	   a	   whole	   received	   little	  attention.	   The	   institutions	   structuring	   the	   decision	   making	   process	   and	   the	  bureaucratic-­‐technocratic	   aspects	   of	   policy	   making	   were	   mostly	   missing.	   The	   next	  section	  addresses	  these	  issues	  and	  evaluates	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  light	  of	  alternative	  explanations.	  	  
Competing	  and	  complementary	  theoretical	  approaches	  	  The	   narratives	   built	   in	   the	   empirical	   case	   studies	   weaved	   together	   the	   analysis	   of	  constellations	   of	   societal	   interests	   and	   power	   with	   the	   discussion	   of	   several	  institutional,	   ideational	   and	   international	   factors.	   They	   elaborated	   on	   the	   strategic	  position	  and	   ideological	  outlook	  of	  parties,	   trade	  unions	  and	  employer	  organizations;	  on	  the	  rules	  guiding	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  state	  and	  on	  the	  international	  environment	  in	  which	  policies	  were	  made,	   in	  order	  to	  provide	  all	   the	  details	  needed	  to	  understand	  the	   political	   and	   policy	   developments	   that	   accompanied	   excessive	   debt	   accumulation	  and	  episodes	  of	  stabilization	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Italy.	  This	  section	  is	  aimed	  at	  disentangling	  the	  different	  elements	  of	  the	  stories	  told	  above	  and	  analyse	  them	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  possible	  independent	  or	  secondary	  effects	  of	  institutions,	  ideas	  and	  international	  constraints	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  
Fragmented	  governmental	  decision	  making	  	  By	  choosing	  societal	  groups	  as	  the	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis	  in	  explaining	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation,	  this	  thesis	  expressly	  took	  a	  side	  in	  the	  long-­‐standing	  controversy	  among	  society-­‐centred	   and	   state-­‐centred	   approaches	   towards	   explaining	   policy	   choices.	  However,	  the	  society-­‐centred	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  has	  some	  interesting	  lessons	  for	  the	  government-­‐centred	  approach	  as	  well.	  This	  subsection	  discusses	  state-­‐centred	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theories	   that	   concentrate	   on	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   decision	  making	  machinery	   of	   the	  state	   in	  explaining	  policy	  choices.	   It	   focuses	  on	   the	  role	  of	  government	   fragmentation	  and	  the	  rules	  governing	  budgetary	  decision	  making.	  The	  next	  presents	  approaches	  that	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  policy	  makers	  are	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  autonomously	  of	  societal	  pressures.	  	  As	   shown	   in	   the	   introduction,	   the	   large	  majority	   of	   theories	   about	   public	   borrowing	  concentrate	   on	   the	   institutional	   features	   of	   decision	  making	   within	   the	   state.	   A	   first	  group	   of	   theories	   within	   this	   category	   focus	   primarily	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   fragmented	  decision	   making	   within	   divided	   governments	   on	   deficits.	   They	   claim	   that	   coalition	  governments	   are	   likelier	   to	   run	   deficits	   because	   the	   different	   parties	   will	   have	  difficulties	   in	   reconciling	   the	   interests	  of	   their	   specific	   constituencies129.	  According	   to	  this	   reasoning,	   the	   large	   fiscal	   problems	   of	   Italy	   and	   Belgium	   in	   the	   1980s	   are	   not	  surprising	  since	  both	  countries	  had	  fragmented	  coalition	  governments	  throughout	  the	  past	   three	   decades.	   However,	   this	   argument	   is	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   observed	   facts.	   Italy	  underwent	   astonishing	   consolidation	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  after	   its	   governments	  became	  even	  more	  fragmented	  than	  they	  were	  in	  the	  1980s	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  electoral	  reforms	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  Belgium,	  the	  drastic	  austerity	  programme	  –	  which	  started	  in	  1982	  and	  improved	  the	  primary	  balance	  by	  more	  than	  a	  tenth	  of	  the	  GDP	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	   1980s	   –	   was	   adopted	   and	   ruthlessly	   carried	   out	   by	   a	   succession	   of	   fragmented	  coalition	   governments.	   Similarly,	   consolidation	   continued	   throughout	   the	   following	  decades	  under	  four-­‐party	  (at	  times	  six-­‐party)	  coalitions.	  	  Another	  group	  of	   theories	   investigates	   to	  what	  extent	   fiscal	   targets,	  procedural	   rules,	  the	   centralization	   of	   decision	   making	   and	   surveillance	   help	   to	   contain	   the	   collective	  action	  problem	  involved	  in	  budgetary	  decision	  making130.	  The	  Italian	  and	  Belgian	  cases	  provide	  interesting	  insights	  on	  this	  issue,	  because	  both	  countries	  implemented	  a	  series	  of	   fiscal	   institutions	   in	   the	   last	   three	   decades	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   better	   control	   over	  borrowing	  and	  both	  subjected	  themselves	  to	  the	  external	  rules	  of	  the	  euro-­‐convergence	  process.	  While	  the	  adopted	  rules,	  procedures	  and	  targets	  undoubtedly	  were	  important	  devices	   in	   managing	   the	   budgetary	   process	   when	   societal	   support	   for	   fiscal	  stabilization	   was	   there,	   they	   were	   of	   little	   use	   in	   and	   of	   themselves	   for	   budgetary	  discipline	  as	  long	  as	  most	  governments	  were	  unable	  to	  adjust	  major	  items	  in	  the	  budget	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	   See	   for	   example	   Roubini	   and	   Sachs	   (1989),	   Grilli	   et	   al.	   (1991),	   Alesina	   et	   al.	   (1998),	   Padovano	   and	  Venturi	  (2000)	  and	  Balassone	  and	  Giordano	  (2001).	  130	   See	   for	  example	  von	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	   (1995),	  Hagen	  and	  Harden	   (1996),	  Perotti	   and	  Kontopoulos	  (2002),	  Lagona	  and	  Padovano	  (2007).	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in	  the	  face	  of	  resistance	  by	  influential	  interest	  groups.	  	  The	  main	  lesson	  of	  the	  two	  case	  studies	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   that	   well-­‐functioning	   domestic	   budgetary	   institutions	   are	  epiphenomenal	   to	   the	   redistributive	   conflict	   between	   different	   societal	   groups.	  Budgetary	  institutions	  work	  well	  only	  when	  the	  conflict	  is	  settled.	  	  	  For	   example,	   a	   range	   of	   budgetary	   innovations	  was	   adopted	   in	   Italy	   in	   the	   1980s	   to	  subject	  budgetary	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  parliament	  to	  discipline131.	  However,	  as	  long	  as	   a	   powerful	   coalition	   of	   interest	   made	   most	   of	   the	   spending	   and	   revenue	   items	  untouchable,	  the	  majority	  of	  parliamentarians	  and	  the	  dominant	  party	  had	  no	  interest	  in	   enforcing	   the	   rules	   and	   sticking	   to	   targets	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   hurting	   that	   powerful	  coalition.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   budgetary	   institutions	  worked	   and	   targets	  were	  met	   in	   the	  1990s,	   because	   of	   the	   electoral	   dominance	   of	   the	   competitiveness	   coalition,	   which	  strongly	   supported	  austerity.	   Similarly,	   in	  Belgium,	   the	   committee	   created	   to	  manage	  budgetary	   coordination	   between	   the	   different	   federated	   levels	   could	   not	   ensure	  budgetary	   discipline	   up	   to	   the	   early	   1990s,	   because	   of	   the	   irreconcilable	   conflicts	   of	  interests	   between	   the	   different	   regions	   and	   communities.	   However,	   when	   it	   became	  urgent	   for	  the	  Flemish	  to	  appease	  Wallonia	   for	  the	  sake	  of	  winning	   its	  cooperation	   in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  committee	  improved	  greatly	  in	  managing	  and	  enforcing	  targets.	  	  	  The	  most	  recent	  research	  on	  fiscal	  decision	  making	  within	  governments	  by	  Hallerberg	  and	   others132	   provides	   a	   synthesis	   of	   these	   two	   approaches	   and	   seeks	   to	   answer	   the	  question	  under	  what	  political	  circumstances	  governments	  are	  willing	  to	  adopt	  and	  able	  to	   successfully	   operate	   coordinative	   devices	   that	   allow	   them	   to	   overcome	   their	  collective	  action	  issues	  and	  keep	  deficits	  under	  control.	  First	  of	  all,	  they	  underline	  that	  political	  actors	  within	  the	  government	  –	  parties	  participating	  in	  the	  coalition	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  ministers	  and	  legislators	  –	  need	  to	  have	  an	  electoral	  incentive	  to	  be	  attentive	  to	   fiscal	   problems	   in	   order	   for	   them	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   constrain	   their	   spending	  preferences	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   fiscal	   discipline.	   Therefore,	   meaningful	   electoral	  competition	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   moving	   away	   from	   what	   they	   call	   the	   fiefdom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3	  above,	  some	  of	  these	  reforms	  were	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  better	  planning,	  such	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  standardized	  format	  for	  presenting	  the	  budget	  as	  a	  single	  law	  (Legge	  Finanzaria)	  in	  1978,	   or	   the	   launching	   of	   comprehensive	   economic-­‐financial	   planning	   in	   1988.	   Other	   procedural	  adjustments	  were	  aimed	  at	  enforcing	  discipline	  on	  the	  members	  of	  parliament.	  From	  1983	  and	  1985,	  the	  budget	  would	   be	   debated	   in	   separate,	   designated	   sessions	   in	   the	   Chamber	   and	   the	   Senate	   (Ferrera	   and	  Gualmini	   2004	  p64).	   In	   1986	   secret	   voting	   on	   budgetary	   issues	  was	   abolished	   to	   stop	   „snipers“(franchi	  tiratori)	  from	  undermining	  the	  government’s	  fiscal	  plans	  (Padovano	  and	  Venturi	  2001).	  132	  See	  Hallerberg	  and	  von	  Hagen	  (1997),	  Hallerberg	  (2004),	  Hallerberg	  and	  Yllaoutinen	  (2008),	  Hallerberg,	  Strauch	  and	  von	  Hagen	  (2009).	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approach	   to	   fiscal	   government	   (i.e.	   the	   unfettered	   pursuit	   of	   particularistic	   spending	  preferences	   by	   individual	   actors).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   Italy’s	   and	   Belgium’s	   poor	  fiscal	  track	  record	  of	  the	  1980s	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  de	  facto	  lack	  of	  competition	  for	  domination	  of	  the	  government	  due	  to	  the	  entrenched	  position	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  of	  both	  countries	  as	  dominant	  actors	   in	   the	  parliamentary	  sphere	   (Hallerberg	  2004	  pp	  131	  and	  183).	  	  	  When	   strong	  electoral	   incentives	   are	  present	   for	   restraining	  deficits,	   parties	  within	   a	  coalition	  constrain	  themselves	  either	  by	  entrusting	  the	  finance	  minister	  with	  the	  power	  to	  defend	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  budget	  against	  spending	  pressures	  from	  ministries	  (this	  is	  what	   Hallerberg	   et	   al.	   call	   the	   delegation	   approach	   to	   fiscal	   governance)	   or	   by	  committing	  to	  a	  set	  of	  fiscal	  targets	  laid	  down	  in	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  parties	  (this	  is	  the	  commitment	  or	  contract	  approach).	  It	  depends	  on	  the	  ideological	  distance	  of	  parties	  within	  a	  coalition,	  which	  of	  these	  two	  approaches	  is	  more	  effective	  in	  a	  given	  case.	  The	  delegation	   approach	   is	   expected	   to	   work	   better	   with	   single-­‐party	   governments	   or	  coalitions	  of	  ideologically	  strongly	  aligned	  parties,	  whereas	  a	  contract	  is	  the	  only	  viable	  solution	   in	   the	   case	   of	   coalitions	   of	   considerable	   ideological	   dispersion.	   In	   this	  framework,	   Italy’s	   remarkable	   recovery	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   1990s	   is	   a	   clear	  example	  of	  the	  successful	  centralization	  of	  budgetary	  decisions	  under	  a	  strong	  finance	  minister	   in	   a	   cohesive	   electoral	   coalition,	   whereas	   Belgium’s	   good	   performance	  presumably	   reflects	   the	   presence	   of	   binding	   contracts	   amongst	   dispersed	   coalitions.	  Importantly,	   in	   both	   cases,	   the	   electoral	   significance	   of	   fiscal	   balance	   is	   greatly	  magnified	   by	   the	   euro-­‐accession	   process	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   by	   both	   countries’	  experience	   with	   fiscal	   crisis	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   enhancing	   the	   adoption	   and	  entrenchment	  of	   the	  new	   fiscal	  governance	   institutions	   (Hallerberg	  2004	  pp	  133-­‐135	  and	  189-­‐195,	  Hallerberg	  et	  al.	  pp126-­‐129).	  	  The	   fiscal	   governance	   framework	   of	   Hallerberg	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	   emphasizes	   that	  government	  fragmentation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  repercussions	  on	  fiscal	  discipline	  and	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  fiscal	  institutions	  depends	  on	  the	  political	  will	  to	  operate	  them.	   Thereby,	   it	   successfully	   corrects	   for	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   literatures	   on	  political	   fragmentation	   and	   on	   fiscal	   institutions.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   does	   not	  incorporate	   the	   full	   range	   of	   forces	   that	   determine	   whether	   there	   will	   be	   enough	  political	   will	   to	   restore	   fiscal	   balance	   even	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   strong	   particularistic	  interests	  in	  a	  given	  polity,	  as	  it	  only	  focuses	  on	  the	  incentives	  and	  constraints	  of	  actors	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within	  the	  narrow	  governmental	  sphere.	  Due	  to	  this	  omission,	  it	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  many	  of	  the	  specific	  features	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  making	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Italy.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   the	   case	   studies	   show	   that	   in	   both	   countries	   conflicts	   amongst	   coalition	  partners	  were	  not	  the	  main	  source	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  restore	  fiscal	  balance	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  hurting	  particularistic	  interests.	  Therefore,	  coalitional	  strife	  cannot	  be	  made	  the	  principal	  culprit	  for	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  of	  the	  1980s.	  The	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  that	  paralysed	   policy	  makers	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   escalating	   fiscal	   situation	   and	   allowed	   the	  deficits	   to	   persist	   emanated,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   from	  within	   the	   dominant	   party	   of	   the	  
government	   itself133	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   from	   outside	   of	   the	   governmental	   and	  
parliamentary	  sphere.	   In	   Italy,	  Christian	  Democracy	  had	  to	  cater	   to	  three	  very	  diverse	  sets	  of	  interests,	  which	  excluded	  the	  possibility	  of	  increasing	  revenues	  and	  significantly	  constrained	   the	   options	   for	   cutting	   collective	   consumption	   and	   public	   investment	  expenditure.	  In	  Belgium,	  too,	  major	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  between	  labour	  and	  business	  were	   housed	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democratic	   party,	   tying	   the	  government’s	   hands	   in	   cutting	   welfare	   entitlements	   or	   increasing	   revenues.	  Consequently,	   even	   if	   these	   parties	   had	   governed	   alone,	   their	   room	   for	   manoeuvre	  would	   have	   been	   equally	   constrained	   by	   the	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   within	   their	   own	  constituencies.	   Furthermore,	   in	   both	   countries	   major	   obstacles	   to	   adjusting	   welfare	  expenditure,	   the	   largest	   single	   spending	   item	   within	   the	   budget,	   arose	   from	   extra-­‐parliamentary	   sources	   –	   from	   the	   threat	   of	   labour	   mobilization	   –	   rather	   than	   from	  intra-­‐governmental	   or	   intra-­‐parliamentary	   vetoes.	   Therefore,	   certain	   avenues	   for	  restoring	  fiscal	  balance	  were	  ruled	  out	  irrespective	  of	  coalitional	  agreement	  about	  the	  issue.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  assertion	  that	  deficits	  were	  caused	  by	  unbridled	  spending	  pressures	  under	   a	   fiefdom	   approach	   to	   budgeting	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   suggests	   that	  discretionary	   spending	   was	   out	   of	   control	   in	   this	   period	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   The	  upward	   drift	   of	   expenditure	   observed	   in	   Italy	   in	   these	   years	   is	   compatible	  with	   this	  interpretation.	   In	   the	   Belgian	   case,	   however,	   this	   depiction	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making	  stands	   in	   marked	   contrast	   with	   the	   drastic	   retrenchment	   of	   spending	   achieved	   by	  successive	   governments	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   Public	   consumption	   and	   investment	  expenditure	  was	  cut	  back	  by	  more	  than	  11	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  GDP	   in	   the	  period	  and	  the	  primary	   balance	   improved	   by	   an	   astonishing	   13	   per	   cent.	   The	   governments	   that	  achieved	  these	  results	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  important	  areas	  of	  the	  budget	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  This	  finding	  confirms	  Balassone	  and	  Giordano’s	  (2001)	  intuition	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction.	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in	   check.	   Fiscal	   tightening	   took	  place	   in	   every	   domain	   except	   in	   social	   spending.	   The	  real	  drivers	  of	  debt	  accumulation	   in	  Belgium	  were	   the	  automatic	   snowballing	  of	  debt	  and	   major	   imbalances	   within	   the	   social	   security	   sector	   rather	   than	   problems	   with	  discretionary	   expenditure.	   Consequently,	   a	   blanket	   assertion	   about	   problems	   with	  spending	  control	  –	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  fiefdom	  approach	  to	  spending	  –	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  deficit	  problem	  of	  the	  1980s	  in	  that	  country.	  	  Finally,	   it	   is	   questionable	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   concepts	   of	   delegation	   and	   contract	  governance	   can	   illuminate	   the	   two	   countries’	   fiscal	   experiences	   in	   the	  1990s	   and	   the	  2000s.	   According	   to	   Hallerberg,	   Belgium	   successfully	   transitioned	   to	   contract	  governance	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   by	   endowing	   the	   High	   Council	   of	   Finance134	   with	   the	  authority	  to	  coordinate	  and	  influence	  agreements	  about	  fiscal	  targets	  between	  different	  levels	   of	   government.	   These	   targets	   served	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   intra-­‐governmental	  agreements	   about	   fiscal	   policy	   (Hallerberg	   2004,	   p133).	   Through	   these	   institutional	  changes	  and	  the	  strengthened	  electoral	  incentives	  for	  fiscal	  discipline,	  spending	  control	  was	  supposedly	  achieved.	  	  	  Two	   main	   observations	   contradict	   this	   account.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   path	   to	  consolidation	  in	  the	  1990s	  relied	  overwhelmingly	  on	  the	  exogenous	  fall	  of	  the	  interest	  costs	   and	   on	   revenue	   increasing	   measures	   –	   including	   one-­‐off	   measures	   such	   as	  privatization	   and	   the	   selling	   of	   the	   central	   bank’s	   gold	   –	   rather	   than	   on	   retrenching	  primary	   expenditure	   through	   tightened	   spending	   control.	   Furthermore,	   in	   the	   2000s	  fiscal	   policy	  was	  noticeably	   relaxed	  and	  primary	   spending	   expanded,	   albeit	   the	   rapid	  dwindling	   of	   primary	   surpluses	   were	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   counterbalanced	   by	   the	  continued	  fall	  of	  interest	  costs	  and	  therefore	  the	  overall	  budget	  stayed	  in	  balance135.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  role	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  Finance	  diminished	  in	   the	  years	  after	   the	  euro	  accession.	  Not	  only	  were	   its	   recommendations	   less	  closely	  adhered	   to	   by	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   government,	   but	   its	   operation	   was	   de	   facto	  suspended	  in	  the	  years	  when	  the	  government	  made	  consequential	  spending	  decisions	  that	   would	   have	   likely	   raised	   too	   much	   controversy	   within	   the	   Council,	   such	   as	   the	  bailing	  out	  of	  the	  state	  railway	  company	  in	  2005	  and	  2006	  and	  of	  troubled	  banks136	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Or	  more	  accurately,	  to	  the	  Public	  Sector	  Borrowing	  Requirement	  of	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  Finance.	  135	  Notably,	   the	   original	   intention	  was	   that	   governments	   should	   capture	   the	  windfall	   gain	   of	   decreasing	  interest	   rates	   and	   produce	   surpluses	   to	   fill	   up	   the	   so-­‐called	   Silver	   Fund	   as	   a	   precautionary	  measure	   to	  counterbalance	  the	  imminent	  effects	  of	  population	  ageing.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  relaxing	  of	  the	  budget	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  natural	  response	  to	  easing	  external	  financing	  conditions.	  136	  These	  decisions	  worsened	  the	  budget	  by	  2.4	  and	  7	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP,	  respectively.	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2008	  (Coere	  and	  Langenus	  2010).	  Therefore,	  Belgium	  seems	   to	  have	  neither	  credibly	  entrenched	   its	   institutions	   for	   fiscal	  commitments,	  nor	   improved	   its	   spending	  control	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  	  	  In	   Italy,	   the	   successful	   shift	   to	   a	   delegation	   form	   of	   governance	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	  formation	  of	  cohesive	  electoral	  blocks	  –	  in	  which	  parties	  have	  joint	  electoral	  fates	  and	  are	   therefore	   willing	   to	   cede	   control	   to	   a	   single	   person	   –	   and	   the	   centralization	   of	  decision	  making	  over	  the	  budget	   in	  a	  single	  ministry	  created	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	   the	  Budget	  and	  the	  Treasury	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1990s	  (Hallerberg	  2004,	  pp191-­‐192).	  After	  2000,	  both	  of	   these	   factors	  were	  strengthened.	  The	  centre-­‐right,	  which	  won	  the	  2001	  elections,	  was	   characterized	  by	  much	  greater	   ideological	   unity	   than	   the	   centre-­‐left	  had	  been	  in	  1996	  and	  two	  of	  its	  three	  main	  parties	  headed	  towards	  merger	  (Conti	  2010).	  Moreover,	   institutional	   centralization	  was	   increased	  when	   the	  Ministry	   of	   the	  Economy	  was	  merged	   into	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance,	   creating	   a	   single	   “superministry”	  under	   the	   Lega’s	   finance	   minister	   in	   2001	   (Hallerberg	   2004,	   p195).	   However,	   these	  developments	   failed	   to	   enhance	   spending	   control.	   Primary	   expenditure	   swiftly	  increased	  under	  the	  centre-­‐right	  government	  and	  deficits	  grew.	  When	  the	  centre-­‐left	  –	  which	   had	   also	   consolidated	   internally	   in	   the	   2000s	   –	   took	   power	   again	   in	   2006,	  primary	  spending	  was	  reined	  in	  once	  again	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  budget	  improved.	  In	  other	   words,	   fiscal	   performance	   oscillated	   wildly	   after	   2000,	   even	   though	   the	  hypothesized	  conditions	  for	  delegation	  steadily	  improved.	  	  	  The	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  framework	  and	  the	  observed	   Italian	   and	   Belgian	   performance	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   the	   2000s	   cannot	   be	  satisfactorily	   explained	   even	  when	   factoring	   in	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   external	   pressure	  from	  the	  evolving	  European	  fiscal	  architecture.	  In	  Fiscal	  Governance	  in	  Europe	  (2009),	  Hallerberg	   et	   al.	   argue	   that	   after	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   euro,	   the	   shift	   towards	   closer	  surveillance	   but	   less	   stringent	   enforcement	   under	   the	   Stability	   and	  Growth	   Pact	  was	  more	   compatible	   with	   the	   commitment	   than	   with	   the	   delegation	   form	   of	   fiscal	  governance.	   This	   argument,	   however,	   does	   not	   tally	   either	   with	   the	   weakening	   of	  commitment	   in	   Belgium	   or	   with	   the	   volatile	   –	   sometimes	   deteriorating,	   sometimes	  dramatically	   improving	   –	   results	   of	   delegation	   in	   Italy.	  One	   could	   also	   argue	   that	   the	  loss	   of	   a	   credible	   European	   punishment	  mechanism	   after	   accession	   translated	   into	   a	  decreased	   political	   salience	   of	   fiscal	   discipline	   and	   therefore	   weaker	   incentives	   for	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policy	   makers	   to	   cooperate137.	   This	   claim	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   brief	   period	   of	   drastic	  fiscal	   consolidation	   in	   Italy	   under	   the	   2006-­‐2008	   centre-­‐left	   government.	   More	  importantly,	  however,	   it	   implies	   that	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   strong	  external	   incentive	  all	  the	  other	  hypothesized	  conditions	  for	  successful	  fiscal	  governance	  –	  increased	  electoral	  competition,	  past	  experience	  with	  fiscal	  crises,	  a	  suitable	  institutional	  infrastructure	  for	  coordination	   and	   the	   necessary	   party-­‐political	   characteristics	   –	   are	   not	   sufficient	   for	  producing	  the	  expected	  fiscal	  results.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  while	  the	  fiscal	  governance	  approach	  undoubtedly	  captures	  a	  crucial	  interplay	  between	  political	  factors	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  fiscal	  decision	  making	  machinery	  of	   the	   state,	   those	   features	   of	   intra-­‐governmental	   collective	   action	   problems	   that	   it	  focuses	  on	  do	  not	  in	  themselves	  account	  for	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  political	  determination	  to	  overcome	  fiscal	  problems	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades.	  The	  case	  studies	  demonstrated	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  extra-­‐parliamentary	  struggles	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  fiscal	  pain.	  Thereby,	  they	  underlined	  the	  limits	  of	  exclusively	  focusing	  on	  the	  parameters	  of	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  state	  and	  alerted	  to	  the	  need	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  more	  directly	  the	  constellation	  of	  societal	  interests	  that	  determine	  the	  availability	  of	  broader	  societal	  support	  for	  fiscal	  sacrifices.	  	  
State	  autonomy	  	  Societal	   constraints	   on	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   state	   play	   a	   central	   part	   in	   theoretical	  approaches	  that	  explain	  variation	  in	  fiscal	  performance	  via	  varying	  levels	  of	  autonomy	  of	   the	   state.	   This	   version	   of	   state-­‐centred	   theories	   acknowledges	   the	   role	   of	   societal	  pressures	   in	   influencing	   fiscal	   outcomes	   and	   ask	   the	  question	  under	  what	   conditions	  the	  state	  can	  sufficiently	  insulate	  itself	  from	  particularistic	  demands	  and	  gain	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  gear	  policy	  towards	  the	  public	  good	  of	  fiscal	  stability.	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  rests	  on	  a	  view	  of	  policy	  making	  that	  accords	  autonomous	  role	  to	  administrative	  elites	  in	   forming	   government	   policies	   that	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   particularistic	   societal	  interests	  (Skocpol	  1985).	  	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  evolving	  fiscal	  performance	  of	  Italy	  and	  Belgium,	  this	  approach	  has	  been	   used	   to	   explain	   the	   policy	   problems	   of	   the	   1980s	  with	   the	   extraordinarily	   high	  permeability	   of	   state	   structures	   to	   diverse	   societal	   interests	   and	   the	   recovery	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  In	  fact,	  in	  ‘Domestic	  Budgets	  in	  a	  United	  Europe’	  (2004	  p136-­‐137	  and	  p195),	  Hallerberg	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument	  when	   he	   contemplates	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   euro	   accession	   in	   the	   temporary	   success	   of	   the	  institutional	  changes	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium.	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1990s	   with	   a	   sudden	   empowerment	   of	   state	   actors	   (Della	   Sala	   1997).	   Authors	  promoting	   this	   argument	   link	   the	   change	   in	   the	   level	   of	   state	   autonomy	  between	   the	  two	  decades	  to	  the	  overriding	  national	  determination	  to	  fulfil	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  in	  time	   for	   the	   first	   round	   of	   euro	   accession.	   The	   gist	   of	   this	   so-­‐called	   vincolo	   esterno	  argument138	   is	   that	   by	   committing	   themselves	   to	   the	   euro-­‐accession	   –	   and	   thereby	  subjecting	  policies	  to	  strongly	  binding	  constraints	  like	  the	  Maastricht	  deficit	  criterion	  –	  governments	  gained	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  powerful	  societal	  groups,	  which	  enabled	  them	  to	  carry	  out	  painful	  but	  necessary	  policy	  adjustments,	   such	  as	   the	  stabilization	  of	  public	  finances	   (Dyson	   and	   Featherstone	   1996,	   Della	   Sala	   1997,	   Pochet	   2004,	   Quaglia	   and	  Radaelli	  2007).	  	  	  Neither	   of	   the	   two	   case	   studies	   seems	   to	   bear	   out	   the	   external	   empowerment	  argument.	   In	   Belgium,	   the	   technocracy	   –	   if	   anything	   –	  was	  weakened	   by	   the	   binding	  Maastricht	   criteria.	   For	   example,	   the	   High	   Council	   of	   Finance	   –	   assumed	   to	   be	   an	  important	   bulwark	   of	   technocratic	   influence	   and	   neutral	   enforcer	   of	   fiscal	   discipline	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  institutional	  role	  of	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  within	  its	  committees	   –	   was	   compromised	   in	   this	   role	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   Maastricht	   criteria	   gave	  Wallonia	  a	  trump	  card	  that	  it	  could	  (and	  did)	  use	  to	  extract	  concessions	  and	  achieve	  the	  loosening	  of	  its	  fiscal	  constraints	  in	  yearly	  negotiations	  about	  the	  fiscal	  targets.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  technocracy	  did	  gain	  quite	  substantial	   influence	   in	  policy	  making	   in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  euro.	  However,	  this	  influence	  was	  conferred	  on	  technocrats	  by	  a	  powerful	  coalition	  of	   interests	   that	   entrusted	   them	   with	   the	   task	   of	   carrying	   out	   fiscal	   retrenchment.	  Importantly,	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   technocracy	   was	   very	   tightly	   circumscribed	   by	   the	  interests	   and	   sensitivities	   of	   the	   coalition	   on	   behalf	   of	   which	   it	   acted.	   This	   is	   well	  exemplified	  by	   the	   limited	  pension	   reforms	   carried	  out	   in	   this	   period	   in	   Italy.	   In	   this	  sense,	  the	  technocratic	  elite	  was	  not	  so	  much	  empowered,	  but	  entrusted	  with	  the	  task	  of	   restoring	   fiscal	   balance	   (within	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   limits).	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	  influence	  of	  technocratic	  elites	  remained	  dependent	  on	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  different	  clusters	  of	  societal	  interests	  even	  in	  the	  Maastricht	  years.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   even	   if	   the	   empowering	   effect	   of	   Maastricht	   is	   questionable,	   the	  
vincolo	  esterno	  argument	  directs	  attention	  to	  an	  important	  shared	  characteristic	  of	  the	  two	  countries:	  the	  marked	  weakness	  of	  the	  state	  in	  both	  cases.	  Many	  authors	  note	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	   The	   term	  was	   originally	   coined	   by	   Giavazzi	   and	   Pagano	   (1988)	   to	   describe	   the	   credibility	   effects	   of	  belonging	   to	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   system	   like	   the	  European	  Monetary	   System,	   but	   it	  was	   then	  used	  by	  (Dyson	   and	   Featherstone	   1999)	   to	   describe	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   constraints	   create	   by	   the	   euro-­‐accession	  process	  on	  government	  policies.	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extreme	  strength	  of	  parties	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  state,	  the	  permeation	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  state	  by	  partisan	  interests	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  politically	  independent	  technocratic	  bureaucracies	  in	  both	  countries	  (e.g.	  Anderson	  et	  al	  2007,	  Marier	  2008,	  Della	  Sala	  2007).	  The	  manifest	  weakness	  of	  the	  Belgian	  and	  Italian	  state	  raises	  a	  particularly	  important	  question	  that	  has	  bearing	  on	   the	   scope	  and	   interpretation	  of	   the	  present	   findings	  about	   the	   crucial	  importance	   of	   societal	   groups	   and	   their	   self-­‐seeking	   alliances	   in	   determining	   policy	  choices.	   Is	   it	   the	  weakness	   of	   the	   state	   that	   allows	   these	   societal	   groups	   such	   strong	  influence	   on	   policies	   or	   is	   it	   the	   structure	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	  within	   the	   polity	  that	   prevents	   the	   formation	   of	   an	   autonomous	   power	   centre	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   an	  independent	   technocratic	   bureaucracy?	   Answering	   this	   question	   requires	   looking	   at	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  institutions	  that	  structure	  the	  interaction	  of	  societal	  groups	  with	   the	   state	   versus	   the	   role	   of	   the	   structural	   characteristics	   of	   societal	   conflicts	   of	  interest	  and	  balance	  of	  power.	  	  	  
Corporatism,	  party	  systems	  and	  consociational	  practices	  	  It	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   study	   to	   definitively	   evaluate	   the	   chicken-­‐and-­‐egg	  problem	  of	  weak	   states	   and	   influential	   societal	   groups	   even	   for	   the	   case	   of	   Italy	   and	  Belgium.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   case	   studies	   do	   supply	   some	   interesting	   detail	   about	  how	   electoral	   and	   party	   systems,	   corporatist	   and	   consociational	   arrangements	   –	   i.e.	  institutional	   factors	   that	   influence	  how	  particularistic	   policy	  demands	   are	   channelled	  into	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  state	  –	  are	   linked	  to	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  different	  societal	   groups	   within	   each	   polity.	   The	   findings	   suggest	   that	   the	   ultimate	   source	   of	  policy	   leverage	   of	   given	   societal	   groups	   is	   typically	   the	   power	   resources	   they	   can	  mobilize	   outside	   of	   the	   institutionalized	   channels	   of	   influence.	   Therefore,	   the	  permeability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  special	  interest	  seems	  to	  have	  depended	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  resources	  among	  different	  coalitions	  of	  interest	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  A	   clear	   example	   of	   the	   primacy	   of	   structural	   sources	   of	   policy	   leverage	   over	  institutional	   position	   is	   the	   role	   trade	   unions	   played	   in	   shaping	   the	   politics	   of	   fiscal	  stabilization	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  Both	  case	  studies	  emphasized	  their	  crucial	  influence	  on	  policy	  choices,	  primarily	  their	  ability	  to	  block	  –	  or	  at	  least	  significantly	  water	  down	  –	  attempts	   at	  welfare	   retrenchment	   for	  most	   of	   the	   past	   three	   decades.	   This	   influence	  had	  some	  of	  the	  trappings	  of	  institutionalized	  power	  in	  both	  Italy	  and	  Belgium,	  but	  the	  analysis	   clearly	   showed	   that	   it	   was	   the	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   threats	   of	   devastating	  
	   218	  
industrial	  action	  that	  endowed	  unions	  with	  the	  observed	  weight	  in	  policy	  making	  and	  gave	  labour	  interest	  strong	  representation.	  	  In	   Italy,	   the	  workers’	  movement	  of	   the	  1960s	   and	  1970s	  wrestled	   a	   few	   institutional	  functions	  from	  the	  state	   for	  unions	  –	  such	  as	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  welfare	  system	  and	  some	  consultative	  rights	  –	  but	  the	  de	  facto	   leverage	  of	  unions	  depended	  on	  successful	  strikes.	   Given	   the	   threefold	   division	   of	   the	   trade	   union	   movement	   –	   between	  Communist,	   Christian	   Democratic	   and	   Socialist	   –	   success	   hinged	   on	   their	   unity	   of	  action,	   although	   the	   largest,	   Communist	   unions	   had	   overwhelming	   importance	   in	  leading	   strikes.	   Since	   the	   three	   unions	   represent	   slightly	   different	   constituencies	   of	  dependent	  employees,	  their	  ability	  to	  cooperate	  and	  therefore	  their	  influence	  on	  policy	  making	   have	   been	   a	   function	   of	   the	   commonalities	   or	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   between	  blue-­‐collar,	   white-­‐collar	   workers	   and	   public	   employees.	   The	   unions’	   lack	   of	   unity	  famously	   led	   to	   a	   failure	   to	   prevent	   the	   adjustment	   of	   the	   scala	   mobile	   in	   the	   early	  1980s	  and	  to	  the	  passing	  of	  labour	  market	  and	  pension	  reforms	  under	  the	  centre-­‐right	  government	   in	   the	   early	  2000s.	  Their	  unified	  action,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   achieved	   the	  dramatic	  welfare	  expansion	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  forced	  the	  Amato	  government	  to	  back	  down	  on	  pension	  reform	  in	  1992	  and	  kept	  successive	  technocratic	  and	  centre-­‐left	  governments	  at	  the	  negotiation	  table	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  1990s	  (Regini	  and	  Regalia	  1997,	  Baccaro,	  Carrieri	  and	  Damiano	  2003).	  	  In	  Belgium,	  unions	  have	  a	  say	   in	  economic	  policy	  through	  their	  places	   in	  the	  National	  Labour	   Council	   and	   the	   Central	   Economic	   Council,	   and	   in	   the	   field	   of	   welfare	   policy	  through	   their	   role	   in	   administering	   the	   social	   security	   funds	   (Hemerijck,	   Berger	   and	  Visser	   1999,	   Marier	   2008).	   However,	   neither	   of	   these	   institutionalized	   channels	   of	  influence	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   struggle	   over	  welfare	   retrenchment.	   This	   is	  best	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   differential	   leverage	   that	   the	   different	   unions	   –	   Christian	  Democratic,	  Socialist	  and	  Liberal	  –	  exercise	  on	  policy.	  Since	  effective	  nationwide	  strikes	  are	  only	  possible	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  largest,	  Christian	  Democratic	  unions,	  the	  other	   two	   organizations	   are	   practically	   powerless	   in	   themselves,	   despite	   their	   equal	  institutional	   roles.	   Christian	   Democratic	   unions	   exercised	   their	   influence	   over	   policy	  mostly	   outside	   of	   the	   institutionalized	   consultation	   fora.	   They	   botched	   retrenchment	  attempts	  either	  by	  striking	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Global	  Pact	  of	  1993)	  or	  by	  informally	  pressuring	   the	  government	   (e.g.	  St.	  Anna	  Plan	  of	  1986).	  Characteristically,	  on	   the	  one	  occasion,	  when	  they	  acquiesced	  in	  retrenchment	  in	  1982,	  this,	  too,	  was	  done	  in	  a	  secret,	  informal	  setting	  between	  the	  leaders	  and	  government	  politicians.	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  In	   sum,	   institutionalized	   corporatist	   arrangements	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   play	   an	   important	  role	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  unions	  to	  assert	  workers’	  interests	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  domain	  in	  either	   country.	   Rather,	   their	   political	   leverage	   arises	   from	   capacity	   to	   mobilize	   a	  majority	  of	  workers.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  both	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium,	  unions	  have	   been	   influential	   despite	   their	   historic	   institutional	   development	   that	   led	   to	   a	  three-­‐way	   organizational	   division	   as	   well	   as	   to	   divergent	   ideological	   outlooks	   and	  organizational	   cultures	   (Baccaro,	   Carrieri	   and	   Damiano	   2003).	   These	   organizational	  divisions	   only	   impeded	   their	   capacity	   for	   united	   action,	   when	   their	   different	  constituencies	  had	  different	  preferences	  on	  a	  given	  issue.	  	  	  Another	   often-­‐emphasized	   way	   in	   which	   particularistic	   interests	   permeated	   policy	  making	   in	   both	   countries	   was	   the	   presence	   of	   factionalized,	   interest-­‐group	   driven	  parties	   at	   the	   helm	   of	   governments,	  who	   kept	   strong	   partisan	   control	   over	   the	   state	  machinery	   (Della	   Sala	   1997,	   Pasquino	   1997,	   Hooghe	   2004,	   Marier	   2008).	   Although	  these	  parties	  acted	  as	  institutionalized	  “transmission	  belts”	  for	  particularistic	  interests	  into	  governmental	  decision	  making,	   the	  case	  studies	   suggest	   that	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  different	   groups	   were	   able	   to	   “upload”	   their	   preferences	   into	   policy	   making	   also	  depended	  on	  the	  resources	  they	  were	  otherwise	  able	  to	  mobilize	  in	  their	  struggle	  with	  other	  groups.	  	  	  In	   Belgium,	   the	   intertwining	   of	   societal	   groups	  with	   parties	   –	   not	   only	   the	   Christian	  Democratic	  but	  also	  the	  Socialist	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  Liberal	  parties	  –	  is	  attributed	  to	   the	  historical	   development	  of	   the	  pillar	   system,	   in	  which	   each	  party	   “family”	   grew	  strong	  roots	  into	  society	  by	  developing	  tight	  links	  with	  societal	  and	  civil	  organizations,	  from	   trade	   unions	   to	   smallholders’	   associations,	   to	   women’s	   leagues	   and	   the	   like	  (Delwit	   1996).	   In	   the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democratic	   party,	   for	   example,	   this	   led	   to	   an	  organizational	   structure	   in	   which	   the	   different	   standen	   –	   business,	   labour	   and	  smallholders	   –	   had	   the	   right	   to	   delegate	   their	   own	   representatives	   into	   a	   predefined	  number	   of	   the	   decision	  making	   positions	   and	   thereby	   directly	   determine	   the	   party’s	  policy	  stance	  all	  the	  way	  until	  the	  early	  1990s	  	  (De	  Winter	  1996).	  	  However,	  throughout	  the	   1980s	   –	   when	   the	   policy	   hegemony	   of	   the	   Flemish	   Christian	   Democrats	   was	  pronounced	  –	  both	  labour	  and	  business	  refrained	  from	  using	  this	  channel	  to	  attempt	  to	  force	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  party,	  for	  fear	  of	  triggering	  a	  painful	  reaction	  from	  other	  groups.	  Business	   feared	   strikes	   at	   a	   time	   of	   great	   economic	   vulnerability,	   whereas	   labour	  worried	   about	   undermining	   international	   competitiveness	   and	   causing	   business	   to	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relocate	   in	  the	  medium	  and	  long	  run	  (Jones	  2008	  p170).	  Therefore,	  both	  groups	  used	  their	  institutional	  influence	  on	  the	  party	  within	  the	  limits	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  other’s	  tolerance.	   Interestingly,	   the	   institution	   of	   internal	   delegation	  weakened	   considerably	  by	  the	  1990s	  and	  later	  it	  was	  completely	  given	  up	  (De	  Winter	  1996).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	   party	   and	   the	   standen	   acknowledged	   the	   irrelevance	   of	   such	   arrangements	  themselves.	  	  	  In	   Italy,	   the	   electoral	   system	   is	  most	   often	   blamed	   for	   the	   development	   of	   Christian	  Democracy	   into	   a	   strongly	   factionalized	   party,	   excessively	   given	   to	   particularistic	  considerations,	   to	   pork-­‐barrel	   politics	   and	   to	   clientelistic	   practices.	   The	   system	   of	  preference	  votes	  used	  up	  to	  1993	  provided	  strong	  incentives	  to	  individual	  politicians	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  each	  other	  and	  the	  general	  party	  line	  by	  securing	  targeted	  benefits	   to	   their	   constituents	   and	   by	   being	   especially	   attentive	   to	   local	   demands	   and	  concerns	   (Carey	   and	  Shugart	   1995,	   Cox	   and	  McCubbins	  2001).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  party’s	   strategy	   towards	   the	   proletariat	   of	   the	   South	   shows	   that	   these	   incentives	   did	  not	   always	  work	  with	   the	   same	   intensity,	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   party	   factions	   to	   secure	  particularistic	   benefits	   to	   their	   specific	   constituencies	   also	  depended	  on	   the	   strategic	  position	   of	   that	   constituency	   within	   societal	   struggles.	   The	   needs	   of	   the	   Southern	  proletariat	  were	  largely	  ignored	  prior	  to	  the	  workers’	  movement	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  Later,	  however,	  this	  group	  of	  voters	  turned	  into	  an	  influential	  constituency	  of	   the	  DC,	   after	   the	   riots	   in	   the	   South	   and	   the	   strikes	   in	   the	  North	   demonstrated	   the	  potential	  danger	  of	  a	  two-­‐front	  war	  for	  the	  DC	  with	  anti-­‐system	  parties	  from	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  and	  for	  business	  with	  worker	  groups	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Existing	  clientele	  networks	  in	  the	  South	  were	  then	  extended	  to	  the	  proletarian	  stratum	   of	   the	   local	   population	   and	   beefed	   up	   with	   new	   resources	   to	   cater	   for	   this	  important	   new	   constituency.	   The	   faction	   operating	   these	   networks	   thereby	   gained	  increased	   influence	   within	   the	   party.	   In	   sum,	   the	   incentives	   emanating	   from	   the	  electoral	   system	  worked	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  balance	  of	   power	  between	  different	  societal	  groups.	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note,	  that	  the	  clientele	  networks	  were	   kept	   alive	   by	   centre-­‐right	   parties	   even	   after	   the	   shift	   to	   majoritarian	   electoral	  system	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   since	   they	   could	   thereby	   reach	   voters	   whose	   ballot	   was	  crucial	  in	  ensuring	  a	  centre-­‐right	  majority	  (Hopkin	  and	  Ignazi	  2008).	  	  	  Finally,	   special	   power	   sharing	   institutions	   between	   regional	   and	   linguistic	   groups	   in	  Belgium	  merit	  particular	  attention	  due	   to	   their	  potential	   to	   influence	  policy	   struggles	  between	  Flemish	  and	  Walloon	  interests.	  These	  institutions	  were	  built	  to	  ensure	  equal	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power	   to	   both	   sides	   despite	   unambiguous	   Flemish	   dominance	   in	   terms	   of	   both	  economic	   resources	   and	   electoral	   numbers,	   via	   a	   series	   of	   vetoes	   and	   rules	  guaranteeing	  parity	  of	  numbers	  in	  key	  decision-­‐making	  fora	  (Deschouwer	  2009).	  In	  the	  past	  decades,	  these	  institutional	  arrangements	  have	  clearly	  provided	  the	  Walloon	  side	  with	  some	  protection	  against	  Flemish	  policy	  initiatives.	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  stop	  the	  gradual	   devolution	   of	   important	   resources	   and	   decision	   making	   authority	   to	   the	  regional	   level,	   where	   economic	   disparities	   are	   free	   to	   exercise	   their	   effect.	   In	   the	  question	   of	   splitting	   social	   security,	   the	   Walloon	   veto	   has	   so	   far	   been	   successful	   in	  averting	  a	  major	  setback	   to	  Walloon	   interest,	  but	   the	   fierce	  determination	  of	  Flemish	  politicians	  to	  achieve	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  this	  matter	  and	  the	  electoral	  support	  that	  the	  most	   radical	   Flemish	   parties	   could	   muster	   in	   the	   past	   years	   suggests,	   that	   Flanders	  might	  be	  ready	   to	  dismantle	   the	  power	  sharing	   institutions	  altogether	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  having	  its	  way	  in	  this	  issue.	  In	  sum,	  while	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  in	   channelling	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   is	   unquestionable,	   their	   longer-­‐run	  effect	  in	  halting	  the	  Flemish	  tide	  and	  their	  eventual	  survival	  is	  far	  from	  certain.	  	  Clearly,	  this	  brief	  overview	  of	  institutional	  factors	  could	  only	  look	  at	  a	  few,	  most	  often	  emphasized	   features	  of	   the	  Belgian	  and	  Italian	  political	  systems	  that	  determined	  how	  particularistic	   interests	   gained	   effective	   representation	   in	   the	   policy	   making	   sphere.	  The	  examples	  illustrate,	  however,	  that	  over	  the	  longer	  time	  horizon,	  these	  institutional	  factors	   played	   relatively	   minor	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   incentives	   and	   constraints	   of	  political	  actors	  representing	  different	  clusters	  of	  interests.	  Instead,	  their	  impact	  tended	  to	   be	   subject	   of	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   different	   societal	   groups	   and	   their	  evolution	  through	  time	  reflected	  the	  changes	  in	  this	  balance	  of	  power.	  	  
Ideology	  and	  political	  entrepreneurship	  	  While	   the	   above	   discussion	   of	   union,	   party	   and	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   politics	   concentrated	  on	   institutional-­‐organizational	   features,	   another	   important	   aspect	   that	   bears	   on	   the	  characteristics	  of	  interest	  representation	  in	  a	  polity	  is	  ideological	  division	  between	  the	  different	  interest	  representing	  actors.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  a	  crucial	  question	  to	  ask	  is	  to	  what	   extent	   ideological	   convictions	  and	   commitments	   enhance	  or	   compromise	   the	  ability	   of	   these	   actors	   to	   effectively	   represent	   the	   interests	   of	   societal	   groups	   and	   to	  
	   222	  
foster	   the	   formation	   of	   powerful	   coalitions	   between	   them	   by	   creatively	   redefining	  commonalities	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interests139.	  	  	  The	  case	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  policy	  preferences	  and	  structural	  sources	  of	   power	   have	   overriding	   importance	   over	   ideological	   considerations	   in	   defining	  societal	  coalitions	  and	  determining	  the	  eventual	  policy	  choices	  advocated	  by	  different	  political	   actors.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   significant	   shifts	   can	   take	   place	   in	   the	   policy	  preferences	   of	   interest-­‐representing	   organizations	   –	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   changing	  preferences	   or	   the	   changing	   balance	   of	   power	   of	   groups	   within	   their	   constituency	   –	  without	  obvious	  changes	  in	  their	  ideological	  outlook.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ideologies	  are	  sometimes	   explicitly	   adopted	   and	   adapted	   by	   interest	   representing	   organizations	   in	  order	   to	   cater	   to	   the	  evolving	  preferences	  of	   a	   given	   societal	   group	  or	   to	   assume	   the	  representation	   of	   an	   emerging	   societal	   coalition.	   In	   this	   latter	   respect,	   political	   and	  policy	  entrepreneurship	  is	  important	  in	  giving	  political	  shape	  to	  emergent	  coalitions,	  as	  enterprising	   organizations	   harness	   new	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   in	  order	  to	  win	  over	  a	  new	  societal	  base.	  However,	  this	  type	  of	  political	  innovation	  tends	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  materially	  given	  cleavages	  and	  often	  responds	  to	  existing	  discontent	  in	  a	  societal	  segment	  with	  its	  existing	  representative	  organization.	  	  In	  Italy,	  scholarship	  has	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  extreme	  ideological	  division	  of	  society	  in	   the	   post-­‐war	   decades	   between	   Communist	   and	   anti-­‐Communist	   forces.	   This	  emphasis	   on	   separate	   Christian	   Democratic	   and	   Communist	   “subcultures”	   within	  society	   suggests	   that	   ideology	  defined	  societal	   coalitions	   in	   that	  period	  as	  well	   as	   the	  policy	   choices	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Communist	   government	   coalition140.	   However,	   the	   co-­‐operation	   of	   Communist	   and	   Christian	   Democratic	   trade	   unions	   during	   the	   years	   of	  worker	  upheaval	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  –	  enforced	  mostly	  by	  pressure	  from	  their	   grassroots	   –	   suggests	   that	   ideological	   divisions	   were	   at	   times	   eclipsed	   by	   the	  underlying	   commonality	   of	   worker	   interests.	   Furthermore,	   the	   firmness	   of	   the	  ideological	   commitment	   of	   anti-­‐Communist	   governments	   to	   certain	   policy	   choices	   is	  put	   into	  question	  by	  the	  observed	  shift	   in	  policies	   from	  a	  business-­‐friendly	  neoliberal	  approach	  resting	  on	  spending	  restraint,	  balanced	  budgets	  and	  monetary	  stringency	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  to	  the	  debt-­‐financed	  expansion	  of	  spending	  and	  the	  monetization	  of	  deficits	  from	  the	  1970s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  On	  the	  role	  of	  parties	  shaping	  cleavages	  within	  the	  electorate	  –	  rather	  than	  being	  shaped	  by	  them	  –	  see	  Sartori	  (1969).	  On	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  coalition	  formation	  (Blyth	  2002).	  140	  On	  political	  subcultures,	  see	  Trigilia	  (1986).	  For	  a	  review	  and	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  ideology-­‐centred	  view,	  see	  (Tarrow	  1977)	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  In	   Italy’s	   Second	   Republic,	   the	   role	   of	   ideological	   “engineering”	   –	   i.e.	   the	   tailoring	   of	  political	  messages	  to	  fit	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  specific	  societal	  groups	  –	  is	  tangible	  in	  both	   shaping	   the	   emergent	   party	   system	   and	   in	   the	   cobbling	   together	   of	   societal	  coalitions	   behind	   the	   opposing	   electoral	   blocks.	   The	  most	   ingenious	   example	   of	   how	  new	  conflicts	  and	  commonalities	  of	  interests	  are	  harnessed	  by	  policy	  entrepreneurs,	  is	  the	  Lega’s	  success	  in	  carving	  out	  a	  sizeable	  electoral	  base	  from	  the	  constituency	  of	  the	  –	  then	   still	   existing	   and	   relatively	   strong	   –	   Christian	   Democracy	   in	   1980s.	   The	   Lega	  discovered	   the	   fundamental	   congruence	   of	   interests	   across	   classes	   in	   the	   industrial	  districts	   of	   the	   North	   in	   international	   competitiveness,	   low	   taxes	   and	   employment	  flexibility,	  and	  it	  managed	  to	  and	  tap	  into	  a	  pool	  of	  discontent	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  voters	   of	   the	   North	   with	   the	   government’s	   inability	   to	   provide	   favourable	   exchange	  rates.	   It	   achieved	   this	   by	   building	   an	   ideology	   that	   is	   territorially	   defined,	   with	   its	  targeted	  territory	  covering	  the	  areas	  where	  the	  industrial	  district	  mode	  of	  production	  is	   most	   prevalent.	   Interestingly,	   this	   ideology	   –	   centred	   on	   the	   conflict	   of	   interests	  between	   North	   and	   South	   –	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	   party	   in	   later	   years	   from	   entering	  coalitions	   with	   a	   strong	   Southern	   force,	   the	   AN	   (Diamanti	   2007).	   Compared	   to	   the	  Lega’s	   innovation,	   Forza	   Italia’s	   ideological	   engineering	   is	   somewhat	   more	  conventional,	   since	   it	   is	   based	   on	  market	   research	   to	   identify	   the	   ideological	   “selling	  points”	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  largest	  possible	  sections	  of	  the	  constituencies	  of	  the	  defunct	  DC	   (Thompson	   and	   Price	   2009b).	   Finally,	   the	   AN	   and	   parties	   of	   the	   left	   followed	   an	  even	  more	   conventional	   strategy	   in	   targeting	   the	   societal	   groups	   they	   inherited	   from	  the	   former	  Communist	   and	  post-­‐fascist	  parties	   and	   “watering	  down”	   their	  previously	  extreme	  ideologies	  to	  be	  able	  to	  cater	  to	  these	  electorates	  in	  the	  new	  political	  context.	  	  	  In	  Belgium,	  economic	  policy	  preferences	  of	  the	  big	  parties	  corresponded	  quite	  closely	  to	  their	  ideological	  commitments	  up	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  times.	  What	  is	  interesting	  in	  the	  Belgian	   case,	   however,	   is	   how	   the	   respective	   –	   Christian	   Democratic,	   Socialist	   and	  Liberal	   –	   ideologies	   have	   waned	   in	   political	   relevance	   due	   to	   the	   emergence	   and	  strengthening	   of	   the	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   divide.	   Parties	   are	   now	   competing	   to	   a	   great	  extent	   on	   their	   ability	   and	   willingness	   to	   defend	   and	   further	   the	   interests	   of	   their	  respective	  regions,	   rather	   than	  on	   traditional	  policy	  platforms.	  As	  a	  result,	  previously	  inconceivable	   government	   configurations	   and	   policy	  mixes	   have	   became	   possible,	   as	  old	  ideological	  dividing	  lines	  have	  weakened.	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This	   displacement	   of	   ideological	   strife	   by	   the	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   conflict	   is	   a	   hugely	  interesting	   political	   phenomenon	   that	   raises	   the	   issue	   of	   what	   role	   political	  entrepreneurship	   plays	   in	   (re)defining	   commonalities	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interests	  between	  different	   groups	   in	   society.	  Even	   though	  division	  between	   the	   two	  halves	  of	  the	  country	  had	  historical	  roots	  and	  gained	  more	  pronounced	  institutional	  shape	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  it	  was	  due	  largely	  to	  a	  campaign	  by	  the	  Flemish	  Christian	  Democrats	  that	   the	   rift	   between	   the	   two	   regions	   gained	   such	   strong	   distributive	   overtones	   and	  became	   the	   centre	   of	   political	   conflict	   over	   fiscal	   policy.	   The	   Flemish	   Christian	  Democrats	   decided	   to	   direct	   attention	   on	   interregional	   transfers	   and	   educate	   the	  Flemish	  electorate	  about	  the	   imbalances	  of	  cross-­‐regional	  taxation	  and	  social	  security	  payments,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   deflect	   attention	   from	   the	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	  business	   over	   social	   security,	  which	   had	   put	   great	   strain	   on	   its	   own	   supporter	   base.	  Interestingly,	   this	   strategy	   built	   on	   an	   existing	   structural	   division	   between	   the	   two	  regions	   rooted	   in	   disparities	   in	   economic	   dynamism	   –	   one	   which	   had	   already	  temporarily	  counteracted	  the	  class	  divide	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  when	  Flemish	  labour	  and	  business	  compromised	  over	  austerity	  measures	  –	  but	   it	  approached	  the	  division	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  taxation	  and	  welfare	  transfers,	  an	  aspect	  that	  was	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  to	   citizens.	   In	   this	   sense,	   although	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   new	   definition	   for	   conflicts	   and	  commonalities	   of	   interest	   was	   objectively	   given,	   its	   rise	   to	   political	   relevance	   is	  connected	  to	  a	  political	  entrepreneur’s	  strategic	  behaviour.	  	  
European	  constraints	  	  A	  final	  question	  to	  address	  with	  respect	  to	  explaining	  fiscal	  policy	  choices	  in	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	   in	   the	   past	   decades	   is	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   choices	   can	   be	   understood	   by	  focusing	   on	   the	   domestic	   policy	   arena	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   they	   derive	   from	  international	  incentives	  and	  constraints.	  This	  issue	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ever-­‐closer	  European	  economic	   and	  political	   integration	   that	   took	  place	  during	   these	  decades,	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  market	  conditions	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  policy	  options	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  	  While	  the	  case	  studies	  provide	  ample	  evidence	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Europe	  for	  policy	  developments,	  they	  also	  show	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  changes	  at	  the	  European	  level	  is	  by	  no	  means	   pre-­‐determined	   or	   straightforward.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	   policy	   influence	   of	  European	  developments	  is	  truly	  exogenous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  new	  constraints	  arise	  and	  are	   enforced	   independently	   of	   the	   domestic	   political	   struggle.	   At	   other	   times,	   such	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developments	   become	   significant	   only	   because	   of	   the	   specific	   policy	   preferences	   of	  certain	   groups	   within	   the	   given	   polity.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   decision	   to	   take	   on	  commitments	   and	   to	   comply	  with	   them	   can	   be	   an	   outcome	   of	   the	   domestic	   political	  struggle,	   rather	   than	   an	   unavoidable	   consequence	   of	   the	   country’s	   position	   within	  European	   integration.	   Consequently,	   the	   impact	   of	   external	   developments	   on	   the	  domestic	  political	  conflicts	  also	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  specific	  domestic	  context.	  	  For	  example,	   the	  case	  studies	  demonstrated	   that	  exchange	  rate	  constraints	  under	   the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  political	  context	  of	  fiscal	   policy	   making	   in	   both	   countries	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   However,	   while	   in	  Belgium	  adherence	  to	  the	  EMS	  was	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  powerful	  domestic	  coalition,	  it	  was	  a	  constraint	   imposed	  by	  external	  pressure	   in	   Italy.	  For	  groups	  exposed	   to	   international	  competition	   in	   Belgium,	   exchange	   rate	   stability	   –	   and	   primarily	   favourable	   exchange	  rates	  with	   the	  German	   currency	   –	  was	   a	   first	   priority.	   Therefore,	  when	  Belgium	  was	  threatened	  with	  exclusion	  after	  manifest	  difficulties	  with	  keeping	  the	  required	  parity	  in	  1982,	   the	   obvious	   choice	   for	   governments	   supported	  by	   these	   groups	  was	   to	   subject	  monetary	  policy	  fully	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  maintaining	  parity	  –	  which	  translated	  into	  an	  end	  to	  the	  monetization	  of	  debt,	   low	  inflation	  and	  high	  real	   interest	  rates	  –	  even	  if	  this	   decision	   came	   with	   prohibitive	   interests	   on	   public	   debt	   and	   therefore	   a	  deterioration	  of	   the	   fiscal	  problem	  (McNamara	  1998,	  Pochet	  2004).	  The	   insistence	  of	  the	  Belgian	  government	  on	  complying	  with	  its	  commitments	  in	  the	  EMS	  was	  a	  way	  to	  insulate	  exposed	  business	  and	  labour	  from	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  problems,	  even	  though	  it	  had	  detrimental	  consequences	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  country	  to	  deal	  with	  those	  problems.	  The	  EMS	   thus	  had	  a	   threefold	  effect	  on	   the	  politics	  of	   fiscal	   stabilization	   in	  Belgium.	  First,	   it	  accelerated	  the	  snowballing	  of	  debt	  due	  to	  higher	  real	   interest	  rates.	  Second,	  it	  elicited	  agreement	  amongst	  the	  exposed	  sectors	  about	  the	  need	  to	  radically	  cut	  public	  consumption	  and	  investment.	  Third,	  it	  allowed	  powerful	  social	  groups	  to	  dig	  in	   their	   heels	   in	   the	   conflict	   over	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  EMS	  were	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  voluntary	  and	  influenced	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  struggle	  over	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  highly	  complex	  ways.	  	  Italy,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   coaxed	   into	   joining	   the	   EMS	   by	   external	   diplomatic	  pressure	   largely	   against	   its	   will	   (as	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   3.).	   Even	   though	   it	   received	  preferential	  treatment	  within	  the	  system	  in	  the	  form	  of	  wider	  volatility	  margins	  for	  its	  exchange	   rates,	   no	   interest	   group	  was	   clearly	   in	   favour	   of	   fixing	   the	   exchange	   rates.	  Successive	  governments	   later	  managed	  to	  achieve	  adjustments	   in	  the	  parity,	  but	  such	  
	   226	  
changes	  were	  subject	  to	  the	  agreement	  of	  Italy’s	  partners	  within	  the	  EMS	  and	  thus	  the	  exchange	   rate	   became	   a	   source	   of	   exogenous	   pressure	   on	   the	   Italian	   policy	  environment	  and	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  making	  the	  economic	  side	  effects	  of	  persistent	  deficits	   painful	   for	   groups	   exposed	   to	   international	   competition.	   Thereby,	   it	   gave	   a	  crucial	   impetus	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   preferences	   of	   these	   groups	   towards	   fiscal	  stabilization	  and	  thus	  to	  rethinking	  existing	  societal	  coalitions	  and	  political	  alignments.	  	  	  Joining	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  was	  an	  elective	  choice	  for	  both	  countries.	  In	  fact,	   their	   omission	   from	   the	   first	   round	   would	   have	   been	   automatic,	   had	   they	   not	  managed	   to	   reduce	   their	   fiscal	   imbalances	   in	   time.	   The	   choice	   to	  make	   the	   required	  sacrifices	   reflected	   the	   preferences	   of	   dominant	   societal	   coalitions	   in	   both	   countries.	  However,	   this	   choice	   still	   influenced	   domestic	   struggles	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   in	  different	   ways,	   because	   it	   affected	   the	   policy	   leverage	   of	   the	   dominant	   coalitions	  differently.	   In	   Italy,	   the	   decision	   to	   join	   the	   EMU	   –	   and	   therefore	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  Maastricht	   criteria	   –	   had	   little	   independent	   effect.	   The	   competitiveness	   coalition	   –	  composed	  of	  large	  businesses,	  a	  section	  of	  the	  small	  entrepreneurial	  class	  and	  parts	  of	  labour	   –	   that	   this	   decision	   favoured	   due	   to	   its	   exposure	   to	   international	   competition	  had	   already	   seized	   control	   over	   policy	  making.	   It	   was	   both	   determined	   and	   had	   the	  political	   leverage	   to	   consolidate	   the	   budget	   irrespective	   of	   monetary	   integration.	   In	  fact,	   by	   the	   time	   the	   decision	   to	   join	   the	   euro	   was	   made,	   this	   coalition	   had	   set	   into	  motion	  most	  of	  the	  significant	  stabilizing	  measures	  that	  put	  debt	  on	  a	  declining	  path	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Therefore,	  consolidation	  happened	  largely	  independently	  of	  the	  euro.	  	  	  In	  Belgium,	   the	  decision	   to	   fulfil	   the	  Maastricht	   criteria	   favoured	  Flanders	   to	   a	  much	  greater	   extent	   than	   it	   did	   Wallonia,	   due	   to	   the	   much	   tighter	   integration	   of	   Flemish	  industry	  into	  the	  European	  economic	  circulation.	  However,	  since	  Walloon	  cooperation	  was	   indispensible	   for	  reaching	  the	  deficit	   targets,	   the	  race	   for	   the	  euro	  gave	  Wallonia	  strong	   blackmailing	   power.	   This	   change	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   the	   two	  regions	  resulted	  in	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  compromises	  that	  allowed	  Wallonia	  to	  withstand	  Flemish	   efforts	   to	   resolve	   interregional	   disputes	   by	   gradually	   starving	   Wallonia	   of	  funds.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   Maastricht	   rules	   intervened	   in	   the	   Belgian	   domestic	  redistributive	   conflicts	   in	   a	  way	   that	  delayed	   their	   resolution	   and	   thereby	  postponed	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  structural	  problems	  of	  Belgian	  public	  finances.	  	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  and	  later	  the	  launching	  of	  the	  Economic	  Monetary	  Union	  are	  just	  the	  two	  most	  important	  channels	  through	  which	  the	  evolving	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European	   integration	   affected	   domestic	   political	   struggles	   over	   fiscal	   policy.	   The	  reduction	   in	  market	   fragmentation	   and	   the	   prohibition	   of	   state	   aid	   under	   the	   Single	  Market	   project	   are	   further	   examples	   of	   how	   European	   decisions	   influence	   economic	  conditions	   that	   impinge	   on	   the	   policy	   preferences	   of	   different	   groups	   and	   how	   they	  limit	  the	  policy	  options	  of	  governments.	  The	  two	  case	  studies	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  while	  these	   external	   developments	   had	   tangible	   effects	   on	   policy	   choices	   in	   both	   countries	  under	   consideration,	   these	   effects	   were	   not	   a	   priori	   obvious,	   because	   they	   were	  refracted	  by	  the	  domestic	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  with	  which	  they	  interacted141.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  domestic	  structures	  versus	  institutions,	  ideas	  and	  international	  constraints	  	  This	   section	   attempted	   to	   disentangle	   the	   complex	   interaction	   between	   structural	  factors	   –	   i.e.	   the	   constellation	   of	   policy	   preferences	   and	   political	   leverage	   –	   and	  institutional,	   ideational	  and	  international	  aspects	  in	  determining	  the	  evolution	  of	  debt	  accumulation	   in	   Belgium	   and	   Italy.	   It	   emphasized	   the	   primacy	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  factors	   in	   determining	   the	   chances	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   by	   showing	   that	   the	  explanatory	  mechanism	  posited	  by	  the	  society-­‐centred	  model	  can	  be	  clearly	  traced	  out	  behind	  political	  and	  policy	  developments	   in	  both	  countries	  without	   the	  need	  to	  make	  limiting	   assumptions	   about	   the	   institutional	   structure,	   the	   ideational	   environment	   or	  the	  international	  context	  in	  which	  the	  mechanism	  played	  out.	  	  	  Thereby,	  it	  reinforced	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  successful	  consolidation	  in	  a	  country	   plagued	   by	   persistent	   fiscal	   imbalances	   should	   be	   universally	   expected	   to	  depend	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  struggle	  of	  different	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  over	  who	  is	  to	  bear	  the	  sacrifices	  required	  for	  restoring	  the	  balance	  of	  public	  finances.	  The	  outcome	  of	   such	   a	   struggle,	   in	   turn,	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   polarization	   of	   policy	   preferences	  between	   different	   groups,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   groups	   are	   able	   to	   insulate	  themselves	   from	  the	  negative	  economic	  side	  effects	  of	   the	   fiscal	  problems	  and	  on	   the	  political	  coalitions	  they	  form	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  interests.	  The	  next,	  concluding	  section	  evaluates	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   findings	   and	   discusses	   the	   theoretical,	  methodological	  and	  policy-­‐related	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	   It	   is	   perhaps	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   case	   studies	   forewent	   reflecting	   on	   other	   potentially	   important	  international	  factors	  beyond	  European	  economic	  integration	  that	  might	  have	  had	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  domestic	  political	  struggles	  in	  both	  countries.	  The	  international	  system	  changed	  tremendously	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s,	  but	  it	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  evaluate	  to	  which	  extent	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  radical	  transformation	  of	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	   or	   in	   the	   intensification	   of	   regional	   conflict	   –	   and	   the	   more	   tangible	   possibility	   of	   the	   eventual	  splitting	  of	  the	  country	  –	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  in	  Belgium.	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Contributions	  	  The	  present	  crisis	  highlighted	  the	  vulnerabilities	  that	  debt	  creates.	  The	  failure	  of	  many	  countries	  –	  such	  as	  Greece,	  Portugal,	  Hungary	  or	  Italy	  –	  to	  get	  their	  debt	   levels	  under	  control	  in	  the	  past	  decades	  now	  has	  dire	  consequences	  for	  their	  chances	  of	  coping	  at	  a	  time	  when	  markets	   are	   nervous	   and	   financing	   is	   scarce.	   In	   the	   present	   situation,	   the	  question	  of	  how	  countries	  end	  up	  in	  such	  desperate	  situations	  is	  raised	  with	  renewed	  urgency.	   This	   thesis	   proposed	   an	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   and	   used	   it	   to	   explain	   two	  historically	   stubborn	   cases	   of	   alarming	   indebtedness.	   While	   the	   research	   design	  applied	  here	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  sweeping	  conclusions,	   the	  findings	  provide	   important	  theoretical,	   methodological	   and	   policy-­‐related	   insights.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   present	  protracted	   economic	   recession	   and	   the	   European	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis,	   when	   many	  European	   countries	   are	   bracing	   themselves	   for	   difficult	   years	   of	   having	   to	   deal	   with	  dangerous	   levels	  of	  debt,	   these	   insights	   can	  be	  useful	   in	  understanding	  how	  different	  countries	  cope	  with	  their	  old	  or	  new	  fiscal	  challenges.	  	  	  
Contributions	  to	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  and	  methodological	  aspects	  	  One	   of	   the	   main	   theoretical	   contributions	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   its	   choice	   of	   theoretical	  approach.	   Although	   the	   society-­‐centred	   approach	   to	   explaining	   observed	   policy	  trajectories	  has	   a	   venerable	   tradition	   in	  political	   economy,	   it	   has	  not	  been	  applied	   to	  the	   field	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   before142.	   By	   looking	   for	   explanations	   for	   disastrous	   debt	  accumulation	   in	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   context	  of	  policy	  making,	   the	   thesis	   considerably	  broadened	   the	   scope	   of	   inquiry	   and	   explored	   factors	   that	   were	   inaccessible	   to	   the	  existing,	  government-­‐centred	  explanations	  for	  sovereign	  borrowing.	  	  A	  second	  theoretical	  contribution	  is	  the	  infusion	  of	  the	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  with	  the	  insights	  of	  a	  dynamic	  game-­‐theoretical	  model.	  The	  static	  society-­‐centred	  approach	  was	   not	   directly	   applicable	   to	   the	   issue	   at	   hand.	   Policy	   analysis	   in	   the	   “coalitions	   of	  interests”	  tradition	  has	  so	  far	  always	  concentrated	  on	  comparative	  statics:	  it	  focused	  on	  explaining	   policy	   choices	   at	   important	   junctures	   in	   a	   country’s	   economic	   history	   by	  exploring	   the	   constellations	   of	   societal	   interests	   under	   the	   given	   economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  The	  approach	  has	  been	  used	   to	  explain	   trade	  policies	   (e.g.	  Kindleberger	  1951,	  Frieden	  and	  Rogowski	  1996),	  industrial	  policies	  (Frieden	  1991),	  monetary	  and	  exchange	  rate	  policies	  (e.g.	  Henning	  1994,	  Frieden	  2002)	   and	   complex	   policy	   packages	   integrating	   several	   elements	   of	   different	   issue	   areas	   (Gourevitch	  1986).	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conditions143.	  The	  issue	  of	  debt	  accumulation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  inherently	  dynamic.	  The	  task	  was	  to	  understand	  why	  and	  how	  long	  it	  is	  allowed	  to	  grow	  and	  why	  and	  how	  long	  the	  economic	  pressures	  and	  financial	  risks	  are	  tolerated	  before	  effective	  action	  is	  taken	   to	   eliminate	   fiscal	   imbalances.	   Therefore,	   the	   thesis	   imported	   into	   the	   society-­‐centred	   framework	   of	   analysis	   a	   dynamic	   game	   that	   modelled	   exactly	   this	   question.	  While	   Alesina	   and	   Drazen’s	   war	   of	   attrition	   model	   has	   been	   a	   widely	   cited	   in	   the	  literature,	  its	  empirical	  applications	  have	  been	  very	  limited	  both	  in	  number	  and	  scope,	  likely	   because	   of	   its	   dynamic	   nature,	   which	   makes	   testing	   it	   in	   a	   large-­‐n	   statistical	  model	  impossible.	  Using	  this	  model	  in	  a	  qualitative	  study	  helped	  to	  gauge	  the	  empirical	  relevance	  of	  the	  model’s	  predictions	  about	  the	  expected	  behaviour	  of	  societal	  groups	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  large	  problems	  with	  public	  finances.	  	  Marrying	   the	   two	   very	   different	   theoretical	   frameworks	   allowed	   for	   a	   diachronic	  analysis	  of	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  of	  policy	  making	  that	  is	  both	  rigorous	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  rich	  with	  sociological	  and	  historical	  detail.	  It	  allowed	  for	  a	  close	  mapping	  of	  the	   endogenous	   evolution	   of	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   making	   by	  tracing	   the	   changing	   structure	   of	   interests	   and	   preferences	   as	   the	   fiscal	   problems	  escalated	  and	  made	  their	  effects	  felt.	  Understanding	  how	  the	  constellation	  of	  interests	  evolved	   is	  key	  to	  explaining	  both	  the	  change	   from	  borrowing	  to	  balancing	  the	  budget	  and	  the	  specific	  composition	  of	  adjustment.	  Therefore,	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  gave	  a	  fuller	   and	   more	   accurate	   picture	   of	   the	   factors	   driving	   episodes	   of	   excessive	   debt	  accumulation	   and	   consolidation	   in	   these	   two	   countries	   than	   existing,	   government-­‐centred	   theories.	   It	   also	   allowed	   for	   evaluating	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   structural	  factors	  compared	  to	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  aspects	  as	  well	  as	  for	  incorporating	  the	  role	  of	  international	  constraints	  on	  domestic	  policy	  making.	  	  This	  dynamic,	  society-­‐centred	  theoretical	  framework	  can	  also	  be	  of	  use	  for	  answering	  important	  questions	  beyond	  the	  one	  presented	  here.	  In	  particular,	  it	  could	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  field	  of	  fiscal	  sociology	  and	  in	  the	  scholarship	  on	  welfare	  state	  reform.	  The	  two	  case	  studies	   clearly	   showed	   that	   increasing	   pressures	   from	   fiscal	   problems	   and	   the	  realignments	   of	   societal	   coalitions	   are	   key	   factors	   in	   determining	   the	   willingness	   of	  societal	   actors	   to	   acquiesce	   in	   higher	   taxation	   or	   to	   give	   up	   on	   social	   security	  entitlements,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   their	   abilities	   to	   defend	   themselves	   against	  unwanted	   reforms,	   on	   the	   other.	   The	   need	   to	   treat	   questions	   of	   taxation	   and	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Gourevitch	  (1986),	  for	  example,	  explains	  the	  different	  policy	  responses	  of	  different	  countries	  to	  major	  economic	   crises.	   Frieden	   (1991)	   analyses	   the	   policy	   reactions	   of	   different	   Latin-­‐American	   countries	   to	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  conditions	  on	  the	  world	  financial	  markets.	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expenditure	   in	   a	   single	   framework	   has	   been	   underlined	   by	   Pierson	   (2001).	   The	  theoretical	   approach	   presented	   here	   goes	   one	   step	   further	   than	   that	   by	   providing	   a	  dynamic	  framework	  where	  taxation	  and	  social	  expenditure	  are	  investigated	  in	  relation	  to	   the	   country’s	   evolving	   overall	   fiscal	   position.	   Furthermore,	   the	   case	   studies	   have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  fiscal	  compromises	  often	  involve	  non-­‐fiscal	  side	  deals,	  such	   as	   the	   redesigning	  of	  wage	  bargaining	   as	  well	   as	   liberalization	  measures	  on	   the	  labour	   and	   product	   markets.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   combination	   of	   the	   societal	  coalitions	   framework	   and	   the	   war	   of	   attrition	  model	   can	   provide	   useful	   insights	   for	  analysing	  these	  policy	  areas,	  too.	  	  From	  a	  methodological	  perspective,	  the	  approach	  taken	  here	  was	  somewhat	  unusual	  in	  that	   it	   consciously	   forewent	  defining	  a	  priori	   the	   expected	   empirical	   content	   that	   the	  key	   units	   of	   analysis	   would	   assume.	   Instead,	   it	   was	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	  empirical	   case	  studies	   to	  clarify	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  abstract	  concepts	  of	   the	   theory	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  the	  concrete	  cases,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  use	  the	  empirical	  material	  to	  further	   develop	   the	   theory.	   Although	   this	  methodological	   choice	   limited	   the	   range	   of	  applicable	  research	  designs	  –	  i.e.	  it	  forewent	  rigorous	  testing	  of	  the	  theory	  by	  excluding	  the	   possibility	   of	   closely	   controlled	   comparisons	   between	   cases	   and	   a	   more	  quantitative	   treatment	   of	   the	   evidence	   –	   it	   greatly	   enhanced	   the	   theory-­‐building	  potential	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  	  The	  choice	  was	  arguably	  vindicated	  by	  the	   findings.	   	  The	  cases	  provided	  evidence	   for	  the	   same	   underlying	   mechanism	   posited	   by	   the	   theory,	   yet	   they	   also	   displayed	  considerable	   variety	   in	   the	   key	   explanatory	   variables:	   the	   underlying	   redistributive	  arrangements	  which	  polarized	  the	  fiscal	  preferences	  of	  different	  societal	  groups	  about	  how	  to	  change	  the	  policy	  status	  quo,	  the	  ability	  of	  groups	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  deficits,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  them	  and	  the	  type	  of	  societal	   coalitions	   they	   formed.	   Furthermore,	   the	   choice	   not	   to	   pre-­‐determine	   the	  empirical	   content	   of	   the	   key	   variables	   also	   allowed	   for	   registering	   interesting	  variations	  in	  the	  institutional,	  ideational	  and	  international	  context	  in	  which	  the	  posited	  mechanism	   played	   out.	   Further	   case	   studies	   are	   necessary	   to	   test	   the	   empirical	  relevance	  of	  the	  theory	  more	  broadly.	  In	  the	  coming	  years,	  the	  fiscal	  difficulties	  of	  many	  developed	  countries	  are	  likely	  to	  provide	  ample	  relevant	  material	  for	  such	  studies.	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Policy	  implications	  1:	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  in	  the	  crisis	  	  The	  latest	  waves	  of	  the	  crisis	  have	  shaken	  both	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  and	  engendered	  some	  important	  political	  changes.	  These	  have	  raised	  high	  hopes	  that	  the	  present	  crisis	  might	  become	   an	   opportunity	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   technocratic	   elites	   to	   resolve	   decade-­‐long	  problems.	   The	   analysis	   of	   their	   past	   experiences	  with	   fiscal	   troubles	   provided	   in	   the	  thesis	  helps	  to	  understand	  the	  policy	  responses	  of	  each	  country’s	  governments	  to	  the	  new	   challenges	   and	   to	   evaluate	   the	   chances	   of	   a	   breakthrough	   in	   stubborn	   policy	  issues.	  	  	  The	  rapid	  escalation	  of	   the	  sovereign	  debt	  problems	   in	  other	  European	  countries	  and	  the	  attendant	  nervousness	  in	  financial	  markets	  raised	  the	  spectre	  of	  serious	  trouble	  in	  both	   countries	   –	   primarily	   through	   the	   rapid	   increase	   of	   the	   risk	   premium	   on	  government	   bonds	   in	   Italy	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   rating	   downgrades	   in	   Belgium.	   This	  emergency	   caused	   a	   suspension	   of	   “politics	   as	   usual”	   in	   both	   countries	   and	   created	  political	  situations	  that	  closely	  resemble	  the	  ones	  observed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  Italy,	  a	   strong	   coalition	   of	   interests	   emerged	   supporting	   fiscal	   consolidation	   –	   and	   the	  attendant	  sacrifices	  –	  whereas	  in	  Belgium,	  feuding	  societal	   forces	  decided	  to	  put	  their	  conflicts	  on	  ice	  until	  conditions	  are	  safer.	  	  In	   Italy,	   the	   last	   centre-­‐right	   government144	   reluctantly	   introduced	   retrenchment	  measures	   in	   July	   and	   August	   of	   last	   year	   under	   pressure	   from	   looming	   danger	   of	  default.	   It	  was	   clear	   that	   if	   Italy	  wanted	   to	   appeal	   for	   European	   support	   in	   financing	  itself,	  harsh	  austerity	  and	  immediate	  savings	  were	  unavoidable.	  The	  measures	  included	  cuts	   to	   local	   spending	   –	   mostly	   affecting	   public	   employment	   –	   higher	   health	   co-­‐payments	  and	   tax	   increases	  on	   top	   incomes	  and	   financial	   investments.	   Some	  of	   these	  measures	  were	  highly	  unusual	  for	  the	  centre-­‐right	  coalition	  given	  the	  dependence	  of	  a	  large	   part	   of	   its	   electorate	   on	   public	   employment,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   aversion	   of	   another	  part	  to	  taxation.	  They	  quickly	  brought	  the	  coalition	  under	  stress,	  especially	  because	  it	  became	   clear	   that	   more	   pain	   was	   necessary.	   By	   October-­‐November	   the	   constituent	  parties	  preferred	  to	  bring	  the	  government	  down	  and	  give	  way	  to	  a	  technocratic	  cabinet.	  	  This	  new,	  unelected	  government	  –	  under	  an	  erstwhile	  European	  commissioner,	  Mario	  Monti	  –	  is	  currently	  governing	  with	  a	  cross-­‐parliamentary	  support	  uniting	  both	  poles	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	   This	   government	   is	   mostly	   composed	   of	   the	   successor	   party	   of	   the	   erstwhile	   Forza	   Italia	   and	   the	  National	  Alliance	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Lega.	  
	   232	  
the	  political	   spectrum.	  Thanks	   to	   this	   support,	   the	   technocratic	  government	  has	  been	  able	   to	   take	  on	   some	  of	   the	  most	   sensitive	   issues	  of	   the	  past	  decades,	   inflicting	  great	  fiscal	   pain	   on	   previously	   untouchable	   interest	   groups.	   Labour	   is	   affected	   by	   a	  major	  pension	   reform	   (the	   raising	   of	   the	   retirement	   age,	   the	   end	   of	   indexation	   and	   the	  separation	  of	  pension	  payments	  from	  past	  earnings)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  planned	  reform	  to	  job	  security.	   Small	   entrepreneurs	   suffer	   from	   a	   crackdown	   on	   tax	   evasion,	   the	  reintroduction	   of	   property	   tax	   and	   the	   reform	   of	   protected	   professions	   (such	   as	  lawyers,	   notaries,	   taxi	   drivers	   etc.).	   Public	   employment	   has	   already	  been	   targeted	  by	  the	   summer	   package,	   which	   drastically	   cut	   back	   spending	   on	   staff	   in	   local	  administrations.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   larger	   corporations	   have	   been	   spared	   of	   tax	  increases.	   Strikes	   and	   demonstrations	   have	   duly	   followed,	   but	   the	   government’s	  approval	   ratings	   have	   remained	   high	   so	   far,	   its	   parliamentary	   support	   is	   stable	   and	  negotiations	   are	   still	   going	   on	   with	   unions.	   These	   measures	   have	   been	   passed	   in	  Parliament,	   but	   their	   implementation	  will	   take	   longer.	   It	   remains	   to	  be	   seen	  whether	  pressure	  from	  financial	  markets	  can	  sustain	  societal	  support	  for	  this	  range	  of	  overdue	  reforms	  and	  consolidation	  measures	   long	  enough	  for	   them	  to	  take	  root	  and	  eliminate	  some	  of	  Italy’s	  most	  stubborn	  problems	  for	  the	  longer	  term145.	  	  In	   Belgium,	   similar	   pressure	   was	   applied	   on	   political	   actors	   by	   the	   menace	   that	   the	  country’s	   sovereign	   bonds	   would	   be	   downgraded	   due	   to	   the	   extended	   delay	   in	  government	  formation.	  Although	  Belgium	  has	  been	  amongst	  the	  lucky	  countries	  whose	  bonds	  continued	  to	  sell	  at	  moderate	  risk	  premiums,	  a	  rating	  change	  could	  have	  easily	  triggered	  deterioration	  in	  the	  market	  sentiment,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  markets’	  anxiety	  about	   developments	   in	   Greece	   and	   Portugal.	   Higher	   interest	   costs	   on	   the	   large	  outstanding	   debt	   stock	   would	   have	   been	   a	   very	   dangerous	   development.	   Therefore,	  after	   more	   than	   a	   year	   of	   fierce	   debate	   over	   transforming	   the	   relations	   between	  Flanders	   and	   Wallonia,	   some	   Flemish	   parties	   decided	   to	   give	   up	   on	   a	   definitive	  settlement	   of	   these	   issues	   and	   thereby	   made	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   new	   government	  possible.	   As	   so	   many	   times	   in	   the	   past,	   Belgian	   political	   actors	   agreed	   to	   put	   their	  disagreements	  temporarily	  on	  hold	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  dealing	  with	  international	  pressures.	  Although	  compromise	  was	  achieved	  in	  the	  question	  of	  another	  round	  of	  state	  reform	  –	  the	   permanent	   sore	   point	   of	   the	   Brussels-­‐Halle-­‐Vilvoorde	   electoral	   district	  was	   once	  again	  addressed,	  and	  the	  transition	  of	  some	  regional	  responsibilities	  was	  agreed	  on	  –	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  “Monti	  takes	  axe	  to	  Mussolini-­‐era	  guilds	  to	  bolster	  Italian	  economic	  growth”,	  Bloomberg	  Jan.	  20,	  2012;	  “Monti’s	   budget	   plan	   gets	   final	   approval	   in	   Italy	   Parliament”,	   Bloomberg	   Dec.	   22,	   2011;	   “Italy’s	   main	  political	  parties	  hold	  fire	  on	  Monti’s	  emergency	  budget	  plan”,	  Bloomberg	  Dec.	  6,	  2011;	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the	  breakthrough	  in	   interregional	  redistribution	  that	  the	   largest	  Flemish	  parties	  were	  campaigning	  on	  was	  definitely	  not	  achieved.	  	  	  The	   current	   Di	   Rupo	   cabinet	   –	   led	   by	  Walloon	   Socialists	   –	   quite	   clearly	   represents	   a	  temporary	   solution	   meant	   to	   address	   the	   present	   situation,	   rather	   than	   a	   lasting	  settlement.	   The	   compromise	   reached	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   making	   government	   formation	  possible	   fails	   to	   reflect	   the	   policy	   preferences	   and	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	  different	   societal	   groups	   within	   the	   polity.	   It	   certainly	   ignores	   the	   strong	   societal	  support	  among	  the	  Flemish	  –	  who	  have	  numerical	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  ascendancy	  over	  the	   Walloon	   –	   for	   definitively	   transforming	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   relations.	   Coalitional	  negotiations	   could	   be	   concluded	   only	   by	   excluding	   the	   currently	   largest	   party,	   the	  separatist	   New	   Flemish	   Alliance	   from	   government.	   Thus	   the	   ballot	   of	   third	   of	   the	  Flemish	   voters	   was	   disregarded.	   Furthermore,	   by	   compromising	   on	   their	   original	  demands,	   the	   other	   Flemish	   parties	   that	   do	   participate	   in	   the	   current	   government	  reneged	  on	  some	  important	  campaign	  promises.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  Walloon	  party	  leads	  the	  government	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   several	   decades	   is	   also	   indicative	   of	   the	   exceptional	  nature	  of	  this	  settlement.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  an	  open	  question	  how	  long	  the	  regional	  issues	  will	  be	  kept	  on	  ice	  this	  time,	  but	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  the	  government	  formation	  crisis	  of	  2010-­‐2011	  was	  not	  the	  last	  episode	  of	  interregional	  feud	  in	  Belgium146.	  	  	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  austerity	  measures	  agreed	  by	  the	  new	  government	  follow	  the	  old	  recipe	   of	   concentrating	   largely	   on	   non-­‐contentious	   items.	   Military	   and	   other	   federal	  public	  investment	  as	  well	  as	  international	  aid	  has	  been	  cut,	  and	  taxes	  on	  company	  cars,	  investment	  products	  and	  tobacco	  have	  been	  raised.	  The	  balance	  of	   the	  social	  security	  sector	  is	  not	  about	  to	  be	  addressed	  –	  in	  fact	  the	  new	  prime	  minister	  explicitly	  rejected	  the	   raising	   of	   the	   retirement	   age	   –	   except	   for	   minor	   adjustments,	   like	   the	   recent	  measures	  to	  discourage	  people	  from	  early	  retirement147.	  Major	  reforms	  in	  this	  field	  are	  especially	  unlikely	  as	  long	  as	  the	  government	  is	  headed	  by	  Walloon	  Socialists.	  In	  sum,	  the	  policy	  problem	  that	  has	  been	  at	  the	  root	  of	  Belgium’s	  fiscal	  woes	  of	  the	  past	  decades	  is	  currently	  unlikely	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  	  Very	   much	   like	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	   two	   countries	   are	   currently	   responding	   to	  pressing	  fiscal	  demands	  quite	  differently.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  fiscal	  issues	  are	  being	  addressed	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  Gets	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  Coalition	  Government	  After	  Record	  18-­‐Month	  Standoff”,	  Bloomberg	  Dec.	  5,	  2011;	  “Belgium’s	  Di	  Rupo	  Starts	  Six-­‐Party	  Talks	  to	  Form	  Government”,	  Bloomberg	  Oct.	  15,	  2011;	  “Belgium	  Moves	  Toward	  Forming	  Full-­‐Time	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  After	  488-­‐Day	  Deadlock”,	  Bloomberg	  Oct.	  14,	  2011;	  147	  “Economic	  malaise	  forces	  Belgium	  to	  extend	  austerity”,	  Reuters,	  March	  11,	  2012;	  “Belgium	  PM:	  Won't	  Raise	  Legal	  Retirement	  Age”,	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  Journal,	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in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  competitiveness	  and	  the	  consolidation	  measures	  rest	  on	  the	  support	   of	   a	   societal	   coalition	   that	   is	   trading	   compromises	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   systemic	  changes	   in	   the	  economic	   regime.	   In	   the	  early	  1990s,	   the	  abolition	  of	   the	   scala	  mobile	  and	   the	   relaxation	   of	   some	   labour	   market	   rigidities	   accompanied	   major	   reforms	   to	  public	  administration	  and	  privatization.	  Now,	  austerity	  measures	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  new	   efforts	   to	   make	   labour	   markets	   more	   flexible,	   the	   liberalization	   of	   protected	  professions	  and	  regulated	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  retrench	  the	  welfare	  system	  and	   to	  make	   local	   administrations	   leaner.	   In	   Belgium,	   the	   fiscal	   problems	   have	   been	  isolated	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy’s	  performance	  for	  so	  long	  now,	  that	  dealing	  with	  the	  persistent	  structural	  fiscal	  imbalances	  (emanating	  from	  the	  social	  security	  system)	  cannot	   be	   made	   easier	   by	   appealing	   to	   the	   general	   economic	   interests	   of	   different	  societal	   groups.	   Instead,	   the	   government	  manages	   headline	   deficit	   figures	   by	   cutting	  discretionary	  expenditure.	  	  	  
Policy	  implications	  2:	  The	  European	  fiscal	  architecture	  
	  Finally,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  policy	  debate,	  the	  main	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  cautioning	  note	  against	   the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	   institutional	   fixes	   to	  policy	  problems,	   especially	   of	   externally	   imposed	   rules.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   crisis,	   the	  European	  Commission	  has	  attempted	  to	  put	   together	  a	  better	   fiscal	  architecture.	  This	  has	  two	  main	  elements.	  One	  is	  a	  set	  of	  more	  strongly	  binding	  rules	  about	  deficits	  and	  debt	  reduction,	  a	  so-­‐called	  “Fiscal	  Compact”	  signed	  in	  March	  2012	  by	  twenty-­‐five	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  The	  other	  is	  a	  new	  procedure	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  European	  Semester	  –	  that	  was	   put	   into	   practice	   last	   year	   for	   closer	   coordination	   between	   EU	   authorities	   and	  national	   governments	   and	   parliaments	   in	   fiscal	   decision-­‐making.	   It	   is	   supposed	   to	  enhance	  longer-­‐term	  fiscal	  planning	  in	  the	  domestic	  policy	  making	  sphere,	  ensure	  the	  consistence	   of	   yearly	   budgets	   with	   the	   longer-­‐term	   commitments	   and	   give	   more	  oversight	  to	  EU	  authorities	  over	  domestic	  budgetary	  decision-­‐making	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  the	   process.	   These	   measures	   have	   questionable	   utility	   in	   light	   of	   the	   lessons	   of	   this	  thesis.	  	  	  At	   the	   time	   when	   the	   Maastricht	   deficit	   and	   debt	   criteria	   were	   laid	   down	   and	   later	  when	   the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  was	  designed	  and	   then	  redesigned	  several	   times,	  the	   regime	   of	   rules,	   targets,	   procedures	   and	   surveillance	   received	   a	   lot	   of	   scholarly	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attention	  and	  almost	  as	  much	  criticism148.	  A	  large	  share	  of	  the	  criticism	  was	  directed	  at	  the	  potentially	  perverse	  effects	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  government	  behaviour.	  Authors	  claimed	  that	  governments	  would	  engage	  in	  creative	  accounting,	  will	  be	  too	  focused	  on	  the	  short	  run	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  longer	  term	  sustainability	  and	  so	  on.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  society-­‐centred	  approach,	  the	  real	  danger	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	   lay	   in	   their	  unpredictable	  effect	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power	   in	  the	  struggle	  over	  fiscal	  policies	  in	  the	  domestic	  political	  contexts.	  While	  the	  Italian	  case	  suggested	   that	   the	   Maastricht	   rules	   had	   little	   independent	   effect	   in	   themselves,	   the	  Belgian	  case	  study	  clearly	  demonstrated	   the	  potential	   for	  externally	   imposed	  rules	   to	  have	   counterproductive	   effects	   for	   the	   resolution	   of	   structural	   problems	   and	   to	  fundamentally	  intervene	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  conflicts	  of	  a	  country.	  	  	  From	   a	   society-­‐centred	   perspective,	   the	   new	   European	   rules	   and	   procedures	   do	   not	  improve	   on	   the	   old	   system.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   reforms	   to	   domestic	   economic	  governance	   under	   the	   European	   Semester	   are	   still	   fixated	   on	   fiscal	   institutions	   and	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  narrowly	  understood	  governmental	  and	  parliamentary	  sphere.	  The	   thesis	   has	   shown	   the	   crucial	   influence	   of	   non-­‐parliamentary	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   actors	   –	   such	   as	   trade	   unions,	   employers’	   organizations	   and	   other	  interest	   representing	  associations	  –	  on	   fiscal	  outcomes.	   Since	   the	  European	  Semester	  leaves	   out	   of	   consideration	   a	   host	   of	   actors	   that	   have	   leverage	   on	   fiscal	   outcomes,	   it	  renders	  domestic-­‐EU	  coordination	  on	   fiscal	  policy	   largely	  meaningless,	  because	  plans	  agreed	   between	   the	   European	   level	   and	   domestic	   governments	   might	   still	   face	  insurmountable	  difficulties	  in	  the	  implementation	  phase.	  	  	  The	  system	  of	  binding	  rules	  and	  tangible	  penalties	  of	  the	  “Fiscal	  Compact”,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  might	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   interfere	  with	   the	   domestic	   societal	   struggles	   that	  determine	   the	   longer-­‐term	  ability	   of	   a	   country	   to	  deal	  with	   its	   fiscal	   imbalances.	  The	  thesis	  has	  shown	  that	   such	  external	   constraints	   interact	  with	   the	  domestic	  context	   in	  complex	   and	   unpredictable	   ways	   and	   –	   as	   the	   Belgian	   case	   study	   demonstrated	   –	  sometimes	   might	   even	   delay	   the	   resolution	   of	   persistent	   structural	   problems.	  Therefore,	  at	  a	   time	  when	   the	  European	  Commission	   is	   thinking	  of	  adopting	  a	  better,	  stronger	   system	   of	   European	   rules	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   daunting	   fiscal	   problems	   of	   the	  member	  states,	  they	  should	  not	  neglect	  the	  possible	  socio-­‐political	  side	  effects.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	   See	   for	   example:	   Beetsma	   and	   Uhlig	   (1999),	   Easterly	   (1999),	   Buiter	   and	   Grafe	   (2002),	   Coeure	   and	  Pisany-­‐Ferry	  (2005).	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  Fischer	  et	  al	  (2006).	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